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Summary 
 
Islaam as a world religion is most often associated with terrorism and numerous 
bombings and conflicts around the globe.  
 
While, Islaam does not encourage these actions there exists movements within the 
Muslim community which use violence as a means of political expression similar to 
the early extremist Khawaarij sect who abused the concept of takfeer.  
 
Many modern day ideologues seem to adopt the main tenets of the Khawaarij creed 
and as a result exhort and carrying out actions of violence under the guise of Islaam.  
 
In addition, Western media, secularists, and United States policy also appears to have 
a direct role in fostering the growth of these movements. Therefore, there is a need for 
further study into the ideological roots of these groups, their actions, and how 
societies can look for solutions to combat their ideals before they evolve into terrorist 
actions.   
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Transliteration Chart from the book UThe Exorcist Tradition in Islaam U (Philips1997:iv) 
 
Note: The reader may at times find some inconsistency in the transliteration system 
and this is due to the researcher's reliance at times on previously translated material, 
and when making direct quotations the language was quoted as it was in the original 
text. 
 
  
THE KHAWAARIJ AND THE CREED OF TAKFEER: 
DECLARING A MUSLIM TO BE AN APOSTATE AND ITS 
EFFECTS UPON MODERN DAY ISLAAMIC MOVEMENTS  
 
By Craig Green 
 
Introduction 
 
    In contemporary times Islaam in the minds of some has become synonymous with 
terrorism and terrorist acts like the heinous bombing of the World Trade Center (9/11), 
the USS Cole in Yemen, the Bali bombing in Indonesia, and the recent bombings in 
Saudi Arabia. Many of these terrorist acts have been perpetrated in the name of 
Islaam, and Muslims and non-Muslims both find themselves victimized.0F1 Many of the 
present day ideologies often attributed to these acts have a link with early Islaamic 
sectarianism. This research asserts that the fundamental creed of the original 
Khawaarij is present in many of the modern day Islaamic groups and sects, and forms 
the ideological root of many contemporary terrorist organizations.1F2 In addition, this 
research claims that the radicalization of these groups is in part a reaction to secularist 
thought, and U. S. government policy toward Muslim states.  
   
     This research analyzes the creed of the first sect in Islaam, the Khawaarij, and its 
influence on contemporary Islaamic movements and thinkers, and contrasts it with the 
orthodox Islaamic creed. 2 F3 In addition, it attempts to show how the media, U.S. policy 
makers, and many contemporary writers misconstrue core Islaamic beliefs and 
misconceive public opinion about Islaam, thus further alienating Muslims and 
contributing to the radicalization of many contemporary Islaamic movements.  
 
    There are many misconceptions about Islaam that stem from the creed of the 
original Khawaarij, the modern day groups that follow their creed, and the media 
                                                 
1 America has unilaterally attacked and devastated two Muslim nations: Afghanistan and Iraq and as a 
result of these two wars non-Muslim countries feel increasingly vulnerable to acts of terrorism. 
2 As the research will show, terrorism is alien to the orthodox Islaamic creed. 
3 The term orthodox as referred to throughout this research is a reference to the creed and practices of 
the Prophet as understood by his companions and it is frequently used in this research to denote 
contemporary Salafee ideology which will be discussed in further detail in chapters two and three. 
  
(Oliver 2005:1). These misconceptions entail investigation in order to determine if 
there is indeed a link between terrorism and radical ideologues.  
 
 Research Objectives    
 
     The problem being investigated arose from the need to explain contemporary 
trends in Islaamic extremist activities and violent terrorist acts world wide. The aim of 
this study is to investigate what effect, if any, these popular Muslim ideologues, 
which often are associated with radicalism, have upon violent extremist thought and 
to what extent their ideologies share common characteristics with the original 
Khawaarij. In addition, this study looks at the role secular ideology, United States 
foreign policy, and Western media contribute to the rise in contemporary extremist 
thought and violence. 
 
     In order to determine the extent in which Khawaarij thought, secularism, and US 
foreign policy effect contemporary Islaamic thinkers and increase their propensity to 
encourage violence, analysis will be given to their texts and speeches to highlight 
statements and ideologies contrary to orthodox Islaam.  
 
Significance of the Research Problem 
  
     This study can assist in filling a gap in contemporary English literature 
contributing to a much clearer understanding of the causes of modern day Islaamic 
extremism.  This topic was chosen for two reasons primarily. Firstly, it is viewed in 
Islaam as an obligation to clarify the orthodox creed to distinguish it from 
sectarianism, and to provide scholarly refutation of deviant ideologies. Secondly, this 
study tries to offer the theoretical tools to pinpoint the cause and refine the debate 
around Islaamic extremism, so that the world may have warning signals before 
extremist action in the name of Islaam is perpetrated, and this knowledge is a first step 
towards prevention. The current study is important because it: 
  (a) Offers insight into some of the causes of extremist Islaamic ideology,   
  (b) Serves as a tool to understand, identify, and assist in curbing trends in violent     
       extremism, and 
  (c) Contributes to the literature base that attempts to explain the causes of    
  
       radical ideologies to assist policy makers, governments, and the general Muslim  
       population to come up with viable solutions. 
  
Research Theory 
  
     The underlying assumption in this study is that contemporary Takfeeree 
movements share a common set of traits with the original Khawaarij creed and in turn 
contribute to extremist behavior and violence. In other words, ideology and creed 
have a causal effect upon violent extremist activities and actions. In addition, many 
"contemporary acts of violence are often justified by the historical precedent of 
religion's violent past. Yet the forces that combine to produce religious violence are 
particular to each moment of history" (Juergensmeyer 2003:6). Creed combined with 
historical, social and political changes all contribute to extremist, reactionary behavior 
leading to violence, primarily because many perpetrators of terror often react to a 
perceived threat or violation of their particular group or community, and attempt to 
rectify their situation by both preemptive and reactionary measures. Juergensmeyer 
concludes that many religious extremists see the world in absolute terms and the 
social tensions and political shifts combined with the need to restore lost prestige give 
these groups a sense of urgency in trying to find solutions (Juergensmeyer 2003:248).       
  
Methodology 
 
          This study is exploratory in nature and comprises both classical and 
contemporary text analysis for theory and historical background, and it makes use of 
the books of contemporary scholars to highlight the misconceptions around takfeer, 
the Khawaarij, terrorism, and Islaam. This research relies heavily upon document 
analysis by surveying a variety of literary sources, both primary and secondary, such 
as published books, unpublished conference papers, internet sources like periodicals, 
articles, and statements and lectures of contemporary Islaamic thinkers.  
    
     Additionally, this study involves a comprehensive literature review by surveying 
contemporary Arabic and English literature as well as classical Islaamic texts which 
will be used in a historic development approach in order to trace the origin of the 
ideology of takfeer. 
  
      Most classical texts offer either a historical analysis of the Khawaarij sect while 
detailing their creed, or a general synopsis of a particular group which holds similar 
beliefs. However, there is very little literature that makes the connection between 
contemporary groups and their historical counterparts in the context of current events. 
There are a few texts that attempt to bridge this gap in Arabic, which completely 
elude the English reader therefore remaining outside of Western discourse. This study 
brings together various studies and disciplines redefining the problem in a 
contemporary setting. 
 
    Most of the texts which attempt to investigate the relationship between the 
Khawaarij and contemporary thought are in Arabic. One particularly useful work was 
taken from a lecture by 'Ubaykaan (2004), and transcribed into a small booklet. In this 
work he speaks about the origins of the Khawaarij with brief reference to classical 
Islaamic texts as well as the rulings pertaining to this sect. He then gives the reasons 
for the reappearance of this sect and makes a very brief reference to the contemporary 
Khawaarij's core belief. Unfortunately, this work is in Arabic, so it remains 
inaccessible to non-Arabic readers. 
 
     One of the most useful texts regarding contemporary Khawaarij and their 
relationship to the original sect was written by Qurayshee (1992). His book offers one 
of the most complete links between one of the most famous contemporary groups; 
Jamaa’a al-Takfeer wa al-Hijra, and the original sect. Although this work is 
monumental, and surveys many important issues related to the issue of takfeer, it still 
leaves the reader with a gap in the link between the original Khawaarij and modern 
day activists, groups, and events. Qurayshee’s research was not meant as a complete 
survey of the contemporary groups and thinkers, but instead an exploration of the 
creed of takfeer itself. 
      
     After the 9/11 terrorist attack there has been a rise in the amount of English 
literature produced in the West to describe the events of 9/11. In addition, there is an 
increasing body of literature which links the Khawaarij and some contemporary 
Islaamic thinkers. A particularly insightful text used in this research is that of Delong-
Bas (2004) which compared the thought of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab with 
contemporary expressions of extremism. Her analysis was particularly perceptive as it 
  
challenged many previously held assumptions made about Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and 
his movement by a thorough investigation into his creed and thought.  
 
     Finally, the method of historical analysis is used in this study to provide 
background and insight into the theology of the original Khawaarij sect and its 
evolvement into the political thought of contemporary thinkers.  
 
Limitations and Scope 
 
     Primarily the ideologues surveyed in this research are from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
and Egypt or have received Islaamic educational training and generally adhere to the 
ideological creed espoused in the region. All of the ideologues examined in this study 
are in some way associated with contemporary radical ideals and share fairly common 
theories regarding jihaad and takfeer. This dissertation sets out to study a particular 
set of characteristics from the original Khawaarij sect and compare these 
characteristics with the ideologues discussed in this study. This dissertation does not 
attempt to address, and provide resolutions to the problem, nor does it look into the 
various socio-economic conditions that may provide the background conditions which 
lead to marginalization, thus creating an ideal situation for the recruitment and 
dissemination of extremist thought.  
 
    Another limitation of this study is that it focuses primarily on the views of 
contemporary Salafee scholars in Saudi Arabia and Yemen as they claim to adhere to 
the orthodox creed and view Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab as a revivalist, not 
extremist, and espouse many of his views which are considered controversial. In 
addition, in recent times Salafee clerics, particularly from Saudi Arabia, have come 
under scrutiny and many accuse them of being advocates of takfeer, terrorist ideology, 
and feeble and often compromised scholarship, so this dissertation highlights the 
views of those scholars regarding matters of creed, takfeer and extremism. 
 
 
 
 
  
Contents of Study  
 
   This study is comprised of five chapters, beginning in chapter one with an 
introduction to the Khawaarij, and the creed of takfeer. This chapter defines the 
Khawaarij, and entails a brief historical analysis of the sect citing both Prophetic 
traditions, and statements of classical Islaamic scholars. The chapter ends by outlining 
the fundamentals of their creed. Chapter two contrasts the Islaamic creed regarding 
takfeer with the foundations of the Khawaarij belief. This chapter gives the reader the 
tools to distinguish the Salafee creed from that of the Khawaarij's. Chapter three 
introduces contemporary groups and thinkers, detailing their relationship with the 
Khawaarij creed, and contrasts their beliefs with the orthodox Islaamic one. This 
analysis of the contemporary groups uncovers the main misconceptions about Islaam. 
Finally, chapter four expounds upon the misconceptions about Islaam by 
contemporary writers and the Media with a clarification of their doubts and confusion. 
Chapter five concludes the research with an analysis of the researcher’s findings.    
 
Definition of Academic Terms  
 
The Khawaarij: This is a general term the author of this study uses to describe the 
original and contemporary Muslim sects, that declared apostasy of other Muslims due 
to major sins they are supposed to have committed. This term also signifies the 
foundation of the creed of takfeer and its misuse. 
  
Takfeer: This term denotes the declaration of apostasy of a Muslim, or group of 
Muslims, or society as a whole. Throughout the study, the creed of takfeer is explored, 
detailed, and its conditions are laid out in order to give an accurate meaning of the 
term and its usage. 
  
 The Companions: The term is used to refer to those closest to the Prophet 
Muhammad specifically. The term has a more general usage as well, and that is to 
describe all of those who met the Prophet Muhammad, and died as Muslims. In this 
study the more specific meaning is referred to as it references the first generation of 
Muslim scholars: those who knew the Prophet and were close to him during his 
  
judgments, arbitrations, and when he received revelation, so they were able to 
understand the context and get the meaning directly from the Prophet.      
 
Orthodox Scholars: Throughout the study, this term is used to describe those who 
hold the orthodox belief, meaning they take their creed from the Qur’aan and the 
authenticated traditions, actions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, and the 
practice and understanding of his companions.  
 
Classical Scholars: This is a general reference used in the study to describe the 
companions, their students, and those who came after them for the first twelve 
hundred years of Islaam. This term distinguishes early orthodox scholars from their 
more contemporary counterparts.     
  
Salafee Scholars: This term is used to describe a particular group of scholars who 
claim to adhere to orthodox traditional scholarship which is derived from the Qur'aan, 
authenticate hadeeth traditions, and the creed and jurisprudence of the companions of 
the Prophet. This research tends to focus primarily on contemporary Salafee scholars 
from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. 
 
Sunna: This term is used frequently throughout this study and it is "adherence to 
what the Prophet … was upon, and his rightly guided caliphate, in belief, actions, and 
sayings…" (cited in al-Suhaymee 2005:27). This was a statement of Ibn Rajab, a 
classical scholar who lived in the fourteenth century. His statement provides one of 
the most useful definitions applicable to this study. 
 
Takfeeree: This term refers to Muslims who declare others to be apostates without 
adhering to established orthodox principles. 
 
Jihaadee: This term is used to describe those who call to jihaad or participate in 
fighting under the guise of jihaad without adhering to orthodox principles and 
classical interpretations of jihaad. 
 
 
  
Chapter One 
The Khawaarij the First Sect in Islaam 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
     The Khawaarij was the first sect in Islaam according to most scholars, both 
classical and contemporary. Their history, creed, and characteristics are of great 
importance if one is to know and understand the Islaamic position regarding them. In 
this chapter they will be defined and introduced as the main subject of analysis, with a 
particular focus upon certain aspects of their creed, and its foundations.  
 
1.2 Definition of the Khawaarij 
 
     According to al-‘Aqal, the Khawaarij can be defined as "those who declare 
Muslims to be disbelievers for their sins and rebel against the leaders of the Muslims 
dividing their unity" (1998:21). This also includes those who hold some of these ideas, 
as well as follow their way of thinking, or actions. This is one of the more 
comprehensive definitions of the Khawaarij; however the sectarian scholars disagree 
between themselves on a precise definition. ‘Awaajee a contemporary scholar of 
Islaamic sectarianism divides the various definitions into three. The first view being 
that the term Khawaarij refers to any Muslim group that rebel against the rightful 
Muslim leader. The second view refers to those individuals who rebelled against the 
caliphate of ‘Alee Ibn Abee Taalib or hold a similar opinion to them. The third 
definition of the Khawaarij ‘Awaajee cites refers to those who rebelled against the 
Muslim leader after the time of ‘Alee (2002:23). For the purpose of this research the 
definition of al-‘Aqal was chosen as it is the most inclusive and accepted view from 
contemporary scholars.   
 
    The Khawaarij are associated by many names and sects which reveal some of their 
history and origins. Many of the names make reference to their various splits, and the 
particular creed of a sectarian leader. Some of the names they are associated with are 
the Khawaarij, the Muhakkima, the Mukaafira, the Azaariqa, the Ibaadeeya, and the 
  
Saba`eeya.4
     The Khawaarij also earned the term Mukaafira meaning the ones who declare 
others to be apostates. This is because they declared other Muslims to be apostates for 
major sins they committed, and they declared those who differed with them to be 
 One reason for the sectarianism amongst the Khawaarij is that the leaders 
amongst them often quarreled over points regarding their creed, and thus split and 
declared takfeer of one another (‘Awaajee 2002:25). 
 
1.2.1 The Khawaarij 
 
    The name Khawaarij is derived from the Arabic word kharaja, which means to 
leave, or exit. This association refers to the sect splitting from the main body of 
Muslims, and rebelling with the sword against the Muslim rulers. This is a general 
name which encompasses those Muslims who rebel, or incite rebellion against the 
Muslim leader, and declare other Muslims to be apostates for committing major sins 
(al-Shahrastaanee 1984:107).  
 
1.2.2 The Muhakkima 
 
    The Khawaarij were also known as the Muhakkima. The word Muhakkima 
originates from the Arabic word hakama which means to judge, or rule. The 
Muhakkima refers to their rebelling against the judgment and rulership of ‘Alee the 
Prophet Muhammad's cousin. The Muhakkima claimed that ‘Alee did not rule justly 
by the Qur’aan in a judgment, but instead he deferred his arbitration to knowledgeable 
men in a dispute he had with Mu'aawiya, another companion; for this reason the 
Khawaarij declared ‘Alee a disbeliever. The Muhakkima also believed that it was 
permissible to choose someone to be their religious leader, as long as he ruled by their 
ideas of justice and equity. However, anyone who opposed him would be disposed of, 
and at the same time if they thought the leader was oppressive, corrupt, or deviant, 
they considered it obligatory to fight or kill him (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:108).  
 
1.2.3 The Mukaafira 
 
                                                 
4 All classical scholars mention Saba’eeya as the beginning of the Shee’a sect. Al-'Aqal, a 
contemporary scholar, mentioned them as a sect of the Khawaarij as they rebelled against ‘Uthmaan 
and declared takfeer upon some of the companions of the Prophet. The Saba’eeya was included to 
show that many of the sects contain overlapping traits, and often a group or individual may not be 
easily classified into one sect or another.  
  
disbelievers as well (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:116). This characteristic is inherent to 
both the original sect and modern groups and it forms an integral part of their belief.   
 
1.2.4 The Azaariqa 
 
     The Azaariqa were the followers of Aboo Raashid Nafee Ibn al-Azaaraq. This was 
one of the famous leaders amongst the Khawaarij who held that ‘Alee the Prophet 
Muhammad's cousin was a disbeliever, and he praised his killer. Furthermore, he held 
‘Uthmaan, Talha, Zubayr, Ibn ‘Abbaas,5
     The Ibaadeeya are named after ‘Abd Allah Ibn Ibaad one of the leaders of the 
Khawaarij during the caliphate of ‘Abd al-Maalik Ibn Marwaan, who died during the 
86th year of the Hijra calendar. The Ibaadeeya are a sect that originated from the 
Khawaarij, and their beliefs are essentially the same, except the Ibaadeeya when 
fighting Muslims did not regard them as disbelievers and therefore judged their 
 and ‘Aa’isha one of the wives of the Prophet, 
and all those who were with them, to be disbelievers (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:115). All 
of these people were companions of the Prophet and beloved to him during his 
lifetime. Aboo Raashid held that whoever stayed behind in battle was also an apostate, 
and that it was permissible to kill the women and children of their opponents. In 
addition, he abolished the punishment of stoning to death as it is not a punishment 
prescribed in the Qur’aan, although it is well known from the traditions narrated on 
the Prophet. One of the most unorthodox beliefs he held was that Allah's Prophets 
may fall into disbelief or that they could have been disbelievers before becoming 
prophets (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:102).  
    
     Finally, the Azaariqa like their counterparts declared major sinners to be 
disbelievers, and they supported their claim by saying the devil committed a major sin 
by not prostrating to Aadam (as he was commanded by Allah) and at the same time he 
acknowledged the oneness of God. In other words, the devil out of sheer arrogance 
disobeyed Allah, thus committing a major sin, which in turn nullified his belief in 
Allah's oneness (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:103). 
 
1.2.5 The Ibaadeeya 
 
                                                 
5 These were some of the most well known and favored companions of the Prophet Muhammad. 
  
Muslim foes as rebels instead of disbelievers. However, al-Shahrastaanee quoted their 
leader ‘Abd Allah Ibn Ibaad as saying, "Those who worship in the direction of the 
qiblah (Holy Mosque in Makka) but oppose us are disbelievers, not polytheists" 
(1984:114). So, on one hand the Ibaadeeya treated their Muslim foes as rebels, but on 
the other hand it has been attributed to their leader that he regarded them as apostates: 
he applied Islaamic judgments and rulings applicable to Jews and Christians to his 
Muslim foes during warfare. The Ibaadeeya believed major sinners are Muslim, but 
not true believers, and according to their paradigm the world was divided into two 
categories Daar al-Islaam (Muslim rule lands in accordance with Islaamic law) and 
Daar al-Kufr (lands ruled by un-Islaamic laws). There will be a more detailed 
discussion of this in the section on Daar al-Islaam. The Ibaadeeya considered the 
rulers, their administration, and soldiers of the Muslim land that disagreed with them 
as disbelieving rebels, and treated them as such if they conquered them.      
 
1.2.6 The Saba’eeya 
 
     Another name of importance referring to the Khawaarij is Saba’eeya. The origin 
of this name is derived from the leader Ibn Saba who was of Jewish origin and 
claimed to embrace Islaam, but in reality did so only to cause division and rancor 
between the Muslims.6 Th
     The Khawaarij as a sect first appeared during the time of great discord and trials 
for the Muslims. After the assassination and martyrdom of ‘Uthmaan Ibn ‘Affaan, the 
third of what is known as the "rightly guided caliphate" by orthodox Muslims, ‘Alee 
the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad became the caliph. From the very beginning 
there were those who cast suspicion upon his ascendancy to rulership. Rumors were 
spread by some people that he had been a part of the plot to assassinate ‘Uthmaan, 
aheer said concerning Ibn Saba that “he was a Jew, a 
hypocrite that exhibited Islaam outwardly, and we already mentioned the evidence for 
that from al-Kashee and al-Nubakhtee and other than them” (2005:22). So Ibn Saba 
was known for treachery and he is considered as the originator of the Shee’a sect, but 
due to his rebellion against the caliph some have classified him as Khawaarij.  
 
1.3 Brief History of the Origins of the Khawaarij 
 
                                                 
6 This is agreed upon by all orthodox Sunni sources. 
  
and there was widespread rebellion throughout the Muslim world. Several of the 
companions of the Prophet Muhammad wanted ‘Alee to take revenge for the killing 
of ‘Uthmaan immediately after his ascendancy, however he felt it was first necessary 
to establish stability before pursuing the killers of ‘Uthmaan. Ibn Saba and the killers 
of ‘Uthmaan began to sow discord between the ranks of the Muslims and the various 
factions, which resulted in the death of about ten thousand Muslims.7
     As a result of this confusion, Mu’aawiya Ibn Abee Sufyaan another companion of 
the Prophet refused to take allegiance to ‘Alee as the killers of ‘Uthmaan were 
amongst the supporters of his caliphate, and he demanded that they be held 
accountable immediately. In 37 AH,
 The killers of 
‘Uthmaan found this discord to be to their advantage as it detracted ‘Alee from 
holding them accountable for ‘Uthmaan's assassination. 
 
8
    The Khawaarij continued to show malice toward ‘Alee until they finally split 
outright from him, settling in a place known as Haroora` where they declared the 
caliph's authority nullified and claimed that legitimacy was for Allah alone. So, the 
Khawaarij distanced themselves from what they considered tyranny and disbelief. 
The Khawaarij declared both ‘Alee and Mu’aawiya to be wrong (‘Awaajee 2002 73-
80). In their eyes, ‘Alee was wrong because he accepted a ceasefire from Mu’aawiya, 
who according to them should be killed for revolting and killing Muslims, and  
appointing arbitrators was useless and against injunctions of the Qur’aan. They 
became so excessive in their insistence upon war that they declared ‘Alee a 
disbeliever and called him to repent and reaffirm his faith in Islaam (al-Shahrastaanee 
 amidst the confusion, a bloody battle known as 
the Battle of Siffin took place resulting again in heavy casualties for the Muslims until 
a ceasefire was declared (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:106). During the cease fire ‘Alee's 
army began to divide, and a group amongst them began to praise ‘Alee excessively, 
and later became known as Shee’a. The other group began to slander and sow seeds of 
rebellion amongst the ranks and they became known as the Khawaarij (al-
Shahrastaanee 1984:109). This initial split in ‘Alee's army according to some 
historians is the beginning of the Khawaarij sect.  
 
                                                 
7 Majority of orthodox scholars consider speaking out against the leader in public as undesirable as it 
fosters hatred towards the rulers and can encourage rebellion. There will be further discussion of this 
issue in chapter three. 
8After the Hijra means after the migration to Madina from Makka thus begins the Islaamic calendar. 
  
1984:109). According to the Khawaarij he had become an apostate by using men as 
judges between the parties instead of the divine injunctions of the Qur’aan. 
  
       Finally, after being urged to come back to their senses by both ‘Alee, and Ibn 
‘Abbaas, some of the Khawaarij repented and rejoined ‘Alee. ‘Alee then launched a 
massive assault upon the remaining Khawaarij almost completely wiping them out. 
The Khawaarij leaders that escaped spread throughout the Muslim world sowing 
seeds of discord until finally they assassinated ‘Alee himself (‘Awaajee 2002:88).   
 
1.4 The Khawaarij in Hadeeth Literature 
 
    In the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad there are many references to the 
Khawaarij, describing their worship, piety, and general characteristics. Many 
narrations describe the Khawaarij and how they should be dealt with if encountered.  
In a hadeeth, a man accused the Prophet of being unjust in dividing the spoils of war. 
The Prophet replied to his companions saying, "There would arise a people from the 
progeny of this (man) who would recite the Qur'aan, but it would not go beyond their 
throats; they will pass through religion just as the arrow passes through the prey" (al-
Nawawee 1997/7:159). The Prophet also mentioned that "they are the worst of my 
nation and the best of my nation will fight them" (al-Nawawee 1997/7:161). From 
these narrations it seems that some of the characteristics of the Khawaarij are that 
they are excessive in their religious practices like prayer, and reading of the Qur’aan, 
but that these acts of worship would not affect their hearts. The Khawaarij were 
known for their pious appearance and ritualism, but these outward acts of worship 
only served to lead them further astray. Ibn al-Jawzee reported that the Prophet said, 
"The Khawaarij are the dogs of the people of the (hell) fire" (2002:96). In another 
authentic narration collected by Ibn Abee ‘Aasim the Prophet Muhammad said, 
"There will come from my nation a people who read the Qur’aan, your reading won't 
be anything compared to their reading, and your prayer to their prayer won't be 
anything, and your fasting to their fasting won't be anything. They will read the 
Qur’aan thinking it is for them, but instead it will be against them…" (1998:436). The 
Khawaarij were known for their excessive worship and their distortion of the 
meanings of the Qur’aan to support their ideology. These are just some of the 
  
narrations from the traditions of the Prophet that make reference to the Khawaarij and 
their characteristics.9
     From the time of the Prophet and his companions until present, the scholars of 
Islaam have made mention of the Khawaarij, and commented on their effects upon 
the Muslim community. Al-Aajooree a ninth century scholar states, "The scholars 
(both) classical and modern agree that the Khawaarij are an evil people, disobedient 
to Allah, the Almighty, and his Messenger-may Allah’s peace and blessings be upon 
him-even if they pray and fast, and strive hard in their worship, none of that is of any 
benefit to them" (1999/1:320). Ibn Hanbal transmitted a narration by Ka’b a 
Taabi’ee,
 
 
1.5 Statements of Classical Scholars Relating to the Khawaarij 
 
10 who said, "Whoever fights the Khawaarij will receive ten lights, which is 
more beneficial than the eight lights for other than him amongst the martyrs" 
(1996/2:638). This narration shows how the early scholars perceived the Khawaarij as 
a threat to the people of Islaam, and considered it commendable and necessary to fight 
them.11 According to report narrated by Sa’d Ibn Abee Waqqaas who said when 
mentioning the Khawaarij that "they are a people who deviated, so Allah turned their 
hearts away" (Ibn Hanbal 1996/2:638). In the same collection it was reported by Ibn 
‘Umar,12 "that he viewed fighting the Harooreeya 13
                                                 
9 It is well known to hadeeth scholars that the aforementioned hadeeths refer to the Khawaarij, Imaam 
al-Bukhaaree mentioned the above narrations under the chapter entitled 'Fighting the Khawaarij and 
Apostates after Establishing the Proofs against Them' (al-Bukhaaree 2001:1225).  
10 A Taabi'ee is someone from the second generation of Muslims who met a companion of the Prophet 
as a Muslim and died as a Muslim. 
11 This narration refers to a matter of the unseen world (lights for those who kill the Khawaarij) which 
according to the orthodox creed is only known to Allah except the things He revealed to His prophets. 
12 He was the son of ‘Umar Bin al-Khattaab the second caliph.  
13 This is another name for the Khawaarij who rebelled against ‘Alee and settled in a place called 
Haroora`. 
  
     Many of the early orthodox scholars maintained that the Khawaarij should be 
fought and killed, and they drew their conclusions from the many authentic narrations 
upon the Prophet which spoke of the evil of the Khawaarij, and the benefit of fighting 
them. The question then arises are the Khawaarij Muslim or not?  
 
 obligatory upon the Muslims" 
(1996/2:639).  Also, in Ibn Hanbal’s collection, Aboo Amama a companion of the 
Prophet, and Aboo Ghaalib a Taabi’ee, saw a leader from amongst the Khawaarij. 
Aboo Amama said, "Dogs of the fire, dogs of the fire, they are the worst of people, 
and the best of people are those who fight them." Then I [Aboo Ghaalib] replied, "O 
Aboo Amama did you hear that from the Messenger of Allah?” He said, “Yes more 
than once” (1996/2:643). The classical scholars including the companions of the 
Prophet were in concordance that the Khawaarij should be fought, their evil avoided, 
and that they would affect the Muslim nation until the end of time. 
    The companions of the Prophet, and most of the early scholars did not make takfeer 
of the Khawaarij. Instead they prayed behind them and dealt with them as Muslims. 
‘Alee Ibn Abee Taalib invited them to come back to the truth as well as Ibn ‘Abbaas 
and neither of them declared the Khawaarij to be disbelievers. ‘Alee was once asked 
after fighting the Khawaarij if they were mushrikeen.14
     As for those scholars who declared the Khawaarij to be disbelievers, their central 
argument was based upon the statement of the Prophet, that they would leave Islaam 
like the arrow moves through its target, and that the Khawaarij made lawful the 
believing women as war captives and concubines, and declared Muslim blood which 
is sacred to be lawful. Also, according to hadeeth literature the Khawaarij should be 
fought and killed so those who hold them to be apostates use this as the strongest 
evidence of their disbelief. Amongst those who held this view were al-Hasan, the son 
of ‘Alee Ibn Abee Taalib, Imaam Shaafi'ee, Imaam Maalik, and al-Qurtubee and some 
of the hadeeth scholars also declared them to be disbelievers (‘Awaajee 2002:528).
 He replied by saying they did 
not commit shirk. Then he was asked if they were hypocrites, and he said that 
hypocrites did not remember Allah often, and mention his name. Then he was asked 
further about them. He then replied, "They were a people who rebelled against us, so 
we fought them" (cited in al-Mashaabee 1997/1:306). From this narration of ‘Alee we 
understand that he did not view the Khawaarij as disbelievers, nor did he see them as 
hypocrites, but instead he saw them as Muslim rebels who should be fought.  
   
15
                                                 
14 The word mushrikeen is plural for mushrik. This refers to the one who worships other than Allah or 
someone or something with Allah, and it is a general reference to polytheism.  
15 Imaam Shaafi'ee and Imaam Maalik were two of the major jurists from amongst the four major 
schools of thought in Islaamic jurisprudence.  Al-Qurtubee (died in 671 Hijra) was a major scholar 
noted for his explanation of the Qur’aan. 
  
1.6 Characteristics and Creed of the Early Khawaarij 
 
     There are many characteristics of the Khawaarij, and as they form no unified sect 
this research will attempt to discuss some of the most important traits relevant to this 
study. 
  
1.6.1 Believing Faith to be Constant 
 
     One of the main points of disagreement between the creed of the Khawaarij and 
the orthodox creed is regarding faith. Almost all Khawaarij sects with the exception 
of the Ibaadeeya believe that faith does not fluctuate. This belief is not in accordance 
with the orthodox creed which holds that faith increases with good deeds and 
obedience to Allah's commands, and that it decreases with sin and disobedience (al-
Faasee 2003/1:8). To the Khawaarij, major sin or disobedience to Allah deletes all 
previous good deeds, and removes all traces of faith, therefore making the one who 
sins a disbeliever. In addition, they believe that there is no forgiveness for the major 
sinner. In the next sub-chapter there will be more details regarding the relationship 
between faith and takfeer. For the Khawaarij, faith and Islaam are the same in 
meaning, and either complete or nonexistent, so if one’s faith decreases with 
committing a sin, his Islaam is nullified, meaning he is no longer a Muslim. 
 
     Regarding faith the Ibaadeeya do not differ from the orthodox creed: that faith 
increases and decreases, but to them major sins are kufr ni'ma which means to be 
ungrateful for Allah’s favors or blessings. So they believe ungratefulness is hypocrisy 
and major disbelief and “those who worship Allah alone from amongst the major 
sinners and die upon their sin, will be in the hellfire forever" (al-‘Aqal 1998:81). 
Some Ibaadeeya hold beliefs similar to other Khawaarij sects, however they all 
believe that major sinners who die without repenting will be eternally in the hellfire. 
In contrast, according to the orthodox creed, only Allah can destine someone to the 
hellfire or grant them pardon for their sins (al-Faasee 2003/1:75). 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
1.6.2 Takfeer for Major Sins 
 
     The central component of the Khawaarij creed is making takfeer upon those who 
commit major sins. The Khawaarij declared major sinners and those who disagreed 
with them, to be disbelievers. Some of the major sins in Islaam are associating 
partners with Allah, suicide, magic, abandoning the prayer, committing adultery or 
fornication, oppression, and drinking alcohol or using intoxicants. In this regard, 
Muslim related that the Prophet said, "Avoid the seven deadly sins." He was asked, 
"O Messenger of Allah! What are they?" He said, "Ascribing partners to Allah, 
sorcery, taking the life which Allah has forbidden except through justice, devouring 
riba (usury), devouring an orphan's wealth, defecting from the battlefield, and 
accusing and libeling chaste and pious believing women" (al-Nawawee 1997/2:273). 
Although the Prophet mentioned seven deadly sins in this narration, there are many 
more which are mentioned in the Qur’aan and other hadeeth traditions. According to 
the practice of the Prophet and his companions, it is clear that except for shirk 16 and 
sorcery the above sins do not take one outside the fold of Islaam.17
 therein forever" (Qur’aan 1996:2:81). The Khawaarij explained that this verse refers 
to the major sinner, whose good deeds will not be accepted, and as a result he will 
spend eternity in the hell-fire. Al-Sa’awee said, "Disbelief and (shirk) associating 
partners with Allah are the only sins that nullify a person's deeds and causes him to 
 However, the 
Khawaarij made takfeer of those who were guilty of major sins. There are many 
examples in Islaamic history where the Khawaarij declared other Muslims to be 
disbelievers. For example, the killing of ‘Uthmaan the third caliph was at the hands of 
the Khawaarij, who felt he was an unjust ruler. In addition, they killed the fourth 
caliph ‘Alee due to his opposition to them, as they felt he committed a major sin by 
using men as arbitrators, and they accused him of not adhering to the Qur’aan in his 
dispute with Mu’aawiya (‘Awaajee 2002:129).  
 
     The Khawaarij used Qur’aanic verses to prove that major sinners were disbelievers. 
Allah says in the Qur’aan, "Whosoever earns evil and his sin has surrounded him (is 
immersed in his sin), they are the dwellers of the fire (i.e. hell); they will dwell 
                                                 
16 Shirk as an Islaamic term means to associate a partner in worship with Allah or worship someone or 
something besides him.  
17 There will be a more in depth analysis of the major sins, and the Islaamic view regarding the one 
who commits them in the chapter on the Islaamic creed.   
  
spend eternity in the fire" (al-Sa’awee 1996:94). Al-Baghawee reports that, "the view 
of Ibn ‘Abbaas, Att
     Another Qur’aanic verse the Khawaarij used as a proof to expel the major sinner 
from Islaam is, "Verily, Allah accepts only from those who are Al-Muttaq'un (pious) 
(1996:5:27). Al-Sa’awee states, "They say (Khawaarij) the major sinner is not one 
who is pious. So, therefore Allah the Almighty does not accept his deeds, so he is a 
disbeliever" (1996:97). The Khawaarij use inductive reasoning to apply this verse to 
the major sinners instead of the classical interpretations of the verse. The Khawaarij 
begin by concluding that the major sinner has lost all piety, therefore his deeds will 
not be accepted and he becomes a disbeliever. However, the orthodox creed holds that 
a major sinner may still have some faith even though he is in sin, and that faith 
increases with obedience to Allah's commands, and decreases with disobedience.
aa, Ad-Dahaak and Aboo ‘Aaliya and Rabee’a and the majority of 
scholars is that he dies in a state of shirk" (al-Baghawee 2002:46). This shows that 
many of the early scholars viewed that this verse applied to the one who dies upon 
shirk, and does not repent before he dies. Unlike the Khawaarij, who believed the 
major sinner was destined to the hell-fire eternally regardless of whether he 
committed shirk or not. 
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     Still another proof the Khawaarij used to support their creed is the hadeeth 
narration transmitted by Muslim, where the Prophet said, "A fornicator at the time he 
is committing adultery, is not a believer; and a thief, at the time of stealing, is not a 
believer; and a drunkard, at the time of drinking alcohol is not a believer" (al-
 
Ibn ‘Abbaas explains that this verse was in specific reference to two brothers, Cane 
and Abel. When one brother killed the other, his sin was not forgiven due to his 
insincerity in repentance (Ibn ‘Abbaas 1992:121). Many classical scholars like Ibn 
Katheer, and some of the companions like Aboo Darda`a, explained that this verse 
shows the importance of sincerity in one’s worship of Allah, and furthermore that one 
who is sincere will have his worship and repentance accepted (Ibn Katheer 1997/2:43). 
In contrast, the Khawaarij interpreted the verse to mean that those who committed a 
major sin, like killing another Muslim, are expelled from the religion, and will have a 
painful torment in the hereafter for all eternity. 
 
                                                 
18 There will be further discussion of faith in the section on the orthodox creed. 
  
Nawawee 1997/1:230). Al-Nawawee, a major scholar who died in 676 on the Hijra 
calendar, explained the hadeeth by saying:  
 
          According to the statement of Allah the Glorified and Exalted, 'Verily Allah   
          does not forgive that partners are associated with him, but he forgives other  
          than that from who he pleases.' In accordance with the consensus of the   
          people of the truth [scholars] the fornicator, the thief, and the murderer,  
          and anyone who commits major sins, except shirk, are not expelled from the  
          religion due to the sin they have committed. Rather they are believers who have  
          deficiency in faith. If they repent, their punishment is remitted, and if they  
          continue in their sin until death, then they are at the mercy of Allah. So if Allah  
          the Almighty wishes, He will pardon them, and they will enter paradise first,  
          and if He wants He will punish them, then admit them into paradise  
          (1997/1:230). 
           
 
Imaam al-Nawawee explained this narration by using a verse from the Qur’aan. It is 
apart of the methodology of the orthodox scholars to use the Islaamic texts to explain 
and interpret one another. This methodology is used to extract the correct meaning of 
a given text, its context and the legislative rulings pertinent to it. This is in direct 
contrast with how the Khawaarij and other sects interpret the texts: they begin with a 
conclusion, and use the texts to support their paradigm. Al-Nawawee’s statement also 
illustrates the orthodox Islaamic creed by showing that faith fluctuates, and his claim 
is supported by textual evidence. Still another benefit from his statement is that it 
highlights the belief that Allah is most forgiving, which contradicts the Khawaarij's 
belief that the major sinner is a disbeliever destined to eternal damnation. A third 
benefit that can be extracted from the explanation given by al-Nawawee is that the 
Muslim who enters the hellfire, but has some faith remaining in his heart will not 
remain there indefinitely. In contrast, the Khawaarij use this evidence to support their 
takfeer of the major sinners, by carefully selecting Qur’aanic verses and hadeeth to 
strengthen their position. The Khawaarij methodology is different from that of the 
orthodox scholars who derived their conclusions from the companions understanding 
of the Islaamic texts regarding belief and legislation (‘Awaajee 2002:258). 
 
1.6.3 Rebellion against Muslim Leadership 
 
     Another component that forms the foundation of the Khawaarij's belief is rebelling 
against the Muslim leadership. Scholars differ as to when the Khawaarij first rebelled 
against Muslim leadership. Some classical scholars like Ibn Hazm, and al-
  
Shahrastaanee 19 refer to the man who accused the Prophet of being unjust when 
dividing the war booty as an example of rebelling against the leader. Other scholars 
like Abee al-‘Azza and Ibn Katheer 20
     Some classical scholars classified rebellion into two types: by speech and by the 
sword; however they make distinction between rebels and the Khawaarij (al-
Barbahaaree 1997:113).
 say that it began with the killing of the third 
caliph ‘Uthmaan Bin ‘Affaan and the taking of Muslim wealth from the treasury.  Still 
some say that it began with the rebellion against ‘Alee, the fourth caliph, the splitting 
of the main body of Muslims, and disagreement between some of the companions 
(‘Awaajee 2002:37-43).  
 
21 Rebels can be defined as those who rebel for worldly 
benefits such as unequal wealth distribution, under representation, or isolation from 
the political system or process. On the contrary, the Khawaarij fought and rebelled 
due primarily to what they observed to be a religious obligation: they felt it was a 
religious duty to overthrow an unjust ruler, or one who disagrees with their 
ideology.22
                                                 
19 Ibn Hazm died in 456 on the Hijra calendar and was one of the leading jurists of his time. 
Al-Shahrastaanee, a major scholar of sectarianism in Islaam, died in 548 on the Hijra calendar. 
20 Abee al-‘Azza Ibn ‘Abd al-Salaam was a major judge and scholar during his time who died in 792 on 
the Hijra calendar. 
Isma'eel Ibn Katheer was a major scholar whose works comprised of Qur’aanic exegesis and history, 
and he died 774 on the Hijra calendar.  
21 This is probably because the one who supplicates against the leader or publicizes his faults 
encourages others to reject the ruler. 
22 The Khawaarij hold a particular set of beliefs based on takfeer which distinguishes them from rebels 
who may or may not declare the governing authority to be apostate. There is a lengthy discussion on 
the concept of khuroo j in the section' 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahmaan on rulership and Takfeer'.   
  
Scholars deduce from this command from the Prophet that it is an obligation to fight 
the Khawaarij at all times.
 Ibn Taymeeya a 13th century scholar who wrote extensively about the 
sects in Islaam, detailed the distinction between the Khawaarij and rebels, arguing 
that rebels are not fought until they rebel against Muslim leadership (khurooj), 
whereas the Khawaarij are to be fought at all times. His evidence for this was the 
Qur’aanic verse, "And if two parties (or groups) among the believers fall to fighting, 
then make peace between them both. But if one of them transgresses against the other, 
then fight you (all) against the one that which transgresses till it complies with the 
command of Allah" (1996/49:9). He used this proof to show that the rebels are to be 
fought only during rebellion. As for the Khawaarij they are to be fought at all times 
according to the following hadeeth transmitted by al-Bukhaaree in which the Prophet 
said, "… fight them wherever you meet them. For verily, whoever fights them will 
receive a reward on the Day of Judgment from Allah" (Ibn Hajar 1996/14: 268). 
23
                                                 
23 It should be noted that fighting the Khawaarij is a duty of the Muslim government or authority: it is 
not for every individual to mete out punishment or fight them, as this might produce a state of 
lawlessness. 
  
1.6.4 Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil 
 
     Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil is a religious duty according to the 
orthodox creed, and Allah says in the Qur’aan, "Let there arise out of you a group of 
people inviting to all that is good (Islam), enjoining Al-Maa'ruf (i.e. Islamic 
monotheism and all that Islam orders one to do) and forbidding Al-Munkar 
(polytheism and disbelief and all that Islam has forbidden)" (1996/3:104). The 
Khawaarij distorted these principles and applied them with strictness, and harshness 
to suit their agenda and beliefs (‘Awaajee 2002:106). According to a hadeeth 
transmitted by Muslim, the Prophet said, "Whoever amongst you sees munkar (evil) 
then he should change it with his hands, and if he is unable to do so, then with his 
tongue, and if he is unable to do so then with his heart and that is the weakest of faith" 
(al-Nawawee 1997/1:212). It can be derived from this hadeeth that enjoining the good 
and forbidding the evil is a part of faith and that it has different levels just as people 
vary in their level of faith. However, the Khawaarij according to their understanding 
tended to only use force and the sword to change what they perceived as evil. 
Similarly, they denied an important principle in Islaam which states that if there is 
greater harm by trying to change an evil action, then it is better not to enforce change 
to prevent a greater evil or harm from occurring (Sidlaan 1999:527).  
 
      In their fervor, the Khawaarij took the principles expounded in the Qur’aan and 
Sunna to support their concept of justice, and rebel. The Khawaarij considered 
rebellion as rectification of the Muslim community and leadership. In the case of 
‘Alee, the fourth caliph they asked him to repent as they felt he had sinned and 
committed apostasy by making a truce with Mu'aawiya (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:110). 
In their view they felt ‘Alee should fight Mu’aawiya. Through their religious zeal they 
felt they were justified if not obligated to fight ‘Alee under the guise of enjoining the 
good. Through careful analysis it seems that the Khawaarij were very concerned with 
justice and moral rectification. However, their enthusiasm and limited understanding 
prevented them from reaching their goal of religious purification; instead they 
contributed to more political instability and loss of life by rebelling, going against the 
very religious texts they so fervently expounded (‘Awaajee 2002:109).          
 
 
        
 
     Evidenc  suggests th t the Khawaarij are constantly in a tate of rebellion against 
the leadersh p. If the le der is chosen by the Khawaarij, or abides by their system of 
justice, then he is accepted by them and obeyed. However, if he disagrees with them 
or they feel he is unjust, then they fight and rebel against him. There are many 
examples throughout Islaamic history of the rebellion of t e Khawaarij. During the 
Umayyad’s ninety year reign and the fiv  hundred year reign of the ‘Abbaasids there 
were countless rebellions by the Khawaarij according t  orthodox scholars nd 
historians (‘Awaajee 2002:129-160). 
 
     The Khawaarij have many reasons for rebelling, but th  two most important 
reasons are widespread appe ance of sins, and religious vor (‘Awaajee 2002:49). 
The early Khawaarij rebelled b cause they ccused ‘Alee of not ruling by the Qur’aan, 
therefore in their view he chos  human arbitration over divin  law, thus they felt it 
was a religious uty to replace him and that he required atonement for his sins. The 
Kh waarij considered their rebellions as commanding the good and forbidding the 
evil. Therefore, if sin and injustice became rampant in  given society it became 
incumbent upon them to stop these sins. If the Khawaarij believed a leader was 
involved in corruption or sin they considered him an adversary, a d it became a 
religious d ty to replace that leader. “While th y saw fighting those who opposed 
them as coming closer to Allah the Almighty, they began with leaders like Imaam 
-despite his justice and greatness-then with the governm nts of the Umayyads 
and ‘Abbaasids, ll of them were oppressive in their eyes wit out crutiny or 
verification” (‘Awaajee 2002:106). Both the Khawaarij and t eir contemporary 
Takfe ree counterparts see rebellion as the means to rectify what th y p rceive as 
c rrupt leadership and this is n part due to heir religious fervor.      
 
 
 
  
1.6.5 Splitting from the Main Body of the Muslims  
 
     Along with religious extremism, the Khawaarij were also known by their splitting 
from the main body of the Muslims. Many of the contemporary Khawaarij in their 
zeal and extremism would abandon the compulsory congregational prayers, thus 
splitting from the main body of Muslims. Ibn al-Imaam states about the modern day 
Khawaarij, "They don't pray in the Muslims' Mosques because the prayer leader and 
followers are disbelievers according to their beliefs" (2003:65). According to a 
narration transmitted by Muslim the Prophet said: 
 
          Verily, the most burdensome prayers for the hypocrites are the ‘Isha and the     
          Fajr. Were they to know the rewards for these two prayers they would come to  
          them even if they had to crawl. I was about to order the prayer to start and  
          command a man to the lead the people, so I would go with some men with  
          bundles of wood to the people who have not attended the congregational prayer  
          and burn their homes with them in it (al-Nawawee 1997/5:156).  
 
Three important benefits are derived from this statement. Firstly, that it is hypocritical 
for men to avoid the congregational prayer. Secondly, that the command to pray in 
congregation is a serious one that should be heeded. Finally, those who refuse to pray 
with their fellow Muslims are guilty of the very sin they accuse others of possessing: 
hypocrisy. Excommunication is a common trait of the Takfeeree groups as will be 
illustrated in chapter three.     
 
1.6.6 Ill-treatment of Enemies 
   
  There are numerous narratives by classical scholars that recount the Khawaarij's 
treatment of the general Muslim population, and how they separated themselves from 
them. They were known to plunder, pillage goods, and take slaves and concubines 
from conquered Muslim peoples. In their eyes the people were disbelievers and their 
blood, property, and wealth became lawful for them, and this is a basis for how the 
Khawaarij viewed their Muslim foes. Al-Ash’aree said about them, "As for the sword, 
then all the Khawaarij believe in using it (against Muslims), except that the Ibaadeeya 
do not rebuke the people with the sword. But instead they view it necessary to remove 
the oppressive leaders, and prohibit them from leading by any means …" (al-Ash’aree 
1999:204). Most of the Khawaarij sects made it permissible to fight the general 
Muslim population, and removal of an oppressive leader was deemed absolutely 
  
necessary. To the Khawaarij, those Muslims who disagreed with them became 
disbelievers and their land became Daar al-Harb. Daar al-Harb refers to a non-
Muslim land where there is no truce with a Muslim land. The Khawaarij believed it 
was obligatory to fight and subdue this land, and its occupants. According to the 
Khawaarij, a Muslim land can change to a disbelieving one if major sins become 
rampant, even if it was controlled by Muslims and Islaamic law is implemented 
(‘Awaajee 2002:486). Orthodox scholars differ over an exact definition of Daar al-
Harb. However, this researcher will attempt to highlight the most inclusive definitions 
and characteristics. According to most jurists Daar Al-Islaam is the land where 
majority of the inhabitants are Muslim, and they are safe to practice their religion, 
whereas some scholars like Ibn Taymeeya, and Ibn al-Qayyim, say that it is the land 
where Muslims reside and the laws of Islaam are applied. Daar al-Kufr is the land 
where most of the laws are un-Islaamic, and the ruler presiding over the land is a 
disbeliever. Daar al-Kufr is further divided into Daar al-Harb and Daar al-Ahd or al-
Sulh. Daar al-Harb refers to the land of disbelief where there is no treaty, or 
agreement with the Muslims, and Daar al-Ahd or al-Sulh is the land of disbelief 
where there is a treaty or agreement with a Muslim state (al-Ahmadee 2003/1:233-
251). 
   
     Some of the more extreme sects of the Khawaarij like the Azaariqa believe that if 
they themselves are amongst disbelievers, in the same land, and are not rebelling 
against the leadership, then they "consider themselves (mushrikeen) disbelievers, due 
to their mixing with those who disagree with them and living amongst them, until 
they rebel against them, and affirm their Islaam" (‘Awaajee 2002:486).  Ibn al-Jawzee 
recorded a saying of some of the Azaariqa, "We are mushrikeen (polytheists) as long 
as we stay in Daar al-Shirk (land of polytheism). So when we separate we will be 
Muslims" (2002:108).  The Azaariqa, in their extremism, deemed it necessary to 
emigrate from any land they believed was un-Islaamic, and mixing with the 
disbelievers was considered disbelief. 
  
1.6.7 Extremism 
 
     Extremism and excessiveness in religious matters are also amongst the main 
characteristics of the Khawaarij. Extremism as a religious term can be defined as 
  
transgressing the religious boundaries (al-Lawayhiq 1999/1:21). Although this is a 
very broad definition it sums up some of the differences amongst religious scholars. 
Some scholars define extremism as going beyond the limits set by the religious texts 
by making things that are permissible in the religion unlawful, or obligatory. Still 
other scholars say that it is extremity in the interpretation of the religious texts, and 
strictness with regards to practicing things commanded in the religion upon oneself 
and others. (al-Dawsree 2005:19).  Al-‘Aqal relates, "The extremism of the 
Khawaarij results from their fanaticism in the religion and its rulings, and their 
separating themselves from those who differ from them and their harsh stance towards 
them" (1998:12). The original Khawaarij were known for being excessive and 
obsessive in worship. Al-Sa’awee says, "… the Khawaarij are people who are 
obedient, and devoted. They were extremely keen on adhering to the principles of the 
religion, fully practicing its verdicts, and staying far away from what Islaam has 
prohibited" (1996:182). The Khawaarij were known for their earnest prayers, having 
full concentration, and elongated prostrations. They were also known for the marks 
upon their foreheads due to their many prostrations, and they used to shave their 
heads believing it an act of worship, a sign of piety and asceticism. In addition, they 
were known to have black marks under their eyes due to excessive crying (al-
Shahrastaanee 1984:107).  
 
     The second characteristic of extremism apparent in the Khawaarij was in belief. 
Due to their extremist belief the Khawaarij were known for declaring anyone who 
held a position contrary to them, or who fell into major sin as apostates (al-Lawayhiq 
1999/1:24). For example, the Khawaarij were known for their truthfulness and hatred 
for lying and they made takfeer of those who lied.24
                                                 
24 The original Khawaarij were so meticulous about telling the truth that although they were considered 
deviant their hadeeth narrations were accepted. This is unlike the modern groups who often conceal 
their Takfeeree principles and intentions and incite acts of terror as will be shown in chapter three. 
 They declared ‘Alee, the cousin 
of the Prophet Muhammad and leader of the Muslims to be an apostate because he 
differed with them and this was due to their fanaticism. Al-Bukhaaree related that the 
Prophet said, "They fight the people of Islaam and leave the people of idolatry" (Ibn 
Hajar 1996/9: 21). The Khawaarij were eager to apply their judgments upon the 
Muslims, even going as far as fighting and killing them and this was a result of their 
extremist interpretation of Islaam and zeal to implement its orders. 
  
1.6.8 False Interpretation of Qur’aanic verses  
 
     Due to the Khawaarij’s lack of understanding of the Qur’aan, and rejection of the 
orthodox interpretation of its verses, they committed grave errors in belief and 
practice. The Qur’aan is to be explained by reference to other verses, then as 
understood and practiced by the Prophet and his companions. The Khawaarij on the 
other hand explained the verses using only their apparent meanings, and their 
opinions, instead of using the methodology prescribed by those before them. The 
Khawaarij were known for their strict adherence to the Qur’aan in accordance with 
their understanding, and outward exemplification of the Prophetic Sunna (al-Sa’awee 
1996:176). Because the Khawaarij abandoned the main group of Muslims, the 
leadership and scholars, they in essence abandoned the Prophetic Sunna making 
"what is not evil, evil, and what is not good, good, and this was evident during the 
time of the Prophet when Dhu Khawasira al-Tamimee said, 'Be just for you have not 
been just!'" (al-Sa’awee 1996:176). Ibn Taymeeya explained that when Dhu 
Khawasira commanded the Prophet to be just he believed he was commanding 
something good, but he was in fact making something good (dividing the war spoils), 
bad, by rebuking the Prophet and thus contradicting the religion (al-Sa’awee 
1996:176).  This example illustrates how from the very beginning the Khawaarij d the 
based their belief upon their personal opinion and their sense of justice, instead of the 
sound dictates of the Qur’aan and Sunna.   
      
     Another blatant example of the Khawaarij’s misinterpretation of the Qur’aan is the 
verse in which Allah says, “And whosoever does not rule by what Allah has revealed 
then they are disbelievers” (1996:5:44). Ibn ‘Abbaas, also known as the explainer of 
the Qur’aan, which was a title given to him by the Prophet himself, explained the 
verse by saying, “The one who renounces what Allah revealed is a disbeliever, and 
the one who believes in it but does not rule by it, then he is an oppressive sinner” This 
was related by Ibn Katheer (1997/2:61). This verse was understood by the Khawaarij 
to mean that all sinners are disbelievers because they are not following divine law 
when they commit a sin. The correct understanding is that the sinner is not ruling by 
man-made laws but "instead he is committing that which Allah has prohibited because 
the one who rules by human legislation commands or legislates other than divine law, 
and he judges by it, and refers to it" (al-Hilaalee 2001:188). In sum, the one who 
  
commits major sins is not legitimizing his acts, or legislating by them, but instead is 
failing to fulfill an obligatory act of worship or doing something which is prohibited 
by the religion, which according to the Khawaarij constitutes apostasy. ‘Abd Allah 
Ibn ‘Umar a companion of the Prophet Muhammad said, "Verily they (the Khawaarij) 
rush to apply the verses that were revealed about the disbelievers and apply them to 
the believers" (Ibn Hajar 1996/9:20). The Khawaarij are known for their 
misinterpretation of the Qur’aanic verses to support their paradigm of takfeer and 
rebellion. 
 
      Misinterpretation of the divine texts by the Khawaarij led to their going astray in 
practice, although they possessed a strong sense of virtue. Ibn Taymeeya said that 
"They are not from those who deliberately lie; instead they are well known for truth. 
Even it is said their narrations of hadeeth are among the most authentic hadeeth. 
However, they are ignorant and misguided due to innovation. So, their sinfulness is 
not due to apostasy and disbelief, instead it is from their ignorance of the meanings of 
the Qur’aan" (1989b/1:68). This trait is common to both the neo-Khawaarij and the 
original sect: interpretation of the religion based upon their opinions. However, 
whereas the original sect was known for its truthfulness, the Takfeerees, as will be 
observed in chapter three, are not. Ibn Taymeeya also described the original sect by 
saying that "they pretend to follow the Qur’aan based upon their opinions and they 
leave the Sunna, which they claim contradicts the Qur’aan" (1989/28:491). The 
Khawaarij seem to contradict themselves: on one hand they strictly adhere to the 
Qur’aan, and at the same time, if it appears to them that the Sunna does not agree with 
the Qur’aan, or their interpretation, they discard the Sunna, and this illustrates their 
deviation from the orthodox methodology regarding Qur’aanic interpretation.25
     Explaining the verses of the Qur’aan based upon one’s unqualified opinion is a 
major sin the Khawaarij fell into. After mentioning several of the major sins like 
illegal sexual intercourse (sodomy, homosexuality, and fornication), oppression, and 
polytheism, Allah mentions that it is hateful to say "things about Allah of which you 
have no knowledge" (Qur’aan 1996/7:33). He also says in another verse "And say not 
 
  
                                                 
25 The orthodox belief holds that the Qur’aan and the Sunna are both divine revelation from Allah, but 
the Qur’aan is the speech of Allah, and the Sunna is revelation transmitted through the sayings, actions 
and things accepted by the Prophet.  
 
  
concerning that which your tongues put forth falsely: 'This is lawful and this is 
forbidden.' So as to invent lies against Allah, verily, those who invent lies against 
Allah will never prosper. A passing brief enjoyment (will be theirs), but they will 
have a painful torment" (Qur’aan 1996/16:116). Here Allah explains that those who 
speak without knowledge, or lie about Him, and make things that He made lawful, 
unlawful, or vice versa, will have an extreme punishment in the hereafter. It can be 
deduced from this verse that lying about Allah or attempting Qur’aanic exegesis 
without proper knowledge is a grave sin and the Khawaarij were guilty of this. Ibn al-
Qayyim says regarding the first verse: 
 
          So Allah ranked the prohibited things on four levels. He began with the       
          lightest of them and that is (al-Fawaahish) illegal sexual intercourse. Then  
          secondly, with that which is a greater prohibition: sin and oppression.  
          Thirdly, that which is even more serious: associating partners with Allah the  
          Glorified. Fourthly, that which is even worse than all of the above sins and it is  
          speaking about Allah without knowledge (2002/1:73).  
 
Although, the Khawaarij interpreted the Qur’aanic verses based upon their apparent 
meanings, most classical scholars did not accuse them of being apostates. This was in 
part based upon the view that ignorance and misinterpretation are sometimes 
excusable and impediments to takfeer as will be shown in the section on takfeer, 
nonetheless Qur'aanic misinterpretation is considered sinful and an innovation.  
 
1.6.9 Religious Innovation  
 
     The notion of innovation (bid'a) was a key concept inherent in the Khawaarij 
doctrine as most of the core tenets they espouse are a deviation from the orthodox 
creed. Innovation in religious matters (beliefs, actions or sayings), is an extremely 
controversial principle in Islaam and majority of orthodox scholars tend to hold it as 
sinful (al-Faasee 2003/1:131-132). To innovate is defined as to “bring in new ideas 
etc.; make changes” (Waite 1994:329). In this research innovation is used to describe 
practices, sayings or beliefs that have no basis in the sharee'a or that have an origin in 
the sharee'a but have been altered as a means of worshipping Allah, either by adding 
to an established act of worship or deducting from it. For example, a person may sing 
or even use musical string instruments as a form of release and consider it as a means 
of praising Allah. Such actions have no basis from the Sunna and using string 
  
instruments as an act of worship would be considered sinful, not an act that nullifies 
one's faith. This does not include innovations in technology or practices outside of the 
religion. However, some scholars divide bid'a into the five different sharee'a 
categories: obligatory, recommended, permissible, disliked, and impermissible. "The 
first scholar to develop this classification was al-'Azza Ibn 'Abd al-Salaam when he 
said, 'Innovation is an action that was not practiced during the time of the Prophet of 
Allah and it is divided into obligatory, impermissible, recommended, disliked, and the 
permissible bid'a'" (cited in al-Rahaylee 2001/1:110). Imaam al-Qaraafee, a student of 
al-'Azza expounded upon his classification of bid'a explaining that the obligatory 
innovation is that which is done for the preservation of Islaam and the sharee'a, such 
as the collection and recording of the Qur'aan. The forbidden innovation is that which 
contradicts the established sharee'a principles. The third type of bid'a is that which is 
recommended which coincides with the sharee'a like the congregational Ramadan 
night prayer. The fourth category according to Qaraafee refers to those actions which 
are not altogether prohibited but are disliked according to the Islaamic texts. The final 
category he mentioned referred to those actions which are permissible in the sharee'a 
but were not practiced by the Prophet (al-Qaraafee 1999:202-205). Those scholars 
that disagree with these classifications of innovation argue that many of the examples 
used by al-Qaraafee were in fact not innovations but were necessary to preserve the 
religion and fit under accepted jurisprudential principles and did not alter any acts of 
worship. Also, they claim al-Qaraafee's example of the congregational night prayer 
during Ramadan did not support his argument because the Prophet prayed this prayer 
in congregation on more than one occasion (al-Rahaylee 2001/1:111). There is a 
plethora of evidence and statements from the Prophet and his companions that support 
the opinion that all religious innovation is sinful. On one occasion a man came to Ibn 
'Abbaas, a companion, and requested advice. He replied, "Fear Allah, be upright, and 
follow [the Sunna] and avoid innovations" (al-Marwazee 1989:24). Ibn 'Umar, 
another companion known for his strict adherence to the Sunna, said, "All innovation 
is misguidance, even if people hold it to be good" (al-Marwazee 1989:24). The 
Companions, Taabi'een and major Imaams of jurisprudence, Maalik, Shaafi'ee, Aboo 
Haneefa, and Ahmad, all agreed that innovation was sinful and that it can be inferred 
that the person who knowingly innovates in a matter of creed or worship is suggesting 
that he has superior comprehension of Islaam to that of the Prophet (Baazmool 
2008:50-63). Finally, the evidence seems to suggest, according to the Prophet's 
  
statement and that of his companions, that all religious bid'a is a form of misguidance 
(acts of worship or belief unknown to the Prophet), and this is why the Khawaarij are 
considered unorthodox in creed as they introduced the concept of accusing the major 
sinner of heresy.   
  
1.6.10 Denial of Punishment in the Grave 
 
     In addition to their unorthodoxy and absence of knowledge based conclusions, the 
Khawaarij also denied the punishment of the grave. The orthodox creed holds that 
after people die they will be questioned in the grave about their religion, their prophet, 
and their lord. According to classical scholars, the one who answers with Islaam as his 
or her religion, Muhammad as his or her prophet, and Allah as his or her lord, will 
receive comfort in the grave. The one who is unable to answer these questions will 
receive punishment and this is what is affirmed by the Qur’aan and the authentic 
hadeeth narrations. The Prophet said, "When a faithful believer is made to sit in his 
grave, then (the angels) come to him and he testifies that none has the right to be 
worshipped but Allah, and Muhammad is Allah's Messenger" (al-Bukhaaree 
1970/2:254). According to orthodox scholars this verifies that the testimony of faith 
will take place in the after life of the grave (Ibn Abee al-‘Azza 1988:396). In another 
narration collected in al-Bukhaaree, the Prophet after hearing a noise left his dwelling 
suddenly and said, "The Jews are being punished in their graves" (1970/2:255). This 
narration confirms for orthodox scholars that there is a punishment of the grave, and 
the orthodox belief is founded upon authentic traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, 
who also used to invoke Allah in his prayers saying, "O Allah I seek refuge with you 
from the punishment of the grave" (al-Bukhaaree 1970/2:255). Imaam Aboo Haneefa 
said, “And the return of the soul to its body in the grave is real, and all disbelievers 
are deserving of its discomfort and punishment as well as the sinful amongst the 
believers” (al-Khumees 1999:65). 
      
     Most of the Khawaarij denied the punishment of the grave, although some of the 
Ibaadeeya affirmed it. ‘Awaajee states, "As for the punishment of the grave, then the 
worst of the Khawaarij deny it, and they claim that it is not real and they do not use 
the authentic hadeeth narrations that affirm it" (2002:200). The Khawaarij did not 
look to the authentic narrations to form the basis of their creed, but instead inclined to 
  
Qur’aanic interpretation without the affirmation of authentic hadeeth literature, thus 
denying the authentic Sunna of the Prophet and methodology of the early scholars.  
 
1.6.11 Reviling the Companions 
 
     Another belief which the early Khawaarij held was reviling the companions of the 
Prophet: challenging their legitimacy to authority, and declaring them disbelievers. 
The Khawaarij declared ‘Uthmaan, ‘Alee and Mu'aawiya to be disbelievers because 
they differed with them in judgment, and in the case of ‘Uthmaan they declared him 
an apostate because they felt he was unjust and illegitimate as the ruler of the 
Muslims (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:110). The Khawaarij accepted the rulership of the 
first two caliphates Aboo Bakr and ‘Umar, and rejected that of ‘Uthmaan, and ‘Alee. 
Some of the Khawaarij historians have used fabricated narrations to substantiate their 
hatred for ‘Uthmaan. In a book called Exposing the Hidden News of the Community 
the author known only as Ibaadee 26 brings numerous fabricated narrations slandering 
‘Uthmaan, depicting him as a greater trial for the Muslims than the Anti-Christ 
(‘Awaajee 2002:466).27
                                                 
26 The name Ibaadee probably refers to the author’s affiliation with the Ibaadeeya sect. 
27 The Islaamic creed holds that one of the signs that the Day of Judgment is approaching is the coming 
of the Anti-Christ. 
  
1.7 Conclusion 
 
     The preceding chapter provided a cursory glimpse of the Khawaarij sect, their 
origin, and statements of the classical scholars regarding them. Also, hadeeth 
traditions were introduced to illustrate their characteristics. It can be deduced that the 
prevailing orthodox view regarding the Khawaarij is that they were, and remain, a 
real test that will exist within the Muslim community for all time. Keeping that in 
mind, the following chapter will detail and contrast the orthodox creed with that of the 
Khawaarij’s and provide additional analysis and scrutiny of their core beliefs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In a fabricated saying attributed to the Prophet he depicts 
‘Uthmaan as a great evil to the community, and regarding that ‘Awaajee says, "Then 
this narration attributed to Ibn Mas’ood is slanderous and it is a lie against the 
testimony of the Messenger of Allah … for ‘Uthmaan to enter paradise. And it is 
falsifying the love of the Messenger for him, and his history in serving Islaam" 
(2002:466). The Khawaarij like the Shee’a, another unorthodox sect, have volumes of 
falsified sayings regarding the Prophet Muhammad in which they slander and ascribe 
major sins to his family, and companions “…and they make it a part of their worship 
to come closer to Allah by cursing them day and night” (‘Awaajee 2002:431). These 
actions are considered heretical according to the orthodox creed and contradict the 
authentic narrations upon which Islaam was built.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter Two 
The Islaamic Creed according to Salafee Scholars 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
     In this chapter the Islaamic creed will be defined and contrasted with the 
Khawaarij belief. In addition, the concepts of the orthodox belief28
     The above categorization of tawheed is supported by evidence from the Qur’aan, 
the Sunna, and early scholars. The division of tawheed into three categories is not 
explicitly mentioned by the textual evidence; however this division is substantiated by 
a vast number of proofs. Philips states, “The division of Tawheed into its components 
was not done by the Prophet… nor by his Companions, as there was no necessity to 
analyze such a basic principle of a faith in this fashion. However, the foundations of 
the components are all implied in the explanatory statements of the Prophet… and his 
companions…” (2002:2). The scholars of Islaam have deduced and derived principles 
and conditions for acts of worship and understanding matters of creed since the time 
 will be explored 
and its outlook regarding monotheism (tawheed), the companions of the Prophet, 
extremism, rebellion and takfeer will be detailed. Finally, the edicts of Muhammad 
Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab, a controversial figure whose beliefs are often associated with 
takfeer and terrorist ideology, will be scrutinized. 
 
2.2 Tawheed  
 
     The basis of the Islaamic religion is monotheism according to the Qur’aan, the 
Sunna, and the general consensus of Muslims (al-Faasee 2003/1:15). Tawheed as a 
concept involves recognizing the lordship of Allah. His right to be worshipped, and 
His divine names and attributes (Philips 2002:2). This categorization of tawheed is 
somewhat controversial and many sects differ over the very concept of tawheed. The 
different theories propounded by many of these groups have caused some of them to 
make takfeer of those who differ with them (Ibn Hazm 2002/1:321-329).  
 
                                                 
28 This term implies an understanding of the practices of the Prophet and the early generation of 
ammad Ibn hQayyim, Mu-Muslims particularly as visualized by scholars like Ibn Taymeeya, Ibn al
'Abd al-Wahhaab and present day Salafee clerics like Bin Baaz. 
  
of the first generation of Muslim scholars,29
     The Sunna of the Prophet is also filled with evidences that support this 
categorization of tawheed. The Prophet mentioned in an authentic narration that “our 
Lord, may He be glorified and exalted, descends each night to the lowest heaven 
during the final third of the night and He says: Who is invoking me, so that I may 
answer him? Who is asking something of Me that I may give it to him? Who is asking 
forgiveness of Me that I may forgive him?” (al-'Asqalaanee 1996/12:413). This 
hadeeth is evidence exhibiting all the categories of tawheed. Firstly, al-ruboobeeya, 
implying that there is no other God worthy of worship and Allah is the Lord of all 
creation, and there are numerous hadeeth and verses that confirm this. Secondly, al-
ulooheeya, seeking absolution from sin and invocation are both acts of worship and 
are sought only from Allah. Thirdly, this hadeeth shows that Allah descends to the 
lowest heaven and this is a divine attribute that He possesses (al-asmaa wa- al-sifaat). 
In another hadeeth collected in Tirmidhee the Prophet said, “Supplication is worship” 
(1996/5:194). This hadeeth is evidence for tawheed al-ulooheeya and it shows that 
 this is why many of the early books of 
jurisprudence list the conditions for prayer and its pillars, the matters that nullify 
fasting, and the obligations of pilgrimage (al-Faasee 2003/1:629).  
 
     There are numerous verses of the Qur’aan that support the categories of tawheed as 
mentioned above. Allah says, “All praises be to Allah, the Lord of the ‘Alamin 
(mankind, jinn and all that exists)” (Qur’aan 1996/1:2). This verse proves Allah’s 
sovereignty and lordship over all creation and is an evidence for tawheed al-
ruboobeeya (lordship). In the same verse Allah says, “You alone we worship, and 
You alone we ask for help” (Qur’aan 1996/1:5). To single Allah out alone for worship 
is the essence of tawheed al-ulooheeya (worship) and this is what all the prophets and 
messengers were sent with, as Allah affirms by saying, “And verily, We have sent 
among every nation a Messenger (proclaiming): Worship Allah (alone) and avoid 
worshipping all false deities” (Qur’aan 1996:16:36). Allah is “the Most Gracious, the 
Most Merciful” (1996/1:3), and both of these characteristics are from His al-asmaa 
wa- al-sifaat (divine names and attributes) which is the final category of tawheed.  
 
                                                 
29 Refer to Sharh al-Fiqh al-Akbar li Abee Haneefa Nu'maan by Muhammad al-Qaaree (1977) which 
explains many issues of creed: tawheed and the pillars of faith.   
  
supplication to other than Allah is a type of polytheism as the Prophet defined 
supplication as an act of worship.30
     Tawheed as a concept was also known to the companions and their students. 
Although it may not have been categorized in the same way later scholars like Ibn 
Taymeeya, Ibn Qayyim, and Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab classified it, the 
general concept was still known. Maalik Ibn Deenaar, a Taabi’ee, said, “The people 
of the world leave this life without tasting the most important thing in it. He was 
asked: ‘What is that Aboo Yahyaa?’ He answered, ‘knowing Allah the Almighty’” 
(Taas 2005/1:221). Ibn Mubaarak, another Taabi’ee, said, “For everything there is a 
reward, and the reward of knowledge is coming closer to Allah the Almighty” (Taas 
2005/1:222). Both of these narrations demonstrate the importance of acquiring correct 
knowledge of Allah and His divine names and attributes, and practicing that 
knowledge by worshipping Allah alone (al-ulooheeya). Imaam Aboo Haneefa
 
 
31
     Many of the early scholars emphasized tawheed al-asmaa wa al-sifaat in their 
writings as they lived in a time where many sects began to appear and challenge the 
orthodox concept of tawheed.
 said, 
“The foundation of tawheed and the sound creed makes it obligatory for one to say, ‘I 
believe in Allah, and His angels, messengers, resurrection after death, and divine 
destiny, the good and evil of it which is from Allah the Almighty…” (al-Qaaree 1997: 
15). He also said, “Allah the Almighty is one, not just in number, but rather from the 
perspective that He has no partners” (al-Qaaree 1997:15). This affirms Allah’s 
lordship and that He is to be worshipped alone without any partners, which indicates 
that the early scholars held these concepts of tawheed as they are derived from the 
Qur’aan and the Sunna of the Prophet.  
 
32
                                                 
30 Polytheism is the concept of attributing partners in worship with Allah or besides Him (Ibn Abee al-
’Azza 1988:77). 
31  Aboo Haneefa Nu’maan Bin Thaabit, a Taabi’ee’ known for his jurisprudence, was the first imaam 
of the four schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islaam. 
32 Refer to Kitaab al-Tawheed by Ibn al-Khuzaymah (223-311 Hijra), Kitaab al-Tawheed by Ibn 
Munda (died 395 Hijra), Kitaab al-Asmaa wa al-Sifaat by Bayhaqee (died 458 Hijra). 
  
upon him, until the deviance of Waasal Bin ‘Ataa’ the leader of ‘Itizaal” 
 Al-Waadi’ee states, “The Islaamic community used to 
take their religion in creed, worship, transactions, and manners from the Book of 
Allah and the Sunna of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah’s peace and blessings be 
33 (al-
Bayhaqee 2007/1:5). Both Imaam Aboo Haneefa and Imaam Maalik have made 
declarations that illustrate the emphasis and place of tawheed al-asmaa wa al-sifaat in 
the Islaamic faith. Imaam Aboo Haneefa said, “There is nothing in His creation that 
resembles Him, nor is there anything that He resembles from His creation. His divine 
names and attributes exist and will continue to exist as actions in and of themselves” 
(al-Qaaree 1997:15). This is an important principle that is drawn from the Qur’aan 
and the Sunna regarding Allah’s names and attributes: they are perfect and do not 
resemble anything in creation nor should anything be compared to them. Imaam 
Maalik was asked about how Allah could be above His throne and he replied, “It is 
known that He raised Himself above it, how [He raised above it] is incomprehensible, 
and belief in it is an obligation. Therefore, asking about it is unorthodox and I 
consider you to be a sinner” (al-Bayhaqee 2007/2:306).  During the time of the 
Taabi’een34
     Although there was less emphasis placed upon the other two categories they were 
still mentioned during the time of the Taabi’een. The concept of tawheed al-
ulooheeya and al-ruboobeeya were not challenged until later generations so there was 
little emphasis during the first four centuries after the death of the Prophet, and it was 
generally accepted that all worship and devotion should be directed to Allah. “So, it is 
accepted that this issue was not mentioned explicitly by the Salaf. Therefore, they did 
not write books unless they felt there was a need to address an issue that might cause 
contention or confusion affecting the common people” (al-Ja’eer, al-‘Ulyaanee, and 
al-Juhanee 2007:121). From amongst the statements of the early scholars is that of 
Saalim Bin ‘Abd Allah Bin ‘Umar Bin al-Kha
 al-asmaa wa -al-sifaat was written about extensively as many new sects 
arose to challenge this conceptualization of tawheed.   
 
t
                                                 
33  Waasal Bin ‘Ataa’ al-Gazaal (80-131 Hijra) was a student of Hasan al-Basree, a famous Taabi’ee, 
who allegedly broke from Hasan’s study circle forming his own where he taught that the major sinner 
is neither a disbeliever nor a Muslim and after death he resides in the hellfire eternally (al-Juhanee 
2003/1:65).   
34 Taabi'een is the plural of Taabi'ee. 
  
obedience was tested by their ability to continue worship which includes their sayings, 
actions, and restraining themselves from the things that they are prohibited from” 
(2005:108). Imaam Aboo Haneefa said, “Do not swear except by Allah with absolute 
tawheed and sincerity” (al-Kanaasi 1981/8:3). These sayings of Imaam Aboo Haneefa 
and Imaam Shafi’ee both are in accordance with the notion of tawheed al-ulooheeya 
which shows that these concepts were not alien to the classical scholars as they are 
based upon principles and beliefs taken from the Qur’aan and the Sunna. Some of the 
early scholars referred directly to tawheed al-ulooheeya and al-ruboobeeya and this is 
evidence that the classification of these concepts began during the second century of 
Islaam. Imaam Aboo Haneefa (died 105 Hijra) states, “When one supplicates to Allah 
he raises his hands upward not down, because lowliness is not one of the attributes of 
al-ruboobeeya and al-ulooheeya” (al-Khumees 2007:25). This statement of Imaam 
Aboo Haneefa illustrates that the categorization of tawheed began with the Taabi’een 
as all three categories were mentioned by him. Imaam Tahaawee commenting on the 
beliefs of Ahl Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a, and specifically those of Imaam Aboo Haneefa, 
said, “We say regarding the tawheed of Allah while believing in the guidance that He 
has bestowed upon us: Allah is one Who has no partners, there is nothing that 
resembles Him, and He can do all things, and there is no other God worthy of worship 
besides Him” (Ibn Abee al-‘Azza 1988:77). Ibn Abee al-‘Azza (died 779) 
commentated saying Tahaawee’s statement encompasses all three categories of 
tawheed (Ibn Abee al-‘Azza 1988:77). There are countless statements by classical 
scholars that show that the categorization of tawheed,
aab who said, “Do not ask anyone 
other than Allah” (al-Ja’eer, al-‘Ulyaanee, and al-Juhanee 2007:121). His statement 
emphasizes the importance of total reliance upon Allah and the significance of 
supplication, which are both acts of worship and part of tawheed al-ulooheeya: 
directing all acts of worship to Allah alone. Imaam al-Shaafi’ee said, “And their 
35
     The Islaamic creed with regard to the companions and family of the Prophet 
Muhammad is in direct contrast with that of the Khawaarij. According to the Islaamic 
belief they are the best of creation after the prophets and messengers sent by Allah to 
 into at least two separate 
categories, began in the time of the Taabi’een and has evolved until the present time.     
       
2.3 Respecting the Companions and Family of the Prophet 
 
                                                 
35  Imaam Ibn Hibbaan (died 354 Hijra) states, “All praises and thanks be to Allah, the only one to be 
singled out in al-ulooheeya, the Exalted One, possessor of al-ruboobeeya” (Ibn Hibbaan 2005:8). 
Imaam al-Tabaree commented on the verse “Know! Verily, no one has the right to be worshipped 
except for Allah, and seek forgiveness for your sins.” (1996:47:19) saying, “Then know O Muhammad 
that there is nothing worthy of worship except Allah. Nor is it permissible for you or anyone in creation 
to worship or ascribe al-ulooheeya except to Allah, Who is the owner and creator of everything, and He 
is the possessor of al-ruboobeeya” (al-Tabaree 1966/11:317-318).  
  
mankind. Also it is considered a major sin to revile them or to criticize them even if 
they fell into error. According to a report transmitted by Tabaraanee the Prophet 
stated, “If my companions are mentioned then keep silent” (cited in al-Barbahaaree 
1997:112). Al-'Abbaad states regarding them that "they became the connection 
between the Messenger of Allah-may peace and Allah’s blessing be upon him-and 
those who came after them. So, whoever insults them, insults the connection and firm 
link that ties the Muslims to the Messenger of Allah" (al-‘Abbaad 2002:15). It can be 
deduced from this statement that the companions are to be revered because it was 
through their striving, and perseverance that we have the religion of Islaam today: 
they preserved the narrations of the Prophet which form the beliefs and rituals of 
Islaam, and they collected and memorized the Qur’aan, which is the Holy book for all 
Muslims. In a narration transmitted by Muslim the Prophet said, "Whoever calls to 
guidance will have a reward similar to all those who follow him without their reward 
diminishing in any way, and whoever calls to misguidance, he will carry a sin similar 
to all those who follow him without their sins decreasing in any way" (al-Nawawee 
1997/4:2060).  The scholars of Islaam refer to this narration to show the place of the 
companions of the Prophet in Islaam because they were the ones who called the 
people to guidance by spreading Islaam, and it was them, their students, and scholars 
after them, who maintained and preserved the orthodox creed. 
 
     Although the companions are revered according to the orthodox creed, it should 
not be excessive. Ibn Taymeeya said, "In spite of this, Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a36
                                                 
36 The next subsection details and defines this term. 
  
This statement exemplifies how the classical scholars took great care not to 
exaggerate beyond the limits of the Islaamic sharee’a with regards to the companions 
of the Prophet. Emphasis was placed upon loving them but not exalting them in a 
manner that contradicts what was expounded upon in hadeeth literature. In addition, 
this statement serves as a refutation to those who over-exalt the companions as the 
Shee’a sect does with ‘Alee the fourth caliph and it refutes the Khawaarij who 
denigrated and degraded the companions. The Prophet said, "Do not revile my 
companions, for if any one of you gave the size of Uhud Mountain in gold as charity, 
he would not even reach a handful of theirs, nor half of that (in reward)" (Ibn Hajr 
1996/7:370). According to the orthodox creed, the companions are to be revered, their 
faults should not be discussed, and they hold the most honorable station in Islaam 
after Allah's Prophets and Messengers (al-Barbahaaree 1997:120-131).  
 
2.4 Adhering to Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a 
 
    The orthodox creed holds that the Islaamic community would divide into sects and 
groups after the Prophet's time, even though it is deemed unacceptable, un-
praiseworthy, and sinful (al-Barbahaaree 1997:128). It is apparent from hadeeth 
literature that only one sect is legitimate and will be successful in the life of the 
hereafter. The Prophet said:  
           
          The Jews divided into seventy one sects, one in paradise, and seventy are in the      
          fire. The Christians divided into seventy two sects, so seventy one are in the  
          fire and one in paradise. And I swear by the one whose hand my soul is in, my  
          Umma (community) will divide into seventy-three sects. So one will enter  
          paradise and seventy two will be in the fire.” Then it was said, “O Messenger of  
          Allah who are they?” He said, “They are the Group (Jamaa’a)”  
          (Ibn Maaja 1993/2:1322).  
 
 
do not believe anyone of the companions to be infallible from major or minor sins. 
Rather, it is possible that they may have sins, yet they have past virtues that 
necessitate forgiveness of what occurred from them, if anything" (cited in al-'Abbaad 
2002:30). An integral part of the Muslim's creed is to love the companions and refrain 
from criticizing them, and at the same time, not be excessive by glorifying them in a 
manner contradicting the orthodox creed. Al-Tahaawee (born 239 Hijra) said:  
 
          We love the companions of the Prophet but we are not excessive in  
          loving them, nor do we  renounce any of them. We hate whoever despises and  
          speaks ill of them, and we only mention them with good. Loving them is part of   
          the religion, faith and righteousness, and hating them is disbelief, hypocrisy,   
          and transgression (Ibn Abee al-‘Azza 1988:468). 
The main group or victorious group as referred to in many narrations is the 
companions of the Prophet, first and foremost, and those who followed them in 
righteousness. Imaam al-Barbahaaree 37
                                                 
37 Imaam al-Barbahaaree, was known as the leader of the Sunna (those who adhere to the Prophet’s 
traditions) in the year 329 after the Hijra (emigration) of the Prophet. 
 said, “And the foundation upon which the 
Jamaa’a was built is the companions of Muhammad … and they are the people of the 
Sunna, and the (victorious) group. So, whoever does not take from them, is misguided 
and has deviated…” (1997:65). Al-Breekaan said, “The Group refers to the 
  
companions, their students, and those who followed them in righteousness” (al-
Breakaan 1997:20). The victorious group which begins with the companions of the 
Prophet will exist throughout time according to hadeeth literature. 
  
     The victorious group is made up of those who hold fast to the commandments of 
the Qur’aan and the Prophet's traditions, and orthodox scholars are agreed on this. The 
Prophet said, “There will not cease to be a party from amongst my community clearly 
upon the truth, no one who betrays them will harm them until the commandment of 
Allah comes and they will remain like that” (al-Bukhaaree 1970/9:209). Classical 
scholars like Yazeed Bin Haroon and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal stated regarding the above 
hadeeth that, “If it is not the People of Hadeeth (Ahl al-Sunna, the Salaf) then I do not 
know who they are” (al-Reemee 2000:27).  On another occasion the Prophet 
Muhammad said, "The best of you is my generation, then those who came after them, 
then those that came after them" (Ibn Hajr 1996/5:587). This shows the importance of 
the early scholars of Islaam and their interpretation and understanding of the texts, 
especially the companions, and the first two generations who followed them. 
Orthodox scholars agree upon the esteemed position of the companions, and refer to 
them as the foundation of the Jamaa’a referred to by the Prophet Muhammad. 
 
     The scholars in Islaam agree that insulting the companions is a major sin and that 
cursing them, especially for religious reasons, is disbelief. Imaam al-Maymoonee said, 
“Ahmad Ibn Hanbal said to me, ‘O Aboo al-Hasan, if you see a man mention any of 
the companions with evil then question his Islaam’" (cited in al-'Abbaad 2002:32). It 
appears that the classical scholars considered it blasphemous to speak ill of the 
companions and regarded the one who did so as heretical. Abee Zur'a al-Raazee said:  
 
         If you see a man defaming any of the companions of Allah’s Messenger…then  
         know that he is a heretic, because we believe in the Messenger of Allah… and    
         in the Qur’aan as being true. It is the companions who have conveyed this  
         Qur’aan and the Prophetic guidance to us. Yet they seek to criticize our witness  
         (to the revelation), so as to nullify the book and the Sunna. They are more  
         deserving to be refuted and they are heretics (al-'Abbaad 2002:32).  
 
The companions of the Prophet Muhammad preserved Islaam and helped to spread it 
around the world. Therefore, the one who disrespects or reviles them is considered 
blameworthy, and they call into question Allah's revelation and the Prophet's 
traditions which form the foundation of the religion. Also the above narration 
  
illustrates how the classical scholars hated innovative practices, so they refuted them 
in defense of the religion and for its preservation. The Prophet said, “And beware 
newly invented matters for every innovation is misguidance” (‘Aasim 1998:46). This 
narration shows that innovation in matters of worship is considered sinful. Ibn 
Taymeeya said about the one who curses or reviles the companions, "then he deserves 
an extreme punishment by agreement of the scholars of this religion. The scholars 
differed as to whether this person is punished by execution or by a lesser punishment" 
(cited in al-'Abbaad 2002:46). In Islaam one's honor is considered sacred and slander 
is a punishable crime. Therefore, according to the orthodox creed the companions, 
who are the greatest people in creation after the prophets and messengers, have even a 
greater right to be respected and held in high esteem (al-Faasee 2003:103). So, 
cursing them related to matters of faith or making takfeer of any one of them expels 
one from the religion (al-Nawawee 2002: 1728). On the other hand, to be excessive in 
one's love for them, declaring them to be infallible or divine, also is a type of 
extremism which can lead to disbelief.  
 
2.5 Shunning Extremism  
 
     As has been previously mentioned extremism is transgressing the religious 
boundaries and it should not be confused or compared with adherence to the textual 
evidences which form the basis for Islaamic law and belief. Al-Khareef says, "The 
companions-may Allah be pleased with them-were the strictest people in adhering to 
the sharee’a and in this they did not exhibit any extremism or harshness…" (al-
Khareef 2005:9). In the West terms like 'fundamentalism' and 'extremism' are often 
used when describing those who practice and adhere to the Islaamic faith, as Said 
states, "The deliberately created associations between Islam and fundamentalism 
ensure that the average reader comes to see Islam and fundamentalism as essentially 
the same thing" (Said 1997:xvi). Said was describing how the media, particularly in 
the West, describes and covers Islaam. However in the Islaamic context the term 
fundamentalism denotes those who practice the fundamentals of the religion like 
regular prayer, charity, and adherence to the principles of the Qur’aan and Sunna in 
action and creed (al-Khumees 1996:147).  
 
  
     There are two types of extremism in Islaam: extremism in belief and extremism in 
actions. Extremism in belief is "more dangerous, more slanderous and harmful to 
Muslims than extremism in actions because all the misguided groups began with 
extremism in belief" (al-Khareef 2005:11). Al-Khareef goes on to point out that the 
extremism of groups like the Khawaarij began with deviance in creed by making 
takfeer, and then they began to rebel and commit acts of violence. 
  
     As for the second type of extremism, this entails both actions and extremist speech 
according to orthodox scholars (al-Lawayhiq 1999a/1:70). Acts of terrorism fall under 
this category and although they are regarded as heinous in Islaam, they mostly have 
an origin in deviant belief, and this is why Islaam views extremism in action less 
dangerous and heretical than extremist belief. For example, extremism can be seen in 
"the thought of the early Khawaarij and it was extremely harmful to the Muslims 
throughout different times. So it is this subversive terrorist thought which contradicts 
the reality of the authentic religion of Islaam" (al-Suhaymee 2005b:91). The 
Khawaarij began with deviant thought and creed and this deviance from the orthodox 
creed manifested itself through violence and rebellion. Al-Barbahaaree said, "If you 
see a man that is a wicked transgressor upon misguidance, straying from the path or 
way, but he is a person of the Sunna, then be his companion and sit with him for his 
sins will not harm you" (1997:120). This illustrates how the one who fell into error 
and strayed from guidance in deeds and actions should be given advice and not cut off 
from the Muslims if his foundation in creed is intact and his harm can be avoided. 
However, al-Barbahaaree said regarding the one who "…strives hard in worship by 
exhibiting asceticism but he is a person of desires [unorthodox in creed] then do not 
sit with him or go with him and do not listen to his speech" (al-Barbahaaree 
1997:120). It becomes apparent from the aforementioned statements that unorthodoxy 
and extremism in belief are a much greater harm and sin than sinful actions, because 
the one who commits sins is able to repent and leave his sinful action much easier 
than the one who believes he is correct in his unorthodox practices, thus refusing to 
abandon it. Sufyaan al-Thawree, a Taabi'ee, was quoted as saying, "Innovation is 
more beloved to Iblees (the devil) than sin. Sin can be atoned for but deviation is not 
repented from" (cited in al-Atharee 1997:218). Finally, it can be deduced from the 
above statements that the danger inherent in extremist belief is the root cause of 
extremist action and this is in accordance with the orthodox belief. Al-Suhaymee 
  
states, "One of the reasons for these terrorist acts is the effect of the Takfeeree thought 
upon some of the youth of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Egypt " (al-Suhaymee 
2005b:91). 
 
     The most commonly cited reasons for extremism according to Salafee scholars are 
ignorance of religious principles, unorthodoxy, and blind following of religious 
personalities. Although there are other reasons attributed to the phenomena of  
extremism, like socio-economic conditions, this research concentrates on violence and 
those factors which help explain the Khawaarij creed (al-Lawayhiq 1999/1:37-40).    
 
     Firstly, ignorance of religious matters is a main cause for religious extremism. 
Many perpetrators of extremism go beyond the limits set by the religion because they 
are unaware of its boundaries or misled due to their ignorance. Ibn Taymeeya said, "It 
was narrated on the Salaf al-Saalih (righteous predecessors) that whoever worships 
Allah out of ignorance, corrupts more than he does good" (cited in al-Khareef 2005:9). 
In a narration transmitted by Muslim the Prophet described how ignorance would 
increase and killing and extremism would appear as a result of this. The Prophet said, 
"Time will pass rapidly, knowledge will be decreased, trials and afflictions will 
appear…and there will be much al-Harj (killing)" (al-Nawawee 1997/16:439). 
According to classical scholars, knowledge will decrease because of the death of 
religious scholars and this is in accordance with the Prophet’s statement when he said, 
"Allah will not decrease knowledge by removing it from the people, but He will 
decrease knowledge by the death of the scholars, and when no knowledge remains, 
people will take the leaders of  ignorance who will be asked (to give verdicts) and will 
give no true answers, or verdicts which, in turn, misguide themselves, and therefore 
they will misguide the people" (al-Nawawee 1997/16:441).  According to the 
statement of Prophet Muhammad, there is a strong correlation between ignorance, the 
spread of trials, and extremism.38
                                                 
38  A common characteristic of the neo-Khawaarij is that they criticize contemporary religious clerics 
who do not share their ideology and at the same time they issue their own verdicts, or seek consultation 
from those clerics that agree with their ideology regardless of their level of knowledge; this will be 
explored further in chapter three.  
  
    Secondly, initiating unorthodoxy: initiating practices or sayings which have no 
basis in the sharee’a, also leads to extremism in religious affairs. The groups that 
profess Islaam and possess extremist thinking all have one thing in common and that 
is "they twist the meanings of the religious texts and evidences to agree with their 
sinful practices”  (al-Khareef 2005:22). The Prophet said regarding unorthodox 
practices, "Whoever innovates in this affair of ours that which is not from it will have 
it rejected" (al-Nawawee 1997/3:1344).  Al-'Abbaad mentioned that this "hadeeth 
shows that whoever innovates an unorthodox practices that does not have a root in the 
sharee’a will have it rejected and the innovator deserves punishment" (2003b:39). 
Therefore, extremism in religion by its very nature is linked to unorthodoxy because 
to transgress the limits is to add an act of worship that was not previously in the 
religion or exaggerate in religious affairs. A prime example is the Khawaarij's takfeer 
for major sins which exhibits how unorthodoxical beliefs led to an extreme practice 
that caused harm, disunity, and killing between Muslims (al-Lawayhiq 1999:96).    
 
 Therefore, in accordance with the Prophet’s 
statement extremism will increase with the decrease of sound knowledge, because 
without proper knowledge of how to practice the religion its boundaries cannot be 
observed. 
     Thirdly, blind following (taqleed) of religious scholars and personalities also fuels 
extremism. Taqleed as an Islaamic principle at times is permissible and at other times 
impermissible. It is allowed for the person who does not have the knowledge and 
ability to research the religious texts to gain the proper understanding and religious 
rulings, then this person must follow trustworthy religious scholars known for their 
knowledge and piety. "Taqleed of the truth is following [the Qur’aan and Sunna], and 
in reality not taqleed. Therefore, we find from the foundation of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-
Jamaa’a the statement, 'follow but do not innovate' and 'we follow what the righteous 
predecessors were upon [Qur’aan and Sunna]'…" (al-Khareef 2005:29). The 
impermissible taqleed is following blindly anyone in religious affairs regardless of 
whether they contradict the textual evidences or not. Allah says in the Qur’aan, "And 
when it is said to them; Come to what Allah has revealed and unto the Messenger 
(Muhammad for the verdict of that which you have made unlawful). They say: 
Enough for us is that which we found our fathers following, even though their fathers 
had no knowledge whatsoever or guidance" (Qur’aan 1996/5:104). As a result of 
following their ancestors they fell into the extremism of disobeying Allah and his 
Messenger, thus resulting in their misguidance, punishment and transgressing the 
religious boundaries. In another verse Allah says, "The Jews and Christians took their 
rabbis and their monks to be their lords" (Qur’aan 1996/9:31). According to a hadeeth  
  
in the Sunan Tirmidhee, the Prophet was asked about this verse from the Qur’aan by 
one of his companions, 'Adee Bin Hatim, who said, "O Allah's Messenger! They do 
not worship them (i.e. the rabbis and monks)." The Prophet then replied, "They 
certainly do. They made lawful things as unlawful and unlawful things as lawful, and 
they (Jews and Christians) followed them; and by doing so, they really worshipped 
them" (1996/5:259).  This type of taqleed is the most severe according to the orthodox 
creed because it involves indirect worship of other than Allah by blindly following 
religious figureheads when they openly contradict the Qur’aan and Sunna. Although 
in general the Khawaarij did not reach this level of misguidance: worshipping their 
leaders, it is one of the underlying roots of extremism. Blind following of religious 
personalities is a common trait amongst many of the sects and this is both true of the 
Khawaarij and Takfeeree groups who often require an oath of allegiance from their 
members (al-Suhaymee 2005:126). 
 
       The Prophet detailed the Islaamic creed and position regarding taqleed, and 
offered a prescription to the problem of extremism when he said, "There will be some 
people who will rule by other than my Sunna. You will see their actions and 
disapprove of them. I (the narrator) said, “Will there be any evil after that good?' He 
said, "Yes there will be inviters at the gates of hell, whoever accepts their invitation, 
he will be thrown in it" (al-Nawawee 1997/12:439). Then, after further discourse the 
Prophet was asked advice on how to deal with the situation and he replied, "Adhere to 
the main body of Muslims and their ruler" (al-Nawawee 1997/12:439). This discourse 
highlights the orthodox position regarding taqleed and following extremist 
personalities. Also, in accordance with the foundation of the religion stemming back 
to the Prophet, Muslims should avoid sectarianism, obey their leadership, and hold 
fast to the Qur’aan and Sunna. This was the methodology of the righteous 
predecessors, and this is the prescription for religious extremism according to the 
orthodox creed (al-Lawayhiq 1999a/3:90).  
 
2.6 Renouncing Islaam  
 
     As was mentioned previously, the Khawaarij due to their extremism declare other 
Muslims to be apostates as a central tenant of their faith. However, in Islaam one 
cannot declare a Muslim to be a disbeliever unless the act or belief they hold is 
mentioned as an act of disbelief in the Qur’aan, or the Prophet's traditions, or is an 
  
action or belief that necessitates expelling someone from the religion according to the 
consensus of religious scholars. Shaikh 'Abd al-Rahmaan Hasan said: 
 
          And every munkar (evil sin) must be repudiated from leaving something  
          obligatory or falling into something prohibited. However, one is not expelled  
          from the religion except from an action of disbelief proven by the book       
          (Qur’aan), and the Sunna as disbelief, and likewise, an action or belief which    
          the scholars agree upon as disbelief, like denying something obligatory that is  
          well known from the religion by necessity (al-‘Aasimee 2004/10:348). 
 
     Al-Fawzaan mentions that there are four bases of apostasy. 39
      The second foundation of apostasy is leaving the religion through incorrect belief. 
A person may believe an unlawful action is lawful or a make a lawful action unlawful. 
For example, Islaam teaches that every Muslim must pray five times daily at the 
prescribed times for prayer. A Muslim who knows that this is a religious obligation 
but rejects this in his heart believing it to be false, regardless if he performs the prayer, 
is guilty of hypocrisy which necessitates apostasy from Islaam. Allah says, "They say 
with their tongues what is not in their hearts" (1996/48:11). This verse referred to the 
 "The apostate is the 
one who leaves his religion either through speech, or belief, or action, or doubt, these 
are the foundations of the various types of apostasy" (al-Fawzaan 2004:18).  As for 
speech it is joking or making fun of Islaam or any speech whether it is serious, or not, 
that ridicules the religion. Allah mentions in the Qur’aan, "They swear by Allah that 
they said nothing (bad), but really they said the word of disbelief, and they 
disbelieved after accepting Islaam" (Qur’aan 1996/9:74). This verse illustrates the 
import of taking the word of Allah as play; even if one was not intending harm this 
can expel him from the religion.  Allah also says, "They declare: We were only 
talking idly and joking. Say: Was it Allah, and his Ayat (proofs, evidences, verses, 
lessons, signs, revelations, etc.) and his Messenger that you were mocking? Make no 
excuse; you disbelieved after you had believed" (Qur’aan 1996/9:65). Making fun of 
the verses of the Qur’aan, or the Prophet, or his message, is strictly forbidden in 
Islaam, and constitutes disbelief. Also, uttering words that involve associating 
partners with Allah, praying, or invoking other than Him are also acts which expel 
one from the fold of Islaam (al-Rahaylee 2006:108). 
 
                                                 
39 Shaikh Saalih Bin Fawzaan al-Fawzaan is a member of the committee of major scholars in Saudi 
Arabia. 
  
Arabs who stayed behind during the treaty of Hudaybiya, and asked the Prophet to 
pray for forgiveness for them for doing so, when in reality they felt no sorrow, and 
their speech amounted to vain words. This shows the import of belief in the heart and 
its relationship to actions in Islaam, and furthermore that faith encompasses belief, 
action, as well as speech. The Prophet said, "Actions are related to intention and every 
man shall have that which he intended. Thus, he whose migration was for Allah and 
his Messenger, then his migration was for Allah and his Messenger. And he whose 
migration was to achieve some worldly benefit or to take some woman in marriage, 
then his migration was for that for which he migrated" (al-Nawawee 1997/13:55). The 
scholars of Islaam explain that this saying of the Prophet shows that the place of 
intention is in the heart, and that actions in Islaam necessitate correct belief, and 
intention to please Allah. In addition, actions must be in accordance with the Prophet's 
sayings, actions, or things he approved of. Therefore, rejecting an action even if it is 
by intention nullifies it, and one's belief can bring him into the fold of Islaam or take 
him out of it (al-Rahaylee 2006:107-108). 
 
     The third foundation of apostasy is through action: an act of worship that 
completely contradicts the Islaamic creed. For example, any act of worship done for 
anything or anyone other than Allah's pleasure, or associating a partner with Him 
nullifies one's action or deed, and in turn can nullify one's Islaam. If for example, 
someone were to pray to a grave, or sacrifice an animal to other than Allah, this is 
considered associating a partner with him, and necessitates apostasy. However, there 
are more details to be discussed regarding judging a particular individual with 
becoming an apostate, even if his saying or action amounts to disbelief.40
                                                 
40 This ruling will be discussed in the section on specific takfeer. 
  
     According to the orthodox creed disbelief is of two types: the major disbelief (kufr 
al-akbar) and the minor disbelief (kufr al-asghar). The major disbelief entails those 
sins that constitute infidelity such as associating partners with Allah, worshipping 
other than Him, not declaring a non-Muslim to be a disbeliever, believing there is 
superior guidance to what the Prophet brought, hating, or mocking something from 
the religion, magic, and helping disbelievers against Muslims,
 
 
     The fourth foundation of apostasy is having doubt in something the Prophet was 
sent with, or doubting his being a prophet. This also includes expressing uncertainty 
in the Qur’aan. Al-Fawzaan gives an example of the kind of questions one in doubt 
might ask when he said, "Is there a paradise and a hell-fire, or not? Then this one 
disbelieves through his doubtfulness even if he prays and fasts" (2004:21). Then 
having doubt regarding something firmly established through evidences in the 
Qur’aan and Sunna is also a type of apostasy. 
41
    One of the major sins which can sometimes take one outside the fold of Islaam is 
ruling by other than divine law: the Qur’aan and the authentic traditions of the 
Prophet Muhammad. Scholars from the time of the companions of the Prophet until 
now have some differences regarding when ruling by human laws constitutes major 
disbelief. However, the classical scholars agree that at times ruling by other than 
divine law takes one outside the fold of Islaam, and at other times it is a major sin: the 
minor kufr which does not expel one from the religion.
 ruling according to 
human law as opposed to divine law, and neglecting the religion: refusing to learn and 
practice it. The major disbelief also includes: rejecting the Qur’aan and Sunna by 
being arrogant, doubtfulness in the truth, and hypocrisy (al-‘Ateeq 2004:21). 
 
     The minor disbelief (kufr al-asghar), does not nullify one's faith. However, 
according to the orthodox creed these are major sins such as rejecting the favor or 
blessings of Allah, killing a Muslim, and swearing by other than Allah (al-Rahaylee 
2006:93). Certain sins or actions can be at one time a type of major disbelief expelling 
one from the religion, and at another time minor disbelief. One such action that falls 
into this category is ruling by human law as opposed to divine law (al-Rahaylee 
2006:108). 
 
2.7 Ruling according to Human Law as opposed to Divine Law 
 
42
    The scholars of Qur’aanic exegesis had two main opinions regarding the 
applicability of the verse, "Whosoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed, 
 This issue alone is a subject 
of great debate in our current times especially amongst those who have been 
influenced by Khawaarij beliefs. 
 
                                                 
41 Details regarding this principle will be detailed in the section on Aboo Hamza.  
42 See Hukum bi Ghayr ma Anzala Allah by Dr. 'Abd al-Rahmaan Ibn Saalih al-Mahmood (1999) for 
details regarding this issue and the classical scholars’ stance pertaining to it. 
  
such are of the disbelievers" (Qur’aan 1996:5:44). Some said it was a general verse 
applicable to anyone who does not rule or judge in accordance with Islaamic laws. 
Others said it was restricted to the Jews, as it was revealed about two Jewish tribes 
who sought arbitration from the Prophet Muhammad. One of the tribes secretly sent 
some people to attempt to gain knowledge about his verdict in the matter, and they 
decided before hand that if the dispute was not in their favor they would not accept his 
judgment, so the verse was revealed about them.43
     As it has already been mentioned the orthodox scholars agree that not judging by 
Allah's laws is a major sin; however there are important details they highlight 
regarding when the ruler is considered to be out of the fold of Islaam (al-Fawzaan 
2004:105). "Ibn 'Abbaas and Taawoos 
 The correct opinion is that the 
verses are general in their applicability, and refer to anyone who does not rule in 
accordance with Islaamic law, whether he is a ruler, or someone from the general 
Muslim population. The issue of ruling by human law as opposed to divine law is “not 
restricted to judges, leaders and princes, but rather it includes anyone who judges 
between two parties, like a teacher and his students, a father and his children etc…” 
(al-’Utaybee 2005:15). The biggest area of contention between the Khawaarij belief 
and the orthodox belief is the condition of the ruler, and when he is considered to be 
out of the fold of Islaam because of his ruling by other than the sharee’a. 
 
44
                                                 
43 See Tafseer Ibn Katheer (1997/1: 61-62) for more details regarding the verse. 
44 A Taabi'ee: a student of a companion of the Prophet Muhammad.  
  
it then he is an oppressive sinner" (al-Baghawee 2002:381). Ibn al-Jawzee, (died 1201 
AD), said: 
 
          And the decisive speech in this regard is that whoever does not judge by what    
          Allah revealed, while rejecting it in belief (jahada), and he knows that it is  
          Allah who revealed it, as the Jews did, then he is a disbeliever. And whoever  
          does not judge by what Allah has revealed, inclining to his desires without  
          rejecting it (in belief) then he is an oppressive and wicked sinner (cited in Rafiq  
          1998:2). 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim, a scholar of the 13th century and student of Ibn Taymeeya, also 
believed that the ruler’s condition should be evaluated before passing a judgment of 
takfeer upon him. He said regarding the ruler: 
 
          If he believes in the obligation of judging by what Allah has revealed in this    
          situation, but turned away from it-out of disobedience-and while   
          acknowledging that he is deserving of punishment then this is kufr asghar. And  
          if he believes that it is not obligatory, and that he has a choice in the matter- 
          along with his firm belief that it is the judgment of Allah-then this is kufr  
          akbar-and if he was ignorant in the matter or made an error then he is one who  
          errs (Mukhtee') and his ruling is the same for those who err (cited in 
          Rafiq 1998:2). 
 
 
said: This is not the disbelief that constitutes 
infidelity, instead if he rules by other than divine law then he has committed an act of 
disbelief and this is not like the one who disbelieves in the Last Day" (al-Baghawee 
2002:381). This statement forms the foundation of the orthodox position as it is from 
some of the earliest scholars who explained the Qur’aan. It should be noted that it 
appears they distinguished between major and minor disbelief in the above statement. 
Another classical scholar 'Ataa` said, "It is disbelief less than disbelief, and tyranny 
less that tyranny, and wickedness less than wickedness" (al-Baghawee 2002:381). 
Here a definite distinction is made between the two types of disbelief regarding ruling 
by other than the sharee’a. 'Ikrimah, another Taabi’ee known for his Qur’aanic 
exegesis mentioned, "The meaning of this verse is whoever does not rule by divine 
law while rejecting it has disbelieved, and whoever agrees with it but does not rule by 
From amongst more contemporary scholars, ‘Afeefee mentions three types of rulers, 
"The first being the one who is not striving to rule by Allah's laws. He does not 
consult the scholars, and he worships Allah without purpose or clarity (baseerah), and 
he makes judgments in disputes between people, so he is a misguided sinner" 
(‘Afeefee 1992:63). So, this one is a major sinner but still in the fold of Islaam and his 
judgments are based upon ignorance. Then he mentions the one "who knows the truth 
and is pleased with Allah's judgment, but sometimes is overtaken by his desires so he 
acts in opposition to Allah's laws, or judges between the people in some matters or 
cases in contradiction to what he knows is from religious law; like bribery, and 
partisanship. Then he is a sinner, but not a disbeliever" (‘Afeefee 1992:63). The third 
type of ruler is the one "who used to be associated with Islaam, knowledgeable of its 
rulings, and then he makes a new law for the people by arranging a new system for 
them to adopt and be judged by, and he knows that this contradicts Islaamic rulings. 
Then he is a disbeliever, outside the religion of Islaam" (‘Afeefee 1992:64). In the 
same book Shaikh Hamad Ibn Ibraaheem al-Shatawee explains that "the Shaikh 
(‘Afeefee) meant here: whoever renounces ruling by the sharee’a relinquishing it 
  
totally in all affairs of life" (‘Afeefee 1992:63). Another contemporary scholar, al-
Fawzaan declares:  
 
          So apostasy is not pronounced on everyone who rules by other than what Allah     
          has revealed. Instead, there are details in this (matter) between whoever sees  
          that ruling by other than Allah's laws is better or the same as any other (law),  
          or that there is a choice (between ruling by Islaamic law or not) then this one is    
          judged as a disbeliever outside of Islaam (2004:105). 
 
Bin Baaz, the former Muftee (head scholar who passes religious verdicts) of Saudi 
Arabia, described the one who does not rule by Allah's law as being a disbeliever if he 
believes the common law he uses to be better than divine law. Likewise, the one who 
believes it is permissible to rule by another law, apart from Islaamic law, is also a 
disbeliever, even if he believes Islaamic law is better.  However, Bin Baaz held that 
the one who rules from his desires, or out of fear, making judgments to please others 
based on bribery, or for some other reason, is a major sinner still in the fold of Islaam. 
In addition, Bin Baaz made a condition that this ruler "knows he is disobedient to 
Allah, and that it is obligatory upon him to rule by Allah's law" (2001/4:416). Al-
Waadi'ee, another contemporary scholar of hadeeth, said, "If someone makes 
permissible what Allah has made unlawful, and he is knowledgeable [of what he does] 
and he is not forced, then he disbelieves…. Whoever makes judgments due to bribery 
has not become a disbeliever, but he has committed a major sin" (2002:147). Ibn al-
Qayyim said, “Then the issue of making something lawful is doing something 
believing it to be lawful” (Ibn al-Qayyim 2006/1:382).  This illustrates another 
striking difference between orthodox scholars and the Khawaarij, as the Khawaarij 
and the contemporary Takfeerees believe that recurrent sinfulness is making a 
transgression permissible thus expelling the one who is persistent in sin from the 
religion. Al-‘Utaybee said, “No one from the early scholars understood repetition of a 
sin to be istihlaal,45
     The concept of ruling by human laws is often referred to in contemporary literature 
by the following terms: tabdeel, and taghyeer or istibdaal, which both carry separate 
judgments. Al-‘Utaybee explains that tabdeel, “is governing by other than Allah the 
and if they had, they would have established this understanding 
before us” (al-‘Utaybee 2005:20).  
 
                                                 
45 Istihlaal is making sins prohibited by the religion lawful or vice versa. 
  
Almighty’s law and claiming that it is from Allah’s legislation” (al-‘Utaybee 2005:29). 
This is major disbelief that expels one from the religion. For example, a Muslim that 
fornicates believing it to be permissible, who is not excused by ignorance, 
misinterpretation, or being forced, has become a disbeliever. Istibdaal is “replacing 
the divine law with another law, without believing it to be permissible, nor doing so 
out of arrogance or deception, and without claiming the new law to be superior to 
divine law, equal to it or attributing it to divine legislation” (al-‘Utaybee 2005:35). 
This is the minor form of disbelief although it is a major sin. 
 
     Finally, what can be deduced from the statements of both classical and 
contemporary scholars is that if a Muslim makes judgments or legislates due to his 
weaknesses: fear, greed, or prejudice, while acknowledging its impermissibility, then 
he is not a disbeliever, but, instead, a major sinner. However, the one who makes 
judgments that go against Islaamic law permissible, or believes that they are equal, 
then he has left the fold of Islaam. 46
     In Islaam the position of the Muslim ruler is one of great esteem and he should be 
obeyed in all matters unless it involves disobedience to Allah: contradicts the Qur’aan 
and Sunna and the teachings of the Salaf (righteous predecessors). The Prophet said, 
"Obey the one who will be given the bai'a (pledge) first. Fulfill their (i.e., the caliphs) 
rights, for Allah will ask them about any shortcomings in ruling over their subjects 
whom Allah has placed under them" (al-Nawawee 1997/13:5).  The Prophet said 
regarding the ruler "obey him as long as he obeys Allah, and disobey him if he 
disobeys Allah" (al-Nawawee 1997/ 12:330). Disobedience to the ruler is only in 
matters in which the ruler commanded disobedience to Allah, as for other commands 
issued by the ruler, even if he is a tyrant, he should be obeyed and this is the 
  
 
2.8 Recognizing Leaders 
    
                                                 
46 Declaring something prohibited in Islaam as lawful expels one from the religion, however to judge 
someone with doing this is complicated as it can only be determined by outward actions or sayings of 
disbelief. Ahl al-Sunna only judge on the apparent not by what is in someone's heart and this is why an 
issue like takfeer is reserved for scholars and judges that know the impediments to takfeer and can 
issue a legal ruling regarding an individual (al-Rahaylee 2006:307). This issue distinguishes Ahl al-
Sunna from other sects because many groups attempt to make judgments upon what is inside peoples' 
hearts. There will be more discussion regarding this in chapter three the section on the modern day 
movements and groups.   
  
understanding of the orthodox creed.47 The Prophet said, "A ruler (of the Muslims) is 
a shield for them. They fight behind him, and they are protected by him. If he enjoins 
fear of Allah, the Exalted, and Glorious, and dispenses justice, there will be a reward 
for him; and if he enjoins otherwise, he will receive its consequences" (al-Nawawee 
1997/12:434). This shows that according to the Prophet the leader is held accountable 
in the hereafter and it is not for his subjects to rebel due to dissatisfaction or 
oppression. The Prophet said, "No obedience is due when it involves disobeying 
Allah, obedience is only in what Allah loves and all that Islam ordains" (al-Nawawee 
1997/12:428). Obedience is only in matters deemed lawful by Islaam and if the leader 
has open sins he should not be fought. One of the companions asked the Prophet if 
they should fight the sinful oppressive leaders by the sword. He replied, "No, as long 
as they observe prayers; and if you notice your rulers doing a hateful thing, hate what 
they do; but never quit obeying them" (al-Nawawee 1997/12/440). 'Ubaada Bin al-
Samit related a saying he heard from the Prophet in which he took the oath of 
allegiance and one of the conditions was that “we listen and obey (a Muslim ruler) 
whether it is convenient or inconvenient to us, and at our times of difficulty or ease. 
And … give him his right even if he did not give us our right, and not to fight against 
him unless we noticed him having plain kufr (disbelief) for which we would have a 
proof with us from Allah" (al-Nawawee 1997/12:441). So, unless open disbelief is 
witnessed or becomes apparent from the ruler and his case is taken to the most 
knowledgeable and experienced amongst religious scholars48
     According to classical and contemporary Salafee scholars before a ruler can be 
fought he must have clear, unequivocal and open disbelief and several conditions 
must be in place.
 he should not be fought, 
and classical scholars have laid down principles and conditions which must be in 
place before a leader is fought.  
 
49
                                                 
47 This means that his disobedience in some matters does not nullify his authority unlike the claim of 
many of the neo-Khawaarij. 
48 This is primarily due to the fact that the ruling of takfeer is a grave and serious matter and the general 
Muslims do not possess the ability and wisdom in religious matters to make judgments, rulings, and 
independent reasoning according to the religious texts and founding principles established by classical 
scholars (al-Shaafi’ee 2005:507-510).   
49 Refer to the section on the foundations of disbelief. 
  
looking out for the welfare of the general society" (al-Salafee 2001:24). So, ability 
and the general welfare of society must be considered before rebelling in order to 
prevent chaos.
 Firstly, according to Bin Baaz, "they should have the ability to 
remove the disbelieving tyrant; however if they do not possess the ability, they should 
not rebel, or if rebelling causes an even greater harm, then they should not rebel 
50 Bin Baaz went on to say regarding the Islaamic principle of avoiding 
the greater harm, "It is not permissible to remove an evil with what is a greater evil 
than it. Instead it is obligatory to fend of evil with what will remove it or lessen its 
harm. So fending off evil with a greater evil is not permissible according to Muslim 
consensus” (al-Salafee 2001:24). Then, according to the majority of scholars rebelling 
against the leader is only in exceptional cases and this differs with the Khawaarij 
belief.51 In addition, disbelief exhibited by the ruler should be open and apparent and 
there should be no dispute about his infidelity. For example, both contemporary and 
classical scholars disagree over whether the one who leaves the prayer has become an 
apostate. So, in this case the one to pass judgment upon this person should be a 
scholar or judge who is well-versed in knowledge, especially in matters of creed and 
jurisprudence. This is especially important because it is an issue which classical 
scholars have no consensus upon. Al-Rahaylee mentions, “The Salaf, may Allah have 
mercy upon them, differed regarding the takfeer of whoever leaves the four pillars of 
Islaam after agreeing upon the takfeer of whoever leaves the shahaada”52
     As was discussed in the previous chapter the Khawaarij was the first sect in Islaam 
to misuse the principle of takfeer (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:105). Therefore, there is a 
difference between the Khawaarij belief regarding takfeer and that of the orthodox 
 (al-
Rahaylee 2006:239).    
  
2.9 Declaring People to be Apostates  
 
                                                 
50 This was witnessed in Somalia after the fall of their president Siad Barre, and in Algeria when the 
political process failed. Also, in Egypt when Sadaat was killed it caused greater control and oppression 
of Muslim groups, and a more contemporary example is the chaos, and instability which has resulted 
from the invasion by America of Iraq. 
 51 Delong-Bas poses another view she asserts, “Contemporary fundamentalists have also taken a new 
approach to defining who qualifies as a “true Muslim.” In classical scholarship, the label of apostate 
could only be applied when a person either expressly abjured Islam or denied axiomatic articles of 
faith….Lack of adherence to Islamic law did not constitute sufficient grounds for accusations of 
apostasy for classical scholars other than Ibn Taymiyyah. Contemporary fundamentalists, on the other 
hand, citing Ibn Taymiyyah, argue that any ruler who does not apply Islamic law in its entirety has 
committed apostasy and therefore deserves to be overthrown” (Delong-Bas 2004:242). As this section 
illustrates, classical scholars as far back as the companion Ibn ‘Abbaas viewed ruling by other than the 
sharee'a as a type of disbelief, but before making takfeer, the condition of the ruler must be considered. 
  
52 The shahaada is the first pillar of Islaam and it is the saying with belief and knowledge that one 
ammad is the last Messenger htestifies that there is no God worthy of worship except Allah and that Mu
of God.   
  
creed. The word takfeer as an Islaamic term means to declare someone to be an 
apostate from the religion. The Salafee scholars are cautious when referring to takfeer 
as an Islaamic principle by making statements such as "a person is not judged with 
disbelief, unless Allah and his messenger have declared him a disbeliever for 
committing a sin from the things which nullify one’s Islaam" (al-Fawzaan 2004b:6). 
So, it appears that contemporary Salafee scholars are careful in the use of language 
when referring to apostasy. This is probably due to the seriousness of declaring one an 
apostate, and their strict adherence to the language and methodology used by the 
classical scholars. “So, takfeer or declaring someone an innovator or sinner are 
Islaamic judgments, therefore its rulings are taken from Islaamic law and it is not for 
anyone to declare someone to be an apostate, or sinner, or innovator, or to be 
misguided except with evidence" (al-Raajhee 2005:115). The accusation that someone 
is heretical or has committed an act of apostasy must be established by sound 
evidence as slander is punishable under Islaamic law.  The Prophet said, "Abusing a 
Muslim is fusuq (an act of disobedience) and killing him is an act of kufr (disbelief)" 
(al-Nawawee 1997/1:242). In another narration which was collected by al-Bukhaaree 
and explained by Ibn Hajr, the Prophet said, "…whoever accuses a Muslim of 
disbelief, then it is as if he killed him" (1996/12: 83).  These narrations exemplify the 
seriousness of making takfeer and that the one that does so carries an enormous 
responsibility, and should be a scholar of the religion. Because declaring a Muslim to 
be a disbeliever by mistake is a major sin, and both classical and contemporary 
scholars agree to this (al-Jibreen 2005:26). 
 
  2.9.1 Categories of Takfeer 
    
    The classification of takfeer into different categories was unknown to the early 
scholars, though the concepts themselves are derived from the Qur’aan and Sunna and 
statements of the early scholars. Takfeer is divided into two main categories: takfeer 
al-mutlaq (absolute), and takfeer al-mu'ayyan (specific) (al-Ghazaalee 1937/3:123). 
However, some scholars divide takfeer into a third category: takfeer al-kullee (the 
total takfeer), which is a type of the absolute takfeer (al-Rahaylee 2001/1:190).  
 
     The absolute takfeer is the general category of takfeer, which states that if 
someone commits a particular sin he becomes a disbeliever. For example, it is known 
  
as a principle of the orthodox creed that whoever says that the Qur’aan is created is a 
disbeliever, or whoever denies one of Allah's characteristics that is proven from the 
Qur’aan, or the authentic Sunna, then he is also a disbeliever. One of the evidences for 
this type of takfeer is the saying of Allah, “Surely, in disbelief are they who say that 
Allah is the Messiah, son of Mary” (Qur’aan 1996/5:17). Imaam Aboo Haneefa said, 
“Whoever says Allah’s attributes and actions are created, or that they have a 
beginning or end, or express doubt in this matter, then he is a disbeliever in Allah the 
Almighty” (Al-Qaaree 1997:16). Imaam al-Nawawee described the absolute takfeer 
by saying, “In reality it is leaving Islaam. Sometimes this occurs by saying or an 
action that necessitates disbelief like intending to openly mock the religion, or 
prostrating to a statue or the sun or dropping the Qur’aan in filth” (al-Nawawee 
2002:1725).   Many of the books of jurisprudence refer to this principle in the chapter 
of apostasy (Kitaab al-Ridda), and the scholars are at variance with one another in 
regards to the specific actions that expel one from Islaam. Takfeer al-mutlaq is a 
general ruling that applies to an individual who commits an action of disbelief; 
however there are conditions before making takfeer on a specific individual (takfeer 
al-mu'ayyan), and these will be mentioned in the section on the conditions of takfeer. 
 
     The specific takfeer is "applying the judgment of takfeer upon an individual who 
uttered a saying of disbelief, or an individual who did an act of disbelief, thereby 
fulfilling the conditions of takfeer and negating the obstructions to it" (al-Rahaylee 
2001/1:192). So, the state of being of an individual must be considered before making 
takfeer upon him and certain conditions must be in place. Allah says, “Allah sets forth 
an example for those who disbelieve: the wife of Noah and the wife of Lot” (Qur’aan 
1996/66:10). In this verse Allah made takfeer of specific individuals decreeing them 
to be non-Muslims. An example of this type of takfeer being put in to practice is if a 
specific individual mocked the Qur’aan, or the Prophet, which is a major sin that 
expels one from the religion. Then the matter should be turned over to a judge who 
would evaluate the condition of the specific individual to determine whether he was 
sane and aware of his sin, not forced, or ignorant of the ruling. Then the person who 
mocked the Qur’aan should be provided with the clear evidence to make sure he or 
she understands this sin expels one from Islaam. If the individual repents then he or 
she remains Muslim. But, if the individual continues to commit this particular sin then 
he or she becomes a disbeliever. The specific takfeer is only made upon an individual 
  
after establishing the proofs from the Qur’aan and the Sunna, and the opinions of the 
scholars, and it is done with meticulous care and caution as it is a serious issue to 
declare one a disbeliever.  
 
      Finally, the total takfeer (takfeer al-kullee) is a type of the absolute takfeer which 
is practiced by both classical scholars and some of the neo-Khawaarij groups like 
Jamaa'a al-Takfeer wa al-Hijra. This group used to declare anyone who was not with 
them to be disbelievers, and this constitutes making takfeer of whole groups, societies, 
and nations. However, the takfeer of entire groups, for example, Jews and Christians, 
is recognized by the Qur'aan. Allah says, “Verily, those who disbelieve from the 
People of the Scripture [Jews and Christians] and the pagans will be in the hell-fire” 
(1996/98:6). Allah says in another verse, “Then a group of the children of Israel 
believed and a group disbelieved” (Qur’aan 1996/611:14). This illustrates that whole 
groups and nations of people that share a particular set of beliefs can be classified as 
disbelievers. This type of takfeer was also practiced by classical scholars as it is 
known "that the Salaf (pious predecessors) made takfeer of some of the sects of the 
people of innovation, which is a form of absolute takfeer, and it did not necessitate 
making takfeer of every individual of that sect" (al-Rahaylee 2001/1:190). Through 
analyzing this statement it can be deduced that the classical scholars were extremely 
cautious in making takfeer, but some sects that arose from Islaam had heretical 
practices that contained undisputable disbelief necessitating their expulsion from 
Islaam. However, it must be reiterated that before making takfeer of an individual 
who is considered a Muslim certain conditions must be met. 
 
2.9.2 Conditions of Takfeer  
 
 Before charging an individual with infidelity, there are certain conditions that 
must be in place after observing disbelief in their actions or sayings. These conditions 
are as follows: that the person must be mature and sane, also the person should 
possess freewill and not have been under compulsion.  Furthermore, the ruling for the 
action or saying of disbelief should be explained to him, and he should not have 
committed the sin by misinterpreting the text (al-Rahaylee 2001/1:201). In addition, 
to these conditions the person should have performed an act or expression of disbelief 
intentionally not mistakenly. The conditions of takfeer are directly related with the 
general criterion of takfeer. 
  
     The criterion for making takfeer are general principles established in the religion 
which show the relationship of faith and the individual, and they are as follows: the 
origin of a Muslim is that his Islaam is authentic until there is clear evidence to 
suggest otherwise. The second criterion is that the orthodox scholars do not make 
takfeer for major sins, unless it is a sin that is specifically mentioned by the Qur’aan 
or Sunna as expelling one from the religion. Al-Rahaylee points out that “deciding 
whether a sinful action is disbelief or not is referred back to the Qur’aan and Sunna 
and there ceases to be independent reasoning in these matters. There is no room for 
interpretive opinion related to belief, or speech or actions of the limbs, instead it is the 
right of Allah and his Messenger” (2006:225). The third criterion for applying takfeer 
is that the one who displays characteristics of disbelief rejects what is known from the 
religion by necessity either by being arrogant or intentionally denying what they know 
to be true. The fourth criterion is that it cannot be claimed that an individual is a 
disbeliever and will dwell in the hell-fire after their death, because this is an affair of 
the afterlife for Allah to judge (Baky 1997:19).53
     The most commonly referred to obstruction to declaring someone an apostate is 
ignorance: whether or not the action or saying of disbelief was excusable due to 
ignorance. The scholars have written at length about this issue devoting whole 
volumes to it.
 
 
2.9.3 Impediments to making Takfeer 
 
     There are several factors which excuse someone from being labeled an apostate 
and these are considered impediments to making takfeer by contemporary scholars. 
Some of the obstructions to making takfeer are: excuse of ignorance, being forced to 
commit an act or saying of disbelief, and misinterpretation (al-Rahaylee 2006:288). 
The obstruction of ignorance is probably the most common amongst these 
impediments to making takfeer so it will be discussed in detail. 
  
54
                                                 
53 According to the sharee’a individuals can only be judged by their actions and sayings as the intention 
aylee 2006:273).This criterion is applicable to hRa-atter of the heart and for Allah to judge (alis a m
those who not explicitly mentioned in the Qur'aan or Sunna as being disbelievers and dwelling in the 
hell-fire. 
 54 See the book ‘Aaridh al-Jahl by Abee‘Ulaa Bin Raashid al-Raashid (2003).  
  
Islaam may abandon the prayer and at the same time may not be aware that leaving 
the prayer is considered disbelief by the majority of Islaamic jurists (al-Rahaylee 
2006:239). Another example would be the person who lives isolated from the Muslim 
community and may not be aware of the prohibition of alcohol and believes that its 
consumption is lawful which leads him or her to declare it so. Also, there are issues 
that the general Muslim community may not be aware of, or knowledgeable about, 
due to their complexity, and this is also considered excusable by Muslim scholars. 
There are many hadeeth narrations which confirm that ignorance is excusable. In a 
narration recorded by Ibn Maaja, Mu'aadh Ibn Jabal, a companion of the Prophet 
returned from the land of Sham and when he saw the Prophet he prostrated to him. 
The Prophet said, "What is this O Mu’aadh?" 'He said, I arrived in Sham and found 
the people making prostration to their rulers and religious men, so I intended to 
prostrate before you." (Ibn Maaja 1993/1:595). The Prophet responded by 
commanding him not to do that with a very stern condemnation. However, he did not 
make takfeer of him due to his misinterpretation because "he thought that prostration 
was a type of greeting and veneration which was permissible to give to created beings. 
Therefore, the Prophet did not charge him with disbelief nor accuse him of sin, 
instead it was sufficient to prohibit him from that and make clear for him that one 
should not prostrate to anyone except Allah" (al-Rahaylee 2001/1:196). There are 
many other narrations which illustrate that ignorance and misinterpretation are 
excusable in Islaam. Imaam Shaafi'ee said regarding this matter that "the one who 
strives and rejects Allah's divine names and attributes, and continues to reject them 
after the proofs have been presented to him has become a disbeliever. However, he is 
excused due to ignorance before the proofs have been presented to him" (Ibn Hajr 
1995/13:407). This statement illustrates how the classical scholars made it conditional 
even in important issues of creed that to establish the proof upon an individual before 
making takfeer is essential and that ignorance is excusable. However, Imaam al-
Nawawee considered one who denied zakaat (charity) as a disbeliever, and likewise 
anyone who denied any aspect of faith which the Muslim community has agreed upon. 
He said, “If the knowledge of an action is widespread like five times daily prayer, 
fasting during Ramadan, washing bodily impurities, the prohibition of adultery and 
alcohol [then an individual who denies these things has disbelieved]…. except the 
new convert to Islaam who denies something from the religion out of ignorance of its 
prohibition, then he is not declared a disbeliever" (al-Nawawee 1997/1:205). Ibn al-
 This issue includes an individual, who is new to the religion and does 
not kno  the ruling pertaining to an obligatory action he may have abandoned, or an 
action or statement of disbelief he may have made. For example, a new convert to 
  
Qayyim said, "Verily, Allah the Glorified and Mighty does not punish anyone until 
after the proof has been established upon them according to his statement, 'And we 
never punish until we have sent a messenger to give warning'" (Ibn al-Qayyim 
1973:413). Ibn al-Qayyim explained that the punishment referred to in this verse was 
for arrogance and stubbornness by refusing to accept the truth after it was made clear 
to them. Therefore, it is important to make clear to an individual their action of 
disbelief before making a judgment upon them otherwise they may be excused on the 
grounds of ignorance. 
     
     There are some actions and sayings that necessitate takfeer as they are considered 
essential knowledge of faith that all Muslims should know. "So there is no excuse of 
ignorance for issues that are clear and undisputable and this is the belief of both Ibn 
Taymeeya and Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab, because to be made aware of the 
proof and to establish the proof are conditions of takfeer and it is not a condition to 
understand the proof” (al-Raajhee 2005:112). Imaam Aboo Haneefa mentioned things 
like prayer, fasting, and al-ruboobeeya as aspects of the religion every Muslim should 
know (al-Khumees 1999:95). So, according to classical scholars there are issues 
which are necessary for all Muslims to know and practice, and ignorance in these 
matters are inexcusable and can lead to disbelief. According to al-Raajhee, and some 
classical scholars, someone is not excused for not understanding evidence in an issue 
after it has been conveyed to them. In such a case if they have been made aware of 
their sin or mistake which justifies their expulsion from Islaam and they persist, then 
they have become apostates (al-Raajhee 2005:113).  Some of the beliefs that one must 
possess as a Muslim are belief in Allah and his angels, and messengers as well as the 
other pillars of faith. Those claim they are Muslim but deny any of the pillars of faith 
after it has been made clear to them then they are not Muslim (al-Raajhee 2005:113).  
 
     Classical and contemporary scholars have differed in respect of establishing proof 
against an individual before declaring takfeer. There are two views. For some scholars 
conveying the proof from the Qur’aan and Sunna that an individual has fallen into 
disbelief is sufficient and understanding those proofs is not a condition for making 
takfeer. For example, a person new to Islaam may not know the real meaning of 
Islaamic monotheism and may declare there is only one God worthy of worship and at 
the same time he may sacrifice an animal to other than Allah not realizing that 
  
sacrificing is an act of worship in Islaam. Those who support the first view might say 
it is sufficient to explain the proofs from the Qur’aan and Sunna to this individual and 
if he does not leave this act he will become a disbeliever. In this regard Muhammad 
Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab said, "And establishing the proof is one thing, and conveying it 
is something else. And the evidence had already been presented to the disbelievers 
and takfeer was declared upon them by conveying the message of monotheism, and 
they did not comprehend it" (al-‘Aasimee 2004/10:93). In addition, he offered the 
example of the Prophet when he commanded his companions to fight the Khawaarij 
who were presented evidence of their errors without comprehending it and so the 
companions fought them. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab also said, "It is well known that 
establishing (the proof) does not mean that one understands the speech of Allah and 
his Messenger like Aboo Bakr al-Siddeeq. Instead if the speech of Allah and his 
Messenger were conveyed to him, excluding what he was excused for, then he is a 
disbeliever like the disbelievers who all had the proof established upon them by the 
Qur’aan" (cited in al-Raashid 2004:51). From the above statements it can be deduced 
that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab did not make it a condition to understand the proof before 
making takfeer of an individual, but instead he felt it was necessary to merely convey 
the proof. Shaikh Hamad Ibn Naasir Ibn Ma’moor a student of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd 
al-Wahhaab said, "All those who were conveyed the message of the Qur’aan and the 
call of the Messenger have had the proof established upon them" (cited in al-Raashid 
2004:51).  
       
     Still for other scholars like al-Rahaylee conveyance is not sufficient alone but 
rather the individual should be made to understand his error. Al-Rahaylee said:  
          
          So, the scholars have differed in establishing the proof upon an individual and   
          have two sayings. The first view is the proof is established upon an individual     
          by conveying it to him and by making him understand it, knowing what is   
          meant by it and many of the people of knowledge support this saying. From  
          amongst them is Ibn 'Arabee and Ibn Qudaama and Shaikh al-Islaam Ibn  
          Taymeeya and Ibn al-Qayyim… (2001/1:206).   
 
Ibn al-Qayyim said, regarding the opinion that it is sufficient to convey the evidence 
to an individual without his comprehension of it, "this does not make sense or agree 
with the saying of the Almighty: 'and whoever contradicts and opposes the Messenger 
after the right path has been shown clearly to him.' which the scholars have built their 
  
saying: 'verily the understanding of the call to Islaam with its evidences is a condition 
for establishing the proof'" (cited in Ma’aash 1996:231).  
 
     Finally, from these statements it can be deduced that the classical scholars are not 
in exact agreement over the conditions of conveying the evidence to an individual: 55
     Most of the sources that chronicle the life of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab come from one 
of four types: his supporters, polemical sources written by his opponents, Western 
travelers and Orientalists, and the works of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab himself (Delong-
Bas 2004:14). This information is critical when considering or assessing Ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhaab’s life as there exists various, often contradictory claims about his life and 
 
whether understanding the proof is a condition before making takfeer or that it 
requires only conveying the evidence. However, they are in agreement that it is a 
necessity to establish the proof before making takfeer of an individual. It appears that 
the strongest opinion is that one should comprehend the evidence being presented to 
him before being judged with disbelief. However, if “…the lack of understanding is a 
result of avoiding the textual evidences or negligence in seeking guidance in anyway, 
then there is no excuse for this, and Ibn al-Qayyim’s explanation is similar to this” 
(al-Rahaylee 2006:270). 
 
2.10 Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and the Creed of Takfeer 
 
     Probably one of the most controversial and misunderstood figures regarding the 
issue of takfeer is Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab. Due to his strong religious 
convictions and heading the revival movement in the Arab peninsula, he is strongly 
associated by his detractors, both Muslim and non-Muslim alike, as a central figure in 
the neo-Takfeeree movement. Often terms like extremism and rebellion are mentioned 
when discussing his movement and those who follow his teachings are considered 
"Wahhaabees" and heretics (Allen 2006:4). Due to the great controversy that 
surrounds his beliefs and its association with the neo-Takfeeree movement it is 
essential to analyze his creed and compare it with that of the Khawaarij. 
 
                                                 
55 It is important to note that in issues of jurisprudence differences of opinions are generally accepted 
and acknowleged; however in matters of creed it is generally not tolerated amongst orthodox scholars 
unless it is an issue where no clear evidence from the Qur’aan or Sunna exists then the scholars may 
resort to knowledge based interpretation (al-Ethiopee 2005/1:178).  
  
creed.  Delong-Bas concludes, “Of all those accounts, the chronicles contain the most 
biographical information and are considered to be the most accurate in terms of 
biographical information because of the proximity of the writers to their subjects” 
(2004:14).   
 
     Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab was born in 1695 in 'Uyaynah a city in what is 
today the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He memorized the Qur’aan before he was ten 
years old and he studied various Islaamic sciences with a variety of different scholars 
(Mutaww'a 2003:86). 
 
     According to those supportive of the ideals espoused by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab, 
during his life time most of the Muslim world and especially the Arab peninsula had 
become saturated with idol and grave worship and it had become common practice to 
go to the graves of saints to pray to them and seek their intercession. Also, pilgrimage 
was performed to the graves of people who called to the worship of themselves during 
their lifetime and these acts were believed to bring people closer to Allah (al-'Umar 
2001:8). According to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab, many of the common people and even 
some scholars approved and participated in these acts of worship which according to 
him contradict the authentic texts and Islaamic creed (Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and Ibn 
Taymeeya 1999: 125). Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab compared them with the original 
disbelievers at the time of the Prophet who “… supplicated with Allah those who 
were favored by Him: either the Prophets, or the angels, or to trees or stones which 
are obedient to Allah. So this differs from the sinners of our time, who associate the 
vilest people with Allah” (al-Fawzaan 2001:92).56 Although all acts of worship 
ascribed to other than Allah or with him are a form of polytheism and disbelief, some 
of the people who associated themselves with Islaam during the time of Ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhaab supplicated to the dead and sought blessings and intercession from trees.57
 
 
 
                                                 
56 In referencing some authors the researcher refers to the explanation of the text by authoritative 
sources instead of the original text as it provides additional insight when attempting to explain the 
meaning of the text.    
57  “There were in al-Uyaynah at that time a number of trees on which the local populace was in the 
habit of hanging things in order to request the tree’s blessing or intercession on their behalf. Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab believed that this practice constituted a direct and serious violation of tawhid because it 
visibly proclaimed the belief that something other than God had the power to grant blessings and 
intercede for people” (Delong-Bas 2004:24).  
  
2.10.1 Detractors of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab  
 
     There are a number of critics of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab and his movement, both 
Muslim and non-Muslim alike, which, in all fairness, would require volumes in order 
to address or even document. This researcher has selected the most frequently 
mentioned claims asserted against Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab. In establishing this link one 
commentator claimed, "Like the Kharijites, the Wahhabi viewed all Muslims who 
resisted as unbelievers (who could be fought and killed). They were therefore to be 
subdued in the name of Islamic egalitarianism" (Esposito 2003:48). AbuKhalil, a 
contemporary writer and critic of Saudi Arabia states, "The Wahhabiyyah clerics 
believe that it is morally safer to preserve the lifestyle and conditions of the early 
companions of the Prophet, as impractical as this is" (2002:65). Here AbuKhalil 
criticizes the whole methodology of the movement, declaring it backward and 
irrelevant, as if to say the foundation upon which the religion was built: the 
companions and their understanding, has no place in the modern era. He goes on to 
say that "Wahhabiyyah cannot be sure as to whether the modern innovations in 
people's lives are satanic in origin or not so they tend to ban them altogether just to be 
safe" (AbuKhalil 2002:65). One of the foremost critics in the West, who is often 
heralded as a 'scholar of Islam', is Bernard Lewis who claimed while describing Ibn 
'Abd al-Wahhaab’s movement that "they enforced their beliefs with the utmost 
severity and ferocity, demolishing tombs,58 desecrating what they called false and 
idolatrous holy places, and slaughtering large numbers of men, women, and children59
                                                 
58 Many allegations of extremism made against Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and his movement are the result 
of some of the actions he and his followers performed in the name of implementing tawheed: “the 
cutting down of a sacred tree, the destruction of a tomb monument, and the stoning of an adulteress” 
(Delong-Bas 2004: 24).   
59  In 1802, an alleged massacre took place in the city of Taif by the followers of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab. 
However, a couple of points must be considered before passing judgment upon the whole movement 
and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab. Firstly, the evidence shows that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab did not approve of 
such actions and his many military campaigns illustrate this. “However much he denounced certain 
practices or beliefs, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never called for wholesale killing of people, not even apostates. 
Rather, he proclaimed the need to call people to Islam and to educate them” (Delong-Bas 2004:82). 
Secondly, this alleged massacre took place approximately ten years after his death and “although 
observers and historians have assumed that any and all military activity undertaken by Saudis after the 
1744 alliance were jihad activities, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings and writings do not support this 
contention” (Delong-Bas 2004:35).   
  
who failed to meet their standards of Islamic purity and authenticity"
 
60
Some of the most persistent claims and accusations against Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhaab are that he made takfeer of all Muslims who did not agree with his concept 
of Islaam, he was a rebel, and a heretic.
 (Lewis 
2004:122).  
 
     Some of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab’s critics within the Muslim community 
attribute takfeer and Khawaarij-like characteristics to him. One such critic Aboo 
Zahra said, "They (meaning those who follow Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab) 
resemble the Khawaarij who used to declare disbelief upon those who committed 
major sins" (cited in al-Hussayn 1999:274). Al-Saawee claimed while explaining a 
verse from the Qur’aan that "this verse was revealed about the Khawaarij who 
distorted and misinterpreted the Book and the Sunna and made lawful the blood and 
wealth of the Muslims like is witnessed in the group similar to them called the 
Wahhaabees" (al-Hussayn 1999:274). Ibn 'Afaaliq said regarding Ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhaab, "By Allah he lied about the messengers, and accused them and their 
communities of polytheism" (cited in al-Hussayn 1999:282). Their criticisms can be 
summed up in a single statement by one of his skeptics who said: 
   
          You have expelled the whole nation from the religion, and expelled those who   
          did not utter a saying of misguidance or disbelief and you made lawful their  
          blood, wealth, and progeny. And you said to a people who have been upon the       
          religion six hundred years that they are upon nothing. You made it a condition  
          upon whoever wants to join your religion that he bear witness against himself  
          and his parents that they were disbelievers (cited in Aali al-Shaikh 2002:57). 
 
61 
 
2.10.2 Discourse over the Concept of Tawass
      His understanding of tawa
ul  
 
ss
                                                 
60  Delong-Bas states, “The main issue at stake with respect to deviant behavior was Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s denunciation of sexual immorality his insistence that people of the region adhere to proper 
Islamic standards of sexual behavior, that is, reserving sexual relations for marriage” (2004:23). 
61 Delong-Bas suggests that much of the initial opposition to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab came not so much 
from his teachings, but rather political expediency. She states, “However, the fact that his teachings 
were accepted until local authorities began to feel that their bases of power were threatened makes it 
clear that the issues were really about power struggles and not so much about heretical religious 
teachings” (2004:20). 
  
accusations of heresy, those most critical of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab suggest that his 
understanding of tawa
ul was one of the main causes for him declaring 
others to be non-Muslim, thus it merits some discussion and overview. Aside from 
ssul is faulty and thus unorthodox, and in turn he implies in his 
treatises that those who misconstrue this concept fall into heresy,62 which may lead to 
polytheism. Tawassul, technically, refers to seeking to come closer to Allah by 
performing acts of worship legislated by the sharee’a. Tawassul is also considered a 
form of intercession, as will be explained in the forthcoming examples. According to 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab three types of tawassul are permissible: imploring Allah by His 
divine names and attributes, imploring Him by mentioning a righteous action or deed 
one has performed, or a person may ask a righteous living person to supplicate for 
him or her. These three types of tawassul are generally agreed upon by religious 
scholars (Ibn Taymeeya 1996:1/201). However, some of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab’s 
critics contend that it is permissible to implore dead saints and prophets in order to 
have one’s prayers accepted by Allah. This form of tawassul is considered forbidden 
and a type of polytheism according to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and many of the classical 
scholars that proceeded him (Ibn Taymeeya 1999: 21). 63 Those who believe this type 
of tawassul to be permissible cite hadeeth narrations to corroborate their view. One of 
the most well known historians and critics of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab, and a proponent 
of this view of tawassul, was Ahmad Zainee Dahlaan.64  
 
     Dahlaan insists that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab was mistaken, and in fact heretical, in 
his conception of tawass
                                                 
62 Tawassul can be characterized into two categories: permissible, and sinful, meaning that it has no 
origin in the Qur’aan or the authentic hadeeth of the Prophet. Furthermore, sinful practices may further 
be divided into those practices that are heretical and those that are simply sinful (Al-Rahaylee 
2001/1:103). This concept of innovation  was acknowledged by the Taabi’een as Aboo Haneefa, 
Awzaa’ee, Hasan al-Basree, ‘Umar  bin ‘Abd al-‘Azeez and many later scholars acknowledged these 
divisions and this appears to be the most supported opinion, according to the textual evidences and 
majority of the Sunni scholars regarding innovation: all unorthodoxy in worship is impermissible (al-
Faasee 2003/1:44).      
63 If a person invokes the dead directly then this is polytheism according to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab, 
however, if someone supplicates to Allah directly but says for instance, “O Allah please answer my 
supplication by the esteemed status of your Prophet,” then this is an act of worship that has no origin in 
the religion and is thus sinful. Imaam Aboo Haneefa said, “It is not permissible for anyone to 
supplicate to Allah except by Him directly and this type of supplication is permissible, in fact it has 
been commanded” (al-Khumees 1996:269).  
64 Ahmad Zainee Dahlaan was born in 1231 Hijra in Makka about twenty years after the death of Ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhaab. He was known for his opposition to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and his movement and 
has written several treatises in attempt to refute Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab’s concept of monotheism, and 
criticizing his movement. 
ul and that his perception was restrictive in nature and thus 
led to excessive pronouncements of takfeer:  
 
  
          He deviated in his heterodoxy by misguiding and seducing the  
          ignorant, and differing with the scholars of the religion until he reached the  
          point of making takfeer of the believers claiming that visiting the grave of the  
          Prophet -may Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him- seeking his intercession,  
          and that of the other prophets, saints, and righteous people was polytheism.  
          Also he declared invoking the Prophet…while seeking his intercession to be  
          paganism (Dahlaan 2007:1).  
 
      One of the greatest claims Dahlaan made against Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab was that 
the evidences he used to refute intercession of the dead were Qur’aanic verses that 
applied to the pagan Arabs during the time of the Prophet, and not Muslims. It will 
suffice to mention some of the verses that Dahlaan mentioned in his treatises that he 
believed Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab had misconstrued (2007:2). Allah says, “And who is 
more astray than one who invokes besides Allah, such that will not answer him until 
the Day of Resurrection, and who are unaware of their invocation of them?” 
(1996:658/46:5). Also Allah the Almighty says, “And invoke not besides Allah any 
such that will not profit you nor harm you” (Qur’aan 1996/10:106). Dahlaan 
comments upon the aforementioned verses that “there are many verses in the Qur’aan 
like this: so Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab said that whoever invokes the 
Prophet … seeking his assistance to remove something harmful (istighaatha) or any 
of the prophets, saints, and pious people or invokes him or seeks his intercession, 
becomes like those pagans according to the general meaning of those verses” (2007:2).  
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab’s assertion seems to be in accordance with the position held by 
classical scholars in that the apparent meaning of those verses seem to be applicable 
to anyone,65 whether Muslim or non-Muslim, and a general prohibition of tawass
                                                 
65 “The companions -may Allah be pleased with them- understood and practiced the texts of the 
Qur’aan and Sunna in accordance to there general meaning unless there was clear evidence to support a 
text being specific in meaning” (Al-Jeezaanee 2003: 322).   
ul or 
istighaatha of those who are unable to fulfill that which is requested of them, which 
certainly includes the dead. However, this variance over the meaning of those verses 
necessitates returning to classical interpretations. Ibn ‘Abbaas said while commenting 
upon the above verse that “and ‘invoke not’ means do not worship that which will not 
benefit you in this world or the hereafter, and can cause you no harm if you refuse to 
worship it” (1992:230). Imaam al-Baghawee commented by saying that invocation is 
worship and by worshipping those who are unable to profit you (by being obedient to 
them) and are incapable of causing you harm if you are disobedient, then you have 
committed polytheism by worshipping those who do not deserve to be worshipped 
  
(2002:612). These verses apply to anyone who violates the concept of monotheism by 
persisting in polytheistic practices even if they claim to be Muslim or were raised in 
an Islaamic environment, because it shows they do not understand central tenets of the 
Islaamic faith.66 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab states, “So it seems strange that one who 
claims Islaam does not know the meaning of the statement La Ilaaha Illallah (there is 
no God worthy of worship except Allah) when even the ignorant disbeliever 
understands its meaning, whereas the one who claims Islaam thinks it is simply 
enough to pronounce this statement without believing it in his heart” (al-Fawzaan 
2001:47).             
 
     In contrast, Dahlaan believes it is Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab’s perception of 
monotheism, false exegesis of Qur’aanic passages, and restrictive concept of tawassul 
that causes him to make takfeer of Muslims who seek intercession from their dead 
saints. Dahlaan, commenting on Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab’s supposed takfeer, states: 
 
           And he explained Qur'aanic verse concerning the polytheists in their idol    
           worship: ‘We worship them only that they may bring us closer to Allah’  
           (1996/39:3). Those who seek to make tawass
                                                 
66 However, before attempting to pass a judgment upon such persons who claim to be adherents of the 
Islaamic faith the conditions of takfeer should be in place, refer to the section on takfeer.   
ul are like those polytheists who  
           say,’ We worship them only that they may bring us closer to Allah’(1996/39:3).   
           Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab said, ‘So, those pagans did not believe that those idols   
           could create something, rather they believed Allah the Almighty was the  
           Creator and the proof is His saying, ‘And if you ask them who created them,   
           they will surely say: Allah’ (1996/44:87). ‘And if you ask them who created  
           the heavens and earth they will surely say: Allah’(1996/31:25). So Allah did  
           not judge them with disbelief and polytheism until they said ‘that they may  
           bring us closer to Allah,’ therefore those people [who claim to be Muslim but  
           seek intercession from the dead], are just like them (Dahlaan 2007:2).  
 
Dahlaan’s argument revolves around the premise that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab was 
misconstruing Qur’aanic verses and applying them to Muslims.  Essentially, Dahlaan 
asserts that the Muslims in the time of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab did not believe that the 
prophets and saints shared in Allah’s divinity, but instead “they believed they were 
worshippers of Allah that were created by Him and undeserving of worship” (Dahlaan 
2007:2). Dahlaan goes on to explain:  
 
          The verses were revealed about the polytheists who held that  
          their idols were worthy of worship and exalted them to the level of  
  
          lordship, even though they believed they did not possess the ability to create  
          anything. On the other hand, the believers did not think the prophets and saints  
          had the right to be worshipped or possessed godliness. Nor did they exalt them  
          to the level of lordship. Instead, they believed that they were slaves of Allah,       
          beloved and chosen by Him, whose prayers were answered, and through their  
          blessedness those who worshipped Allah would receive His mercy … (2007:2).   
 
According to Dahlaan, what distinguished the Muslims who seek intercession from 
the dead and the pagan Arabs of the past was the pagans thought that idols shared in 
divinity and were worthy of worship and 
 
           this is what made them fall into polytheism not merely their saying, ‘We  
          worship them only that they may bring us closer to Allah’ (1996:39:3). Because  
          when the proof was established that the idols had no right to be worshipped and  
          they believed they should be worshipped, that is when they said as an excuse  
          ‘We worship them only that they may bring us closer to Allah’  
          (Dahlaan 2007:3).  
 
Dahlaan appears to justify tawassul by Muslims who seek intercession from dead 
saints and prophets under the condition that they do not deem the intercessor to be 
godly or divine.67  
 
     A more contemporary advocate of this type of tawassul is Ahmad Rafaa’ee who 
uses several hadeeth narrations to support the permissibility of seeking intercession 
from deceased saints or prophets. Most of the narrations Rafaa’ee uses are either 
fabricated or not traceable to the Prophet (Aali Suleemaan 2005:116-117). However, 
he uses an authentic hadeeth collected in Tirmidhee in which a blind man came to the 
Prophet and sought his intercession to pray for him to have his sight returned. The 
Prophet then ordered the man to pray directly to Allah by saying, “O Allah I turn to 
you and ask of you by your Prophet Muhammad, the Prophet of mercy, and I turn to 
you my lord for my need so that you will fulfill it for me. O Allah accept his 
intercession on my behalf” (Tirmidhee 1996/5:530). Rafaa’ee deduced that,  
 
          The literal meaning of the hadeeth supports seeking tawassul from the living  
          and its implication is proof for the permissibility of seeking tawass
                                                 
67 Imaam al-Nawawee said, “A person can apostate by a saying of disbelief whether it stems from creed, 
arrogance, or joking” (al-Nawawee 2002:1725). This statement of Imaam al-Nawawee illustrates that 
certain actions in and of themselves expel one from Islaam and this contradicts the claims made by 
Rafaa’ee and Dahlaan: seeking intercession from the dead becomes an act of disbelief if one believes 
the dead themselves are the reason one’s prayer is answered. This also illustrates that there were 
scholars, long before Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab, who made takfeer for actions that were considered 
automatic disbelief.      
  
          dead. Meaning that to make tawa
ul from the  
ssul to the living or the deceased is not in itself  
          seeking intercession with the physical body, living or dead; but rather  
          something more important which is inherent in a human being, whether he is  
          living or dead. The body is just like a bag in which this essence is being  
          preserved, so it should be honored whether living or deceased. Likewise,  
          [according to another narration] his saying, ‘O Muhammad’ is an invocation of  
          one who is absent regardless of whether he is living or dead. Therefore, the  
          supplication is being directed to that essence which is inseparable with the soul  
          and honored by Allah. So, the main point of tawass
This definition of tawa
ul is that it is the same  
          regardless of whether it is directed to the living or the dead (Rafaa’ee 1984: 80). 
 
ssul has undertones of philosophical pontification with 
references to the soul and essence of a human being and this has no precedence from 
the Prophet or his companions and the early generations. Allah says regarding the soul, 
“And they ask you concerning the soul. Say: The soul is one of the things, the 
knowledge of which is only with my Lord. And of knowledge you (mankind) have 
been given only a little” (Qur’aan 1996/17:85). Secondly, the blind man is making 
supplication and in the narration where he invokes the Prophet he is present, so this 
evidence does not support seeking tawassul from those who are absent and especially 
not the deceased. Thirdly, Dahlaan and Rafaa’ee both hold it permissible to seek 
tawassul from the dead, and if this evidence were sufficient to support that, then it 
only follows that after all of their argumentation and their refutations of Ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhaab they believe seeking tawassul is a type of worship and so seeking tawassul 
through an intermediary who cannot respond is directing worship to other than Allah. 
Finally, “not a single person from amongst the most knowledgeable of the Qur’aan 
and its meaning, the early generations, understood from the evidences to come seek 
penitence from the Prophet during his lifetime”68
                                                 
68 This is a well known concept taken from Catholicism which has no basis in Islaam. 
 (Sahsoowaany 2007:34). Although 
there were instances where companions asked the Prophet to supplicate on their 
behalf to enter paradise, the practice of seeking penitence during the Prophet’s 
lifetime was unknown. “Additionally, there was never a situation where anyone from 
the earliest generations came to the grave of the Prophet saying, ‘O Messenger of 
Allah! I did such and such, please seek forgiveness for me.’ So, whoever reported a 
narration like this has lied and oppressed the best of generations: the compani ns and 
Taabi’een” (Sahsoowaany 2007:34). 
              
  
     Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab argues that those who perform any acts of 
worship, for example tawassul, to other than Allah have fallen into polytheism. Ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhaab claims the mission of the prophets was to destroy all false worship 
and redirect divine veneration to Allah alone. He states, “Allah sent him to a people 
who were given to devotion and worship, would perform the pilgrimage, give charity, 
and remember Allah often. However, they made some of Allah’s creation into 
intermediaries between themselves and Allah, and would say, ‘We seek to come 
closer to Allah by them’ and ‘We seek their intercession’" (al-Fawzaan 2001:25). Ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhaab compares the tawassul of the pagans to the practices that were 
widespread amongst the Muslims of his time, and although his treatise Kashf Al-
Shubuhaat  (al-Fawzaan 2001) was written at least seventy years before Dahlaan’s 
refutation, it is as though it were written as a refutation of Dahlaan’s central claim: the 
Muslims did not fall into polytheism. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab states, “So the polytheists 
concurred that Allah is the Creator, and the Sustainer, who has no partners, and that 
no one causes life and death or sustains provisions except Him” (al-Fawzaan 2001:25). 
Dahlaan holds that Muslims made tawassul by using dead saints as a means to come 
closer to Allah and that they did not believe there was a God other than Allah worthy 
of worship. However, those who performed this type of tawassul performed the same 
actions as the polytheists only they did not consider it to be worship of the dead, and it 
is a well known religious principle that the essence of something is not changed by 
renaming it (Ibn al-Qayyim 2006:216). So, because some Muslims in the time of Ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhaab did not consider their tawassul to dead saints as worship, although 
they invoked them and venerated their graves, it did not change the fact that this 
tawassul was a form of worship as the verses indicate, and thus an act of polytheism.  
Allah says, “Say (O Muhammad): “Who provides for you from the sky and the earth? 
Or who owns hearing and sight? And who brings out the living from the dead and 
brings out the dead from the living? And who disposes the affairs? “They will say: 
“Allah” Say! “Will you not be afraid of Allah’s punishment (for setting up rivals in 
worship with Allah)?” (Qur’aan 1996:10:31). Both the pagans in the time of the 
Prophet and many of the Muslims in the time of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab concurred that 
Allah was the Lord of all things, yet, they performed acts of worship to other than 
Him which violates the concept of Islaamic monotheism. Finally, the Prophet said, 
“You will follow the way of those who came before you hand span by hand span, 
arms span by arm span, so much that even if they entered the hole of a lizard you 
  
would enter it.” We said, O Messenger of Allah! The Jews and the Christians? He 
said, “Who else?” (al-Nawawee 1997/16:436). Imaam al-Nawawee explained that this 
illustrates the extreme manner in which the Muslims would come to imitate non-
Muslims especially in sinfulness and acts of worship contrary to the Sunna, by 
invoking dead saints and seeking their intercession (al-Nawawee 1997/16:436).  
       
2.10.3 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab’s Creed 
 
     Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab is mostly known, by his supporters, for reviving the call to 
Islaamic monotheism, and prohibiting what contradicts it as evidenced in his books 
and beliefs which are "in accordance with the Qur’aan and the Sunna and the 
methodology of the people of the Sunna and the group. Therefore, he did not instigate 
a new school of thought or different methodology" (al-Mutaww’a: 2003:103).  Ibn 
'Abd al-Wahhaab described his own beliefs by saying I am "a follower of the Qur’aan 
and Sunna and not a heretic. My belief, my religion is that which Allah has authorized 
which is the way of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa'a which the leaders of the Muslims 
were upon like the four Imaams,69 and those who follow them until the Day of 
Judgment" (al-‘Aasimee 2004/1:79). Here he affirms his belief in the orthodox creed 
and asserts that his methodology is the same as the companions and orthodox scholars 
who came after them.70 Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab thought of himself as a revivalist, and 
this is evidenced in a statement in which he described himself as making "clear for the 
people: sincerity in the religion for Allah, I prohibited them from supplicating to the 
living and dead amongst the righteous" (al-‘Aasimee 2004/1:79).71 However, many of 
his critics were known for their unorthodox beliefs: supplicating to the dead for 
intercession, building high tombstones as monuments for saints,72
                                                 
69 Imaam Aboo Haneefa (died 150 Hijra), Imaam Maalik (179 Hijra), Imaam Shaafi’ee (204 Hijra), 
and Imaam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (241 Hijra), are the four major scholars of Islaamic jurisprudence who 
were known for their scholarship, and service in preserving the religion. All of them advocated 
following the authentic religious texts and prevented people from blindly following them in their 
religious verdicts. 
70 “Ibn Abd al-Wahhab frequently used examples from the time of Muhammad to illustrate his points. 
This was not done in an attempt to recreate the early Islaamic community, as some scholars have 
posited” (Delong-Bas 2004:54). 
71  Delong-Bas states, “Other non-Wahhabi historical records confirm that actual examination of 
Wahhabi texts revealed consistency with the Quran and hadith so that those who bothered to read them 
did not find any evidence of heresy in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s writings” (2004:20). 
72 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab leveled the graves of saints even destroying the monument over the grave of a 
companion. Delong-Bas states, “The destruction of the tomb represented direct adherence to the 
example of the prophet Muhammad. The hadith record Muhammad’s command to destroy tombs and 
  
in their love for the Prophet even ascribing divinity to him. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab’s 
prohibition of these practices appears to be in accordance with the Qur’aan and the 
Sunna. Allah says, "And who is more astray than one who calls on (invokes) besides 
Allah, such as will not answer him till the day of resurrection, and who are (even) 
unaware of their calls (invocations) to them?" (Qur’aan 1996/46:5). Allah also says, 
"Verily those whom you call upon besides Allah are slaves like you. So call upon 
them and let them answer you if you are truthful" (1996:7:194). In the above verses 
Allah challenges those who supplicate to other than him to see if their prayers get 
answered.
 and being excessive 
73
                                                                                                                                            
shrines because they can and have led to the veneration and worship of the people buried or 
commemorated there, an act that clearly violates the principle of tawhid” (2004:25).  
73 Refer to the section on discourse over the concept of tawassul. 
  
2.10.4 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab’s Position Regarding Leadership 
 
 In the authentic narrations on the Prophet there are numerous examples 
where he forbade building mosques on graves or attributing divinity to him as the 
Christians did with Jesus. The Prophet said, as recorded in al-Bukhaaree, "Do not 
exaggerate in praising me as the Christians praised the son of Mary for verily I am 
only a slave. So, call me the slave and Messenger of Allah" (1970/4:435).  If 
excessive praise of the Prophet is prohibited then it only follows that supplicating to 
him is also considered unorthodox. Therefore, those who pray to other than him are 
contradicting the teachings of the Prophet. Allah says, “And those who take Auliya 
(protectors, helpers, lords, gods) besides him (say): We worship them only that they 
may bring us near to Allah… Truly, Allah guides not him who is a liar and a 
disbeliever” (Qur’aan 1996:39:3). Therefore, it seems Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhaab acted in accordance with the orthodox Islaamic creed when he prohibited 
acts of worship which emulated polytheists, excessive reverence towards the Prophet, 
and seeking intercession in worship. Likewise, the Prophet forbade and warned 
strongly against these practices and fought those who believed in Allah but associated 
partners in worship with him. The Prophet even predicted that the Muslims would 
become misguided and he addressed them saying, “You will follow the way of those 
who came before you hand span by hand span and arms length by arms length even if 
they entered a lizard’s hole you would follow them” (Ibn Hajr 1995/15:235). This 
indicates that Muslims would imitate disbelievers in their practices and acts of 
worship, and this is what Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab resisted during his life time as he felt 
many of the Muslims had adopted unorthodox customs.  
 
    Many of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab’s critics accuse him of rebellion against the Muslim 
leadership, something which is against the orthodox creed and is one of the main 
foundations of the Khawaarij belief. His statements and actions must be scrutinized in 
order to make concise conclusions as to whether or not he adhered to the Khawaarij 
creed. In a letter Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab wrote to the people of Qaseem province 74
      Moreover, according to supporters of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab his actions also 
conformed to the orthodox creed, although many criticized him and claimed he 
rebelled against the Ottoman Empire. Aali al-Shaikh rebutted the claims made against 
Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab by pointing out that Najd was not under the control of Ottoman 
leadership. Najd was considered unimportant to them economically and politically 
and it had no governor appointed for the area with every village being governed by its 
own prince. Also, there was widespread fighting between the Arabs who were 
ignorant, fearful, and impoverished and this exemplified the fact that there was no 
control or safety in the area.
 he 
said, "I believe it is obligatory to hear and obey the leaders of the Muslims, the pious 
amongst them and the wicked amongst them, as long as they do not order 
disobedience to Allah… and it is prohibited to rebel against them" ('Abd al-Lateef 
1991:234).  He also said regarding following the leadership "it is part of the greater 
good to hear and obey whoever leads us even if he were an Ethiopian slave" ('Abd al-
Lateef 1991:234). So, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab’s statements conform to the orthodox 
creed and even the language he uses is similar to what the Prophet used when he said 
in a narration collected by Muslim,  "If a slave whose limbs are amputated is ruling 
you by the book of Allah, you must hear and obey him" (al-Nawawee 1997/12:429). 
In another authentic narration collected in Muslim he said to hear and obey even if the 
leader were an Ethiopian slave. In addition, Allah says, "O you who believe! Obey 
Allah and obey the Messenger, and those of you (Muslims) who are in authority" 
(Qur’aan 1996:4:59). Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab’s beliefs and statements appear to 
conform to the Qur’aan and Sunna. 
 
75
                                                 
74 This is a province north of the capital of current Saudi Arabia. 
75 “Corruption, greed, violence and insecurity were rampant in the Hijaz  by the late eighteenth 
century….Appalled by the failure of the sultan to provide the security and justice that served as the 
  
were built to glorify dead saints, and people prayed alone instead of unified in groups 
according to their own methodology.  Secondly, instability and disbelief were 
widespread and rampant amongst the general people and many polytheistic practices 
had become common. Thirdly, the Ottoman Empire was collapsing and it was not the 
result of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab and his movement, but rather pressures 
from imperial powers like Britain as well as internal struggle (Aali al-Shaikh 
2004:140). These evidences offer insight into the movement of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab, 
the background of his revival, and the condition of the Arab Peninsula at the time.
 For example, the pilgrimage was unsafe, high graves 
76
     Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab is seen by many contemporary Salafee scholars and Muslim 
activists as a reviver of the religion, due to his calling to restore orthodox Islaam and 
jihaad. As was previously mentioned his teachings focused on calling Muslims to 
traditional understandings of Islaam.
 
Finally, historical evidence shows that during the lifetime of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab his 
movement was not a revolt against the Ottoman Empire as it did not assert control 
over the entire region, nor was the aim of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab regime change, thus 
the jihaad of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab should not be considered rebellion, according to 
classical Islaamic understanding. 
   
2.10.5 His Jihaad 
 
77
 
 As for his jihaad, it also appeared to be in 
accordance to the principles established by the classical scholars (Delong-Bas 
2004:231).  
                                                                                                                                            
sources of his religious legitimacy and political claims to the region, the Wahhabis decided to conquer 
the Hijaz and restore order themselves” (Delong-Bas 2004:247). 
76 Delong-Bas states, “Although Ibn Abd al-Wahhaab recognized the possibility of a Muslim leader 
failing to fulfill his duties, he had limited the response to such failure to discussion and debate with the 
leader about where his errors lay following the teachings of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and the general stance 
of classical Muslim scholarship, he did not allow for the removal of such a leader from power” 
(2004:247). 
77 What distinguishes Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab’s jihaad was that it was carried out against those who he 
considered to be apostates due to their heretical beliefs and he saw this to be enjoining the good by 
forbidding the evil of polytheism (al-‘Umar 2001:63). Although, neo-Takfeerees and Jihaadees often 
associate themselves with Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and Ibn Taymeeya, whose concepts of jihaad are 
radically different from those extremist groups who tend to call for a perennial global jihaad against all 
of their opposition by insisting jihaad is always offensive with disregard for its principles. On the other 
hand, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and Ibn Taymeeya both saw jihaad as a means of defending the Muslim 
community and advancing the religion of Islaam: making Allah’s word superior which is a permanent 
duty and this is consistent with the four primary schools of jurisprudence; however it is based upon 
conditions and principles (al-Muneef 2005:16). There will be a further discussion highlighting the 
differences between Jihaadees and orthodox concepts of jihaad in chapter four the section on western 
think tanks and Jihaadees.      
  
     The jihaad (holy struggle or fighting) of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab is also another issue 
exploited by his critics who accuse him of killing women and children and those who 
disagreed with him. Allen alleges, “Whatever spiritual gloss he cared to put on it in 
his writings under al-Wahhab’s tutelage the bedoins of Najd became not so much holy 
warriors as fanatics without scruples. They preyed on their neighbors, each man in the 
raiding party setting out to plunder, destroy and kill bolstered by the conviction that 
he did so as a jihadi” (Allen 2006:55). This statement needs historical support; 
however it is known that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab emphasized the importance of the 
Islaamic rulings and principles established by the classical scholars while fighting 
jihaad and this appears to contradict Allen’s assessment. According to the writings of 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab, he emphasized restraint and ordered his followers not to be 
hasty in passing judgments upon others, and to authenticate matters before acting. He 
cited the example of the Prophet on one occasion by saying, “He knew who the 
hypocrites were in his midst but he judged them according to their outward 
appearance of faith. Then if they exhibited hypocrisy and he affirmed it then he 
fought them” (al-‘Aasimee 2004/8:52). Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab’s statements and advice 
to his followers is very telling about his character and show a side of him often 
misunderstood by his critics. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab said, “Making mistakes by being 
extreme while admonishing people creates divisions between Muslims, and Allah and 
the Messenger both commanded Muslim unity” (al-‘Aasimee 2004/8:49). This 
indicates Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab had concern about how he was perceived in his call to 
tawheed before making preparations for jihaad. He further states, “The classical 
scholars say that the one who commands the good and forbids evil should possess 
three things: knowledge of what he is commanding to do and prohibit from, 
gentleness in his demeanor of enjoining good and prohibiting evil, and patience with 
the trials he may face while doing so” (al-‘Aasimee 2004/8:49). He also emphasized 
not causing a greater harm when trying to remove an evil; this is what distinguishes 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab from the Khawaarij’s perception of removing evil.78
                                                 
78  Aside from the differences in creed the Khawaarij believed in changing what they perceived as evil 
by hand and those who opposed them were considered disbelievers. Refer to chapter one.  
  
          prayer and prohibit paying charity like Aboo Bakr
 He said: 
 
          As for fighting, we did not fight anyone until this day except for retribution  
          [according to Islaamic law] and for committing an infraction punishable by  
          death. Likewise, we fight whoever curses the religion of the Messenger… after  
          he understands it. Also, we fight the idol worshippers and those who leave the  
79
This statement shows "that the methodology of the Shaikh in this issue is the creed of 
Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a and that the goal of fighting and jihaad is to make 
apparent the religion of Allah and pure worship of him alone, as He has no partners" 
(al-Shathree 2002:45). To further illustrate, Aali al-Shaikh also asserts Ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhaab’s jihaad was similar to the companions, and he points out that "the 
companions had consensus on fighting those who became apostates" (2004:59).
 fought those who refused  
          paying it (cited in al-Shathree 2002:45).  
 
80 
During the time of Aboo Bakr’s caliphate many Arab tribes had become apostates and 
some people even claimed they were prophets after the Prophet Muhammad. Still 
some reverted to idol worship, while some tribes refused to pay the obligatory alms 
tax. So, the companions fought them as that was in accordance with the Islaamic faith 
as expounded by the Qur’aan and Sunna, and according to some contemporary 
scholars, this similarly correlates with Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab’s jihaad.81
     The single most controversial issue associated with Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhaab is his position regarding takfeer. There are numerous sayings attributed to 
him regarding takfeer from both his detractors and contemporary scholars who 
support his teachings, and there appears to be no consensus even amongst Salafee 
scholars regarding some of the more intricate details of his conditions for takfeer.
 
 
2.10.6 His Position Regarding Takfeer  
 
82
                                                 
79 Aboo Bakr, the most beloved companion of the Prophet and first caliph in Islaam. During his 
caliphate a group of Muslims refused to pay the zakaat (charity or alms tax) which is the third pillar of 
Islaam and an obligatory duty upon all those who are able and whose wealth meet the conditions for 
paying it.  
80  The Prophet said, “Whoever changes his religion should be executed” (al-Bukhaaree 1970/9:43). 
Majority of the scholars of jurisprudence hold the opinion that anyone who apostates from Islaam 
should be executed if they do not repent” (al-Faasee 2003/4:1927). 
81 Delong-Bas concludes that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab emphasized the value of preserving human life and 
that this comes from his interpretation of Qur'aanic verses. She states, “Thus, in his writings they 
served to place limitations on the violence of jihad’s activities rather than incite them. While this may 
not be in keeping with traditional historical interpretations of the Wahhabi movement, this support for 
the maximum preservation of human life and dignity and the protection of property is entirely 
consistent with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s worldview” (2004:234). 
82 Refer back to the section declaring people to be apostates. 
  
explicit authentic sharee’a proof" (Al-Radaymaan 2005:45). Al-Madkhalee said, "The 
methodology of Imaam Muhammad… is the essence of the methodology of Ahl al-
Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a in this issue … which differs from the Khawaarij" (2004:47). 
According to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab’s statements it appears he was cautious in making 
takfeer and this is in accordance with the classical scholars' concept of making takfeer. 
Delong-Bas states, “Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s stance did not, however, prevent some of 
his more enthusiastic followers from actively seeking an excuse to label someone a 
kafir because he or she refused to join the movement….Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s writings 
indicate that he was aware of such distortions of his teachings during his own 
lifetime” (Delong-Bas 2004:221).    
 
 
However, Salafee scholars do agree that his belief is within the domain of Ahl al-
Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a. Al-Radaymaan offers his analysis of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab’s 
use of the principles of takfeer when he said, "Then it appears that the Imaam 
Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab… supported his position regarding takfeer with 
     Some writers accuse Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab of making takfeer of the entire 
population of the Arabian Peninsula, especially those who disagreed with him, but his 
creed and the statements of the Salafee scholars contradict these claims. Al-Hussayn 
said, "We did not come across any religious verdict from him where he accused the 
Ottoman empire of apostasy" (1999:394). In contrast, Abou El Fadl claims Ibn ‘Abd 
al-Wahhaab made takfeer of the Ottoman empire accusing them of major heresy. El 
Fadl states Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab “claimed that supporting or allying oneself with the 
Ottomans was as grievous a sin as supporting or allying oneself with Christians or 
Jews” (El Fadl 2005:51). This statement attributed to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab might 
lead one to conclude he accused the Ottoman leadership of disbelief. However, it 
appears El Fadl was mistaken as the statement in question is that of Hamad Bin ‘Alee 
Bin ‘Ateeq, one of the students of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab.83 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab said 
in response to those who accused him of the general takfeer, "I make takfeer of the 
one who is knowledgeable of the religion, then curses it, and prohibits others from it, 
and makes these actions a habit....and most of the Umma is not like that" (al-
’Aasi
                                                 
83 The statement is taken from the chapter entitled “Kitaab Beyaan al-Najaat wa al-Fakaak” which was 
compiled by Bin ‘Ateeq, so Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab cannot be held accountable for the conclusion of one 
of his students (Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and Ibn Taymeeya 2004:165). 
  
          most popular practices of Sunni Islam were also condemned as innovations or      
          reversions to paganism. They included a host of expressions of religious  
          devotion that had developed over the centuries, such as invoking the    
          intercession of the Prophet, the saints or the angels; visiting or praying at the  
          graves of holy men or erecting monuments over their graves; celebrating the  
          Prophet’s birthday or the feasts of dead saints; and making votive offerings. At  
          the same time, many everyday habits were also declared sinful, among them  
          smoking hashish, dancing, playing music, fortune-telling, dressing in silks,   
          telling beads or wearing talismans…. But the parallels with Puritanism went  
          only so far. According to the Wahhabi code, the moment a Muslim deviated  
          from Al-Wahhab’s interpretation of monotheism he became an unbeliever  
          (Allen 2006:56).             
 
This statement of Allen illustrates the conflicting opinions writers and scholars alike 
hold with regard to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab. In the above statement Allen contends that  
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab considers all those practices to be among the actions which 
nullify one’s Islaam, and this is a blatant error as many of those practices, according 
to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab, are innovations but do not constitute disbelief (Ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhaab  and Ibn Taymeeya 2004:23-24). Finally, although Allen is critical of Ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhaab, he concedes that those practices “had developed over the 
centuries”, which shows they were unknown as acceptable acts of worship to the 
Prophet, his companions, and the Taabi’een, and thus cannot be considered orthodox.      
 
2.11 Conclusion 
 
mee2004/1:72). Here he directly refutes those who claim he makes the general 
takfeer and then he praises the Umma (religious community) for not being heretical. 
Also this statement proves that he did not make takfeer of those who had the excuse 
of ignorance. Still others like Charles Allen, allege that: 
 
          Although Al-Wahhab’s main targets were the Sufis and the Shia, many of the     
     Through careful analysis the researcher was able to compare the relevant aspects 
of the Islaamic creed and compare them with that of the Khawaarij highlighting the 
differences to provide a meaningful background to Islaamic extremist thought. In 
addition, the researcher gained insight into the issue of takfeer and the complexities 
that underlie it, and how groups like the Khawaarij deviate from the orthodox view 
and methodology due to their oversimplification of matters associated with takfeer 
and faith. Ibn al-Qayyim said, “Another important principle that distinguishes Ahl al-
Sunna from heretics like the Khawaarij, is according to the foundation of Ahl al-
Sunna a man may possess both disbelief and faith, shirk and tawheed, sinfulness and 
God consciousness, hypocrisy and faith…” (1992:39). The Khawaarij make takfeer 
for major sins, and rebel against the legitimate Muslim authority and differ with 
orthodox scholars in many important aspects of creed. Regarding the controversy 
  
surrounding Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab it can best be summed up by the 
saying of the Orientalist Julid Seehir: 
 
          It is incumbent upon whoever seeks to make a judgment on Islaamic events     
          that he considers Wahhaabism as support for the Islaamic religion in the image  
          put forth by the Prophet and the companions. Therefore, the aim of  
          Wahhaabism is returning Islaam to the way it was (cited in al-Hussayn  
          1999:463).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter Three 
Contemporary Islaamic Thinkers 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
     There are many contemporary individuals and groups who like Muhammad Ibn 
'Abd al-Wahhaab are beset with tremendous controversy. Most of them have been 
associated with takfeer, rebellion, and terrorist ideology, and for that reason an 
analysis into their fundamental creed is required to determine if there is a link 
between them and the Khawaarij. Before analyzing the various ideologues and their 
beliefs it is imperative to highlight some of the background issues from a historical 
perspective to provide the context in which these various movements and ideologues 
developed. 
 
     No study of the rise of these political movements and ideologues would be 
complete without scrutinizing the general underlying factors which gave rise to them. 
This section will introduce the underlying issues which contribute to the animosity 
and rise in reactionary movements and ideologues. Secondly, in this section there will 
be a concise overview of the permissibility of criticizing deviant Muslims. Thirdly, 
there will be a comparison of the main traits of the Khawaarij with that of the 
individual ideologues. Lastly, this section will gauge if there is a link between the 
various groups and extremism. 
 
3.2. Factors Contributing to the Radicalization of Islaamic 
Movements 
 
     This section, although brief, is dedicated to some of the main concerns that are 
often voiced by many of the groups and ideologues associated with takfeer and 
terrorist ideology. Amidst the backdrop of colonialism and the rise in nationalism 
many of the early groups of this century were formed. In fact many groups like the 
Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen) and political thinkers such as Aboo al- 
A'la Mawdoodee became active as a reaction to colonialism and its effects upon 
Muslim communities and populations. Mamdani vividly describes this turbulent 
  
period attributing to it the rise of the founder of the  Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-
Banna, who "argued that Muslims must draw on their own historical and cultural 
resources instead of imitating other peoples, as if they were 'cultural mongrels' " 
(2005:49).  Al-Banna formed the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 initially as a group that 
disavowed violence and provided social welfare to the general people; however "It 
was the defeat of Arab armies in 1948 and the subsequent creation of the state of 
Israel that convinced the society to expend its energies beyond welfare to armed 
politics" (Mamdani 2005:49). Initially they had the support of the president of Egypt, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, but after pressuring him to democratize the society; they were 
banned and imprisoned with some of them becoming radicalized in prison. Mamdani 
states: 
 
          If the reform vision was identified with the thought of Hassan al-Banna in the  
          formative period of the society, the extremist turn was inspired by the pen of  
          Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), writing in prison. The experience of such brutal  
          repression under a secular government was one influence shaping the birth of a  
          radical orientation in Egyptian Islamist thought (2005:49). 
 
     The politicalization of Islaam is the result of a variety of socio-political and 
historical factors; however in the context of this research probably the most 
distinguishing characteristics between political Islaam and the Salafee approach is that 
those who espouse political Islaam tend to emphasize the injustices of current regimes, 
their policies, and a more pro-active approach in addressing the current crisis facing 
the Muslim community. Whereas, those who claim to adhere to the Salafee approach 
to Islaam emphasize the reformation of creed and the importance of returning to more 
classical interpretations and understandings of Islaam. The Salafee view holds that 
rectification of the leadership, society, Muslim deviancy, and political grievances will 
result by restoring the creed and methodology of the Prophet. Those who hold a more 
politicized view believe that Salafees do not address the current political crisis 
(especially with regard to leadership) and tend to be openly critical of the scholars 
who espouse that view. 84
                                                 
84 These are some of the general divisions between what is seen by some as political Islaam and the 
more orthodox approach. With regards to the more political approach it appears that those who adhere 
to this view vary with regards to their call, approach and methodology. Whereas some call for reform 
of Muslim leadership by democratic reforms and more participation others respond by calling for 
rebellion and takfeer as they deem the leadership illegitimate.  
  
    There are several key factors that contribute to the cause and rise in the 
radicalization of political Islaam.
 
 
85
     The abolishment of the Islaamic Caliphate by Mu
 Some of the most important factors are the fall of 
the Islaamic Caliphate, the spread of secularism and secularist regimes, their 
dependence upon non-Muslim states, and non-Muslim presence and power in Muslim 
lands. These factors fuel much of the discontent in the Muslim world and contribute 
to the rise in terrorist activity and political violence which will be discussed in the 
section detailing the creed of contemporary groups like al-Qaeda. 
 
3.2.1 Fall of the Islaamic Caliphate 
 
stafaa Kemal Attaturk in 1924 
has had a profound impact upon the psyche of the Muslim nation as a whole and as a 
result contributed to the rise in both secular 86 and radical movements.87
                                                 
85 By political Islaam the researcher is referring to Islaamic movements and parties that compete for 
political control either through the system or by fighting both Muslim and non-Muslim governments. 
However, the term “political Islaam” can be confusing, because according to both orthodox and Salafee 
scholars, Islaam is inherently a whole system which does not distinguish between the governing 
institutions and the religious authority: all are governed by Islaam. 
86 Secularism is an ideology that separates the belief in God from the life and politics of the individual, 
or state. Secularism as a system is used to dismantle the role of religious institutions in a given society.  
87 Contemporary groups like Mawdoodee’s Jamaa’a al-Islaamee and Hizb al-Tahreer make it their 
primary call to reinstate the Islaamic caliphate (al-Hilalee 2004:369).  
  
  
           total cultural revolution, imposed by one man’s iron will and by the force of a  
           ruthless army (1982:2). 
      
After dismantling the caliphate Ataturk began systematic reform of the Turkish 
society and began to implement a policy of extreme nationalism and secularization in 
Turkey.  
           
          From the very onset of coming to power, Kemal Ataturk and his   
          followers -the Kemalists- tried to doom Islam from ever becoming a  
          vital force in the Turkish social and cultural life. Sufi orders were  
          dissolved. Adhan, the call to prayer, was initially banned from being    
          transmitted in Arabic. A Turkish form of Adhan was endorsed, only to be  
          rejected later (because of mass disapproval). Sermons were to be  
          delivered in Turkish, and no longer in Arabic. Even private instructions in  
          religion were disapproved. Official Imams were appointed to preach the  
          official line. Many mosques were closed down. People were not allowed  
          to put on turban and the Fez for prayer. Even keeping beard was  
          restricted. The Kemalists wanted to reform Islam in the light of Reform  
          Judaism. In this regard, it is worth noting some of the suggestions put forward  
          by Kopruluzade, a disciple of Zia Gokalp: religious service should be made  
          inspiring by the employment of musically trained chanters and prayer leaders  
          and the introduction of instrumental music; the Turkish language is to be used     
          as language of worship, instead of the Qur'anic Arabic. Kopruluzade’s Masonic  
          ideas caused such uproar in the public that the government had to shelve the  
          report (Siddiqui 1982:4). 
 
The Kemalists’ reforms illustrate the epitome of secularist extremist ideology and 
policy, and how secularism, to most scholars, aims to destroy Islaam from its 
foundation by opposing its laws, and attempting to reform Islaam in the name of 
“progress”. 
 
     Groups like al-Qaeda offer the most stinging criticism of the current leaders and 
secularization. According to al-Qaeda, since the fall of the caliphate, rulers “started to 
fragment the essence of the Islamic nation by trying to eradicate its Moslem identity. 
Thus, they started spreading godless and atheistic views among the youth. We found 
some that claimed that socialism was from Islam, democracy was the [religious] 
council, and the prophet-God bless and keep him-propagandized communism” (al-
Qaeda 2005:8). 
 
 
 
 
  
3.2.2 Secularization of Regimes 
 
     The rise in secular regimes is a cause of great concern for many Muslims and due 
to the spread of secularist thought throughout the Muslim world there has been a  
backlash by both extremists, and those who uphold the orthodox creed with the 
former taking the form of violence. Secularism is a concept alien to Islaam and 
actually opposes it completely as the orthodox creed is built upon the belief that 
Islaam is an entire system and way of life with no separation between religion and 
state. Allah said, "This day I have perfected your religion for you, completed my 
favor upon you, and chosen for you Islam as your religion" (Qur’aan 1996:5:3). The 
orthodox creed holds that Islaam is a complete way of life and pure religious system 
that dictates public and private life which by its very nature opposes secularism. 
Secularism as an ideology has had a profound effect upon the Muslim nation in the 
aftermath of colonial domination and Zakaria points out that, "as Western powers 
occupied more and more Muslim territories, they inevitably influenced the way of 
thinking of the faithful" (1989:164).  He goes on to criticize the post-colonial Muslim 
leaders by saying: 
 
          Now their rulers-inept, cowardly, and corrupt- had not only yielded power but  
          were willing to adopt Christian values, laws and institutions… in the process   
          Islam was pushed aside. Though they talked of reforming Islam, the aim of  
          these leaders seemed to secularize it, and like Christianity, turn it from a  
          community religion to one to be practiced in the home (1989:164).  
 
According to Zakaria the newly Western educated elites began to opt for reforms and 
to imitate Western governments at the same time by trying to industrialize, and cast 
off the so-called restraints dictated by Islaam. Some secularist leaders through 
ignorance and misinterpretation attempted to justify their secularist ideologies by 
reinterpreting the religion. Ruthven describes Habib Bourguiba the founder of modern 
Tunisia of making jihaad analogous to modernization. Ruthven says, "Bourguiba 
persuaded the Tunisian ulama (scholars) to allow workers to be exempted from 
Ramadan fast, which he held responsible for slowing production, since mujahidin (the 
warriors taking part in jihad) are exempted from fasting” (2004:68 Both the 
secularists and nationalists had profound effects upon the Muslims and their concept 
of nationhood, and both ideologies are inherently alien and hostile towards Islaam and 
  
the foundations of its creed.
 Attaturk 
began to gain power at a time when the Ottoman Empire was nearly completely 
destroyed. Attaturk had a secularist nationalist vision in which he saw that the birth 
and preservation of the Turkish state would only come by Westernization and 
rejection of traditional religious values. Siddiqui states: 
 
           His program was for Turks to become Europeans. He abolished the caliphate,      
           and changed the country to a secular republic. He closed the Shari’a courts of  
           law and religious colleges; replaced the remaining parts of Islamic law by  
           Western civil codes. He moved the capital city from Istanbul inland to Ankara.  
           He instituted a unified secular education system; religious instructions were  
           banned from schools and the Latin script superseded the Arabic script (this was  
           done to permanently seal the separation between the Turks and their religion).  
           He removed the Islamic ban on reproducing human images; statues and  
           pictures were introduced. So was Western music. He ended the ban on alcohol  
           and encouraged the growth of a wine industry. Sunday, instead of Friday,  
           became the official day of rest. Women were given Western "emancipation"  
           and strong pressure was put upon them to discard their veils, scarves and other  
           traditional dresses. In 1928, Islam lost its status as the established religion in  
           the Turkish Republic and secularism was enshrined as the state policy. It was a  
88
Qutb expressed hostility toward the secularization of Muslim societies which is in 
accordance with the orthodox creed, however at the same time his anger led him to 
the extremism of pronouncing takfeer on all Muslim societies without exception.
 An example of the nationalist ideology prevalent in the 
1960s was that of the Ba'thist of Syria who were quoted in one of their papers as 
saying, "Let us call upon the Arab rulers to make comrade Assad their political qibla 
(literally: direction of prayer) instead of kneeling down before the idols of Islam" 
(cited in Sivan 1990:58). This demonstrates the general trend amongst communist and 
nationalist movements: lack of respect for religious symbols, and encouragement of 
ideals contrary to the Islaamic creed. Islaam by its very nature is not comprised of 
borders and racial boundaries, but instead Muslims are commanded to be one nation. 
Allah says, “And hold fast, all of you together to the rope of Allah and be not divided 
among yourselves” (Qur’aan 1996:3:103). 
 
      A key thinker in voicing hostility toward both the secularists' and nationalists' 
movements was Sayyid Qutb. Unfortunately his hostility did not stop with 
secularization, but instead led him to traverse the path of takfeer. Qutb said: 
     
          Among Muslim societies, some openly declare their 'secularism' and negate all  
          their relationships with the religion; some others pay respect to the religion  
          only with their mouths, but in their social life they have completely abandoned  
          it. They say that they do not believe in the 'Unseen' and want to construct their  
          social system on the basis of 'science', as science and the Unseen are  
          contradictory! This claim of theirs is mere ignorance, and only ignorant people  
          can talk like this (Qutb 2005:5). 
 
89
     Many colonizing nations viewed the rise of pan-Islaamic movement as a greater 
threat than the nationalism of the secularists, so they were more tolerant of those 
 
There will be further discussion of this issue in the section analyzing some of the 
contemporary groups as this is one of their most persistent claims: Muslim 
governments are dismantling the sharee’a through secularization, thus guilty of 
apostasy. 
 
                                                 
88 In chapter four there will be a further analysis of secularism in its extreme form and the political 
activism of Westernized secularist like Salman Rushdie, who call for the reform of Islaam and the 
dismantling of its institutions. 
 89 Takfeer is a religious principle comprised of conditions, and cannot be made arbitrarily. 
  
movements (Zakaria 1989:165). Pan-Islaamicism as an ideology began to grow as a 
reaction to secularism and colonial powers saw this as a threat to stability in their 
colonies. For this reason, they allowed and encouraged secularism. Secularism was 
compatible with the ideology of the colonizing nations and moreover a product of it. 
By encouraging an elitist class of the colonized people who thought like the colonizer, 
this insured the colonizer’s ideals would be propagated and this is what the European 
powers implemented throughout the developing world.90
This critique from members of the al-Qaeda organization, although extreme, 
highlights the mood of the Muslims towards the leaders for their roles in changing the 
characteristics of the Muslim society, culture and divine laws. However, each leader 
 Siddiqui says: 
 
          We saw the result of colonial education policy. It created a western   
          educated elite society amongst the natives - many essentially becoming  
          puppets and Quislings for their colonial masters. So invasive was its  
          influence in British India that many western educated Hindus  
          abandoned Hinduism and became Christians. Similarly, many western  
          educated Muslims were brainwashed to imitating the western values.  
          They wanted to become a European from the head to the toes. In this  
          context, it is worth mentioning what Jean Paul Satre, a French scholar,   
          had to say on the effect of western education on the African youths,  
          who were educated in Europe. He said that it was so gratifying to see  
          that those Africans trained in Europe would mould the African society in  
          a European way once when they had returned home. So the Europeans  
          did not have to politically control them. They would, instead, be  
          controlled by western values, which in turn would serve the same  
          purpose (probably, more effectively) (Siddiqui 1982:12).   
 
    The colonial powers were well versed in the techniques of divide and conquer and 
they realized by secularizing educational institutions and the colonized elite, that they 
could better contain Islaam and their colonial exploits. According to an al-Qaeda 
document: 
   
          Colonialism and its followers, the apostate rulers, then started to openly erect  
          crusader centers, societies, and organizations like Masonic Lodges, Lions and  
          Rotary clubs, and foreign schools. They aimed at producing a wasted   
          generation that pursued everything that is western and produced rulers,  
          ministers, leaders, physicians, engineers, businessmen, politicians, journalists,  
          and information specialists (al-Qaeda 2005:8).  
 
                                                 
90 “When you control a man’s thinking you do not have to worry about his actions. You do not have to 
tell him not to stand here or go yonder. He will find his ‘proper place’ and will stay in it. You do not 
need to send him to the back door. He will go without being told. In fact, if there is no back door, he 
will cut one for his special benefit” (Woodson 1990:xi). 
  
and society must be judged individually by a scholar to before making takfeer, which 
is in accordance with the orthodox methodology.  
 
    Another important observation to be noted is that the colonial powers realized that 
the reform of the belief or creed of a people is paramount to controlling them. The 
orthodox creed emphasizes the call to Islaamic monotheism in order to repel doubts 
and disbelief as they corrupt the individual and allow for alien ideologies to become 
widespread until nothing remains of Islaamic belief.  Siddiqui states: 
 
          More than a hundred years ago, the British government appointed Dr. William    
          Hunter to propose specific measures that would enable Muslims in the Indian  
          subcontinent to be ruled more efficiently. Hunter recommended that the Muslim  
          youth be "western educated." Western education would make Muslims more  
          tolerant of the British rule, like the Hindus who had already succumbed to such    
          a British gambit. The recommendation for implanting the British educational  
          policy was carried out so meticulously that there hardly exists today a single  
          school where a balanced and adequate knowledge of religion is imparted in  
          relation to demands of our modern time (1982:15). 
 
     This flagrant implementation of secularist policies and encouragement of new 
secular elite began to isolate the religious scholars who saw secularism as a threat to 
Islaam. Zakaria says regarding the radical backlash that began to build that: 
 
          Already they were mortified by the replacement of the shari'ah by European  
          criminal and civil codes; but they found the interference in personal and family     
          laws, as engineered by Western-educated classes, intolerable. They had  
          acquiesced in the replacement of Qur'anic punishments for certain offences; and  
          in the taking of interest on loans, but they could not stomach the tampering with  
          of personal and family laws which threatened to destroy the whole social fabric  
          (1989:169).  
 
     Many Muslims who became secularized began to feel a sense of betrayal, and that 
reforms were becoming too intrusive into their daily lives. In addition, in 1918 after 
the defeat of the Turkish Empire the British promised the Jews a homeland in 
Palestine. "The rebellious Arabs discovered to their cost that they had only changed 
masters from fellow Muslims to alien Christians, who had no real love for them" 
(Zakaria 1989:171). Zakaria points out that this model was pertinent to the developing 
Arab states, but that the rest of the Muslim world had their own models of colonial 
domination and secularism to contend with.   
 
  
     One of the most significant factors that accounts for the rise in secularism 
according to Ahmad al-Rahaylee is deviance of Muslims from the orthodox creed due 
to colonialism. He mentions that the weakness of the Muslims is attributed to alien 
ideas that became widespread from colonial powers. As a result Muslims became ill-
prepared to wage jihaad, their lands infiltrated by Western culture and ideas, the 
spread of missionary schools which effected the youth and encouraged sectarianism. 
Groups like the Qadiyaania 91 were established by the British and al-Rahaylee 
suggests that some Sufi groups 92
     The rise in extremist thought and activity has not gone unnoticed by the regimes in 
power and their reactions to the rise in militancy are all too often repressive serving to 
further isolate and anger extremists who see the regimes as illegitimate in the first 
place. In many cases Muslim regimes will react to the pressures placed upon them 
 were put in place to change the creed and thoughts 
of the Muslims in order to weaken them (al-Rahaylee 2003:27). Also the 
establishment of English as the official language helped to turn the youth against their 
Islaamic traditions, cultures, and mannerisms resulting in a new class of Muslims who 
regarded their own religion as backward, oppressive and detrimental to progress. 
Most of these examples were the result of Western imperialism and as for the Eastern 
communist model al-Jaamee commented, "Is there a form of colonialism more 
oppressive than the system of communism? Which does not leave for us our religion 
or worldly affairs! This is the price we have to pay for security. And we pay for it 
with our religion and belief" (al-Jaamee 1993:220-230).  To many contemporary 
scholars the ideology of communism is more oppressive than the ideals espoused by 
Western imperialists as the communists tend to be more intrusive, oppressive and 
brutal, especially with regards to religious expression. All of these factors gave rise to 
secularist ideology in the Muslim world and left many Muslims alienated and angry, 
thus giving rise to a more militant backlash and extremism.      
 
3.2.3 Repression as a Backlash to Islaamic Militancy 
 
                                                 
91 A sect that is believed to be started by the British during their colonization of India in the early 19th 
century and the leader of the sect was Ghulaam Ahmad al-Qadiyaanee who claimed he was a Prophet 
after Muhammad and by consensus of the orthodox scholars this is disbelief (al-Faasee 2003:1/44).  
92 Sufism is a very broad term denoting mystical tendencies in general. As a term it is used to describe 
those who are prone to asceticism. There are many different Sufi groups, some of which have a 
tendency towards mysticism and others who have transgressed the bounds of Islaam in creed and 
practice (al-Juhanee 2003/1:247-248). 
  
with brutality and repression. Burgat observes while discussing the Egyptian state that, 
"as products of the dysfunctional system, there appears to be a common link between 
the acts of Islamist violence that followed the gradual intensification of the repression 
of these currents" (2003:98). He then details many cases in Egypt of the secret police's 
policy of assassination and torture of alleged extremists.  
 
3.2.4 Regime Cooperation with Non-Muslim States 
 
     Another area of contention for extremists is dependence of Muslim states upon 
Western governments economically, politically, and militarily. Due to the weakness 
of many Muslim states and need for economic development most of them have forged 
strong bonds of cooperation with Western governments and this is especially true of 
the Gulf states. According to Burgat: 
 
          US policy has supported what are effectively long-lived dictatorships: political    
          protection, blind acceptance of autocracy and lucrative weapons deals are    
          offered to Saudi Arabia in return for maintaining high levels of cheap oil  
          production. Such policies serve to fuel the anger, alienation and resentment felt  
          by a generation deliberately excluded from the domestic political process and  
          marginalized by the global struggle between rival states (2003:xiv). 
 
     Many Western as well as non-Western writers offer stinging criticism such as 
Burgat's about the interdependent relationships between the West and many Muslim 
states. Zakaria claims: 
 
          The ulama (religious scholars) are not a force in the Gulf states, as they depend  
          for their livelihood on the rulers and toe the official line. In foreign relations    
          these states are guided by the British and the Americans who guarantee their  
          ruler’s protection from external enemies and internal revolts…. The anti- 
          communist outlook of the rulers has prevented them from cultivating friendly  
          relations with Russia and China as they are entirely dependent on the armed  
          support of America and Britain (1988:181).  
 
Zakaria's comment echoes that of many of those critical of contemporary leaders 
which will be explored in detail in the section on the creed and criticisms of the 
various movements. However, it is important to note that Zakaria's comment 
regarding the scholars requires verification as many of the neo-Khawaarij sects make 
criticizing the Muslim governments and scholars the main focus of their call. Instead 
of making takfeer of the companions as the original sect did, the neo-Khawaarij 
  
pronounce takfeer and attack the religious scholars with false statements and 
unfounded criticisms. These criticisms contradict the orthodox creed which maintains 
that the religious scholars are the inheritors of the Prophets and hold an extremely 
important position in Islaam.93
     Another important observation regarding Muslim state relations is that many 
Muslims feel betrayed by the relationships these states have with non-Muslim states. 
Examples would be the making of peace treaties and trade with nations hostile to 
Muslim interests like Israel, China and Russia.
 Interdependence probably more accurately defines the 
relationship between many Muslim and non-Muslim governments, and these 
relationships and the orthodox position regarding them will be analyzed further in the 
section detailing modern day movements.  
 
94 In the example of Israel, Jordan and 
Egypt both have peace treaties with Israel and close ties with the United States and 
support its 'war on terror' and both have recently felt the wrath meted out by Islaamic 
extremists. It is noteworthy that they are the only two Arab Muslim countries with ties 
to Israel. These relations aggravate terrorists as the U.S is blatant in its biases toward 
Israel and the U.N sanctions these relations.95
                                                 
93  However, this does not mean that scholars are infallible or that some of them are not dubious but 
rather in general they should be given the benefit of the doubt regarding their intentions when making 
scholastic judgments as they play an important role in Muslim society.  
94 China has a long record of repression of its Muslim minorities and Russia has been engaged in a 
brutal war with the Muslim state of Chechnya since the mid-nineties.  
 95 There will be a further discussion of US policy towards Israel and its impact upon extremists in 
chapter four.  
  
gulf between the ruling elite and the governed which breeds enmity and fosters terror. 
Gleis comments regarding the Egyptian case, "such actions could lead to the 
overthrow of the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. Such a move would be 
catastrophic for U.S. interests, considering that a stable Egypt is central to U.S. 
interests in the Middle East, and the United States has pumped billions of dollars in 
aid to the Mubarak government" (2005:4). The U.S has direct investment in the 
stability of many Muslim regimes and is pursuing an increasingly aggressive 
democratization policy which serves as a catalyst for violence for many Takfeeree 
groups and fosters resentment amongst Muslims.
 Paul Pillar, a former CIA intelligence 
official, describes how "the U.S role in this picture is both as the current leader of the 
West that established this Zionist beachhead in the Muslim world and as the principal 
military supplier and backer of Israel" (2001:61). This flagrant support of the state of 
Israel at the expense of the Muslims has served to anger and foster hostility between 
Muslims and the West and is an important factor in the rise of militancy. Furthermore, 
"the latest upsurge in terrorist attacks in Egypt by Islamic extremists is another sign of 
the danger posed by Takfir Wal-Hijra" (Gleis 2005:3). This observation by Gleis 
shows the seriousness in which Takfeeree groups regard interaction with Western 
states and the vulnerability of these governments to terrorist attacks. This offers 
insight into the relationship between terror and Takfeeree ideology. Financial support 
from Western governments used to stabilize oppressive regimes, and support Western 
interests has also contributed to the anger of militants and inflamed the ever widening 
96
                                                 
96 To Salafee scholars' democracy is a system which directly opposes Islaam in totality; they argue that 
democracy is a system which claims to have its basis in the will of the people, whereas Islaamic 
legislation and governance is based upon the divine texts: the Qur’aan and the Sunna. In addition, it is a 
-eem 2004:129). Alth‘A-foreign ideology seen as encroaching upon Muslim sovereignty (‘Abd al
Waadi'ee states, "Democracy calls us to shirk. Implicit in its meaning is that the individual governs 
himself and there is no legitimate rulership except Allah's divine rul rship" (2005b:117). This 
statement is indicative of the position of many contemporary scholars towards democracy as they view 
it in its most extreme f rm and consider it a thr at r compromise to divine law; therefor  they t nd to 
respond in absolute terms in order to prevent compromise to divine law. On the other hand, proponents 
of democracy or the democratization of Islaamic political institutions tend to cite the concept of shura 
or consultation which was practiced by the Prophet. The concept of democracy and its relationship to 
Islaam is extremely complex and an in-depth discussion is outside the scope of this research; however 
democracy or consultation (assuming they are interchangeable concepts) cannot be applied in issues 
clearly demarcated by the Qur'aan or Sunna as this may constitute ruling by man made laws or 
compromising divine legislation. Salafee scholars also claim that shura is between the governing 
il h-d with government affairs (ahl alauthority, scholars and those politically astute individuals charge
wa al-'aqd) and it is based upon the Qur'aan and Sunna. 
  
3.2.6 US Attack on Muslim Countries 
 
  
 
3.2.5 Non-Muslim Presence in Muslim Lands 
   
     The presence of non-Muslims and the imprint of their traditions and customs have 
caused immense pressures upon Muslim regimes from extremists and the general 
Muslim population. From Mc Donald restaurants to military troop facilities, the West 
has made a profound impact upon the Muslim societies that host them. Flagrant 
unrestrained capitalism combined with the secular behaviors that accompany it have 
caused uproar in many traditional Muslim societies. Gunaratna articulates the stance 
of al-Qaeda by saying, "Al-Qaeda believes that until US troops are ejected from Saudi 
Arabia, Muslim society will be living a life of sin" (Gunaratna 2003:116). This is 
similar to how the Azaariqa considered themselves disbelievers until they emigrated 
from the non-Muslim society (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:115). 
  
 
     Mamdani states regarding political violence that "by seeing the perpetrators of 
violence as either cultural renegades or moral perverts, we are unable to think through 
the link between modernity and political violence" (2005:4). A case in point is the 
recent London bombings and George Bush's and Tony Blair's adamant refusal to 
admit that the war on Iraq and Afghanistan might be one of the contributing factors 
for these bombings even though the evidence suggests this.97
     The reasons for discussing these various individuals and groups are to highlight the 
issue of takfeer and radicalism that links these movements in the contemporary setting. 
There has been a strong rise in terrorist activities and attacks around the globe 
 Esposito says, "It is well 
documented that religious discourse can be used to condone and sanctify violence, 
although it is in no way the cause. The Quran can 'explain' Osama bin Laden no more 
that the Bible can 'explain' the IRA" (2003: xv). Many of the modern Islaamic 
ideologues claim the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq are to blame for the increase in 
terrorist activities, because Western foreign policy fuels resentment in the Muslim 
world. In the following sub-chapters this relationship between the claims of radical 
Islaamic ideologues and Western intervention in the Muslim world will be explored to 
determine the motivation for terrorist activities. This analysis is necessary in order to 
verify if indeed these are ‘attacks on freedom’ or there are deeper and more 
substantial political motivations behind these attacks.  
 
3.3 Overview of Islaamic Thinkers 
 
     The various groups and thinkers that have a common Takfeeree ideology all 
express a common concern for the welfare of the Muslim community and 
establishment of the Islaamic sharee’a. However, their extremist interpretation of the 
texts and deviation from the orthodox methodology prevent them from attaining their 
goals and prioritizing them. 
 
                                                 
97 “Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government has insisted the bombings have no link to its foreign 
policy, particularly its decision to invade Iraq alongside the United States. But an opinion poll this 
week showed two thirds of Britons see a connection between Iraq’s war and the bombings. A top think 
tank and a leaked intelligence memo have also suggested the war has made Britain more of a target for 
terrorist” (Gray 2005:1). 
  
associated with Islaam. These contemporary figureheads are contributors, if not 
supporters of the radical ideologies that fuel Muslim terrorist activity. 
 
     Before detailing the creed of these modern day groups, it is important to look into 
the permissibility of criticizing individuals in Islaam. As previously mentioned, 
slander and backbiting are major sins in Islaam. However, in certain circumstances 
criticizing individuals and groups according to the orthodox creed becomes 
permissible and one such case is when warning the Muslim community about heretics 
or innovators whose harm distorts the religion and leads others astray. The proofs for 
this are many from the Qur’aan and Sunna and it is a part of commanding the good 
and forbidding the evil. Allah says, "Allah does not like that the evil should be uttered 
in public except by him who has been wronged. And Allah is ever All-Hearer, All-
Knower" (Qur’aan 1996:4:148). Ibn Katheer and Ibn Taymeeya, both classical 
scholars, explain that this verse is proof for speaking about the people of innovation 
and especially the one who openly sins or is guilty of oppression. Therefore, it 
becomes permissible for the one who was oppressed to warn against his or her 
oppressor and there are numerous examples from the Sunna exhibiting this principle 
(al-Rahaylee 2001/2:486). According to al-Rahaylee the conditions for backbiting 
(gheebah) the people of innovation are four. The first being sincerity; meaning it is 
done as an act of worship to warn Muslims against the harm or deviance of the 
individual being warned against. The second condition is that the individual has 
outward deviant actions or sayings meaning they have the potential of being spread 
among the general Muslim population. The third condition is that the individual being 
warned against should be living, or if he is deceased it is only permissible to warn 
against him if his harm is still spread through books and speeches. Lastly, the one 
who warns against someone should be just, not exaggerating or lying about the person 
they are criticizing (al-Rahaylee 2001/2:508). The warning against groups and 
individuals is part of the preservation of the Islaamic creed and classical scholars have 
written extensively about sectarianism in defense of the orthodox creed of Islaam. 
Even to the extent that the preservation of hadeeth is built upon the science of 
criticizing narrators for their trust worthiness and reliability in narrating and collecting 
hadeeth. Therefore, it becomes impingent upon those who have knowledge, ability, 
  
and the determination to warn against extremism before it is manifested in violent 
action.98
     The concept of criticizing an individual and determining whether he is from the 
ranks of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa'a is similar to the concept and parameters of 
takfeer established by Salafee scholars. Similar to takfeer there are criterion the 
scholars use to determine whether an individual who differs with the orthodox creed 
or commits an act of innovation is within the ranks of Ahl al-Sunna or not. The first 
criterion being that the innovation should not contradict the foundation of Islaam or 
something accepted by consensus of the Muslims. Secondly, the misinterpretation or 
mistake should be knowledge based and in an ambiguous matter which may be open 
to different interpretation due to a difference in meaning between a sharee'a term and 
a term common in the Arabic language. Thirdly, that the intention of the individual 
was in accordance with the sharee'a. Fourthly, that the individual is not arrogant or 
fanatical in adhering to his view (Rislaan 2007:170). Ibn Hajr said, "The scholars say 
that anyone who misinterprets based on knowledge, but his opinion can be understood 
from the perspective of the Arabic language, then he is excused without sin" 
(1996/12:318). For this reason many scholars who contributed tremendously to 
preserving Islaam and the orthodox creed were not considered innovators even if they 
held a particular opinion or view that appeared to differ with the orthodox creed. For 
example, Imaam Nawawee, Ibn Hajar, Ibn Hazm, Imaam Bayhaqee, Imaam 
Shawkaanee, and countless other scholars who were known for their contribution to 
Islaam, and mentioned as imaams of the Sunna, were criticized for some controversial 
views they held in creed but were held in high esteem. Salafee scholars hold that those 
individuals esteem should be preserved but the matters in creed that they differed with 
the orthodox position should be warned against. Also, each individual must be 
critiqued to determine if they differ in methodology or in certain issues to determine 
whether they are considered from Ahl al-Sunna or not. Al-Rahaylee states, "None of 
the scholars from Ahl al-Sunna…can be judged as an innovator or outside the fold of 
Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa'a due to a mistake in ijtihaad whether it is a mistake in 
creed and tawheed, or an issue of determining whether something is lawful or 
unlawful, because he struggled to attain the truth" (2001/1:63).            
  
                                                 
98 Imaam al-Aajooree said, “…One must adhere to the book of Allah and the Sunna of His Messenger 
and the Sunna of the rightly guided caliphs, all the companions and those who follow them in 
righteousness, and the leaders of the Muslims. Also, a person should leave debating, argumentation, 
and disputes in religious matters and keep far from the people of innovation” (al-Aajooree 1999/1:424).   
  
     Finally, although this chapter is based upon the critique of certain individuals and 
groups by contrasting their ideologies with the Salafee creed, the author of this study 
in no way calls for the takfeer of, or accuses anyone of them of apostasy, but rather 
criticizes them in effort to determine some of the causes of contemporary Islaamic 
extremism. “And the consensus of Ahl al-Sunna is that the believers who pray 
towards Makka and believe in Allah, His angels, books, and messengers, and all 
affairs Allah the Almighty and His Prophet commanded us to believe in, are not 
considered outside the realm of Islaam or disbelievers for the major sins they commit” 
(al-Faasee 2003/1:10).    
     
3.3.1 Aboo al-A'ala al-Mawdoodee 
 
     One of the most well known contemporary thinkers associated with 'Muslim 
radicalism' in the twentieth century is Aboo al-A'ala al-Mawdoodee. He was born in 
1903 and is the "founder of Jama'at-i-Islami, the foremost fundamentalist organization 
in South Asia" (Zakaria 1988:9).  Mawdoodee was not a scholar of Islaam but instead 
he was a journalist and religious thinker who later became known for his Islaamic 
activism and protest against nationalism, and he was a fervent proponent of Islaamic 
statehood and sharee’a. Mawdoodee “described the West as morally decadent and 
corrupt and argued that Islam was self-sufficient and quite separate from, and indeed 
opposed to, both Western and socialist ways of life. He advocated total reliance on the 
Shari’a, while recognizing the need for interpretation in response to changing 
circumstance” (Marsden 2002:81). Mawdoodee was relentless in trying to achieve his 
vision of Islaamic statehood in Pakistan by the use of non-violent political means, 
although his writings show he was considering a progressively more violent approach, 
essentially this distinguishes him from his successors who went from activism to 
calling for violent rebellion.99
     Mawdoodee was passionate about the cause of Muslim empowerment and 
statehood which is reflected in his various writings, however it seems at times his 
  
 
3.3.1.1 Mawdoodee's Creed  
 
                                                 
99  Some suggest that Mawdoodee also differed with subsequent thinkers like Qutb over the issue of 
takfeer. Al-Bahnasaawee states, “It is clear that one cannot attribute to Mawdoodee that he believes in 
takfeer of whole societies because he clearly denies that in his statements” (al-Bahnasaawee 1985:67). 
  
political vision overshadowed his call to tawheed by emphasizing the reform of 
Muslim leadership. Much of his call was focused on exhorting Muslims to evaluate 
their leadership and this was probably due to the turbulent time in which he lived. 
Mawdoodee centered his call on the reform and overthrow of repressive leaders and 
likened the call of the Prophets to political and revolutionary causes to establish the 
religion of Islaam. Mawdoodee said, "Therefore the goal aspired for in the messenger-
ship of the Prophets…in this world did not cease to be the establishment of the 
Islamic government upon the earth. Through this they could establish the complete 
system for human life which they brought from Allah" (cited in al-Madkhalee 
1997b:183). However, Allah says regarding the goal of the Messengers that "…We 
did not send any Messenger before you (O Muhammad) except we revealed to him 
(saying): none has the right to be worshipped but I (Allah), so worship me" (Qur’aan 
1996:21:25). In another verse Allah mentions the goal of the Messengers was to 
"worship Allah (alone) and avoid Taghut (all false deities)" (1996:16:36). According 
to the orthodox creed the link that binds and forms the call of the prophets and 
messengers sent by Allah to mankind is Islaamic monotheism. 100
          cooperate with it at every opportunity (cited in al-Suhaymee 2005b:165). 
 Mawdoodee’s 
vision for Islaamic statehood was so overwhelming that he overlooked important 
matters of creed and was willing to compromise them in order to achieve his goal. He 
commented upon the Iranian Shee’a revolution by saying: 
                   
          Khomeini’s revolution is an Islaamic revolution. Those who participated in it  
          are the Islaamic group and the youth experienced Islaamic education in this  
          movement. Furthermore, it is upon all the Muslims in general to assist  
          it and especially the Islaamic front to aid and establish that revolution and   
101
Al-Suhaymee states, “And this is proof of Mawdoodee’s lack of knowledge of the 
Sunna and ability to distinguish it from innovation, truth from falsehood, and 
misguidance from guidance” (2005b:165). Al-Suhaymee criticized Mawdoodee 
because it appears that his zeal to establish a Muslim state led him to urge Muslims to 
 
 
                                                 
100 This does not mean Mawdoodee’s writings did not contain emphasis on tawheed; on the contrary he 
emphasized both al-ruboobeeya and al-ulooheeya, with special care given to Allah’s sovereignty as the 
sole legislator (al-Mawdoodee 1987:47-52). During the life time of Mawdoodee and Qutb, both were 
accepted amongst many contemporary scholars and respected as great thinkers and proponents of 
tawheed. Until recently, due to an escalation of terrorism and violence in Muslim lands, neither 
Mawdoodee’s nor Qutb’s writings had come under such careful scrutiny resulting in many 
contemporary scholars renouncing them altogether or writing refutations of their concepts of tawheed, 
takfeer, and rebellion against the Muslim authorities.   
that and Shee’a both praise a dafiaRWaadi’ee said while describing Khomeini’s Iran, “and the -Al 101
evil government” (al-Waadi’ee 2000:292).  
  
support those who cursed and made takfeer of the companions. Khomeini is known 
for his many statements of disbelief, like cursing the companions, takfeer of the 
orthodox scholars, and even criticism of the Prophet Muhammad which are acts of 
disbelief contradicting the orthodox creed (al-Hilaalee 2004:625-634). This lends 
credence to Suhaymee’s claim that Mawdoodee lacked correct knowledge of the 
orthodox creed.102
                                                 
102 What seems odd is Mawdoodee emphasized the significance of all the categories of tawheed and the 
importance of correct practice and staying away from heresy much in the same way Ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhaab did except not nearly to the same extent. Mawdoodee said, "It is not simply a matter of 
telling Muslims that they will enter paradise by simply agreeing to the creed of tawheed, and then it 
being permissible for them to call to what they desire from their opinions and false beliefs and 
deviance…” (al-Mawdoodee 1987:63-65).   
  
Mawdoodee goes on to say regarding the Prophets' revolutionary zeal that "others 
actually managed to start revolutionary movements, but their messengership finished 
before the divine government could be established at their hand, such as Jesus" (cited 
in al-Madkhalee 1997b:189). Here Mawdoodee seems to imply that some of the 
messengers failed or fell short of their divine purpose which would amount to heresy 
as it implies the messengers were guilty of incompetence. According to the Salafee 
creed it is considered heresy to speculate in matters regarding belief, so Salafee 
scholars confine themselves to the beliefs substantiated by the religious texts and 
evidences (al-Ja’eer, al-‘Ulyaanee, and al-Juhanee 2007:52).  
 
     
 
     M wd odee was adamant and pers stent in his c ll for political rulership and in his 
view that amounted to the goal of the prophets and this caused him to fall into errors 
in his belief regarding the prophets. He claimed, “Therefore every prophet and every 
messenger strove to cause a political revolution so the efforts of some of them were 
limited to preparing the way and amassing the number of people required such as 
Ibraaheem" (cited in al-Madkhalee 1997b:189).  Mawdoodee’s claim about the 
Prophet Ibraaheem seems dubious and he appears to insinuate Ibraaheem fulfilled his 
goal but it was limited to gathering his followers together for religious revolution. 
According to the orthodox creed all the Prophets fulfilled their aim of calling people 
back to monotheism, and Prophet Ibraaheem is no exception as he was considered the 
friend of Allah, as Allah says, "Then we revealed to you, O Muhammad that you 
should follow the religion of Ibraaheem who was a Muslim upon the true religion and 
was not one of those who worshipped idols and associated partners with Allah" 
(Qur’aan 1996:16:123). Ibraaheem was known as the father of the Prophets and his 
example was that of righteousness forbidding polytheism, and he was an example for 
the final Prophet and Messenger Muhammad (al-Madkhalee 1997b:56). Al-
Madkhalee offers a refutation of Mawdoodee's analysis of the goal of Ibraaheem 
when he states: 
 
          The call to tawheed (Islaamic monotheism) represents the peak of sincerity,  
          wisdom, and intelligence… as Allah has willed not merely struggling for      
          kingship nor seeking to fight for leadership. If the goal of Ibraaheem had been  
          to attain ruler-ship and authority he would have taken a different methodology       
          to this, and he would have found people who gathered around him and  
          supported him (al-Madkhalee 1997b:63). 
      Evid nce suggests that Mawdoodee envisioned political trength as more vital 
than calling to mono ism as the ethodology of reform for Muslims. Mawdoodee 
said," …The way forward for whoever wants to reform the Islaamic world is not 
achieved through preaching and guidanc lone, instead political strength is necessary 
f r correcting thought and moving to the impl mentation of Islaamic law" 
(Maw oodee 1984:36). His statement suggests that the propagat on of monotheism is 
se ondary to pol tical activism in establishing Islaam which does not conform to the 
call of the Prophets who were the original propagators of the orthodox creed.103
     Mawdoodee was particula ly knowledge ble ab ut the st te of the Mus ims in 
India where heresy was widespr ad and ignorance prevalent; however he decided to 
combat ignorance with th  call for political and economic reform. Al-Madkhalee says, 
“So M wd od e was fully awa e of the state of his land, he knew its history, and he 
knew the xtent to which he beliefs of the Muslims were connected to and influenced 
by their forefathers and indeed present day idolaters” (al-Madkhalee 1997b:161). So, 
according to al-Madkhalee, rectification should have begun with the removal of un-
Islaamic beliefs and practices adapted from Hinduism and Buddhism which 
influenced t e Muslims of his society. This was the call of l the Proph ts: they 
began their call with monotheism and prohibited polytheism. Mawdoodee, who was 
 
 
                                                 
103 Mawdoodee’s statement must be placed in its proper context and through analyzing his writings it is 
easy to conclude that Islaamic political activism and reform were of the utmost importance to him. 
Marsden makes a comparison between Mawdoodee’s tactics for political reform and that of the Muslim 
Brotherhood by saying, “He was highly elitist in his approach in that he set out to influence those 
holding power in societies as a means of promoting change within it. This was quite distinct from the 
policy of the Muslim Brotherhood, which advocated the building of change from the bottom, though 
the development of mass movements" (Marsden 2002:81).   
  
not an ignorant man should have known “the strength of the methodology of the 
Prophets in calling to monotheism…and in concentrating upon giving importance to 
the Muslim’s creed in order to save them from the claws of the shirk (polytheism) of 
Hinduism, Buddhism and their like” (al-Madkhalee 1997b:161). Mawdoodee best 
articulates his call when he said:  
 
          it becomes apparent from our books and treatises that the final goal which we  
          aim in our present struggle is to cause a revolution overthrowing the leadership,  
          what I mean by that is that we wish to attain and be successful in this world by  
          achieving to purify the earth from the filth of wicked leaders and their  
          supremacy, and to establish the system of pious and rightly-guided leadership  
          (imamate) (cited in al-Madkhalee 1997b:158). 
 
Mawdoodee is very unambiguous about his objectives which conform to aspects of 
the Khawaarij creed and contradict the basic principles of orthodox Islaam,104 even in 
his discussion of tawheed.105
     Mawdoodee regarded corrupt leadership as the cause of the ills and humiliation of 
the Muslims. He believed that the masses of Muslims had not realized their true 
calling: to remove corrupt leadership as they are to blame for the Muslims' lowly 
condition. Mawdoodee said, "The leadership of the wicked and evildoers is the source 
of all disasters and calamities that afflict mankind, and the well-being and happiness 
of mankind rests solely upon the reins of authority over the worldly affairs lying in 
the hands of the righteous and just" (cited in al-Madkhalee 1997b:162).  While 
 Much of Mawdoodee’s call was based upon revolt 
against corrupt leadership and this seems to be his methodology for changing the 
condition of the Muslim community. However, the orthodox creed calls for the 
rectification of the beliefs of ignorant Muslims before any other reforms can be put in 
place and this was the methodology of the Prophets (al-Ja’eer, al-‘Ulyanee and al-
Juhanee 2007:87). 
 
3.3.1.2 Mawdoodee’s View on Leadership  
 
                                                 
104 Majority of the classical and contemporary scholars hold it to be impermissible to rebel against the 
Muslim authorities (al-Faasee 2003:107). 
105 Mawdoodee’s emphasis on tawheed primarily dealt with the aspect of rulership and sovereignty, 
and it is this overemphasis in his writings which latter thinkers and ideologues transferred into violent 
action. Mawdoodee said, “The foundation on which the Qur’aan stands is nothing more than mankind 
submitting themselves to the guidance and laws which Allah revealed though his messengers and 
fighting their own independent desires” (al-Mawdoodee 1987:216). It is not Mawdoodee’s general 
concept of tawheed that is in question here, but instead his conclusions and linking these concepts to 
revolutionary theory is where he seems to depart with classical interpretations. 
  
concern for the leadership’s conduct is important, it is not the main cause for 
Muslims' weakness according to scholars like al-Madkhalee (1997b:162). For many 
contemporary scholars, the cause for Muslims’ weakness is in part due to deviation 
from the orthodox creed, sins and failure to enjoin good and forbid evil, along with 
leaving jihaad and widespread ignorance.106
     Mawdoodee seemed to think the success of the Muslim community would come 
through revolution, but unfortunately failed to realize the orthodox methodology.
  In contrast, Mawdoodee uses a 
fabricated saying he mistakenly thought was a hadeeth of the Prophet to justify his 
claim that failed leadership is the cause for the misfortunes that plague the Muslim 
community. He said, "The scholars of the Umma and its leaders are the ones 
responsible for its well-being or its corruption" (cited in al-Madkhalee 1997b:166). 
Allah says, "And any misfortune which befalls you it is a punishment for the sins 
which you have committed" (Qur’aan 1996:42:30). In accordance with the 
aforementioned Qur’aanic verse it seems that the sins committed by individuals as 
well as those who lead the community are the cause for Muslims’ humiliation and 
trials; however many of the contemporary extremist groups and ideologues blame the 
leadership, and this is one of the key traits of the Khawaarij (al-Shahrastaanee 
1984:115).  
  
107
                                                 
106 Refer back to section on causes for extremism in chapter two. 
107  Mawdoodee said, "Our call is to all of mankind, to bring about a general revolution against the 
contemporary law of the wicked and Tawaagheet who have corrupted the earth, and replace their 
leadership and ideology” (al-Mawdoodee 1973:5). 
  
In the first part of Mawdoodee's statement he seems to call into question that faith 
comprises of actions, the tongue, and the heart.
 
Instead of calling to correct worship Mawdoodee began with rebellion against corrupt 
leadership, which was similar to the Khawaarij and the various secular nationalist 
forces he opposed. Mawdoodee said: 
         
          So if someone today wishes to purify the earth and change the corruption to  
          well-being, unrest to security, corrupt manners to righteous manners, sins to   
          good deeds, then it will never be enough for him to call them to good and to  
          admonish them to have God fearfulness, and to encourage them to have good  
          manners. Rather it is a duty upon him to gather what he is able with regard to   
          the resources of righteous people, and form them into an organized group and a  
          strong community, such as will enable him to snatch the reins of authority from  
          those in charge of civilizations in this world, and bring about the revolution  
          aspired for, to attain leadership of the world (cited in al-Madkhalee 1997b:165).   
 
108 His claim that admonishment is not 
enough suggests that he rejects the possibility of changing corrupt leadership by 
rebuking it verbally.109 In the second part of his statement Mawdoodee calls for 
revolution and rebellion which is one of the central tenets of the Khawaarij creed.110
     One of the most influential Muslim proponents of radicalism in the twentieth 
century was Sayyid Qutb. He was born in 1906, and executed by the Nassirite regime 
 
Lastly, Mawdoodee’s statement seems to echo the same discontent and rhetoric that 
the nationalists used when protesting colonialism. So, Mawdoodee despite the fact 
that he rebuked and despised Western vice and secularism emulated and borrowed 
much of the rhetoric and ideas of the nationalists and communists and applied them to 
his critique of Islaamic governments. Mawdoodee was “impressed by the totalitarian 
movements in Russia, Italy and Germany, he compared Islam favorably with 
communism and fascism as a movement with the potential to mobilize the masses” 
(Ruthven 2004:69). Mawdoodee was very influenced by the political forces of his 
time and this affected his creed and methodology causing him to believe that reform 
should begin with leadership instead of the masses which is inherent to Khawaarij 
thought.  
 
     Finally, Mawdoodee was passionate about the struggle to improve the plight of 
Muslims; establishment of the Islaamic state, and re-establishment of the Islaamic 
caliph. However, he could not break free from the very ideologies that he so fervently 
fought, and this appears to be a major factor in his placing emphasis on Islaamic 
revolution and political reform instead of creed.   
 
3.3.2 Sayyid Qutb      
 
                                                 
108 Imaam al-Aajooree said, “The Muslim scholars believe: that faith is an obligation upon all of 
creation and it consists of belief in the heart, utterance of the tongue, and deeds with one’s limbs” and 
He also said, “It was narrated upon the Prophet, and a group of the companions, and many of the 
Taabi’een, that faith is belief in the heart, pronounced upon the tongue, and comprised of actions done 
with the limbs, and whoever does not possess something from these characteristics is a disbeliever” (al-
Aajooree 1999/2:636).   
109  Admittedly, it is quite plausible that due to his emphasis on revolution that he places greater stress 
on faith as action (al-Mawdoodee 1984: 18-37).  
110 This was detailed in chapter one regarding the Khawaarij creed and in the section regarding faith. 
  
in Egypt in 1966.111
    Sayyid Qutb made some very serious statements regarding the Qur’aan and some of 
his claims appeared to support the concept that the Qur’aan was created. Muslims 
view the Qur’aan as the speech of Allah and that it is uncreated and perfect, and this is 
an important aspect of the orthodox creed, therefore classical scholars made takfeer of 
those sects who claimed the Qur’aan was created or imperfect.
 Qutb was influenced by the thinking of Mawdoodee as he often 
quoted from him in his Qur’aanic exegesis. Qutb memorized the Qur’aan at an early 
age but his main training was in literature at which he became quite prolific as a 
writer. Later in his life he joined the Muslim Brotherhood of Hasan al-Banna and 
became a very influential espouser of revolutionary movement and Islaamic statehood. 
Ruthven says regarding one of his writings “more than any other text it articulates 
both rage and the revolutionary energy underpinning the Islamist movement. It also 
reveals the extent to which the values and aspirations of the movement are rooted in 
classical Islam, while also significantly departing from it” (Ruthven 2004:85). Qutb is 
one of the most revered spokesmen for contemporary extremists, so it becomes 
absolutely necessary to critique his thought by comparing it to that of the orthodox 
creed to determine why his example is so often used by these modern ideologues. 
 
3.3.2.1 His Creed   
      
     Sayyid Qutb’s creed will be analyzed from its three main aspects: his view 
regarding the Qur’aan, the companions and prophets, and his thoughts concerning 
monotheism and Allah’s divine characteristics. By analyzing these aspects of his 
creed it will be easier to discern whether he is indeed influenced by the Khawaarij in 
his beliefs or closer to the orthodox beliefs of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a. 
 
112
                                                 
111 “Qutub’s vision of global jihad was developed at a time of conflict within a specific environment--
Nassir’s secular Egypt and its persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet it was precisely because of 
this context that his work has been taken as an inspiration for contemporary jihad-oriented 
organizations that see themselves in similar battles against secular ideologies and repressive, 
authoritarian governments…” (Delong-Bas 2004:265). 
112 “It is the consensus of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a, that Allah’s commands and speech have no 
beginning and were not created” (al-Faasee 2003/1:26).  
  
declaring takfeer of those who doubted the Qur’aan's authenticity or claimed that it 
was a created thing. Qutb said regarding the Qur’aan “that the main aspect of this 
miracle is that it is an integral part of all of Allah’s creation. So, it is like Allah’s 
creation of everything and the creation of the people” (Qutb 2007/1:38). He also said 
regarding mankind “that they do not possess the means to author a book like this. 
Because it is from Allah’s creation not from mankind” (Qutb 2007/5:2719). The 
importance of introducing these quotations of Qutb is that it illustrates his departure 
from the classical view regarding the Qur’aan: his suggestion that the Qur’aan was 
created and this researcher has not found any evidence to suggest that contemporary 
scholars make takfeer of him.
 One of the early 
scholars and hadeeth narrators Wakeeá Ibn al-Jaraa said, "Whoever doubts that the 
Qur’aan is the speech of Allah: not a created thing, then he is a disbeliever" (al-
Laalakaa`ee 2002/1:360). There are many such narrations upon the early scholars 
113
     Sayyid Qutb also made other statements which call into question his creed 
regarding some of the prophets, and the companions of the Prophet Muhammad. This 
is a major sin that can lead to unbelief as discussed previously.
 In contrast, Qutb was very apt to issue verdicts of 
disbelief upon whole Muslim societies for their shortcomings in implementing the 
sharee’a and sins.  
 
114
                                                 
113 This is most probably due to the ambiguity of some of his statements and the possibility of his 
words being misconstrued. 
114 Refer to the section on slandering the companions in chapter two. 
  
striking similarity to the Khawaarij creed and clear deviance from the orthodox 
position regarding the Prophet's companions.
 When describing 
the Prophet Moosa he said, “We can take Moosa as an example of a pushy, nervous 
and temperamental leader” (cited in Suhaymee 2005b:167). Criticizing the 
companions of the Prophet can lead to disbelief according to orthodox scholars, so 
slandering or criticizing a prophet who has even greater status than a companion is an 
even graver sin. Bin Baaz, a Salafee scholar, referred to the description of Moosa by 
Qutb as a “mockery of the Prophets which is open apostasy” (cited in Suhaymee 
2005b:167).   However, Suhaymee commented that Bin Baaz’s statement was general 
and not a pronouncement of takfeer on Qutb (Suhaymee 2005b:167).  Qutb described 
the disagreement that led to fighting between Mu'aawiya and ‘Alee by saying, "While 
Mu'aawiyah and his companions relied upon lying, cheating, deception, hypocrisy, 
bribery and purchasing slander, ‘Alee did not condescend to such low levels" (cited in 
Suhaymee 2005b:168). This type of criticism is considered slanderous, according to 
Salafee scholars, against Mu'aawiyah and is a pillar of the Shee’a and the Khawaarij 
creed. The position of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a has already been detailed 
regarding the companions in chapter two. Hence, this statement of Qutb's reflects a 
115
     Qutb also made statements which might lead one to believe he was a proponent of 
wahdahtu al-wajood (Allah merging with His creation) which is a belief that 
originated with some of the extreme Sufi sects.
   
 
     In addition to criticizing the companions, Qutb also had harsh condemnation of the 
scholars of al-Azhar University of that time. Zakaria describes how the scholars 
appointed by Naaser supported him in his socialist reforms and "Qutub denounced 
them as pharaonic pagans, who had no understanding of Islam; they were munafiqun 
or hypocrites, who loved the pleasure of this world more than the life of the hereafter" 
(Zakaria 1989:189). If indeed the scholars were supportive of reforming or 
dismantling the Islaamic sharee’a then they were committing major sins; however 
Qutb’s criticism was extreme accusing them of hypocrisy and paganism with blatant 
disregard for the conditions for making takfeer.    
       
116 This panentheistic view in its most 
extreme form seems to suggest that the creator nd the creation are inseparable and in 
reali y on . Wha  is challenging in some of Qutb’s writing is the ambi uity of his 
langu ge, and a t mpting to ccurately und rstand the meaning of s me of his 
t teme ts his inte tion behind them can be problematic. Conversely, this does 
indicate the contrast between his writings nd that of classical holars: they used a 
common methodology and set us  of terms when referring to re   order to 
articulate clear principles, especially when referring to issues of t whe d (Ibn 
Taymeeya 2007:32). Qutb said, “He is the only one in existence. Then there is no 
reality and there is no existence except His existence, and everything that is in
existence other than Hi  derive its xistence from His existence” (Qutb 
2007/6:4402).117
                                                 
115 Th  Shee’a were know  for their extreme reverence for ‘Alee and the arly Khawaarij were known 
for their takfeer of him, refer back to chapter one. 
116  Although Qutb was known for his stance against extreme mysticism some of his statements appear 
to have an undertone of this view. 
117  Another rendition of what Qutb said that has been translated into English reads “the unity of Allah 
is such that there is no reality and no true and permanent existence except His. Moreover, every other 
being acquires whatever power it possessed from the effective power of Allah which rules over the 
world. Nothing else whatsoever plans anything for the world nor decides, for that matter, anything in 
it” (Qutb 2007a:3). This translation, which is what is circulated throughout Western countries, does not 
accurately reflect Qutb’s statement, as there are many words added which actually change the meaning 
  
statement is astounding and it contradicts Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa'a. His 
explanation of the verse is evidence that points to the belief of wahdahtu al-wajood" 
(cited in Suhaymee 2005b:169).
 Ibn ‘Uthaimeen said after reading Qutb's statement that "his 
118 What is apparent in Ibn ‘Uthaymeen’s criticism is 
that he does not attack Qutb, but rather points to the fact that his exegesis of the 
particular verse in question has a statement which contains a form of panentheism. 
After analysis of the evidence it is difficult to determine precisely what Qutb believes 
in this regard and whether he was mistaken in his use of language or due to the 
ambiguity of his statement it has been misconstrued. Qutb was a linguist and he used 
a high level of Arabic in his writings, but nonetheless, matters of creed are not 
debatable or left to personal reasoning and Qutb has no predecessor, from amongst 
orthodox scholars, who explained the verse in the way in which he articulated its 
meaning. What can be deduced is that if he believed in aspects of this concept it is a 
radical departure from the orthodox creed and at the same time it is clear that he was 
not a supporter of the more extreme Sufi schools of thought and if he were it would 
have been apparent through his many writings.119
     Probably the most serious deviance in creed attributed to Sayyid Qutb is the total 
takfeer of entire societies. This was primarily due to his use of the term of jaahileeya 
(pre-Islaamic ignorance) to describe non-Muslim and Muslim states which he claimed 
did not rule by the sharee’a. Qutb said, "Then there is not on the face of the earth a 
  
 
3.3.2.2 Qutb and Takfeer 
 
                                                                                                                                            
of his statement. What is apparent from this rendition is that Qutb believes that Allah is the only true 
existence which contradicts the Qur’aan and basic reasoning. Throughout the Qur’aan Allah declares 
that the Day of Judgment and death are realities and the existence of mankind and jinn are real and are 
created by Him not a part of Him (Qur’aan 1996/55-56).   
118 Wahdahtu al-wajood (regardless of its variance), according to Salafee scholars, is considered a 
major form of deviance which can expel one from the fold of Islaam because, they ague, it involves 
ignorance of the creator which can lead to incorrect worship and even polytheism. In accordance with 
the Salafee belief, the one who believes in this concept might claim that Allah is everywhere, which is 
inclusive of filthy places, or he or she may claim they have become Allah so they should be 
worshipped or have no need of worship and this is what some of the extreme mystics practice. (al-
Juhanee 2003:/1:1168). Some suggest that the concept of wahdahta al-wujood is more complex than 
the Salafees suggest and that their view is over simplistic. However, Salafee scholars look at whether a 
belief can be traced back to the Prophet and his companions before it can be authenticated as a 
legitimate Islaamic belief or concept. In sum, the Salafee belief holds that if a practice or belief is 
determined to be without origin from the sources of the religion then it is unacceptable as a practice or 
concept and this seems consistent with the belief of the companions.  
119  Bin ‘Uthaymeen scrutinized Qutb’s statement and made his deduction after contextualizing the 
statement in question and comparing it to other statements Qutb has made in his exegesis of the 
Qur’aan. This process is a part of passing a judgment on an individual to determine whether he made a 
mistake in his use of language or he has a defect in creed.  
  
Muslim country nor a Muslim society that rules practicing Allah's legislation and 
Islaamic jurisprudence" (cited in Suhaymee 2005b:180). This statement carries very 
serious implications and Qutb is accusing the whole Muslim nation of his time of not 
practicing the sharee’a and insinuating that they are apostate societies.  He also said, 
"The Muslims of today do not fight jihaad that is because they cannot be found. The 
situation Islaam is in and the Muslims are in today needs remedy" (cited in Suhaymee 
2005b:180). Here again Qutb implies that there are no Muslims due to the poor state 
of affairs of the Islaamic nation and the lack of jihaad, what is in question here is not 
Qutb’s analysis of the problem, but rather his conclusion that there are no Muslims to 
be found. Qutb comments upon another verse in his Qur’aanic exegesis by saying:  
 
          This is a sine qua non for the contemporary advocates of Islam. They badly  
          need to realize that they are calling for Islam today in entirely ignorant  
          surroundings amongst ex-Muslim peoples whose hearts have grown harder and  
          whose beliefs have now deteriorated considerably. They need to understand that  
          there is no room for short-term or half solutions, compromises, or partial  
          redemption or adjustment, and that their call is for uniquely distinguished Islam,  
          in contrast to what these people conceive of as Islam (Qutb 2007/6:3992).120
                                                 
120 Many of the direct quotes taken from sources already rendered into English contain a variety of 
different spellings for words like jihaad, Islaam, takfeer and sharee'a due to the use of various different 
transliteration systems. 
  
     Evidence suggests Qutb's concept of faith resembled the Khawaarij paradigm: 
either a Muslim had complete faith or none at all. 
 
 
     Qutb seems to be one of the most important, if not the most important 
contemporary figurehead in neo-Takfeeree thought. His ideas have been taken from 
generation to generation, and all the successive radical ideologues discussed in this 
dissertation have benefited from his thought. Qutb’s statements resemble that of the 
Khawaarij who made takfeer of whole societies due to their sins. Qutb said, 
“Whoever follows a man in legislation from himself, even if it was in a slight matter, 
then he is a polytheist” (Qutb 2007/3/1198). This statement offers further insight into 
the creed of Qutb as it illustrates yet another way in which his creed is at variance 
from the beliefs of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a. It appears that Qutb believes that 
faith is either complete and one is a believer, or non-existent: become a disbeliever for 
the sins he has committed and this is one of the most well-known aspects of creed 
attributed to the Khawaarij as was detailed in chapter one.   
121
One of the strongest statements made by Qutb which suggests his takfeer of the 
Muslim nation is when he said, "The question in essence is that of unbelief and belief, 
of associating others with God and the Oneness of God, and of jaahiliya and Islam. 
This ought to be made clear. Indeed, people are not Muslims, as they proclaim to be, 
as long as they live the life of jaahiliya" (Qutb 2005:11). In line with the creed of the 
Khawaarij Qutb declares takfeer of all those who have weak faith. According to Qutb 
there is no middle ground, one either has complete faith or is a disbeliever regardless 
of his testimony of faith. The danger inherent in this type of thinking is that it is a 
nullification of all the rights that are afforded to Muslims. In addition, it paves the 
way for rebellion and disobedience of the Muslim leaders which usually results in 
chaos.
 This is illustrated in his use of 
the term jaahileeya and reference to Muslim states as illegitimate. Qutb said:              
          The chasm between Islam and jaahiliya is great, and a bridge is not to be built   
         across it so that the people on the two sides may mix with each other, but only            
         so that the people of jaahiliya may come over to Islam, whether they reside in  
         a so-called Islamic country and consider themselves Muslims or they are outside  
         the 'Islamic' country, in order that they may come out of darkness into light and  
         may get rid of their miserable condition, and enjoy those blessings which we  
         have tasted-we who have understood Islam and live in its atmosphere (2005:10). 
 
122
     It is imperative to discern what Qutb defines as jaahileeya to determine to what 
extent his creed resembled the Khawaarij. Qutb said, "The jaahili society is any 
society other than the Muslim society; and if we want a more specific definition, we 
 Qutb went on to explain that jaahileeya and Islaam cannot mix then he said, 
"This is not Isla , and they are not Muslims. Today the task of the call is to return 
these ignorant people to Islam and make them into Muslims all over again" (Qutb 
2005:13). His takfeer of whole Muslim societies was based upon his lack of 
knowledge of the principles of takfeer and misinterpretation of the religious texts 
which he misused to pronounce his judgments. 
                                                 
121 According to the majority of orthodox scholars, faith fluctuates and one can be in the fold of Islaam 
and a sinner and major sins do not make a person an apostate (al-Faasee 2003/1:8). In contrast Qutb 
said, “As explained in the commentary on surah 103, “The Declining Day”, the essence of faith once 
firmly rooted in the hearts and minds, will begin immediately to operate and manifest itself in men’s 
behavior. The surah stresses unequivocally that, if this is not the case, there is no faith” (Qutb 
2007/7:3985). 
122 See the section on Zarqaawee. 
  
may say that any society is a jaahili society which does not dedicate itself to 
submission to God alone, in its beliefs and ideas in its observances of worship, and in 
its legal regulations" (Qutb 2005:14). Qutb was clear in explaining his usage of the 
term jaahileeya and according to him all societies during his time were disbelievers. 
However, al-Bahnasaawee suggests that Qutb and Mawdoodee both used the term 
jaahileeya to mean oppressiveness and sinfulness, which does not expel one from 
Islaam, so they cannot be considered Khawaarij-like (al-Bahnasaawee 1985:75-78). 
But the weight of the evidence suggests, that at least in the case of Qutb, jaahileeya 
meant disbelief. Qutb said, "According to this definition, all the societies existing in 
the world today are jaahili…Lastly, all the existing so-called 'Muslim' societies are 
also jaahili societies" (Qutb 2005:14). The statements of Qutb are unambiguous and 
full of blatant examples of the misuse of the principles of the general takfeer by 
labeling the Muslim societies during his time as 'so-called Muslim'. Qutb goes on to 
explain what makes a society jaahilee and he expounds on his definition by saying: 
          We classify them among jaahili societies not because they believe in other    
          deities besides God or because they worship anyone other than God, but  
          because their way of life is not based on submission to God alone. Although  
          they believe in the unity of God, still they have relegated the legislative  
          attribute of God to others and submit to this authority, and from this authority  
          they derive their systems, their traditions and customs, their laws, their values   
          and standards, and almost every practice of life (2005:15). 
 
Qutb refers to those governments that do not legislate by Allah's sharee’a as jaahilee 
and to him that means they are non-Muslim and this differs from the orthodox creed 
which holds that ruling by other than the sharee’a is a major sin and at times is a type 
of lesser disbelief, and this has already been discussed in the section on ruling by 
divine law. Qutb does not appear to distinguish between minor and major disbelief 
and his writings indicate that he considers al-hakameeya the most important aspect of 
tawheed as he declares total societies to be jaahilee for their tacit support of their 
leader. Qutb said in this regard: 
 
          Islam does not look at the labels or titles which these societies have adopted;  
          they all have one thing in common, and that is that their way of life is not based  
          on complete submission to God alone. In this respect they share the same  
          characteristic with a polytheistic society, the characteristic of jaahiliya     
          (2005:16). 
 
  
Here Qutb likens Muslim societies to polytheistic ones in the same way the 
Khawaarij likened those individuals, groups, and societies which disagreed with them 
as polytheists. Also, Qutb claims that any deviance from the sharee’a is major 
disbelief and this coincides with the Khawaarij's accusation against 'Alee the fourth 
caliph whom they accused of not judging in accordance with the Islaamic sharee’a 
and becoming an apostate from the religion. It appears, according to Qutb's view, 
Muslim societies have become polytheistic in nature because of their shortcomings in 
implementing the Islaamic sharee’a and widespread sins. The Khawaarij preceded 
him in this view: faith is either complete or totally absent due to falling into major sin. 
Conversely, the orthodox creed is derived from the Qur’aan and Sunna and 
understanding of the pious predecessors who believed faith fluctuates: at times one’s 
faith is high and at other times it is low, but still one is considered a Muslim. Allah 
said, “And whenever there comes down a verse, some of them (hypocrites) say: 
‘Which of you has had his faith increased by it?’ As for those who believe, it has 
increased their faith, and they rejoice” (Qur’aan 1996/9:124). Ibn Katheer said about 
this verse that “this noble verse is one of the greatest proofs that faith increases and 
decreases, like the way (madhhab) of most of the predecessors (Salaf) and successors 
(Khalaf) among the major scholars. Moreover, it has been narrated upon more than 
one authority that this is the consensus” (cited in Mubdal 2003/3:1202).  Evidence 
suggests that Qutb makes takfeer of whole societies due to the sins of its inhabitants 
and leaders. This creed and methodology of takfeer is in total violation of the 
principles established by the early scholars of Islaam (al-Rahaylee 2006:38-39). 
  
3.3.2.3 Qutb's Assessment of Daar al-Harb  
 
     Qutb's emphasis and assessment of Daar al-Islaam and Daar al-Harb led him to 
call for the separation of his followers from the rest of Muslim society and this is a 
trait of the Khawaarij. Qutb described Daar al-Islaam saying, "It is that place where 
the Islamic state is established and the Shari'ah is the authority and God's limits are 
observed, and where all the Muslims administer the affairs of the state with mutual 
consultation. The rest of the world is the home of hostility (Daar-al-Harb)" 
(2005:18).123
                                                 
's statement seems to suggest he visualized a state in which Islaamic law prevailed under the btQu 123
ative type of b envisioned a representtauspices of democratic procedure. It is difficult to determine if Qu
 Qutb essentially made takfeer of whole Muslim societies considering 
  
them to be Daar al-Harb. Shaikh Muhammad Sa’eed al-Booty said regarding their 
issuance of Takfeeree rulings that, “the reason for their issuance is ignorance of the 
sharee’a rulings while excluding oneself from this trait (of disbelief).[Takfeerees] 
assess things according to their desires then apply a dangerous ruling in the name of 
Islaam and the sharee’a upon the land belonging to Allah the All-Glorified, and judge 
most of it, if not all of it as the land of disbelief or war” (al-Qurayshee 1992:427). 
Qutb's revival and preoccupation with these concepts led subsequent radicals to go a 
step further by separating from Muslim society and committing acts of violence. 
Groups like Jamaa’a al-Takfeer wa al-Hijra would encourage their members to 
intermarry, live in caves and establish a separate economic base from Egyptian 
society which they felt was essentially one of disbelief. The withdrawal phase was 
removing themselves from the jaahili society, then the indoctrination phase until they 
began to use violence (Sivan 1990:88). For Qutb: 
A Muslim can have only two possible relations with Dar-ul-Harb: peace with a 
contractual agreement, or war. A country with which there is a treaty will not 
be considered the home of Islam ...Any country which fights the Muslim 
because of his belief and prevents him from practicing his religion, and in 
which the Shari'ah is suspended, is Dar-ul-Harb, even though his family or his 
relatives or his people live in it, or his capital is invested and his trade or 
commerce is in that country; and any country where the Islamic faith is 
dominant and its Shari'ah is operative is Dar-ul-Islam, even though the 
Muslim's family or relatives or his people do not live there, and he does not 
have any commercial relations with it (2005:19). 
Qutb's portrayal of Daar al-Harb and insistence of separation from it was a principle 
that would be taken up by many successive movements. In fact, "…some of Qutb's 
votaries such as ‘Alee Abduh Isma'il began to organize their group in jails during the 
late 1960s and they had recourse to the basic symbols of segregation: refusing to pray 
with the impure imams and choosing to have their group pray on its own" (Sivan 
1990:86). According to the orthodox creed Muslims should separate from Daar al-
Harb the problem lies in Qutb’s assessment and classification of all countries 
including Muslim societies as being such. Many subsequent thinkers tend to view 
treaties with their adversaries as weakness and impermissible (refer to the section on 
Shukree Must
                                                                                                                                            
government or he was merely suggesting greater participation of the general public in the decision 
making process. 
  
     Qutb also espoused violence as a means to remove corruption and establish the 
Islaamic state. Qutb reiterates his call to fight the oppressive system of Daar al-Harb 
when he said:        
 
afa). 
But any place where the Islamic Shari'ah is not enforced and where Islam is 
not dominant becomes the home of Hostility (Daar-ul-Harb) for both the 
Muslim and the Dhimmi.124
Qutb like Mawdoodee considered removing corrupt or jaahilee leadership as the 
supreme duty in Islaam. Qutb like the early Khawaarij was so disaffected by corrupt 
 A Muslim will remain prepared to fight against it, 
whether it be his birthplace or a place where his relatives reside or where his 
property or any other material interests are located (2005:19). 
 
Qutb's assessment is too rudimentary. He considers any land not ruled entirely by the 
sharee’a or where the Muslims are not in the majority permissible to fight or rebel 
against. His assessment laid the foundation for terror and violence as many successive 
movements adopted his ideals (al-Rahaylee 2006:39). It appears Qutb’s extremism 
results "from a gloomy diagnosis of the malady of Islam, hence the sense of urgency. 
If urgency does not necessarily lead to violence... it does however, lead to a divorce 
from and almost always to some sort of revolt against present Muslim society and 
policy" (Sivan 1990:84-85). Most of the Takfeeree groups share this characteristic 
which is similar to the original Khawaarij; however the Takfeerees seem to be more 
reactionary and driven by political circumstance. 
 
3.3.2.4 Sayyid Qutb and Leadership 
 
     Qutb like his predecessor Mawdoodee was also extremely critical of contemporary 
Muslim leadership and he believed Muslims have a responsibility to remove them. 
Qutb said: 
The foremost duty of Islam in this world is to depose jaahiliya from the 
leadership of man, and to take the leadership into its own hands and enforce the 
particular way of life which is its permanent feature. The purpose of this rightly 
guided leadership is the good and success of mankind, the good which proceeds 
from returning to the Creator and the success which comes from being in 
harmony with the rest of the universe. The intention is to raise human beings to 
that high position which God has chosen for them and to free them from the 
slavery of desires (2005:15). 
                                                 
124 This refers to those non-Muslims who reside in Muslim lands under their protection and pay the 
jizya tax. 
  
society and leadership that he left only two courses of action: to revolt or 
excommunicate from the society. Qutb said during his trial, "We are the Umma of 
believers, living within a jaahili society. Nothing relates us to state or society and we 
owe no allegiance to either. As a community of believers we should see ourselves in a 
state of war with the state and the society. The territory we dwell in is Dar al-Harb" 
(cited in Sivan 1990:86). Qutb's appeal was powerful evoking emotion and at the 
same time it showed similarity to the Khawaarij belief as he nullified his allegiance to 
the Muslim society and essentially declared war against it and its leadership. Finally, 
Esposito draws a comparison between Qutb and Khomeini and concludes that their 
ideals of revolution are identical. Khomeini said: 
Give the people Islam, then, for Islam is the school of jihad, the religion of         
struggle; let them amend themselves and transform themselves into a powerful 
force, so that they may overthrow the tyrannical regime imperialism has 
imposed on us and set up an Islamic government…. If certain heads of state of 
Muslim countries…permit foreigners to expand their influence… they 
automatically forfeit their posts…. Furthermore, it is a duty of the Muslims to 
punish them by any means possible (cited in Esposito 2005:61).   
3.3.3. Shukree Must
     The group was founded by Shukree Mu
afa  
 
     In more contemporary times one of the most extreme of the Takfeeree groups who 
set the precedence for terrorist action and belief was Jamaa’a al-Takfeer wa al-Hijra. 
Reminiscent of the early Khawaarij this "…group is known for perpetuating violence 
against those it considers kufaar (heretics), including those Arabs and Muslims whom 
takfiris do not consider to believe in accordance with true Islam" (Gleis 2005:2).  
 
stafa an agricultural engineer in Egypt in 
the 1960s as an offshoot of Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen (the Muslim brotherhood).While 
Mustafa was imprisoned for his activities with Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen he became 
highly influenced by Sayyid Qutb's book Milestones which is still revered by 
Takfeerees and other extremists as a reference for creed, rebellion and revolution. 
Aboo Hamza al-Misree one of the contemporary Takfeerees commented regarding 
Mustafa, "however he went overboard with his idea and he exaggerated some of the 
meanings of what was in that good book" (al-Misree 2000a:100).125
                                                 
125  Although Aboo Hamza al-Misree’s creed will be discussed in the following subsections he is cited 
frequently throughout this section as he is regarded as an authoritative source on the subject of 
  
      Mu
  
stafa's extremism never really became deep rooted in Egyptian society as in 
the initial stages they called their followers to emigrate from the mainstream society. 
Al-Misree says, "He issued a fatwa (religious verdict) that the imaams of all masaajid 
in Egypt are kuffar and that no good Muslim can pray behind them. He also issued in 
his fataawa that all masaajid in cooperation with the government are masaajid of 
harm and may not be used for worship" (al-Misree 2000a:101). This trait of 
excommunication from Muslim society is apparent in nearly all Khawaarij groups 
and individuals who possess their characteristics. These groups feel it is a religious 
obligation to separate and fight the society and its corruption, and this coincides with 
the Azaariqa belief as discussed in chapter one. 
 
     Mustafa was executed in 1978 by the Egyptian authorities; however his ideology 
still exists today, and as the evidence suggests, his thought is deeply rooted in the 
Khawaarij creed. When the early Khawaarij fought ‘Alee the fourth caliph and were 
nearly wiped out, the remnants of their group carried their ideas throughout the 
Muslim world until they eventually assassinated ‘Alee himself. Both the ideas of 
Mustafa and the Khawaarij are not easily contained and therefore should be exposed 
before they manifest themselves in terrorist activities (‘Aseeree 2007: 134).  
 
3.3.3.1 Shukree Mustafa’s Creed  
 
     The central tenets of Mustafa's belief are excommunication from the Muslim state, 
takfeer of those who opposed him, and rebellion against the Muslim authority. 
Must
     Mu
afa like the Khawaarij misinterpreted the Qur’aanic verses and twisted their 
meanings to strengthen his opinion.  
 
stafa and his group "found the whole social fabric anti-Islamic and urged their 
fellow-Muslims to withdraw into the mountains away from the corrupting influence 
of secularists, and lead lives of purity as good Muslims. They declared that all those 
who disagreed with them were enemies of Islam" (Zakaria 1989:190). Parallel to 
Qutb's concept of jaahilee society Must
                                                                                                                                            
Jamaa’a al-takfeer and Shukri Mustafa, and his analysis offers direct insight into the perspective of the 
Takfeerees themselves as he shares some of the same beliefs regarding jihaad and takfeer.    
afa also held Egyptian society as a 
disbelieving one, ripe with sin and vice, and he considered those who disagreed with 
  
his concept of excommunication as apostates. This exemplifies his misuse of the 
principles of the general takfeer. This concept of declaring detractors as disbelievers 
is at the core of the Khawaarij doctrine.  
 
      Mustafa's group went one step further when they "kidnapped Muhammad al-
Dhahabi, a former Waqf minister, who had condemned their movement and executed 
him" (Zakaria 1989:190). Must
     Takfeer wa al-Hijra practiced the concept of taqeeya or dissimulation which is a 
practice associated with the extreme Shee’a. The identification of Takfeer wa al-Hijra 
with Qutb's concept of a jaahilee society, induced some of the group at the early stage 
to secretly withhold declaring takfeer of the society. "Since one could not pronounce 
the takfir openly on Egyptian society while continuing to live in it without incurring 
the charge of ilhad-heresy-
afa and his group did not stop with making takfeer of 
those who opposed them, but they showed they were willing to act upon their 
ideology by kidnapping and killing their opponents. This seems to be a common 
characteristic of the more radical Takfeeree groups of today, like al-Qaeda and 
Zarqaawee’s group, who believe in striking terror into the hearts of those who oppose 
them in order to support their cause. There will be further analysis of the phenomena 
of kidnapping and killing in the section on Zarqaawee.  
  
126 the takfir must be done secretly, in the heart, while the 
true believer continued to observe the outward conduct of an ordinary Muslim" 
(Ruthven 2004:106). Ruthven suggests that this practice is inherent in the Shee'a 
minority groups within a Sunni society: they declare openly an allegiance to the Sunni 
leadership and at the same time conceal in their hearts loyalty to their imaams, some 
of whom they take to be divine (‘Awaajee 2001/1:370). Ruthven also mentions that 
"these moderate Islamists actually prayed on Fridays before an imam whom they 
privately regarded as being apostate" (2004:106). According to the orthodox creed 
one's prayer is nullified if the imaam is not a Muslim and this is agreed upon by all of 
the scholars (al-Rahaylee 2001/1:344). This practice by Must
                                                 
126 Innovation as used by the author of this study does not necessarily mean apostasy from the religion 
as the above quote seems to suggest, because some unorthodox practices expel one from Islaam and 
others are considered only sinful (al-Rahaylee 2001/1:104). 
 
  
groups, was not a common practice of the Khawaarij because they believed that 
deception was disbelief (‘Awaajee 2002:448-449). 
 
afa's group exemplifies 
their commonality to the Khawaarij and Shee'a rather than the orthodox belief of Ahl 
al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a. However, taqeeya, which is a common practice of Jihaadee 
     Mustafa’s group began to become more outward in their "radical approach of 
complete religious and social separation. They prayed at home, refusing to attend 
Friday prayers or to visit mosques other than family (private) mosques where the 
prayers were led by imams of their persuasion" (Ruthven 2004:107).  This separation 
in all spheres of life had all the trappings of a secret society in which even the 
marriages of its members were declared void if one of the spouses was not a member 
of the cult. These practices are totally inconsistent with orthodox Islaam, its texts, and 
the understanding of the companions, and are a testimony to their extremist 
thinking.127
     Shukree Mu
 
 
3.3.3.2 Qur’aanic Misinterpretation 
     
stafa in his religious fervor misused and misinterpreted Qur’aanic 
verses to support his paradigm and he ignored the established foundations of Islaamic 
jurisprudence in favor of his own reasoning. "...Shukree denounced both the 
traditionally orthodox and the secular modernists. Relying on the Quranic verse that 
'god knows and you know not' [1996 2:216], he said that everything that came after 
the Quran and the Sunna was not binding on Muslims. He considered the four great 
schools of Sunni jurisprudence null and void; they were counterfeit and had no place 
in Islam" (Zakaria 1989:190).  This denunciation of the main schools of jurisprudence 
by Mustafa contradicts the foundation of Islaam, which is built upon the Qur’aan and 
Sunna, and the understanding of the orthodox scholars especially the first three 
generations after the Prophet Muhammad. Shaikh Aadam al-Ethiopee 128 said, “The 
sources that are agreed upon by the majority of Ahl al-Sunna are: the book (Qur’aan), 
the Sunna, the consensus, and juristic reasoning” (2005/1:289). This quote shows 
Mustafa's deviance from the orthodox methodology and this is a sign of the people of 
innovation: they attempt to undermine the principles of the religion in order to re-
establish new ones based upon their whims (al-Rahaylee 2001/1:16). Must
                                                 
127 ‘Aseeree mentions four aspects of excommunication practiced by Jamaa’a wa al-Takfeer: 
excommunication from mosques and congregational prayer, the society, universities and schools, and 
government employment (‘Aseeree 2007:134). 
who resides in Saudi Arabia. adeethhHe is a well known contemporary scholar of  128  
  
that his own interpretation of the religious texts could only be considered valid, and 
he re-established the principles and verdicts of the early scholars. It was narrated upon 
several companions like Aboo Darda`a, and 'Abd Allah Ibn Mas'ood that "frugality in 
the Sunna is better than (ijtihaad) perseverance in innovation" (cited in al-Atharee 
1996:55). So, adherence to the established Sunna and ways of the early scholars is 
part of the orthodox creed, and the Salafee creed holds that it is incumbent to distance 
oneself from unorthodox practices and ideologies.
afa held 
129
      Another illustration of Mu
     
 
stafa's desire to depart from classical interpretations of 
Islaam was his approach to understanding the Qur’aan. Mustafa claimed, "Islam has 
been in decline ever since men have ceased to draw their lessons directly from the 
Qur'an and the Sunna and have instead followed the traditions of other men.130 Those 
who call themselves imams. The Qur'an, he emphasized, was clear as crystal. To 
understand its verses a Muslim needed a dictionary, not a commentary" (Zakaria 
1989:190). On numerous occasions Must
     Mu
afa violated the principles of religious 
tradition and Qur’aanic exegesis which is an integral part of Islaam and part of the 
preservation of the orthodox creed. As previously mentioned, a statement like this 
contradicts the consensus of the scholars and leaves the divine texts open for anyone 
to interpret according to his whims. 
     
stafa also had a very serious mistake in creed regarding the Qur’aan. He replied 
after being asked if the Qur’aan was the speech of Allah that, "I believe that the 
Qur'an is with absolute certainty from the practical point of view which implies 
glorifying it and worshipping Allah according to its orders...." (cited in al-Misree 
2000a:109). Then he was asked, "Do you mean that the Qur'an is not with absolute 
certainty the word of Allah from the theoretical point of view?" Must
                                                 
 129 Innovations in creed and practice that have no basis in the foundation of the religion are rejected 
according to the orthodox creed. However, this does not suggest that Islaam does not accommodate 
changes in circumstances and technology, but rather the established principles of the religion are used 
to make judgments of whether something is permissible or not.    
130 Mustafa might be classified as an extreme literalist; however he departs radically with the ideas of 
traditional literalists like Ibn Hazm (died 1064), one of the great scholars of jurisprudence, who 
interpreted the religious texts according to their most literal interpretation. Whereas, Mustafa sought to 
reinterpret entire principles regarding creed, jurisprudence and Qur’aanic exegesis according to his 
understanding, Ibn Hazm on the other hand was more of a traditionalist who generally adhered to the 
principles and foundation that the classical scholars agreed upon.   
  
according to it" (al-Misree 2000a:109). So it appears Mu
afa replied, "Yes 
and without any reservation. I want to say that Allah did not send down the Qur'an so 
it would become an idol or a shape, but it has been revealed so people could work 
stafa may have had some 
doubts about the authenticity of the verses of the Qur’aan and al-Misree concludes by 
saying his statement is flawed and "he is hinting that some ayat in Surat ul Ahzaab 
and Surat ut-Tawba had only one sahaaba (companion) to witness them, other than 
the collector of the Qur'an"  (al-Misree 2000a:109). Mustafa’s speech seems unclear 
and ambiguous.131
          Jahmee
 However, as it has been previously stated, according to classical 
scholars the one who doubts the Qur’aan's authenticity has disbelieved. Al-Aajooree, 
a 9th century scholar, said: 
 
          Surely the Qur’aan is the speech of Allah the All-Mighty and it was not created,  
          because the Qur’aan is from the knowledge of Allah, and Allah’s knowledge is  
          not a created thing. Allah is far removed from that. The Qur’aan, the Sunna, the  
          sayings of the companions-may Allah be pleased with them- and the sayings of  
          the imaams of the Muslims all prove this. No one denies this except an evil  
132 and to the scholars the Jahmee is a disbeliever (1999/1:489). 
  
     Mustafa seemed to reinterpret the religion and its texts in order to give credibility 
to his movement. This is best illustrated when he claimed, "I want to declare that no 
authority could possibly have the capability to denounce our doctrine. That is because 
we have put conditions on ourselves that our evidence should always be decisive in 
meaning and not have any other meaning that could be over ruled or superseded" 
(cited in al-Misree 2000a:109). This quote from his trial shows his conviction and 
pedantry which are inherent in Khawaarij thought. Must
     Mu
afa’s opinions are usually 
derived from general verses used to support his belief instead of surveying all of the 
evidences and returning to more orthodox interpretations.  
      
st
                                                 
131 Some sects doubt the authenticity of hadeeth literature that was only transmitted by one narrator and 
this could be the case with Mustafa except his mistake is more serious as he seems to express doubt in 
a verse from the Qur’aan.  
132 The Jahmeeya is the name of a sect that began with Ja’d Bin Dirham around the 7th century and they 
denied Allah’s divine names and attributes, and claimed the Qur’aan was created and the classical 
scholars made takfeer of them by consensus (al-Aajooree 1999/1:489).  
  
He said, "I still declare now that it is beyond the capacity of all of our opponents to 
bring one sound evidence to answer or denounce our doctrine. And that challenge 
from us is sound and trustworthy until the Day of Judgment" (cited in al-Misree 
2000a:109). Most of Mu
afa's group not only misinterpreted the evidences from the religious texts but 
they also believed he was the Mahdee or savior and could not be killed. "Shukree 
Ahmad Mustafa believed that he was the savior of the era. He frequently challenged 
the government in court and was adamant in saying that no one could kill him and he 
would never die" (al-Misree 2000a:109). The extremism exhibited by this group gave 
the leadership a cult-like following and contributed to his thinking he was infallible. 
stafa's speech leaves no room for ambiguity and is rightfully 
labeled Takfeeree with ideological roots firmly grounded in Khawaarij thought. 
Mustafa made takfeer of the state and all of those who were deemed part of it similar 
to his predecessors the Khawaarij who believed all of those who were employed by 
the state were apostates and hypocrites. It was this principle which led Mustafa to 
make takfeer upon Shaikh al-Dhahabi who was the imaam of al-Azhar Masjid and 
Minister of Religious Endowments at the time. Regarding this he said, "My evidence 
is that he worked in the religious endowments department and was a minister and 
director for the nobility of the Masaajid of daraar (harm). He also made an oath in 
swearing by other than the judgment of Allah in taking an oath upon entering the 
office of ministry" (cited in al-Misree 2000a:126). According to Must
     Mu
afa the minister 
was a disbeliever because in his view he had made a sacrilegious oath to an apostate 
government, thus he became an apostate. This type of circular reasoning is very 
common in neo-Takfeeree thought: they make takfeer by association rather than 
looking at the condition of a particular individual, state, or regime and they tend to 
disregard the principles of takfeer altogether (al-Rahaylee 2006:45).  
 
stafa declared that the essence of the Muslim is actually disbelief until proven 
otherwise. Although it is known from the religion that the essence of a Muslim is his 
belief: he is not tested regarding his Islaamic belief unless something of doubt arises 
in his actions which call his beliefs into question (al-Barbahaaree 1997:123). Mustafa 
however reversed this principle and began with suspicion of his fellow Muslims 
which led him "to stop judging a person as a Muslim initially until he goes through a 
test. Thus until tested, everyone claiming Islam was judged to be kaafir (disbeliever) 
first. Then, upon passing the test, they (the new members) also have to give him (bai'a) 
the oath of allegiance due to a Muslim ruler by his subject" (al-Misree 2000a:103). 
This new edict of Mustafa's only served to further illustrate his deviant beliefs and 
deviancy from the orthodox creed as al-Barbahaaree, a 9th century scholar, said, 
"Testing in Islaam is an innovation" (1997:123). In this regard the Prophet said, 
"Beware of suspicion, for suspicion is the worst of false tales; and do not look for the 
other's faults and do not spy, and do not cut relations with one another..." (al-
  
Bukhaaree 1970/8:59). Mustafa seemed adamant about disregarding the principles 
upon which the religion was based. His extremist interpretation only served to 
distance him from orthodox Islaam and ultimately led to his demise. Mustafa 
contradicted the principles of takfeer laid down by the orthodox scholars in their 
totality by building his beliefs upon the foundation of the Khawaarij creed. 
 
     Must
Mu
afa also distrusted and pronounced takfeer of the scholars of al-Azhar 
University which is characteristic of the contemporary Takfeeree groups. Instead of 
attacking the Prophets and companions, they criticize and make takfeer of the scholars. 
stafa criticized and accused the scholars of his time by saying, "They propagate 
sins and for the haraam to become halaal (unlawful to become lawful) in the name of 
Islam....This is because it became a physical fact in our life, such as making usury, 
adultery, ruling by other than the Shari'a of Allah, obscenities, and even toxic drink 
halaal in the name of Islam" (cited in al-Misree 2000a:113). Mustafa then mentioned 
several of the scholars of al-Azhar who he accused of giving religious verdicts 
allowing interest, and the consumption of alcohol.133
     Finally, the level of extremism of which Shukree Mu
   
       
st
                                                 
133 Mustafa and Qutb both criticized the Egyptian government and scholars of their time and it is well 
documented in several sources this researcher has come across that some of the scholars of al-Azhar 
were guilty of making lawful things prohibited by Islaam ( Ruthven 2002:110). However, this does not 
excuse the blatant misuse of the principles of takfeer by Mustafa and his group and caution must be 
exercised when making judgments of takfeer.   
afa and his movement had 
reached regarding takfeer and jihaadist thinking can best be summarized in his own 
words when he responded at his trial to the question of defending Egypt against Israeli 
aggression. He answered by saying, "If the Jews or others come, our movement 
should not take part in combat in the ranks of the Egyptian army. We would rather 
escape to a safe place.... For by no means can the Arab-Jewish conflict be considered 
Islamic warfare" (cited in Sivan 1990:19). There are two noteworthy points in this 
statement. First, he regarded the Egyptian army as an army of apostates and so he felt 
it was impermissible to fight alongside it. This shows his abuse of the principles of the 
total takfeer by decreeing the Egyptian army to be apostate as if it constituted a sect 
holding a particular belief. Al-Rahaylee relates that “…all of this is from the general 
takfeer, which really is a classification of a saying, action, or particular belief as 
disbelief, which also includes the categorization of a particular group well known for 
  
a characteristic of disbelief” (2006:253). Therefore, it is not permissible for Must
    As an outgrowth of Shukree Mu
afa 
to declare a group of individuals to be disbelievers without open proof of their 
apostasy as a group. Second, he considered the whole conflict to be illegitimate: not 
jihaad, but instead an Arab-Israeli nationalist struggle and this issue differentiates his 
movement from some of his successors like Muhammad 'Abd al-Salaam Faraj. 
     
3.3.4 Muhammad 'Abd al-Salaam Faraj and Jamaa’a al-Jihaad 
 
stafa's Takfeer wa al-Hijra movement came 
another revolutionist thinker Muhammad 'Abd al-Salaam Faraj.  Faraj was an 
Egyptian engineer who was influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, and 
Mawdoodee "and their interpretation of Ibn Taymiyyah's writings. He rejected many 
of his contemporary Salafis134
     Faraj like his contemporaries was influenced by revolutionary thought and the 
ideas of Mawdoodee and Qutb. Primarily his creed and call were to jihaad, takfeer, 
and revolution. Faraj said, "Governments in the Islamic world today are in a state of 
apostasy-of Islam they preserve nothing but its name although they pray, fast and 
pretend to be Muslims" (Zakaria 1989:13). Faraj was very explicit when describing 
the rulers as apostates from Islaam and he offered a very clear and unequivocal 
prescription to their rulership over Muslim societies when he said, "Our Sunna has 
determined that the apostate must be killed even if he is in no position to fight, while 
  including the Muslim Brotherhood for seeking 
integration with the political process and Shukree Mustafa's Takfir W'al Hijra for 
allegedly shirking the duty of jihad" (Stanely 2005:1). Like Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhaab, the writings of Ibn Taymeeya also seem in accordance with classical 
writings and especially with regards to creed. However, they were often 
misunderstood and interpreted as being supportive of Takfeeree ideology as they both 
wrote extensively upon the topic. Faraj's movement did not last very long as he began 
in 1981 and he was executed in 1982 by the Egyptian Authorities for his alleged 
involvement in the assassination of then President Anwar Sadat. 
 
3.3.4.1 His Creed 
 
                                                 
134 The term Salafee could denote those who preceded him in the Takfeeree methodology. According to 
the scholars referred to in this research the term Salafee distinguishes those who follow the classical 
methodology in creed from that of other sects. 
  
an infidel does not merit death in such a case" (Zakaria 1989:13). From this statement 
it seems clear that he considered himself an authority to establish and derive the 
rulings regarding the leader and adjudicate his death sentence. Secondly, like the 
Khawaarij he begins by making takfeer, fighting Muslims, and calling for the 
overthrow of the rulers and these are principles frequently articulated by advocates of 
this thought, and both Mawdoodee and Qutb held the same notion: reform should 
begin by overthrowing corrupt leadership. Faraj states, “There is no doubt that the 
Tawaagheet135
    Some of Faraj's ideals are deeply rooted in the Khawaarij creed, with an 
embellishment of Qutb's thought, although he did refer to classical scholars like 
Imaam Aboo Haneefa and Ibn Taymeeya frequently. Faraj thought the Egyptian state 
had become Daar al-Harb and he cited Imaam Aboo Haneefa’s conditions for 
changing a Muslim state into a disbelieving one to support his conclusion (Faraj 
1981:5).
 should be removed by the sword” (Faraj 1981:2). Faraj like 
Mawdoodee and Qutb also believed that the supreme aim for Muslims should be to 
establish divine law on the earth by any means. He says, “Establishing Allah’s law 
likewise an Islaamic state is an obligation upon Muslims, and an obligation is not 
fulfilled except by completing that which is an obligation, so if the state cannot be 
established except through violence, then it becomes imperative that we fight” (Faraj 
1981:3). 
 
136
                                                 
135 The term taaghoot refers to those things or people worshipped besides Allah; here Faraj uses this 
term to refer to leaders that rule by human law.   
136  Aboo Haneefa’s conditions were as follows: human laws supercede divine law, the land became 
unsafe for Muslims, and that hostile non-Muslim states were on its borders. Faraj felt the sharee’a had 
been subverted in the Egyptian state to the extent it became Daar al-Harb (Faraj 1981:5). 
  
they often begin their fighting against the Muslim society and its rulers.
 "His contribution to the Qutbist/Jihadi theory of Islamic revolution was 
ultimately unsuccessful in that his group was quickly crushed without overthrowing 
established authority in Egypt, much less establishing an Islamic state" (Stanely 
2005:1). Although Faraj may not have realized his goals of overthrowing the state his 
ideals and concepts would spill over into Islaamic extremist ideology and form the 
foundation for contemporary Jihaadee groups. The term Jihaadee is a general 
reference to those Muslims who interpret jihaad in contradicition to classical 
interpretations and make it their utmost priority to call to jihaad regardless whether its 
conditions are present or not. These individuals often have traits of the Khawaarij and 
137
     For Faraj, jihaad was one of the most important obligations to fulfill and the sole 
means for rectifying the state and replacing the ruler. Faraj is most noted for his book 
entitled 
 Another 
characteristic of these groups is that they are usually supportive if not active in 
terrorist activity (al-Suhaymee 2004:19). These groups and individuals should not be 
confused with those who sincerely fight Islaamic jihaad according to its conditions 
and principles established by the classical scholars as practiced by the Prophet 
Muhammad and his companions. 
 
3.3.4.2 Faraj’s Concept of Jihaad  
 
The Neglected Obligation
                                                 
137 This contemporary classification is a result of a more recent phenomenon: the call of individuals and 
groups to jihaad with blatant disregard for established jurisprudent principles or the overall objectives 
that dictate the rules of Islaamic combat (Delong-Bas 2004:230).   
  
has different rulings depending upon the situation and this differs from the 
conclusions of the Takfeeree/Jihaadee groups who claim jihaad is always an 
obligation regardless of whether its conditions are met are not. For Faraj, like his 
predecessors, removing the rulers was one of the utmost duties of jihaad and this is 
where he began his call. Faraj wrote:  
 
          There are some who say that the jihad effort should concentrate nowadays upon    
          the liberation of Jerusalem. It is true that the liberation of the Holy Land is a  
          legal precept binding upon every Muslim. . . but let us emphasize that the fight     
          against the enemy nearest to you has precedence over the fight against the      
          enemy farther away. All the more so as the former is not only corrupted but a  
          lackey of imperialism as well. . . . In all Muslim countries the enemy has the  
          reins of power. The enemy is the present rulers. It is hence, a most imperative  
          obligation to fight these rulers. This Islamic jihad requires today the blood     
          and sweat of each Muslim (cited in Sivan 1990:20). 
 
 (Faraj 1981), in which he "posits jihad as the sixth 
pillar of Islam, a fard 'Ayn (compulsory religious duty) that must be satisfied 
immediately. Faraj claimed that apostates had denied and hidden this duty, leading the 
Muslim world into its current malaise" (Stanely 2005:2). Although jihaad has 
extremely important status in Islaam it is not mentioned in the traditions of the 
Prophet as being a pillar of Islaam. In addition, jihaad at times is obligatory upon 
some of the Muslims (fard kifaaya) and the Qur’aan and Sunna and books of Islaamic 
jurisprudence all attest to this (al-Ahmadee 2004:42). However, under certain 
conditions it becomes obligatory upon all those who are able to fulfill the jihaad (fard 
'ayn). Allah says in the Qur’aan, "Not equal are those of the believers who sit (at 
home), except those who are disabled, and those who strive hard and fight in the 
cause of Allah with their wealth and their lives. Allah has preferred in grades those 
who strive hard and fight with their wealth and their lives above those who sit" 
(Qur’aan 1996/4:95). This shows that at times only a group is required to fight jihaad 
and those who stay back with valid excuse are rewarded as well. Ibn Katheer said 
about the above verse that "In it is proof that jihaad is not obligatory on all, instead it 
is obligatory on some" (1997/2:241). Al-Badr said, "Al-jihaad in the cause of Allah is 
one of the greatest Islaamic rites and one of the most important religious obligations, 
and its ruling varies according to its type and level and by assessing the conditions of 
the ones who are entrusted with it" (2005:15). The above evidences show that jihaad 
For Faraj fighting the rulers took priority to fighting those who had usurped Muslim 
land, this is a trait of his successors who call for the liberation of the Muslim lands 
from the alleged apostate rulers. This call for revolution contradicts the Islaamic creed 
in several aspects. Firstly, it is the methodology of the Khawaarij to make takfeer for 
major sins and rebel against the ruler whereas the more classical approach encourages 
communal duties like hajj and jihaad alongside them regardless of the mistakes they 
may commit as long as they remain Muslim. Al-Tahaawee said, “And performing hajj 
and jihaad with a pious or wicked leader is a duty until the Day of Judgment and 
nothing changes this principle nor falsifies it” (Ibn Abee al-‘Azza 1988:555). This 
radically differs with the Takfeeree approach to jihaad which begins with eliminating 
the alleged apostate leadership. Secondly, Faraj has declared 'jihaad' when he was not 
the legitimate Islaamic authority which contradicts one of the main conditions for 
offensive jihaad. Thirdly, Faraj in his extremism has equated jihaad to revolutionary 
theory, a foreign ideology, which can be found amongst the theories propounded by 
the communists and other idealists. Hoffman compares the concept of terror and the 
French revolution to communist Marxist ideals “born of the alienation and 
exploitative conditions of 19th century capitalism. From this milieu a new era of 
terrorism emerged, in which the concept had gained many familiar revolutionary, 
anti-state connotations of today” (Hoffman 1998:17). Faraj’s theories seem to 
resemble the call of Marxist revolutionaries more than Islaamic jihaad; however most 
of his book is well supported by Islaamic texts and examples throughout history, but 
  
his conclusions about how to practice those principles is what differentiated him from 
orthodox scholars primarily. The Prophet was asked about jihaad and he answered, 
"Whoever fights to make the word of Allah superior then this is for the sake of Allah 
the Most Exalted" (al-Bukhaaree 1970/ 4:50). So, the establishment of Allah's religion 
is the purpose of jihaad according to classical scholars not revolution and blood shed. 
Finally, Faraj made it an obligation upon all Muslims to rebel as he felt the leaders 
were apostates, and this contradicts the authentic narrations of the Prophet urging 
obedience to the rulers in goodness and patience if they become oppressive. Faraj 
alleges, “The governments of today have abandoned Islaam and they were raised 
under the supervision of colonialism, regardless of whether it was crusaders, 
communists or Zionists” (Faraj 1981:6). For Faraj the leaders were simply 
masquerading as Muslims and deceiving the people by implementing secularist 
policies and educational systems. However, his claims did not legitimize rebellion and 
his view seems inconsistent with more classical interpretations. Imaam Shawkaanee 
(born 1173 Hijra) said, "It is not permissible to rebel against the leaders even if they 
are extremely oppressive. The limit is as long as they establish the prayer and do not 
show open disbelief" (cited in al-Jazaa'iree 2003:135).  Therefore, it becomes clear 
from the above evidence that the purpose of jihaad is not to overthrow the Muslim 
rulers and cause chaos in Muslim societies, but rather to make the word of Allah 
supreme by defending it and spreading it, and the command to offensive jihaad is at 
the discretion of the legitimate Muslim ruler. 
 
     From Faraj's statements it appears he differs with Mustafa with regards to his 
theory of revolution and jihaad. Stanely in his analysis of the two ideologues 
commented: 
 
          Faraj's theory of revolution as an antithesis to Shukree Mustafa's is a useful  
          way of understanding it and the synthesis that came afterwards. Both men were    
          in the stream of radicals who had interpreted Qutb's Milestones
So, for Faraj and Mu
 literally, and  
          both therefore rejected the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood's line that fighting  
          Israel took precedence over overthrowing the Egyptian regime, which led the  
          MB to collaborate with the regime (2005:1). 
 
stafa overthrowing the regime took priority over dealing with 
external enemies and for Faraj that meant immediate rebellion, whereas Mustafa 
sought to excommunicate and prepare for war. Another issue where they tended to 
  
differ was regarding excommunication. For Faraj it seemed to be more of a spiritual 
separation from the society, "he rejected the idea of the 'period of weakness' and 
physical separation from the infidel society, instead advocating infiltration of society, 
government and security forces and militant engagement with the regime" (Stanely 
2005:2). This strategy of Faraj seems to indicate he had more sophistication, planning 
and vision than Mustafa and his predecessors. Even the Khawaarij sects like the 
Azaariqa tended to advocate complete removal from the infidel society as it was 
deemed sinful to stay amongst disbelievers. Another area in which Faraj differed with 
Mustafa, and many of his contemporaries, was that he believed jihaad required 
preparation and the ability to carry it out, but he felt that many of his contemporaries 
used this as an excuse to leave jihaad off permanently. He states, “It is agreed upon 
that Muslims should possess strength to fight, but how can they realize this strength 
when you negate the obligation of jihaad?” (Faraj 1981:18). Faraj also refuted those 
during his time who held that jihaad could not be carried out because the Muslims 
were in a state of weakness like the Makkan period during the lifetime of the Prophet. 
Faraj states, “There are some who claim we live in the Makkan phase so they can 
have an excuse to leave off jihaad in the path of Allah. Therefore, whoever claims 
they are in the Makkan phase so they can leave the obligation of jihaad should also 
leave fasting and prayer, and they can practice usury because it was not prohibited 
until Madina” (Faraj 1981:18). Faraj's group eventually assassinated Sadat and was 
crushed soon after carrying out its plot. What is noteworthy though is that "the 
assassin was an army officer, Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli, who was able to get close 
to the President because he was part of the parade. This attack, which was personally 
sanctioned by Faraj, demonstrated the effectiveness of his policy of infiltration of the 
regime" (Stanley 2005:2). Due to the government repression that ensued after the 
assassination of Sadat, militants were forced underground and this discredited Faraj's 
ideals in Egypt. However, there still remains in many of the contemporary Jihaadees 
elements of his conceptualization of jihaad and takfeer which evolved from the 
Khawaarij. Both Faraj and Mustafaa possessed Khawaarij-like thought although their 
approach to achieving their aims differed.   
 
 
 
 
  
3.3.5 ‘Umar 'Abd al-Rahmaan     
 
     Another more contemporary figure who has had a large influence upon Jamaa’a 
al-Jihaad was ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmaan. ‘Umar is a blind cleric who spent a 
significant portion of his life in prison for radicalism and inciting terrorist acts. 
Currently he serves a life sentence in America for his alleged role in the plotting of 
the World Trade Center Bombing in 1993. ‘Umar was a strong influence on 
Islambouli one of the assassins of Sadat and “he became known to some of his 
students and followers as the ‘muftee’ or religious suzerain of al-Jihad” (Cooley 
2000:40). Consequently, al-Jihaad was the group led by Faraj and it was well known 
for its violent extremism; “members could and did commit murders, and for purposes 
of gathering funds for the organization, made armed raids and robberies on jewelers 
or goldsmiths, many of whom happened to be Coptic Christians” (Cooley 2000:40). 
These activities may not be directly attributed to ‘Umar but they are illustrative of his 
religious rulings. These illicit activities are characteristic of Takfeeree groups as they 
deem the state as Daar al-Harb and they make it permissible to steal, terrorize and 
take war captives, and they perform these acts to materially strengthen their groups 
under the guise of Islaam (Cooley 2000:40).138 ‘Umar is well-known for his 
incitement to rebel against contemporary Muslim leaders, and perhaps, this is in part 
due to his adherence to the Qutbists' methodology (Cooley 2000:43). 139
     ‘Umar was tried and acquitted of the plot to assassinate Sadat. When asked about 
the ruling on assassinating a leader who rules by other than the sharee’a he replied it 
was permissible. “Later when asked to give a specific ruling about Sadat he replied, 'I 
cannot say that he has definitely crossed the line into infidelity'…This helped to make 
possible his future acquittal, and to empower him as a helpmate to the CIA in 
recruiting young zealots, especially among Arab-Americans in the United States, for 
the jihad in Afghanistan” (Cooley 2000:41). ‘Umar, unlike some of his predecessors, 
was knowledgeable about Islaam and trained in the religion. These characteristics 
combined with charisma and fiery speech has given him enormous impact upon 
Jihaadees and Muslim youth in general around the Muslim world. 
   
 
                                                 
138 The issue of terror as a political weapon will be explored under the sections on Bin Laaden and 
Zarqaawee.  
b, tThis term refers to those who follow or are influenced by the methodology or creed of Sayyid Qu 139
especially in matters of takfeer and group partisanship.  
  
3.3.5.1 His Concept of Jihaad 
 
     Jihaad as was mentioned previously is an important obligation in Islaam; however 
‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmaan and those who follow his methodology tend to over-
exaggerate its place in Islaam. For ‘Umar, as well as his predecessor Faraj, jihaad was 
considered a sixth pillar of Islaam and the most important matter to rectify the 
condition of the Muslim nation (Esposito 2002:62). In addition, similar to the 
Khawaarij they claimed one of the main objectives of jihaad is to remove corrupt 
leadership. It appears they did not consider the consequences of removing the rulers 
through violent means and its cost physically and financially upon Muslim society.140
                                                 
140 There are tremendous costs materially due to the destruction of infrastructure, the loss of life, 
instability, and fear that result from terrorist acts, and Muslims bear the brunt of such actions.   
 
 
    For ‘Umar and many of his successors jihaad was deemed so important that it was 
waged by cooperating with their enemies.  During the time of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, ‘Umar like many of the famous Mujahideen (Islaamic holy warriors) 
became assets to the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies. A noteworthy 
personality he became acquainted with was ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam a well known scholar 
who like Shaikh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmaan “appears to have worked with the CIA in 
their campaign to recruit foreign volunteers to fight the Soviets” (Ruthven 2002: 203). 
This is an incredibly significant point as it illustrates the fact that many of the 
extremists who openly defy, terrorize and berate the West also seek refuge, financial 
and military support from Western governments. Moreover, in the cases of ‘Umar, 
'Azzam, Bin Laaden, and Zarqaawee they were even dependent upon those most 
hostile to their aims like the CIA and the American military establishment for military 
training and aid. For example, “By the time the last Russian soldiers marched out of 
Afghanistan in February 1989, money measured in billions of dollars, to say nothing 
of over a million human lives, had been expended to win the war” (Cooley 2000:107). 
The most outspoken critics of the American government also benefited tremendously 
from it and openly accepted its support, and this is where many of the modern day 
groups depart with the original Khawaarij. Whereas, the Khawaarij freed themselves 
totally from their enemies, the contemporary groups do so when it appears convenient 
(‘Awaajee 2002:459). According to Cooley:  
          
  
          Beyond the CIA funds and the largesse of Arab Shaikhs, kings and financiers,  
          many other sources, well before the victory, had made the continuing Islamist  
          jihad and its export around the world, self-financing. There was the profitable  
          sale and resale of gift weapons, from rifles to Stinger missiles and other  
          commodities of all descriptions, sent free to fighters and their Pakistani  
          sponsors, but often reaching arms salesmen. Some of the victorious Afghan  
          leaders, by the time they fell out and began after the soviet withdrawal to  
          slaughter each other, had already built a huge international drug network  
          (Cooley 2000:107).  
 
It is noteworthy that most of the supporters of the Afghan jihaad (Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, and other Muslim governments) later became the targets of the new global 
jihaad waged by the various Takfeeree groups, and ‘Umar is considered to be 
instrumental in exporting of that so-called jihaad. ‘Umar “…allegedly was among the 
group of Egyptians who first persuaded Bin Laden to ‘have a clear idea to use (the 
Arab recruits) after Afghanistan for other wars’” (Kohlmann 2004:26). ‘Umar is 
renowned and respected amongst Takfeeree/Jihaadee circles as a shaikh who exhorts 
to jihaad and condemns the West, although he sought refuge in America from the 
Egyptian authorities. ‘Umar claimed, “Americans are descendants of apes and pigs 
who have been feeding from the dining tables of the Zionists, Communism, and 
colonialism!” (cited in Kohlmann 2004:26). Even though ‘Umar was dependent and a 
beneficiary of American military and political power he never ceased to express his 
hostility towards the American establishment. This apparent duplicity was not known 
to the Khawaarij as they were very open in their stance towards their enemies and 
refused to reside amongst them (‘Awaajee 2002:448). The support and aid to groups 
and individuals like ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmaan, and al-Qaeda, who took part in the 
Afghan jihaad served to spread the Takfeeree/Jihaadee ideals and export terror in 
both Muslim and non-Muslim societies.141
     ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmaan and his group were determined to implement what they 
consider a pure Islaamic state under the rule of a single leader. However, this goal has 
not materialized and it has come at a high price: bloodshed and terror of those who are 
protected under Islaamic law. Esposito described their rationale by saying, “They 
have rationalized their holy war against Egypt’s ‘atheist’ state and rulers as required, 
  
 
3.3.5.2 ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmaan on Rulership and Takfeer 
 
                                                 
141 Essentially, the West made allies with those whom they shared a common political objective with: 
stopping Soviet aggression. 
  
the obligation of all true believers. Islamic Jihad’s war is waged against all 
nonbelievers, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Extremist groups like Jihad reject 
Islam’s traditional tolerance of the protected communities of Jews and Christians, 
People of the book (dhimmi)” (2002: 90).  These ideals espoused by ‘Umar are 
similar to Qutb’s, and yet are another striking difference between classical scholars, 
Takfeeree groups and their predecessors the Khawaarij who also sought to overthrow 
the leaders and declare their opposition to be apostates, potentially resulting in havoc 
for Muslims and those under their authority.142 ‘Umar “issued a fatwa sanctioning the 
killing and plundering of Christians in Luxor in 1997 because they were anti-Muslim” 
(cited in Esposito 2002:91). Allah says, “If anyone of the polytheists seeks your 
protection then grant him protection so that they may hear the word of Allah then 
escort him to where he can be secure, that is because they are men who know not” 
(Qur’aan 1996/9:6). This verse is for those who seek protection from the Muslims, so 
it can be inferred that those who reside in a Muslim land have the same protection and 
security afforded to them. The Prophet mentioned specifically that whoever kills those 
who are under the contract or protection of the Muslims will not smell the fragrance 
of paradise (al-Bukhaaree 1970/4:259). Therefore, this religious verdict given by 
‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmaan is inconsistent with verdicts issued by classical scholars as it 
contradicts the authentic sources of Islaam. Moreover, this verdict constitutes 
disobedience to the leader as the non-Muslims are under his authority and protection, 
and have his permission to live in the country. Ibn al-Qayyim, a 13th century scholar, 
mentioned the seriousness of issuing religious verdicts in the following words, “Then 
every danger for the muftee is the same for the judge. His danger is even greater than 
this because he specializes in verdicts. However, the danger of the muftee143
     From amongst the Takfeeree ideologues analyzed in this study, ‘Umar’s argument 
for rebelling against an oppressive leader is the most coherent. ‘Umar cites three 
 is greater 
in another way, for his sharee’a verdict is general and it applies to the one who asked 
for it and those other than him” (Ibn al-Qayyim 2002:2/72). So, it is not for everyone 
in the society to make religious rulings and attempt to implement them without the 
governing authority because this amounts to arbitrary rule instead of Islaamic justice.  
 
                                                 
142 “Mirroring the Kharijites, Qutb taught that those Muslims who refused to participate were to be 
counted among the enemies of God, apostates who were excommunicated (takfir) and should be fought 
and killed along with the other enemies of God" (Esposito 2002:61). 
143 One who makes religious verdicts.   
  
different sayings regarding the orthodox scholar’s position regarding the corrupt 
leader. The first position being that one should abstain from rebellion unless disbelief 
becomes open and apparent from the leader. The second position is abstinence from 
removing the oppressive leader if it will cause greater harm to the Muslims than his 
remaining in power. Lastly, a group of the classical scholars held that it was 
permissible and obligatory to remove the corrupt leaders, among those scholars he 
cited were Aboo Haneefa one of the early jurists, and classical scholars; al-
Maawardee and Ibn Hazm.144
Al-Maawardee, a classical scholar, explains this hadeeth claiming that if the leader is 
corrupt and neglecting his duty he should be advised and if he does not heed this 
advice he should be removed. This is essentially the argument of ‘Umar and some of 
his contemporaries like Aboo Qataada whose position will be discussed in the next 
section. Although this opinion was held by a group of classical scholars it contradicts 
 The evidence for the first two positions has already 
been mentioned in the section referring to the orthodox position regarding leadership. 
The third position requires analysis as this would appear to bolster ‘Umar’s argument 
for rebelling against corrupt leadership.  
 
     Although initially some classical scholars supported rebelling against corrupt 
leadership, this opinion contradicts the majority of the textual evidences. Many 
hadeeth urge patience and tolerance of the leader as long as he does not become a 
disbeliever. Some classical scholars used the following hadeeth narration as evidence 
to support the permissibility of rebelling against an oppressive leader. In a narration 
transmitted by Muslim, the Prophet said: 
 
          There was no Prophet sent by Allah to the nations of old who did not have   
          disciples and companions from amongst his own people, adopting his manner  
          and executing his instructions who, later came to differ amongst themselves,  
          saying what they did not do and doing that for which they had no authority.  
          Whoever fights against them with his hands is a believer, and whoever fights  
          them with his tongue is a believer and whoever fights them with his heart is a  
          believer, for behind this there lies not a mustard seed of faith (al-Nawawee 
          1997/1:215-216).  
 
                                                 
144 Two important points are worth mentioning here: that although these orthodox scholars held this 
position contrary to the majority of classical scholars and what the strongest evidence suggests, it does 
not lessen their status as major orthodox scholars. The second point is that the fact that ‘Umar and 
some Takfeerees use these scholars’ opinion in this issue does not mean they are correct, nor is this 
researcher suggesting those classical scholars were Khawaarij because they concur upon this particular 
issue.    
  
most of the evidences from the Qur’aan and the Sunna and the general consensus of 
the classical scholars as was illustrated in chapter two. Another problem with this 
argument is that it does not take into consideration the welfare of the general Muslim 
population: most leaders resist attempts to remove them from power, especially 
corrupt ones, and this internal strife usually leads to bloodshed and general instability 
(‘Aseeree 2007:137). 
 
     As for the saying of Aboo Haneefa which was cited by Qurtubee in his explanation 
of the Qur’aan, where he said, “If a regime becomes corrupt, overthrow it for if it is 
not overthrown then every successive regime issuing from it becomes illegitimate” 
(cited in ‘Abd al-Rahmaan 1990:12). This opinion of Aboo Haneefa also goes against 
the evidences from the Qur’aan, the Sunna, and what the majority of the classical 
scholars agreed upon. Also, some suggest Aboo Haneefa later recanted this statement 
and recalled his verdict as is evidenced by the saying of Imaam al-Tahaawee who was 
a follower of his school of jurisprudence (Ibn Abee al-'Azza 1988:73).145
     Finally, Ibn Hazm (died 456 Hijra), a major Sunni Muslim jurist also held that it 
was permissible to revolt against the corrupt leader. However, Ibn Hazm is known to 
have held controversial views in matters of faith especially regarding the 
characteristics and attributes of Allah, and therefore some scholars question his 
 Al-Khumees 
concludes, after weighing the different evidences, that Aboo Haneefa “in the 
beginning used to support the overthrow of corrupt leadership, then later in his life he 
chose the position of abstaining from their removal, and this is evidenced by the 
position al-Tahaawee chose and agreed to when clarifying the belief of Ahl al-Sunna 
wa al-Jamaa’a according to the school of jurisprudence of Aboo Haneefa and his 
companions” (1996:569). Also, it is narrated that Aboo Haneefa held the position that 
rebelling against the corrupt leader entails creating a greater harm than benefit and 
this is another way in which classical scholars differed with modern thinkers on this 
issue: Takfeerees view rebellion as a point of creed and generally see greater benefit 
in removing corrupt leadership (al-Khumees 1999:108-109). 
 
                                                 
145  Evidence is conflicting regarding the final position of Aboo Haneefa as many scholars of his school 
of thought narrate that his position changed. “The statement that al-Tahaawee mentioned was also 
reported on the authority of Ibn al-Hamaam on Aboo Haneefa in Al-Masaayira and  Ibn Abee al-
Shareef and Ibn Qatloobgaa explained it and also concurred. Likewise, al-Bazdawee mentioned it“   
(al-Khumees 1996:569).      
  
opinion regarding this issue especially since it contradicts the evidences of the 
majority of the orthodox scholars in this matter (Ibn Hazm 2002/1:9-15). 146
                                                 
146 Although Ibn Hazm differed with orthodox scholars in his understanding of al-asmaa wa al-sifaat 
none of the classical scholars refer to him as a heretic because of his immense service to the Sunna and 
support for it and his contribution towards the preservation of Islaam and he is considered excused due 
to his misinterpretation of verses that mention certain attributes of Allah. However, according to the 
orthodox creed it is not permissible to follow him or anyone in their mistakes as only the Prophet 
Muhammad can be followed blindly and can be considered a perfect example.   
 
Additionally, the evidence 'Umar cited from Ibn Hazm applies to rebelling against the 
apostate ruler not one who is corrupt. Ibn Hazm was referring to the Raafida Shee’a 
who are known to contradict the orthodox creed through their extremism in worship, 
takfeer of many of the companions of the Prophet, and are considered to be non-
Muslim by the consensus of orthodox scholars both classical and contemporary 
(‘Awaajee 2001/1:362). Therefore, this example 'Umar cited was not applicable to the 
matter at hand: rebelling against the corrupt leader. 'Umar is very clear in articulating 
his stance towards the leadership when he says, "Whenever an element of injustice 
appears, the imaam must be approached in order that he be corrected or 
restrained....But if he refuses to fulfill any of his duties and is unrepentant then his 
removal is obligatory and he should be replaced by a man who will stand by truth" 
('Abd al-Rahmaan 1990:15). This statement is in clear contradiction to the orthodox 
position regarding advising the ruler. Firstly, when enjoining the good and forbidding 
the evil it should be done in accordance with one’s ability to carry out the duty and 
not cause a greater harm. Secondly, classical scholars like Imaam Ahmad, Ibn al-
Jawzee and many others viewed changing a wrong by the hand as meaning to separate 
two parties physically not using a weapon or through violence. Thirdly, if the leader is 
to be advised it should not be done in a way that causes the subjects to have rancor for 
him, or spread harm or rebellion ('Abd al-Kareem 2001:106). The Prophet said in a 
hadeeth transmitted by Muslim that "Verily Allah is pleased with three things for you; 
that you worship him and not associate partners with him. That you all hold fast to the 
rope of Allah and not split, and that you advise the one Allah has placed in authority 
over you" (al-Nawawee 1997/12:432). Many scholars use this narration and many 
others to support advising the leader with patience, and kindness regardless of 
whether he is corrupt or just, and the leader should be advised in privacy so as not to 
threaten his position or reduce his authority in the eyes of the general population. Ibn 
‘Uthaymeen points out that the killing of ‘Alee the fourth caliph and 'Uthmaan the 
third caliph, as well as the fighting and differences that arose between the companions 
  
was the result of outwardly criticizing the leaders, publicizing their faults, and 
creating rancor and differences between the subjects and leadership, and this was the 
beginning of the Khawaarij and those who followed their methodology ('Abd al-
Kareem 2001:112). 'Umar's position regarding how to deal with Islaamic authority is 
inconsistent with the majority of the classical scholars and “the scholars of the Salaf. 
used to warn against following strange issues, that which is permissible but not 
recommended, mistakes of the scholars, and odd sayings or opinions, and they were 
very strict in rejecting those that follow that methodology” (Hussayn 2007:18).  
 
     In sum, the most important arguments posed by the classical scholars against 
deposing a corrupt leader are as follows: the Qur’aan and Sunna both provide clear 
evidence to show that it is impermissible to rebel against the Muslim leader unless he 
exhibits open disbelief.147 Secondly, majority of the scholars consider it to be a 
foundation of the orthodox creed.148  Thirdly, those scholars like Maawardee, and 
Aboo Haneefa who thought it was permissible to rebel against an oppressive leader 
believed it was only an option if the benefit of revolt was greater than the harm of 
revolting, and this seems to indicate that patience was the primary premise and 
rebellion was considered only in exceptional cases. Many of the books of the early 
scholars of creed and jurisprudence mention (ijmaa’a) consensus when discussing this 
issue in favor of not rebelling.149
                                                 
147 Refer to the whole chapter of Saheeh Muslim with the explanation of Imaam al-Nawawee, entitled 
Kitaab al-Imaarah (al-Nawawee 1996/12:405-448). There are no less than one hundred and two 
hadeeth in that chapter alone that strengthen the argument of those who hold it to be impermissible to 
rebel against the Muslim leader who is not guilty of open disbelief. 
148  Imaam al-Nawawee said, “As for rebelling and fighting against the leaders, then it is unlawful 
according to the Ijmaa’a (consensus) of Muslims, even if the leaders were sinful oppressors. My 
opinion is supported by evidence from hadeeth and Ahl al-Sunna have consensus on the 
impermissibility of removing the leader due to his sinfulness” (al-Nawawee 1997/12:432).  
149 Imaam al-Nawawee states, “As for the position supported by some of our companions [scholars of 
Shaafi’ee jurisprudence] in the books of jurisprudence that the leader can be removed, and it is the 
position of the Mu’tizilah as well, then it is a mistake that goes against the consensus. The scholars say: 
the reason for not removing the leader and rebelling against him is because of the tribulations, 
bloodshed, and open wickedness that results from it” (al-Nawawee 1997/12:432). Imaam al-Barbaharee 
said, “It is not permissible to fight the leaders and rebel against them even if they commit oppression… 
and it is not from the Sunna to fight the leader as it spreads evil in the religion and worldly affairs” (al-
Barbaharee 1997:76). Majority of the books of creed and jurisprudence support this and refer to 
rebellion against a Muslim leader as a sinful practice and refer to it as agreed upon, meaning it is a 
principle that forms the foundation of Islaam and those who disagree with it either have fallen into 
innovation or mistaken in their ijtihaad (jurisprudent reasoning). For other statements of the early 
scholars and their view that this principle is agreed upon refer to (al-Laalakaa’ee 2002/1:176-183) and  
(al-Faasee 2003:107).  
  
throughout Muslim history, against the leader resulted in bloodshed and failure (Ibn 
al-Atheer 1965/3:372:410). 
      
3.3.6 Aboo Qataada al-Filisteenee 
 
 Finally, many of the incidents of rebellions, 
     Among the better known clerics in the West, often associated with radicalism, is 
'Umar Aboo Qataada al-Filisteenee. Born in Bethlehem around 1960, Aboo Qataada 
is a Jordanian national thought to have had ties with the Armed Islaamic Group150 in 
Algeria and to have been an associate of Usaama Bin Laaden. Unlike many of his 
predecessors with the exception of 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahmaan he has a background in 
Islaamic studies and "...has impeccable traditional and modern Salifist 151
     Aboo Qataada has remained in controversy for his religious verdicts and alleged 
involvement with terrorist groups and activities. Burke comments, "Qatada himself 
had become famous after issuing an opinion on an Algerian cleric's fatwa in 1994, in 
which he backed the view that the killing of women and children by militants in 
Algeria was justified" (2004:185). Aboo Qataada said in his religious verdict, “this 
research includes two issues from the topic of jihaad: the permissibility of killing 
credentials 
and had acted as the in-house alim to radical groups, particularly in Algeria, from his 
base in northwest London since 1994" (Burke 2004:184). Aboo Qataada has world 
wide Takfeeree/Jihaadee credentials which among many groups substantiate his 
Islaamic verdicts and rulings. After Bin Laaden's decline in credibility amongst 
certain Takfeeree groups he relied upon Aboo Qataada's religious verdicts to re-
establish his legitimacy as a fearless Islaamic holy warrior free from Western 
influence. Burke comments: 
 
          The basis of the Takfiris' criticism was that bin Laden supported, and was  
          protected by, the Taliban who themselves were 'apostate' because they wanted  
          to be recognized by the United Nations, a kufr organization. Abu Qatada  
          decided that the Takfiris were in error. His fatwa ... pointed out that the   
          Takfiris were declaring 'very senior and important movements including   
          Hamas, the Taliban, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and Islamic Movement  
          in Kurdistan' as kufr (2004:184).   
 
                                                 
150 A Takfeeree group that fought the Algerian government after it refused to relinquish power after 
Islaamic political parties began to have popular support in Algeria. 
151 Aboo Qataada appears to reject the use of associating with a particular group and he takes exception 
to being labeled Salafee. On an audio tape he said, “Whoever makes it an obligation upon the people to 
be Ikhwanee [Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen], Tableeghee, or Salafee, then he must repent or be killed” (Aboo 
Qataada 2005).      
  
women and children to prevent the danger of the brothers being killed or violating our 
dignity. Secondly, the permissibility of suicide bombings: these actions should not be 
classified as suicide” (Aboo Qataada 1994:10).  
 
3.3.6.1 Aboo Qataada on Jihaad and Takfeer  
 
     Aboo Qataada is most noted for his support for global jihaad and his staunch 
position regarding the modern day leaders and societies, with Saudi Arabia being 
foremost in his criticisms. In general most of Aboo Qataada's divergence from the 
orthodox creed appears to be regarding his views on jihaad and takfeer (al-Suhaymee 
2005:193).152
     Aboo Qataada seems to be aware of the main principles that prohibit making 
takfeer upon an individual; however his verdicts appear to contradict his knowledge. 
Aboo Qataada was asked about the connection between jihaad and terrorism in the 
West and he replied by saying, "No doubt that the Koran, the Sunna and the life of the 
Prophet order the Muslim to carry on jihad and fighting. This is something no Muslim 
can deny. Any Shaikh (who) tries to deny it or strip it of its real meaning is considered 
[as having committed] an act of apostasy" (Mckenna 2004:1). Aboo Qataada did not 
mention the fact that someone who denies jihaad as an immediate obligation or by 
misinterpreting the texts or through ignorance of its true meaning and purpose could 
still be considered Muslim as misinterpretation and ignorance are among the 
obstructions to making takfeer. However, if they deny that jihaad is a part of the 
religion without having the excuse of ignorance, or misinterpretation, or coercion, 
then they have contradicted the consensus of orthodox scholars and may be  
considered apostates (al-Muneef 2005:45-48). Aboo Qataada is quick to apply the 
judgment of takfeer with disregard for its conditions and principles similar to the 
Khawaarij and this becomes evident from his position regarding the rulers. In contrast 
to this Ibn Taymeeya says, “It is an obligation to be cautious not to make takfeer of 
the Muslims for their mistakes and sins; as it was the first innovation that became 
  
 
                                                 
152 Aboo Qataada made takfeer of all the soldiers in Algeria saying they were apostates guilty of killing 
Muslims and Islaamic fighters and supporting the apostate regime. He said, “So every soldier in 
Algeria, with the government and its party, are disbelievers in Allah, a polytheist that will spend 
eternity in the hell-fire and his blood and honor are lawful” (al-Jazaa'iree 2005:66).  
  
apparent in Islaam. For they declared the Muslims to be apostates and made their 
blood and wealth lawful” (Ibn Taymeeya 1989/13:31).   
 
     When discussing the rules of jihaad Aboo Qataada mentions an important and well 
known principle, and then he contradicts it by issuing a religious verdict undermining 
this same principle. From the Prophetic traditions regarding the rules of jihaad it is 
established that women, children, and the elderly non-combatants should not be 
harmed. Aboo Qataada acknowledges this principle. He said, "Islam prohibits the 
killing of women and children (the non-fighters). But sometimes during jihad, 
mistakes happen and non-fighters from women and children do get killed. The 
probability of non-fighters being killed does not stop or prohibit jihad from happening. 
This is an Islamic as well as a worldly principle" (Mckenna 2004:1). On the other 
hand, on an audio cassette, Aboo Qataada was asked about a religious verdict he gave 
for the fighters in Algeria to kill the children and women of the government soldiers, 
and he said that it depends upon what brings the maximum benefit (Hamad and al-
Ree’is 2005). 153
     Aboo Qataada justified his fatwa by claiming it was in accordance with the jihaad 
of the Prophet and classical sharee’a rulings. He cited a hadeeth in which some 
women and children were killed while fighting jihaad as evidence to support his 
ruling. The Prophet said regarding those women and children, “They are from them” 
 Aboo Qataada clearly contradicts himself with this religious verdict 
and at the same time this verdict opposes the Qur’aan, the authentic Sunna and the 
consensus of the Muslim community (al-Faasee 2003/3:1019). This verdict also 
highlights the similarity of Aboo Qataada and the original Khawaarij who believed 
that it was an obligation to annihilate their enemies after making takfeer of them. The 
only essential difference is that Aboo Qataada believes in killing the combatant’s 
women and children to terrorize his opponents, which is similar to the Azaariqa sect, 
whereas most Khawaarij groups advocated enslavement of them (al-Shahrastaanee 
1989:115). For this reason some contemporary scholars believe the modern Takfeeree 
groups are worse and more extreme than the original Khawaarij and prone to 
advocating wanton violence.   
 
                                                 
153 It is assumed that he means here doing whatever it takes to bring about the victory of the Muslims 
and cause them the least amount of harm and losses. 
  
(al-Bukhaaree 1970/4:158).154 Aboo Qataada alleges that his fatwa is supported by the 
sharee’a. He claims, “This makes it clear that what Jamaa’a al-Islaameeya al-
Maslaha did by issuing death threats to the women and children of the apostates in 
order to take pressure off the brothers in sisters in prison is without doubt from the 
sharee’a” (Aboo Qataada 1994:12). In addition, he also asserts that “the Mujahideen 
brothers in Algeria warned the women of the apostates that their husbands had 
abandoned the religion, so they must separate from them because it is not permissible 
to stay with an apostate, and if they refuse, then they are as guilty as their husband” 
(Aboo Qataada 1994:12).155
                                                 
154  It is clear from the hadeeth that the women and children were not intended targets as the battle took 
place at night. Many other hadeeth show that it is one of the principles of jihaad to avoid harming 
women and children. This is why Imaam al-Bukhaaree, from his wisdom, entitled the chapter: ‘Is it 
permissible to attack the enemies with the Probability of killing women and children?’ This illustrates 
that Aboo Qataada probably misunderstood this hadeeth and took it out of context.  
155 Aboo Qataada seems to exhibit the same circular reasoning many of the Takfeerees use:  according 
to him the husbands have become disbelievers; therefore the wives become disbelievers if they remain 
with them. This claim requires evidence and has parallels with Sayyid Qutb’s concept of  
excommunication: separating from those he believes have become apostates by remaining with infidels, 
a concept Shukree Mustafa and Faraaj expanded upon (Qutb 2007/6:3990).  
  
Aboo Qataada appears to set himself up as the spokesman for the Muslim nation 
while criticizing the Muslim governments for their shortcomings. Aboo Qataada 
advocates violence as the means for change if Muslim governments do not support his 
views. This call for violent political action and change contradicts the Salafee creed 
which holds that patience and advice are the appropriate responses to oppression and 
abuse of power by the Muslim authority.
 However, classical scholars like Aboo Haneefa say, “We 
do not make takfeer of a Muslim for sins even if it were a major sin, as long as he 
does not make it lawful then he still has faith” (al-Khumees 1999:43). Even if the 
claims of Aboo Qataada were true that the wives were sinning by remaining with their 
husbands this does not negate their faith according to the orthodox creed. Al-Rahaylee 
mentions that making takfeer without evidence is a trait of the Khawaarij and 
subsequent sects displayed this characteristic until contemporary times and this is 
what seems apparent in the case of Aboo Qataada and the contemporary groups (al-
Rahaylee 2006:37).      
 
     Like the Khawaarij and those ideologues that preceded him, Aboo Qataada 
advocates violence and the overthrow of present day Muslim regimes because he 
regards them as apostates. Aboo Qataada said: 
 
          I believe that the regimes existing in our countries are bad regimes. Our     
            nations cannot be content except if these regimes are overthrown. These  
            regimes are the ones that are dictating the method of change. If they  
            accepted the peaceful change, we will not choose otherwise, but when these  
            regimes do not accept even any discussion, then they are the ones who are  
            dictating another means of change other than just using words (Mckenna    
            2004:1). 
 
156 The Prophet said, “Religion is sincerity. 
We said; to whom: He said: To Allah and his book, and his Messenger, and to the 
leaders of the Muslims and their common folk” (al-Nawawee 1997/2:225). Al-
‘Abbaad mentioned that sincerity is in helping and advi ing the leader to be honest 
and bedient to Allah ( l-‘Abbaad 2003b:44). It is ll known from that many of the 
clas ical scholars believed in supp icating for the oppressive leader that h  governs 
the affairs of the Muslims in righteousness, and leaves off oppressiveness (‘Abd al-
Kareem 2001:186). Aboo Qataada appears t  be influenced greatly by thinkers such 
as Sayyid Qutb nd Mawdoodee and this is reflected in his v rdicts and push for 
revolutio  throughout th  Islaamic world.157
     Aboo Qataada espouses revolution and overthrowing the leader and this creates 
divisions amongst Muslims, causing some groups to declare others apostates. By 
inciting violence and casting suspicion upon the Muslim leaders Aboo Qataada 
distances himself from the main body of Muslims which only serves to further the 
depictions of Islaam as a violent terrorist religion. Aboo Qataada calls for removing 
the leader through violence; however the Prophet stated, “Whoever finds something 
he hates in a leader then be patient! For whoever, divides the group by even a hand-
span then he has died the death of the days of ignorance” (al-Nawawee 1997/12:442). 
In another narrati n the Pro het specified rebellion against the leader as the reason for 
dying the death of jaahileeya (ignorance). Ibn Hajar explained that the death implied 
here is not like that of a disbeliever, but instead the death of one who is a major sinner 
dying upon misguidance (Ibn Hajar 1996/7:13). Therefore, in accordance with the 
 
 
                                                 
 156 One of the main conditions for rebelling against a ruler is that he displays open undisputable 
disbelief and the Muslims have the ability to remove him from power with the least amount of harm to 
the society and Muslim population. See chapter two the section on the orthodox position regarding 
leadership.  
157 “More than anyone else, Sayyid Qutb…inspired generations of jihadis, including Al Qaeda’s senior 
leaders, Osama bin Laden and his deputies…to wage perpetual jihad to ‘abolish  injustice from the 
earth, to bring people to the worship of God alone, and to bring them out of servitude to others into the 
servants of the Lord’” (Gerges 2005:4).  
  
Prophet’s statement it seems the call for revolution and takfeer are issues that divide 
the Muslims, go against the orthodox creed, and are clear evidence of misguidance 
and disregard for the well being of the Muslim community.  
 
     Aboo Qataada at times appears to base his verdicts upon his personal opinions 
which conflict the evidences of the Qur’aan and Sunna, and consensus of classical 
scholars. Aboo Qataada mentioned that rebellion against the corrupt leaders is a duty 
but he did not bring clear evidence for this statement and it contradicts what has been 
previously mentioned from the classical scholars in this research. Aboo Qataada 
stated: 
          No doubt that one of the types of jihad in our religion is to fight the ruler if    
            he went astray. Some scholars see that the ruler did not do enough wrong,   
            or that he is not wrong at all and thus does not deserve to be overthrown.   
            But I personally believe, and many people believe with me, that the ruler       
            has done enough wrong to be overthrown and fought. Not only in Jordan,   
            but also in all the Islamic countries (Mckenna 2004:1). 
 
Aboo Qataada justifies rebellion of all the Muslim countries without exception. 
However, unless the leader has openly demonstrated unbelief, and scholars pass a 
judgment confirming this, then it is not permissible to rebel against them (al-
Nawawee 1997/12:440).158 ‘Umar Bin al-Khatt
                                                 
158 These conditions came from a prophetic tradition and protect the Muslim society from arbitrary 
judgments which could plunge the society into anarchy.  
aab the second caliph and one of the 
closest companions to the Prophet emphasized the importance of obedience to the 
ruler even if he is corrupt. He said, “If an Abyssinian slave rules over you then be 
patient, listen and obey even if he beats you. Then if he prohibits you then remain 
patient, and if he wants something that compromises your religion then say: I hear and 
obey with my blood, with the exception of my religion, and do not divide the main 
body of Muslims” (cited in ‘Abd al-Kareem 2001:142). There are several ways in 
which this narration about ‘Umar contradicts the position adopted by Aboo Qataada. 
Firstly, it illustrates that even when experiencing physical repression, one should be 
patient and non-aggressive towards the Muslim leader. Secondly, this narration shows 
that rebellion is a un-Islaamic principle due to oppression alone, as long as the leader 
does not display undisputable disbelief. Thirdly, ‘Umar’s statement is supportive of 
the textual evidences and not based upon whims and opinions, which incite rebellion, 
takfeer, and the violation of Muslim blood which Islaam has made sacred. Fourthly, 
  
the statement emphasizes obedience; even if you are not pleased with the leader or he 
has low status in society, such as in the case of a slave. Finally, as long as the leader 
remains Muslim he should be obeyed in righteousness, and the majority of both 
classical and contemporary Salafee scholars express agreement on this issue (al-Ja’eer, 
al-‘Ulyaanee, and al-Juhanee 2007:900-904).  
 
3.3.6.2 Aboo Qataada and Leadership 
 
     Although the majority of classical scholars hold it to be impermissible to rebel and 
spill the blood of Muslims, Aboo Qataada has written extensively, decreeing takfeer 
upon the rulers and calling for their removal by violent means. The main argument 
held by Aboo Qataada is that the leaders are dismantling (tabdeel) the sharee’a which 
is disbelief, so this de-legitimizes their authority to rule over the Muslims, thus they 
must be overthrown. An important point that must be introduced is the meaning of 
tabdeel and the term taghyeer (changing). On an audio cassette, Al-Ree’is explains 
that tabdeel is to make new legislation and claim that it is permissible to rule by it. 
Whereas, to legislate while at the same time acknowledging one is sinning by ruling 
by other than what Allah has revealed is taghyeer. Al-Ree’is then mentions that Ibn 
Taymeeya referred to this in his collection of religious verdicts, Ibn ‘Arabee in his 
book Ayaat al-Ahkam, and Imaam Qurtubee mentioned it in his exegesis of the 
Qur’aan (al-Ree’is 2005). The views held by the aforementioned scholars emphasize 
the orthodox view: dismantling the sharee’a is disbelief as it involves making un-
Islaamic legislation permissible, and changing the legislation involves doing these 
actions through one’s desires without believing them to be permissible which is minor 
disbelief. Aboo Qataada seems to consider both actions the same: any ruling which 
contradicts the sharee’a is major disbelief which necessitates takfeer especially if the 
leader continues in this behavior.159
 
 Al-‘Utaybee said, “Making an action lawful is not 
a result of doing a sinful action regardless of whether it is done repeatedly or 
insistently” (al-‘Utaybee 2005:20). This contradicts the statement of Aboo Qataada 
and shows that if a Muslim continues in a sinful practice he does not become a 
disbeliever, because making something lawful is an issue regarding belief and is not 
simply restricted to one’s actions.  
                                                 
159 Refer back to chapter one to see how the Khawaarij made takfeer for major sins.  
  
     Aboo Qataada claims that the humiliation and trials the Muslims face today are a 
result of changing the sharee’a, and that the governments “have become apostates in 
everyway, so they dismantled the sharee’a, and they took the pagans as protectors, 
and killed the monotheists by accusing Islaam” (Aboo Qataada 2005a:1). Here Aboo 
Qataada makes a very general claim assessing the current situation of the Islaamic 
nation as the result of apostate leaders who have lost legitimacy to rule. These claims 
of his originated in the thought of Mawdoodee and his assessment and prescription for 
Muslims’ problems are essentially the same.160
Aboo Qataada urges the Muslims to speak out against their governments and he 
pronounces takfeer of all the leaders similar to Sayyid Qutb, only Qutb seemed to 
accuse whole societies of apostasy (al-Rahaylee 2006:39). The problem lies in the 
absoluteness of his assessment and in his general indictment of all the governments: 
he does not distinguish between those who allow these sinful practices to happen, 
 Aboo Qataada makes takfeer of the 
Jordanian government declaring it an obligation upon all Muslims “to free themselves 
from them, and it is an obligation to rebel and refuse to be obedient to them according 
to the consensus of the early scholars” (Aboo Qataada 2005b:3). Al-Barbahaaree said, 
“And whoever says the prayer is permissible behind every pious or wicked leader and 
(believes in) jihaad with every caliph and does not believe in rebelling against the 
ruler by the sword, and supplicates for his reformation, has differed with the opinion 
of the Khawaarij” (1997:57). The classical scholars viewed supplicating for the leader 
as a means of salvation from their harm, and the well-being of the community. 
Nevertheless, the Khawaarij and their successors like Aboo Qataada seek rectification 
by removing the leader.   
 
     Aboo Qataada appears to make takfeer for the major sins that are widespread in 
some Muslim societies. Aboo Qataada uses as evidence for the right to rebel, some of 
the well known sins that are found in many Muslim countries when he says:  
           
          By keeping silent about them likewise paves the way for their false   
          methodology and legislative codes that they practice upon the community of  
          Muhammad…and in their legislation is making lawful, unlawful wealth, and    
          making permissible illegal intercourse, and they judge between the people  
          falsely, and are oppressive, and the consequences of their rules  
          being to waste and destroy the country (Aboo Qataada 2005b:3). 
 
                                                 
160  Refer to the section on Mawdoodee in this chapter. 
  
from those who actually legislate secular laws and take them as superior or the same 
as divine law. For example, a government may condone and keep silent about banks 
that deal with interest which is known as an unlawful practice in Islaam. However, if 
the government knows it is unlawful and they persist due to international pressure, or 
fear for economic instability then this is a major sin and they will be held accountable 
for it. On the other hand, if the government declares this practice to be permissible or 
Islaamically valid, the same as it, or better than divine law then this is disbelief (al-
Nawawee 2002:1725). Another example, but on the micro level, might be people who 
involve themselves in prostitution. They know it is unlawful but persist out of 
economic necessity. Then these persons are major sinners, but if they believe it to be 
permissible then this would nullify their faith. Aboo Qataada is aware of these 
principles but seems to ignore them when analyzing the Islaamic governments. Aboo 
Qataada mentions that there is a difference between mistakes and actually legislating 
sinful practices (Aboo Qataada 2005a:2). This shows he is aware that there is a 
difference, but he persists upon the methodology of takfeer and calls for revolt. Lastly, 
Aboo Qataada considers the governments to be held accountable for their sins more 
so than the general Muslim population, when in fact they both have obligations and 
rights (al-‘Abbaad 2003:45). Aboo Qataada places all the blame for the ills that exist 
in Muslim societies upon the governments which fosters rebellion and animosity 
towards the leaders and makes them a target for Takfeerees, in fact Aboo Qataada 
does not believe there are any Islaamic governments that exist in contemporary times 
(al-Suhaymee 2005:194).  
 
     Like Mawdoodee and Qutb, Aboo Qataada holds overthrowing corrupt 
governments and establishing the sharee’a as one of the most important goals for the 
Muslim community to attain. Moreover, Aboo Qataada holds that “the most important 
matter that a Muslim should know in our time is Allah’s judgment on these 
governments” (Aboo Qataada 2005b:2). This contradicts the orthodox creed which 
regards monotheism in all acts of worship as the highest attainment in this life, and 
this conforms to what the Prophets of Allah were sent with. Allah says, “I have not 
created mankind and jinn except for worshiping me” (Qur’aan 1996/51:56). He also 
says, “And verily, We have sent among every Ummah a Messenger (proclaiming): 
‘Worship Allah alone, and avoid Taghut’” (Qur’aan 1996/16:36). According to Aboo 
Qataada, it would seem judgment regarding contemporary rulers has now replaced the 
  
foundation of the Islaamic religion. This methodology reflects that of Mawdoodee and 
Qutb who made correcting the rulers the fundamental pillar of their creed and 
activism by emphasizing the tawheed of Allah’s sovereign right to rule only.161
     The efforts of Aboo Qataada and many of the modern day ideologues are spent 
belittling scholars who oppose them in creed. This trait is comparable to the early 
Khawaarij who slandered and made takfeer of the earliest scholars, the companions 
(al-Shahrastaanee 1984:115). When speaking about some of the contemporary 
scholars such as Saleem al-Hilaalee he refers to him as one of the leaders of 
irjaa’a 
  
 
3.3.6.3 Belittlement of the Scholars 
 
162 and servant to the Taaghoot (evil ruler who accepts to be worshiped). In 
addition, he claims that he abides by the methodology of those who only make takfeer 
upon those who make sinful acts lawful even if there is consensus that they nullify 
one's faith. He also claimed that Naaser al-Deen al-Albaanee, the former muftee of 
Jordan also known as one of the greatest hadeeth scholars of this century; was from 
the extreme Murji’a. Al-‘Abbaad states in very unequivocal language that “I swear by 
Allah that Shaikh al-Albaanee is a major scholar. A well known hadeeth scholar, 
supporter of the Sunna and his creed is excellent…A student of knowledge cannot do 
without his knowledge and books” (cited in al-Reis 2002:42). Bin ‘Uthaimeen said in 
defense of al-Albaanee that he is a “major scholar (alim) of hadeeth and jurisprudence 
even if he was greater in knowledge of hadeeth than in jurisprudence. I do not know 
of any speech that shows irjaa’a from him ever. But those who want to make takfeer 
of the people accuse him, and those like him, of belonging to the Murji’a. So this is an 
evil name to associate him with. And I bear witness to Shaikh al-Albaanee’s correct 
and sound beliefs” (cited in al-Reis 2002:42).163
                                                 
161 Gerges states, “Far from viewing jihad as a collective duty governed by strict rules and regulations 
(similar to just war theory in Christianity, international law, and classical Islamic jurisprudence, or fiqh) 
jihad for Qutub, was a permanent revolution against internal and external enemies who usurped God’s 
sovereignty” (Gerges 2005:4).  
162 Irjaa’a is the belief that faith does not fluctuate and that once one enters Islaam they are a true 
believer no matter what they do because the meaning of faith to them is by saying not actions. The 
Murji’a are those who ascribe to these innovated beliefs. They are the exact opposite in creed, 
regarding faith, to the Khawaarij as they do not believe in takfeer at all, unless one openly declares 
they have renounced the faith.  
163 Al-Albaanee has edited and authenticated many classical texts that contradict and expose the creed 
of the Murji’a, so this criticism of Aboo Qataada‘s seems somewhat dubious.  
  
the spread of innovation and misguidance by the Madkhaliyeen, followers of Rabee’a 
al-Madkhalee” 
 After discussing al-Albaanee and 
some points regarding his creed pertaining to takfeer he says, “And that gave rise to 
164 (Aboo Qataada 2005c:2). Here Aboo Qataada attacks, one of the 
contemporary scholars of Saudi Arabia, known for his criticism of the Takfeeree 
Qutbist groups and upholding the orthodox creed. The Khawaarij fought and made 
takfeer of those who opposed their methodology, whereas Aboo Qataada and the 
modern Takfeeree groups scrutinize, belittle, and some of the more extreme amongst 
them make takfeer of the scholars (‘Aseeree 2007:134).165
     To Aboo Qataada the scholars, “have become traitors for the tyrants (Taaghoot), 
for these people come closer to Allah-as they claim-by exposing the names of those 
who differ with them and make takfeer of the tyrannical regime” (Aboo Qataada 
2005c:4). A couple of points must be made regarding Aboo Qataada’s claims. Firstly, 
he claims that these scholars who are well known for their orthodox beliefs are traitors 
because they advise the leaders and supplicate for them to assume their responsibility. 
It seems Aboo Qataada would prefer they make takfeer of the rulers because of their 
mistakes. However, the early scholars like Fudhail Bin A’eeyaad, a Taabi’ee, advised 
patience and supplication for the leader. He said, “If I had an accepted prayer I would 
not make it except for the leader.” He was asked, “Why is that O Abaa ‘Alee? He 
replied, “When I make it for myself it does not benefit anyone except me. But when I 
make it for the leader then it reforms the leader, the slave, and the country” (cited in 
al-Tareefy 2005:29). Secondly, Aboo Qataada claims that the above scholars say that 
it is an act of worship to expose those who deviate from the orthodox creed. In that 
claim he is correct as “speaking about an innovator with the intention to clarify his 
condition to the people and warning the community from him is permissible in the 
sharee’a. The obligation increases if there is no other way to rebuke the innovator” 
(al-Rahaylee 2001/2:506). This position of denouncing sin and innovation stems from 
the Prophet and his companions and remains the position of the orthodox scholars 
until today.
  
 
166
                                                 
164 Shaikh Rabee’a al-Madkhalee is another well known Salafee scholar known as the “flag bearer of 
the Sunna” and he is well known for speaking about heresy and the groups who differ with the Salafee 
methodology. 
165 These Takfeeree groups through their extremism attempt to refute and attack the credibility of the 
Salafee scholars as can be observed by the statements of Aboo Qataada and some of them even make it 
permissible to shed their blood as they do not regard them as Muslim.  
166 Ibn al-Qayyim mentioned that refuting innovators was a type of jihaad and this conforms to the 
position of Imaam Ahmad as well (al-Muneef 2005:35). 
  
of the major scholars of Saudi Arabia, and his urging the youth to rebel against the 
Saudi regime. Aboo Qataada says, “Shaikh Safar al-Hawaalee exposed (the Murji’a 
scholars)-may Allah free him from the prison of the tyrannical apostates” (Aboo 
Qataada 2005c:3).  Here he praised al-Hawaalee, who similarly has alleged Qutbist 
inclinations, and is known for his activism and dissent against the Saudi regime. Al-
Hawaalee said, “As for ruling by the sharee’a-then this is an old claim- the reality is 
that the sharee’a does not remain with us except what is called by the friends of the 
evil tyrants law: personal law and other than that some of the punishments which are 
intended to maintain security” (cited in al-‘Adnaanee 2004:110).   These statements 
made by al-Hawaalee undermine the legitimacy of the Saudi rulers with the 
implication that the sharee’a is almost entirely absent and that the rulers have violated 
their social contract.
 Aboo Qataada defends a scholar known in the past for his belittlement 
167
     In this section the researcher has chosen to quote from Aboo Hamza extensively in 
order to present his methodology accurately. Aboo Hamza appears to have a very 
 Statements like these sow the seeds of enmity and discord 
amongst the Muslim youth towards the rulers. In addition, this statement requires 
substantiation, as Saudi Arabia is considered by many to be adherent to Islaamic 
sharee’a. Finally, Aboo Qataada in his supplication makes takfeer of the Muslim 
authority thus giving credence to the claims made against him as being Khawaarij 
like, and one who vilifies the scholars who oppose his methodology.        
      
3.3.7 Aboo Hamza al-Misree 
  
     Another Takfeeree/Jihaadee residing in the West is Aboo Hamza al-Misree. His 
notoriety comes from his outspokenness, total takfeer of the Muslim governments, 
and his open exhortation to jihaad to the dismay of the British authorities. Like Aboo 
Qataada and ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmaan he sought political asylum in the West and used 
it as a base of support to recruit Islaamic militants. Aboo Hamza unlike Aboo Qataada 
and ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmaan, does not possess the same Islaamic credentials, 
knowledge, or scholarly background, however he is popular amongst some of the 
Muslim youth in Britain and America.   
 
                                                 
167 Scholars like al-Hawaalee were generally accepted and held in high regard before the advent of the 
first Gulf War in 1991. However, in the view of those who criticize him it is precisely that major event 
and the subsequent American troop presence on Saudi Arabian soil that exposed his deviance in 
important matters of creed (al-‘Adnaanee 2004:110).     
  
comprehensive approach and theory in which he seems to have amassed a mountain 
of evidence to prove his points and attempt to refute important aspects of the orthodox 
creed. The primary differences between his creed and that of the orthodox creed 
revolve around the issues of jihaad and takfeer and his misapplication of these 
principles regarding present day leaders and scholars.168
     Aboo Hamza's call is centered primarily upon four main issues: the call to jihaad, 
takfeer, the establishment of the sharee’a, and his critique of Salafee scholars.
 
 
3.3.7.1 Aboo Hamza's Call to Islaam   
 
169 For 
Aboo Hamza the fundamental problem facing Muslims is illegitimate rulership, and 
he holds that it is of utmost importance to give “moral aid and support for the modern 
struggle of tawhid (that being hakameeyah).170
                                                 
168 It must be noted that Aboo Hamza unlike Aboo Qataada appears to be more abusive, and wanton in 
his exhortations to violence but does not have the scholarly credentials or same position as Aboo 
Qataada; however his ideals are equally threatening due to there appeal to some of the Muslim youth.  
169 The emphasis he places upon these issues is evidenced in his books and tapes with titles such as The 
Khawaarij (2000), Allah's governance on Earth (2000b), and Beware of Takfeer (2005). 
170 Al-hakameeya is the belief that all rulership, authority and legislation is from Allah’s law as 
revealed through the Qur’aan and Sunna. This is in accordance with the orthodox creed; however the 
emphasis that the Takfeerees place on it by labeling it as a separate category of tawheed and belittling 
the other categories is a distortion of its meaning. In addition, they emphasize al-hakameeya and use it 
as a political tool, with aspirations to remove or replace the existing Muslim leaders as will be 
evidenced by Aboo Hamza’s statements.   
 This struggle is the most important 
one of our time, as the Shari`a acts as protection for all the forms of tawhid and the 
people that are under the banner of tawhid” (al-Misree 2000b:4). The struggle he 
refers to here is what Jihaadees consider to be jihaad:  removing so-called apostate 
leaders to establish righteous ones who implement the sharee’a (al-Suhaymee 
2005:266-268). The other aspect of his call is “the negligence of the scholars and their 
adherents in presenting the ails of the Ummah and giving workable solutions” (al-
Misree 2000b:4). Here Aboo Hamza criticizes the scholars whom he describes as 
negligent with regards to emphasizing the importance of the sharee’a and its 
implementation. These issues form the basis of his Islaamic propagation. However, 
the sharee’a emphasizes that claims must be supported by evidence. In this regard the 
Prophet said, “The evidence is upon the claimant and swearing is upon the accused” 
(al-Bukhaaree 1970/3:417). Imaam al-Nawawee explained this hadeeth by saying, 
“This hadeeth is a major proof from the sharee’a principles for making judgments, 
and from amongst these principles is that no one’s saying is accepted by mere 
  
accusations of the accused. Rather we look to the proof or honesty of the accused” 
(cited in al-Reemy 2000:61). It can be deduced from this statement that it is not 
sufficient for Aboo Hamza to make unsubstantiated claims and pass judgment upon 
scholars known for their service to the Sunna, and who have waged jihaad against 
religious unorthodoxy.   
 
3.3.7.2 His Concept of Jihaad  
 
    Jihaad is an important aspect of Islaam and it has rules and regulations governing 
it, and there are different types of jihaad: against one’s desires, the devil, against the 
disbelievers and hypocrites, against innovation and heresy (al-Muneef 2005:31-35). 
Aboo Hamza believes in all of these types of jihaad, but his understanding of its 
detailed principles seems to differ from the orthodox methodology. In the introduction 
of his book entitled Allah’s Governance on Earth (2000b), he mentions the jihaad 
against innovation and heretical scholars, but it seems he attacks scholars known for 
their adherence to classical interpretations of Islaam. He uses explicit analogies for 
warfare and claims his book “will fortify the reader with the ammunition for both 
word and action and (act) as a sword and shield against the knights of dark oppression 
and their scholars, who act as the horses of kufr (disbelief), bringing in their wake the 
excrement of their fataawa, filled with nothing more than dregs and stolen evidence 
from the books of Ahl us-Sunna wal Jama`ah” (al-Misree 2000b:4). Al-Fawzaan says, 
“It is obligatory to respect the Muslim scholars because they are the inheritors of the 
prophets and denigrating them is considered belittling their position” (cited in al-
Hussayn 2003:70). Aboo Hamza has harsh words for the scholars and leaders and in 
his view this is his fulfillment of jihaad against the hypocrites.  
 
     Aboo Hamza uses passionate and emotional appeals in calling for physical jihaad 
against the leaders. He speaks extensively on how he believes the al-Saud family 
tricked Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab into establishing their throne, and rebelling 
against the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, he refers to al-Saud family as Khawaarij, 
and then he exhorts the Muslim nation to action by saying: 
 
          This is the time! If we decide now to correct what the illegitimate people have  
          done, those who have stolen the khilaafa, destroyed the khilaafa, they should be  
          killed just for that alone! Let alone changing the shari’a, taking women’s  
  
          clothes off, using money from the kuffar against Muslims or dropping jihad and  
          doing their jihad against Muslims. Who is killing the Muslims and making  
          friends with the kuffar? This is the definition of the Khawaarij. Who is doing       
          this? It is these rulers, not us (al-Misree 2000a:208). 
 
Aboo Hamza cites the sins that seem apparent to him in the Saudi state which 
according to his rhetoric is enough to pronounce takfeer of the regime and wage 
jihaad against them, even though he is fully aware of the sanctity of Makka and 
Madina. Aboo Hamza makes many unfounded claims to justify his jihaad claiming 
the two holy Mosques in Makka and Madina are no longer pure because the hotels 
surrounding them are not being used as guest houses for pilgrims. In addition, on the 
same audio cassette, he claims people face harassment and get arrested while trying to 
perform pilgrimage “…and Allah did not order you to go for hajj so you can be killed 
or you can be raped! When it comes like that then you are exempt from hajj, but you 
are not exempted from taking steps to do your hajj by doing jihaad against these 
people to stop and make it a safe haven for Muslims” (al-Misree 2005c). Aboo Hamza 
makes many claims against the Saudi regime: accusing them of rape, and creating a 
volatile environment for pilgrims (al-Suhaymee 2004:22-32). However, it is known 
that the Saudi regime provides security and spends millions of Saudi riyals every year 
to provide services for the pilgrims. These statements of Aboo Hamza’s echo the 
understanding of the Khawaarij who believed in removing the leader by any means 
instead of looking at the harm of the consequences of their actions. Ibn al-Qayyim 
said: 
          If prohibiting evil results in creating a greater evil and what displeases  
          Allah even more, then it is not permissible, even if Allah hates the action and  
          abhors those who commit it. This is similar to preventing a king or ruler by  
          revolting against him as this is the basis of all evil (Ibn al-Qayyim  
          2002/3:171).  
 
Through extremism and misunderstanding the Khawaarij made takfeer for the sins 
they witnessed, and performed jihaad against the leader (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:111). 
Aboo Hamza appears to be following the same methodology only he does not make a 
very clear case for his jihaad, and this researcher has not come across a single 
religious text that describes poor service as amongst one of the major sins which expel 
one from the religion, substantiate rebellion, or legitimize jihaad. Aboo Hamza is 
known for his financial and physical support for jihaad in places such as Afghanistan, 
  
Chechnya, and Bosnia (Kohlmann 2004:189). However, his exhortation to fight 
jihaad does not justify his mistakes in methodology and creed.  
 
     There are several examples of orthodox classical scholars throughout Muslim 
history rebelling against the leadership and Aboo Hamza attempts to use these 
examples to illustrate the legitimacy of his call to jihaad against the leaders. Aboo 
Hamza states, “We also need to elaborate on how many Imaams of Ahl us-Sunna wal 
Jama’ah have rebelled against tyrant rulers and no one ever called them Khawaarij. It 
was not known that these rulers were kufaar either” (al-Misree 2000a:228). From the 
more prominent scholars he mentioned were Mu’aawiya Ibn Sufyaan, a companion of 
the Prophet, and al-Hussayn the grandson of the Prophet, and ‘Abd Allah Ibn Zubayr 
another companion. This is probably the best illustration of how Aboo Hamza 
misuses the textual proofs and examples from the classical scholars. Firstly, the 
reason no one considered them Khawaarij was because they did not possess the 
creed171 or characteristics of the Khawaarij and thus were considered rebels.172 
Secondly, the majority of classical scholars consider it impermissible to rebel against 
the leader. Al-Tahaawee said, “And we do not see [the permissibility] of revolting 
against our imaams or leaders, even if they are oppressive, and we do not supplicate 
against them nor disobey them. We also believe that we are obliged to obey them and 
this is obedience to Allah the Almighty, as long as they do not call us to disobey Him” 
(Ibn Abee al-‘Azza 1988:379). Thirdly, in Islaam as a principle it is not permissible to 
use a single example, even if it was a companion, which goes against the Qur’aan and 
Sunna and the consensus of the classical scholars as a proof to practice an action of 
worship (al-Baghdaadee 2005:437). The orthodox creed holds that no one is infallible 
except the Prophet, and Muslims should not follow anyone in their mistakes (al-
Baghdaadee 2005/1:272).173
                                                 
171 Imaam al-Nawawee states “The scholars define a rebel as one who leaves obeying the just ruler  and 
ceases to carrying out the obligatory duties owed to him….The Khawaarij are a group of innovators 
who believe that committing a major sin is disbelief and the one who commits it will be eternally in the 
hell-fire” (al-Nawawee 2002:1718-1719).  
172 It is important here to note that this is a description of the actions they took not a belittlement of the 
companions by calling them rebels.  
173  Imaam al-Baghdaadee said, “Taqleed is accepting someone’s saying without evidence” (al-
Baghdaadee 2005/2:128). The concept of taqleed, as was discussed in chapter two, has often been 
abused by many Muslims who only accept the saying of their particular shaikh or methodology of 
jurisprudence, even if it contradicts the Sunna of the Prophet.   
  
mistakes according to the majority of orthodox scholars (al-Nawawee 2002:1718-
1719). Fourthly, Aboo Hamza made a mistake when he used the examples of the 
companions by saying they “rebelled against tyrant rulers” as this implies that ‘Alee 
the Prophet’s cousin was a tyrannical ruler, as Mu’aawiya fought against him-which 
is a harsh criticism levelled against ‘Alee and a grave mistake according to the 
orthodox creed. Finally, Aboo Hamza’s examples cannot be used as evidence to 
support resisting a corrupt Muslim ruler as it contradicts the foundation of Islaam. 
However, the fact that some of the classical scholars fought leaders they felt were 
tyrannical does not make them like the Khawaarij because they did not have their 
creed (al-Nawawee 2002:1718). 
 
3.3.7.3 Takfeer of the Rulers 
 
     Aboo Hamza seems to disregard the impediments and conditions of takfeer 
concerning the rulers, and he is quick to attribute disbelief to them. Most of his 
writings contain scenarios in which he deems the Muslim authority as apostates and 
he sees revolt as the only solution. He states, “If the ruler becomes a kaafir for any 
reason or risks the lives of the Muslims for the kufaar, and the scholars, or those in a 
position to rule fail to remove him peacefully, they must ask the Islamic army to 
remove him for the sake of Islam and the Muslims. Both Islam and Muslims must be 
preserved at all costs at all times” (al-Misree 2000b:112). It appears to be 
contradictory to preserve the Muslims while rebelling against the leader, especially if 
it spreads chaos, blood shed, and instability as was witnessed in Algeria, Somalia, and 
Iraq. Aboo Hamza’s description of the leaders is contrary to the way of the Prophets, 
and his images are often violent, urging the Muslim youth to takfeer and act against 
the ruling regimes. Aboo Hamza states:   
 
          In this day and age, the evil rulers of our time are absolutely obese with their  
          big bellies, engorged with the blood that they have drunk from Muslim   
          societies, not to mention what they have done with the resources of Muslims.  
         The foundations of their kingdoms have been built upon the skulls of our  
          Ummah, with the bones from the skeletons of our people as girders and  
          pillars that support the structures of their castles and palaces (al-Misree  
          2000b:3). 
 
 Therefore, although there were examples of rebellions by 
those who held the orthodox creed, it does not legitimize those actions and they were 
Like those who preceded him, Aboo Hamza pronounces takfeer upon all of the 
existing Muslim regimes, and this is takfeer al-Kullee which some of the Khawaarij 
  
sects practiced when they made takfeer of the leader, his army, and all those 
associated with him (al-Rahaylee 2001/1:190).174
     Regarding takfeer Aboo Hamza commits mistakes in the principles he espouses. 
He described two types of oppression: minor kufr dealing with the rights of other 
human beings and major kufr which deals with the right of Allah. He said, “… 
however, the moment the tyranny touches the right of Allah, for example legislation, 
then it is without doubt major kufr and must be resisted until it ceases or the person is 
removed from his post” (al-Misree 2000b:192). This statement seems flawed as the 
 Aboo Hamza states, “Although the 
army and the scholars are both a group of kufaar from the point of view of assisting 
kufaar against Muslims, maybe some of them are doing more kufr than others, this is 
not our concern in this research” (al-Misree 2000b:288). Aboo Hamza accuses the 
government, scholars and army of apostasy, although even if it were the case that they 
sought support from non-Muslims against Muslims this does not necessitate disbelief 
in all cases. “So it is considered disbelief if one supports them intending assistance in 
their religion. As for supporting them in other than that-like worldly matters for 
example-then he is not an apostate and these are the details which the scholars use to 
make their conclusions and what the evidence suggests” (al-‘Utaybee 2005:89). One 
of the evidences that many of the classical scholars use is the incident involving 
Haatab Ibn Abee Bult’a, one of the companions of the Prophet, who wrote to the 
pagans exposing the secrets of the Prophet’s invasion of Makka because his family 
was under the pagans’ authority and he feared for their lives. Classical scholars like 
Ibn Taymeeya, and Imaam Shaafi’ee use this as evidence that supporting the 
disbelievers against Muslims is not always an act of apostasy because the Prophet did 
not make takfeer of him because he acted for a worldly reason: out of fear for his 
family’s safety. Aboo Haneefa and Imaam Ahmad also believe that supporting pagans 
against Muslims does not always constitute unbelief (al-‘Utaybee 2005:91). Aboo 
Hamza and many of the Takfeeree groups consider supporting non-Muslims against 
Muslims as apostasy without reviewing the evidences of the classical and 
contemporary scholars regarding this complex issue which causes them to misuse the 
principles of takfeer (‘Aseeree 2007:134).            
 
                                                 
174 For example, Aboo Qataada makes takfeer of all the contemporary Muslim leaders, their police, 
military and security services. He also declared that there is no difference between Jewish soldiers and 
Yasser Arafat’s security apparatus, except that Yasser Arafat and his government are guilty of even 
greater disbelief; however in his opinion both should fought (al-Jazaa'iree 2005:62).  
  
issue of ruling by other than Allah’s laws has already been detailed in this research 
and it becomes apparent that sometimes it is major disbelief and at others minor 
disbelief. Therefore, usurping the right of Allah does not always expel one from the 
fold of Islaam as is the case of ruling by other than divine law. As for the one who 
does not govern by Allah’s law Bin Baaz said, “He does not become an apostate 
unless he makes it permissible, and if he declares that he is not making it permissible 
then we accept his statement according to its face value, and we do not judge him to 
be an apostate” (cited in al-‘Utaybee 2005:20). 
 
        Aboo Hamza attributes the term Daar al-Harb to all Muslim societies with 
disregard for the conditions that prohibit takfeer; this is a synthesis of Sayyid Qutb’s 
ideals and the original Khawaarij. Sayyid Qutb is known for his takfeer of whole 
societies, his attempts to justify rebellion against the rulers, and coining the term Daar 
al-Harb to describe all Muslims societies (al-Rahaylee 2006:37). Aboo Hamza is 
clearly Takfeeree in his methodology and creed, even though he does not make 
takfeer for all the major sins. Al-Reis states on an audio tape that: 
 
          …if someone makes takfeer for one major sin then he is considered like the     
          Khawaarij. For instance, those who rebelled against ‘Alee-may Allah be  
          pleased with him-was their beginning and methodology takfeer for every major  
          sin? Or takfeer for the major sin of ruling by other than what Allah revealed?  
          They made takfeer for one major sin and with that they are all Khawaarij by  
          consensus (al-Reis 2005b).  
 
This shows that although one may not possess all the traits of the Khawaarij he or she 
can still be considered Khawaarij due to recklessness in making takfeer and this is in 
accordance with the consensus of classical scholars (al-Barbahaaree 1997:114). Like 
the Khawaarij, Aboo Hamza considers making takfeer of the leaders as enjoining the 
good and forbidding evil. Aboo Hamza describes the leaders as apostates stating: 
 
          Once the people in authority fail to check the ruler’s falsehood, willingly or    
          unwillingly, and the Shari`a of Islam disintegrates, then the whole country is  
          transformed into Daar ulHarb. It is irrelevant if it is the two Holy Places  
          (Makkah and Madinah), or Jerusalem, which today is classified as Daar ulHarb  
       because it rests in the hands and under the laws of the Jews (al-Misree   
          2000b:112). 
 
Aboo Hamza tends to use hypothetical case scenarios to substantiate his takfeer with 
vague accusations against all Muslim countries, accusing them of abandoning divine 
  
law. Information and claims must be substantiated by fact and reliable witnesses, or 
religious texts in order to be considered valid and acceptable. Allah says, “O you who 
believe! If a fasiq (liar, evil person) comes to you with any news, verify it, lest you 
should harm people in ignorance, and become regretful for what you have done” 
(Qur’aan 1996:49:6). This verse shows the importance of confirming information and 
it is a stern warning to beware of harming others by unsubstantiated claims. Aboo 
Hamza’s claim is an attack upon the Saudi society which in the view of Salafees is the 
most adherent society today in sharee’a laws, but according to Aboo Hamza it is 
nothing more than a society governed by apostates that should be fought against (al-
Misree 2000b:112). Aboo Hamza gives the impression that the whole society is guilty 
of supporting open apostasy and has become Daar al-Harb. Even if this were the case 
that the rulers had fallen into open disbelief the rest of society can only be judged with 
disbelief according to the extent of their support for the apostate leader (al-Mawjaan 
2004:95). Aboo Hamza, like those who came before him, attributed the trials of the 
Muslim community to the absence of the sharee’a. Therefore, the solution is to 
establish divine law, by any means, to its rightful place on earth and this has become 
the primary goal of Aboo Hamza. He states, “Since the loss of the Shari`a, the 
Ummah has been put through unimaginable trauma, to the point where every which 
way we turn in, we see new disturbances mounting” (al-Misree 2000b:3). Aboo 
Hamza after defining the problem claims: 
 
          The Majority of the scholars of Islam, if not all, have declared any country not   
          ruled by the complete Shari`a of Allah, as Dar ul Harb with no exception to    
          any land on this blue planet, irrespective of the number of Muslims or the  
          plentiful amount of masaajid. The implication for the leader that perpetrates an  
          act of legislation in the Shari`a is that the ruler, his scholars, his army are all a  
          group of kufaar that must be fought, stripped of power, and punished severely    
          for what they are doing to Muslims and Islam (al-Misree 2000b:112). 
 
Aboo Hamza made it a stipulation that the sharee’a must be complete or the land is 
Daar al-Harb.175 This contradicts the consensus of the scholars and this definition 
does not consider those lands where the majority is Muslim and the leader makes 
some mistakes applying the sharee’a.176
                                                 
175 Refer to chapter one the section on Daar al-Harb.  
anafee schools of thought base the concept of calling a Hanbalee, Maalikee, and HThe Shaafi’ee, “ 176
land a Muslim land on the following criteria: Muslims must be sovereign and have full control over it 
so that they are able to display the signs of Islaam and implement its regulations (Qureeshee 1992:438). 
This shows that the classical scholars of jurisprudence regarded the Muslim land to be intact as long as 
  
definition is because if one concedes to Aboo Hamza’s definition it potentially opens 
the door to unwarranted rebellion, takfeer, and bloodshed: he does not recognize the 
possibilities of mistakes by the leaders, and those who feel the leadership has lost 
legitimacy will more than likely begin by attempting to overthrow it.  In contrast, Ibn 
al-Qayyim said, “It is prohibited to fight and revolt against the Muslim leaders, even 
if they become oppressive as long as they establish the prayer.… The result of 
fighting and rebelling against them only increases their harm and the Umma is still 
effected by this evil until today” (Ibn al-Qayyim 2002/3:171). In addition, Ibn 
Taymeeya said, “It is not for anyone to make takfeer of a Muslim even if he makes a 
mistake or error, until he presents evidence and explains it to him. Therefore, whoever 
has been affirmed as a Muslim cannot be declared an apostate based upon suspicion, 
but rather only by providing evidence and removing his doubt” (Ibn Taymeeya 
1989/12:466). The second mistake in Aboo Hamza’s statement is his conclusion 
which appears to be reminiscent of the extreme sects of the Khawaarij like the 
Azaariqa who believed in killing the women and children of their opponents and all 
those associated with the ruler whom they deemed to be apostate (al-Shahrastaanee 
1984:115). Aboo Hamza’s assessment appears a bit extreme as it violates the 
principles of takfeer by not considering the condition of those under the leader in 
question, and it disregards the other categories of the state: Daar al-Kufr, Daar al-
Sulh (al-Mawjaan 2004:106). Another example which illustrates Aboo Hamza’s 
likeness to the Azaariqa is when he was asked about the September eleventh attacks 
on the World Trade Center in which he responded by saying, "Everybody was happy 
when the planes hit the World Trade Center. Anybody who tells you that they are not 
happy, they are hypocrites on the Muslim nation. I am telling you, everybody"  
(Mckenna 2004b:1). Here Aboo Hamza in very explicit terms declares that it was 
justified and an occasion of joy because he equated it to the killing of Muslim 
civilians by American forces in Iraq and around the world. In addition, he considers 
the Muslims who did not deem this attack as praiseworthy hypocrites. Aboo Hamza 
and many of the Takfeeree ideologues seem to have no real concern for the sanctity of 
human life because they are always calling for what they consider jihaad and the 
destabilization of Muslim societies in order to remove the existing regimes (Gerges 
2005:6). Allah said, “…nor kill such person as Allah has forbidden, except for just 
 The reason for emphasizing the difference in 
                                                                                                                                            
groups who decree Muslim lands  ereeTakfeamza and the Hthe above conditions are met, unlike Aboo 
to be unholy and un-Islaamic according to their criteria (‘Aseeree 2007:127-128).  
  
cause, nor commit illegal sexual intercourse, and whoever does this shall receive the 
punishment” (Qur’aan 1996:25:68). Aside from the major sin for taking an innocent 
life, the repercussions upon the Muslim nations is far reaching and the effects are still 
to be seen.177
This saying of Aboo Hamza is similar to that of Qutb and his contemporaries who 
believed in removing the leadership after making pronouncements of takfeer upon 
whole societies. Altering the sharee’a can be kufr al-asghar or kufr al-akbar 
depending on the state and belief of the leader as was discussed at great length in 
 Also in the Qur’aan Allah mentions, …if anyone killed a person other 
than in retaliation for murder, or to spread mischief in the land, it would be as if he 
killed all of mankind” (1996:32:156). Mujaahid, one of the Taabi’een, explained this 
verse by saying, “Whoever takes a life which is sacred will roast in the hell-fire 
similarly to how he would burn in the hell-fire for taking the life of all humanity” (al-
Baghawee 2002:374). This shows that Islaam regards human life as sacred and 
disregarding that sanctity is considered a punishable offense under Islaamic law. On 
the other hand, Aboo Hamza expresses concern for the sharee’a but he disregards its 
basic principles and rulings by issuing decrees of wanton violence.  
 
     Instead of implementing the methodology of classical scholars, Aboo Hamza 
exploits and misinterprets evidences to support his paradigm. Aboo Hamza misuses 
accepted principles from the orthodox creed to attempt to justify the takfeer, killing, 
and rebellion against Muslim states. As evidence of this, Aboo Hamza makes a very 
vague judgment in support of rebellion, and predicts an almost text book like ending 
in which the Muslim nation will be rectified. It seems Aboo Hamza disregards the 
principles of takfeer, Muslim life, and property, and maintains that the Islaamic state 
will be established from chaos and revolt. He predicts success after decreeing: 
 
          … that there is no legitimate bai`a for any ruler tampering with the Shari`a as  
          he has nullified the contract by his own doing. In Islamic law, the people should  
          replace him for the system of justice to carry on. If the people refuse to do so,  
          and the army supported him, the whole country becomes Dar al-Harb, which  
          is loud announcement for enmity to be between Allah and His creation due to  
          their disobedience (al-Misree 2000b:118).  
 
                                                 
177 Whole nations like Iraq and Afghanistan have seen their leaders removed and experienced immense 
amount of suffering, loss of human life, and instability as direct consequences to these actions 
(Cockburn 2006:1-5).  
  
chapter two.178 However, Aboo Hamza appears to make a general judgment 
encompassing anyone who alters legislation, which is the method of many who 
deviate from the orthodox creed: they use general evidences which are ambiguous and 
apply them to specific circumstances without analyzing the applicability of their 
rulings. Allah mentions, “So as for those in whose hearts there is deviation they 
follow that which is ambiguous, seeking to (cause) trials, seeking for its hidden 
meanings” (Qur’aan 1996:3:7). The Prophet said about the above verse that, “If you 
see those who follow that which is ambiguous then they are those whom Allah has 
named (as having deviation) so beware of them” (al-Bukhaaree 1970/6:54). This 
Qur’aanic verse and explanation by the Prophet seem to refute Aboo Hamza’s whole 
methodology which is to use the general verses that may have many meanings or 
differences of opinion and apply them to make rulings of takfeer upon individuals, 
groups and societies. For example, Aboo Hamza offers his prescription for the one 
who failed to rule by divine law which is that,“ trustworthy scholars should then 
pronounce him an apostate and his groups as a group of enemies of God, but not all of 
them are enemies, as surely some are only sinners” (al-Misree 2000b:118). Aboo 
Hamza seems to disregard the statement of the Prophet which allows for the mistake 
of the scholar or judge who attempted to make an honest verdict but failed to do so 
and the hadeeth mentions he will be rewarded from Allah. Aboo Hamza said, 
“Scholars who fail to deliver the proper verdict also become enemies, regardless of 
their knowledge or their acts of religious worship. Jihaad then becomes compulsory 
for every Muslim according to each one’s ability until the state is restored with a 
proper ruler and the state is brought to order” (al-Misree 2000b:118). 179
                                                 
178 Altering the sharee'a does not mean making lawful practices unlawful or vise versa as this expels 
one from the fold of Islaam if it is done intentionally. 
accusing those who disagree with his  takfeertently misapplies the principles of amza consisHAboo  179
adjudications of takfeer to be apostates. When according to Salafee scholars, "It is not permissible for a 
group of monotheists who declare grave worshipers to be disbelievers to pronounce takfeer upon 
another group of monotheists who abstain from pronouncing takfeer upon them until the proof has been 
presented to them…and this differs from takfeer of those who there is no disagreement over their 
disbelief"(al-Daweesh 1990/2:151).  
  
1997/12:239). Aboo Hamza is highly critical of the mistakes of the Muslim leaders 
and equally critical of those scholars who disagree with his ideology.  
 
3.3.7.4 His Position Regarding the Scholars 
 
     In addition to making hasty judgments, Aboo Hamza praises those scholars and 
thinkers who follow his methodology and adhere to a similar revolutionary theory. 
Additionally, he praises those Salafee scholars who may have ambiguous verdicts 
which are open to interpretation, and Aboo Hamza uses these opportunities to exploit 
their verdicts to support his theories of takfeer and rebellion.  Aboo Hamza speaks 
highly of “those scholars of tawhid of our time that we would like to thank and give 
respect to for their stand regarding tawhid” (al-Misree 2000b:6). He names a list of 
scholars like Muhammad Ibn Ibraaheem a former muftee of Saudi Arabia, 
Muhammad al-Ameen al-Shanqeetee also a distinguished scholar from Mauritania 
who taught in Saudi Arabia, Ahmad Shaakir from Egypt a major hadeeth scholar, and 
his brother Mahmood Shaakir. These scholars were known for their orthodox 
methodology and creed; however due to their extensive writing about issues regarding 
rulership they seem to be accepted by those Takfeeree ideologues. 
 
      Additionally, Aboo Hamza extols many of the ideologues that have been 
presented in this research as they share a common ideology with him. He mentions 
Sayyid Qutb, Shaikh `Abd Allah `Azzam and Hasan al-Banna. He then says, “We also 
thank the scholars alive today that are representing the struggle such as Shaikh `Umar 
`Abdur-Rahmaan, the thousands of Shaikhs and students of knowledge who have 
been imprisoned in the Arabian Peninsula struggling to support the Shari`a and the 
Mujaahidin, Shaikh Usaama ibn Laadin, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and many 
others” (al-Misree 2000b:6). The paradigm of Aboo Hamza is comparable to that of 
the Khawaarij who were harsh with their opponents and had affinities with those who 
held their same ideology (al-Shahrastanee 1984:115). 
 
 This 
statement looks as if it opposes the Prophet Muhammad’s statement, when he said, “If 
a judge gives a verdict according to the best of his knowledge and his verdict is 
correct, he receives a double reward. And if he gives a verdict according to the best of 
his knowledge and his verdict is wrong, he will get one reward” (al-Nawawee 
     A common practice of Aboo Hamza is the vilification of those scholars who differ 
from his concepts of rebellion. Aboo Hamza praised Muhammad al-Ameen al-
Shanqeetee, and then he slandered his students when he said, “Although he had the 
government scholars of today in his class, he did not give them permission to teach 
  
his knowledge, for they were part of a government institution. These government 
scholars today are Shaikh Ibn Baz, Shaikh Muhammad ibn Saalih al-`Uthaimin, and 
Rabi`a al-Madkhali” (al-Misree 2000b:233). In another statement he seemed to make 
exception for some of the scholars of Saudi Arabia when he said, “This just shows us 
that not all of the `Ulama in the Peninsula are the lap dogs of the regime” (al-Misree 
2000b: 233). His vilification of the scholars is a common trait of the Takfeeree creed, 
and Aboo Hamza is ruthless in his criticisms, similar to the Khawaarij who decreed 
takfeer upon the greatest scholars of the Muslim community: the companions 
(‘Aseeree 2007:134). Aboo Hamza also explained to his followers that “It is well 
known that many of our scholars will follow in the footsteps of the scholars of the 
Jews, so please, do not be surprised at their disgusting behavior” (al-Misree 
2000b:263). Here he uses the example of those who went astray by not practicing 
their knowledge, so the implication is that many of the well known contemporary 
scholars of Saudi Arabia are not practicing the knowledge they have acquired, nor do 
they possess piety, instead they are merely puppets used to prop up apostate regimes. 
Probably due to the fact that these scholars are known for their outspokenness 
regarding takfeer and rebellion, this makes them a prime target for Aboo Hamza and 
those who adhere to Takfeeree principles.   
 
     Aboo Hamza made a lengthy rebuttal of one of the major scholars of this time 
which illustrates the importance he puts upon refuting scholars that differ with his 
ideology. He states about Bin Baaz that, “He is asking for Muslims to cooperate with 
these legislators of kufr. This cooperation has four points of major kufr” (al-Misree 
2000b:268). The researcher will present his claims and refute them in order to make 
distinction between the Takfeeree criticism of the scholars and the Salafee position 
regarding them. 
 
     The first claim he makes is that Bin Baaz helps propagate unlawful practices by 
supporting un-Islaamic legislation undermining the sharee’a. Many of the Takfeerees 
criticize the Saudi regime because they allow usury banks to operate in Saudi Arabia. 
 
          In this line of reasoning, the criterion for determining the link between action  
          and belief is the pervasiveness of the sin. Because so many people practice  
          usury, a practice that everyone knows was prohibited by the Prophet, the regime  
          must believe it is better that Islam; otherwise they would have adhered to  
  
          Islamic law and banned it. The fact that they imprison scholars who point out  
          their acts of sin is used as further evidence that the rulers know that they are  
          rejecting Islam; they are trying to prevent the truth from emerging by silencing  
          their most potent Islamic critics (Wiktorowicz 2005:233).  
  
These are common criticisms made by Takfeerees and Aboo Hamza makes the same 
criticisms of the Saudi regime and Bin Baaz; however his claim has no basis because 
Bin Baaz is known for his outspokenness against usury, sinfulness, and polytheism. 
Regarding banks that use interest he said, “As for interest, it is clear and there is no 
doubt about its prohibition. It is an issue that is proven by the verses of the Noble 
Qur’aan, and proven by the Sunna and the consensus of the scholars” (Bin Baaz 
2003/19:246). Aboo Hamza claims that Bin Baaz is guilty of istihlaal (making the 
prohibited lawful) however, “the issue of istihlaal is an issue of the heart [related to 
belief]” (al-’Utaybee 2005:18).  Ibn Taymeeya said, “Istihlaal is believing something 
is lawful” (Ibn Taymeeya 1997/3:971). This shows that classical scholars like Ibn 
Taymeeya considered istihlaal to be related to belief: believing the unlawful to be 
lawful, not simply committing an unlawful action even if it were committed 
repetitiously. Aboo Hamza provides no reliable evidence for his claims, but instead he 
seems to harbor hostility towards the scholars who do not openly admonish the rulers.   
 
     Secondly, Aboo Hamza said, “This is a direct contradiction of the statement of the 
Messenger when he said, ‘Obedience is in righteousness.’ How can Muslims obey a 
people who are bringing usury banks into the Peninsula and making laws to protect 
these institutions?” (al-Misree 2000b:268). The mere existence of banks that use 
interest is not a sin that expels one from the fold of Islaam, so in that case it does not 
nullify obedience to the ruler in all affairs, only in matters where they have 
commanded sinful acts. Ibn Taymeeya said, “Declaring someone to be sinful and a 
disbeliever are sharee’a rulings, and these rulings are not to be undermined by 
reasoning. Therefore, a disbeliever is whoever Allah and His Messenger declare to be 
a disbeliever” (cited in al-Rahaylee 2006:225). According to Ibn Taymeeya’s 
statement, Aboo Hamza cannot make takfeer upon individuals based upon his 
reasoning, but rather it is based upon what is legislated by the Qur’aan and Sunna and 
consensus of orthodox scholars.   
 
     Thirdly, according to Aboo Hamza the leaders have nullified their right to be 
followed through treachery. Again this is a baseless claim. Even if a leader had fallen 
  
into treachery, corruption or exhibits oppression it does not nullify his right to be 
obeyed in lawful commands, unless his action is open indisputable disbelief, and this 
has been detailed in the section on takfeer in chapter two. 
 
s and supporting them is apostatethe leaders are  edclaim amzaH AbooFourthly,      
amza’s criticisms are based HAboo  Muslims.-noncooperation with tantamount to 
upon the premise that the rulers have engaged in such a high level of corruption and 
treachery that they are guilty of apostasy. He states:  
      
          Cooperating with and obeying the kaafir rulers means that we would go against  
          the Victorious Party (Mujaahidin) who are striving to remove them from power,  
          as Allah said and ordered. If we then cooperate against them with the rulers,  
          then that means that we are helping non-Muslims to kill Muslims. This act  
          alone takes one out of the fold of Islam, according to the fatwa that Ibn Baz  
          wrote himself above about assisting kufaar against Muslims (al-Misree  
          2000b: 268). 
 
Aboo Hamza seems to use a myriad of circular reasoning in order to prove his claim 
that the leaders should be fought because they are disbelievers and by supporting 
them the general society becomes guilty of supporting non-Muslims against Muslims. 
This statement is full of assumptions such as assuming the ruler is an apostate and that 
support for him is an act of apostasy in all cases. Al-Reis explains on an audio 
cassette, “Whoever does not call a disbeliever a disbeliever then he becomes a 
disbeliever. Then what disbelief is this? This is for the disbeliever by origin: Jews and 
Christians or whoever is considered a disbeliever by consensus” (al-Reis 2005b).180
                                                 
 180 The meaning of this statement is that if a Muslim denies the disbelief of someone or a group who 
Allah or the Prophet has described as disbelievers, then they become a disbeliever because they have 
denied the Qur’aan and Sunna. 
  
    Aboo Hamza’s world view resembles that of Sayyid Qutb and his declaration of 
takfeer upon Muslim societies due to their tacit support for the leadership. “Sayyid 
Qutb makes takfeer of the people in a way that no Muslim scholar condones. He 
speaks randomly about the issue of al-hakameeya and he makes takfeer of the general 
people without sins, without establishing the proof, and disregards the conditions the 
scholars’ have established regarding the issue” (al-Madkhalee 2006:18). Aboo Hamza 
also appears to follow Qutb’s methodology regarding takfeer. For example, assuming 
Aboo Hamza was correct in his declaration of takfeer upon a particular leader, it does 
not necessitate takfeer of the rest of the society, as they may possess the excuse of 
ignorance, or the inability to change the apostate leader. Therefore, it is an extremely 
dangerous claim to make takfeer of a society that claims to adhere to Islaam, or those 
who follow the ruler, without verifying the conditions of takfeer, and this requires the 
judgment of a scholar.  
    
     Aboo Hamza attacks the character and credibility of contemporary scholars who 
disagree with his methodology and creed. He accused Bin Baaz of dishonesty and 
mental deficiency which illustrate his animosity towards those who hold the Salafee 
creed. He claimed: 
 
         We can see from his fatwa that he is still calling those who rule and               
         legislate Muslims, which is going against his own fatwa and the statements  
         of Allah, as well as the Sahaaba and the scholars, which proves that he  
         is either insane or dishonest. The scholars that we mentioned before show us  
         how we should deal with these types of people (al-Misree 2000b:268). 
 
 
This shows Aboo Hamza’s misunderstanding of this principle of takfeer because this 
ruling is applicable to those who are indisputable disbelievers. Therefore, it is not 
permissible to make a ruling of takfeer on those who do not support his ruling or 
judgment of takfeer. The early scholars were meticulous about holding fast to the 
Qur’aan and Sunna and leaving their opinions when making verdicts unlike Aboo 
Hamza. Imaam Aboo Haneefa said, “If I said something which contradicts the book 
of Allah and the saying of the Messenger then leave my saying” (al-Humaydee 
1999:18). 
 
Aboo Hamza spends much of his efforts attacking the credibility of those whose 
verdicts he disagrees with. Aboo Hamza charged several Saudi scholars with 
hypocrisy. As previously mentioned he directed his attacks against many scholars of 
Saudi Arabia particularly Bin Baaz. Bin Baaz issued a very controversial verdict 
allowing American troops to enter Saudi Arabia in 1991 to defend the kingdom from 
Saddaam Hussayn and the Iraqi army.181
                                                 
81 Not all Salafee scholars agreed with this verdict. However, those that disagreed with Shaikh Bin 
Baaz’s opinion did not criticize or attack his character, but rather expressed disagreement with his 
verdict. Those scholars who agreed with his edict cite several reasons for doing so. First, the harm that 
the Muslims faced from Saddaam and his Ba’thist army was much greater than the harm of hosting 
American troops to defend the holy sites. American soldiers did not spread their ideology or religious 
beliefs in Saudi Arabia; however the Ba’thists, like most communist regimes, are openly hostile to 
fundamental religious ideals and practices. In addition, hosting an army by mutual agreement is 
potentially less intrusive than being occupied by an invading hostile force. Second, the Saudi army was 
 Aboo Hamza said regarding this verdict that, 
  
“this fatwa is nothing but a piece of satanic paperwork that has been handed out to 
destroy the Ummah” (al-Misree 2000b:277). He claimed the verdict did not contain a 
verse of the Qur’aan or hadeeth of the Prophet. He also said there was no “…evidence 
from scholars of the past, which he could mention to support his evil fatwa” (al-
Misree 2000b:277).182
                                                                                                                                            
ill-equipped and unprepared to defend against the threat of invasion from Iraq’s superior army. Third, 
the risk of losing the two holiest places in Islaam to the Ba’thists was unimaginable. Finally, instability 
in the holy lands should be avoided at all cost.  This is essentially the argument of the Salafee scholars 
who supported Bin Baaz's edict; however it is difficult to predict based upon empirical evidence 
whether Iraq posed a greater threat than American forces.  
182 “The Saudi regime’s decision to rely on American military forces during the 1990-91 Gulf War to 
defend the Peninsula against potential Iraqi aggression radicalized the leading figures of the sahwa 
[Islaamic awakening]… Salman al-Awdah and Safar al-Hawli. They gained widespread popularity 
criticizing the regime by circulating taped audiocassettes of their fiery sermons around the kingdom” 
(Jones 2005:10). It seems most of the internal opposition to US troop presence came from clerics like 
Salman al-‘Awdah and Safar al-Hawaalee and they essentially cited corruption of the regime, 
subservience to the US  and its interest in oil in the region, and general charges that the Americans 
would spread corruption in the holy lands. Zuhur states, “Shaikh Al-Hawali has a background in 
Islamic studies and argues, as had bin Ladin, against Western influence and modernization. Unlike bin 
Ladin, he did not personalize his attacks against the royal family or question its authority. Al-Hawali 
decried America’s pursuit of its interest, including access to oil in the region, to be achieved with 
alliances with moderate, secularist Arab regimes, as well as with Israel” (Zuhur 2005:25).    
  
Aboo Hamza claimed that this verdict is making the unlawful lawful by assisting non-
Muslims to kill Muslims,
 As previously mentioned it is permissible to rely on non-
Muslims out of absolute necessity as the Prophet “sought help from Sufwaan Ibn 
Umayya before his acceptance of Islaam” (al-‘Utaybee 2005: 45). Also, a group of 
classical scholars like Imaam Ahmad, and Imaam Shaafi’ee declared it permissible 
out of necessity. Some of the conditions for relying upon a disbeliever that the 
scholars stipulate are that it be out of necessity to defend against harm, and that the 
Muslims are cautious of the potential danger or treachery posed by non-Muslims.  
Finally, if there is no need for them then they should not be relied upon (al-‘Utaybee 
2005:46).  
 
    Aboo Hamza claimed Bin Baaz’s verdict which allowed American troops to be 
stationed in Saudi Arabia was an act of disbelief when he said:  
 
This fatwa is hindering and denying what the Messenger said about expelling 
Jews and Christians from the Peninsula. This man is actually bringing them into 
the Peninsula and opposing the words of the Messenger and Muslims. This could 
only be a naked kufr and clear opposition to the statements of the Messenger (al-
Misree 2000b:277).  
 
183 however by closely examining the religious texts and 
evidences classical scholars have detailed this issue: expelling the non-Muslims from 
the Arab Peninsula (al-‘Utaybee 2005:36). Firstly, the scholars deduce that this 
statement of the Prophet is g neral in aning and that there ar  important details 
regarding the meaning of this hadeeth. The first meaning is that it prohibits on-
Muslims from having perman nt residence in the Arab Peninsula Sec ndly, it 
prohibits them from outwardly showing the signs of their r ligion like places of 
worship, and calling to pray r. Furthermore, it is also not permiss bl  to rebel against 
the le der f he allows non-Muslim work r , those who h ve treaties with the Muslims, 
or those who are under the Muslim’s protecti n, to reside temporarily due to necessity 
or benef t (al-‘Utaybee 2005:36). The classical scholars disagre  about the exact 
boundaries of the Arab Peninsula, but it definitely includes Makka and Madina in 
modern day Saudi Arabia. 184
     Aboo Hamza also claimed that the scholars of the Arab Peninsula never made 
takfeer of Saddaam Hussayn, so resisting him with the aid of non-Muslim troops was 
an act of disbelief. However, this statement is not true as Bin Baaz himself was asked 
 According to Ibn Taymeeya, the proof that there are 
exceptions to this had eth, is that the P ophet allowed th  Jews of Khaibar to remain 
and work out of necessity and it remained that way u der Aboo Bakr the first caliph 
and they were not expelled until the caliph of ‘Umar (‘Ubaykaan 2005:5). This shows 
that out of necessity non-Muslims can be permitted to enter the Arab Peninsula and 
this was the case during the time of the Pr phet and it is an established I laamic 
principle. Therefore, Aboo Hamza and all those who argue this moot point are making 
false accusations against the scholars, resulting in hasty verdicts of takfeer of the 
rulers. In fact, Islaam discourages hastiness and urges caution, and turning to the 
orthodox understanding derived from the example of the Prophet. Ibn Mas’ood a 
companion said, “Verily, we adhere and do not begin anything new, we follow, and 
do not innovate, and we will not be misguided as long as we strictly adhere to the 
example of the Prophet” (al-Laalakaa’ee 2002/1:86).       
 
                                                 
183 It is noteworthy that while Aboo Hamza accused the Saudi regime of disbelief for seeking military 
assistance from non-Muslims, he himself is an asylum seeker in Britain: he has sought assistance, 
financial support and protection from extradition to Yemen and America. So, it seems that he has dual 
standards that are only applicable to his enemies.  
184 Ibn Taymeeya, Imaam Shafi’ee and Ibn Hajar were amongst some of the classical scholars who 
detailed this issue. 
  
about Saddaam Hussayn and he made takfeer of him due to his “not distancing 
himself from the Ba’thist secular principles” (Bin Baaz 2001/6:155).185
Aboo Hamza warns against the major scholars as he claims they fortify apostate rulers 
and it seems that he wants to replace them by attacking them. If the major scholars are 
removed there will be a void in knowledge and ignorant people will be able to 
misguide the Muslim community with false judgments (‘Aseeree 2007:134). Aboo 
Hamza said that the Muslims should not refer to the major scholars, “and if we do 
have to ask them for something, we should treat our inquiry as if we are eating pork in 
the desert. In other words, this should be our last resort… to learn from the classical 
scholars directly from the books will sever the umbilical cord of kufr that these people 
have attached to the Muslim masses”  (al-Misree 2000b:279). This is a sign of the 
deviant sects who went astray by leaving the scholars and misinterpreting the texts, 
severing the bond that protects the Islaamic creed.
 
 
     Aboo Hamza falls short of openly making takfeer of one of the major scholars of 
this era and commented, “Until now, children are still being killed in Iraq due to this 
fatwa. On top of that, Ibn Baaz died unrepentant and without retracting a single part 
of this fatwa. He simply was not told by his master to do so” (al-Misree 2000b:277). 
186
                                                 
 185 It is well known that the Ba’thists derive their primary ideology from communist/nationalist 
principles with the state and party being the supreme legislative body along secularist doctrine. 
Secondly, Ba’thist doctrine supersedes Islaamic principles and legislation and has the tendency to deify 
the party and its leadership (al-Waadi’ee 1996:200). Thirdly, Lewis observes that “The Ba’th Party has 
a double ancestry, both Fascist and Communist, and still represents both trends well” (Lewis 
2004:167).  
 186 This statement is reminiscent of that of Faraj’s when he deemed it necessary to only possess a 
dictionary to interpret the Qur’aan.  
  
and instill distrust and hostility in the youth toward the scholars. This encourages 
ignorance and opens the way for revolutionary thinking instead of returning to the 
divine texts of the religion as the source of guidance. Aboo Hamza alleges:  
 
         Therefore, these Kibaar al`Ulama and establishments are nothing but a gang of  
         hoodlums, armed with ayaat from the Qur’an and words from the ahaadith. This  
         is just like the army and the police who are armed with weapons. It is exactly  
         like the army, in that it is a hired gang by the rulers. These laptop Shaikhs and  
         cheque-book muftees follow the regimes with complete blind loyalty, eat  
         because of the government and strengthen the illegitimate monsters that they  
         gave their allegiance to in the first place (al-Misree 2000b:287). 
 
Aboo Hamza concluded by making takfeer of the major scholars by compiling a huge 
list of unsubstantiated claims and accusations. He said: 
 
          It is then truly a group of kufaar, this panel of Kibaar al`Ulama and its like.  
          But this is again without calling each and every one of them a kaafir. We hold  
          this reservation because some of them have ta’wil (interpretation), others are  
          jaahil (extremely ignorant) of the essentials of tawhid, a group of them are to  
          some extent senile and many of them are fussaaq (rebellious sinners) that just  
          want to make benefit, no matter what the price. And there is still another group  
          that has entered these establishments, in an attempt to try to reform by speaking  
          the truth (al-Misree 2000b:305). 
  Aboo Hamza then declares the 
major scholars of Arabia to be disbelievers. “It is important to understand that just 
because someone is employed by a tyrant it does not mean that he is a kaafir. But if a 
tyrant employs a group of people, and they are paid to pass fataawa for the regime, 
then they are a group of kufaar” (al-Misree 2000b:285). Aboo Hamza claims that the 
scholars are appeasing the regime through their verdicts and neglecting their duty to 
the Muslim community which is unsubstantiated. Commenting about the scholars, al-
Fawzaan says, “They are the people furthest away from appeasement (to the leaders). 
They pass judgments based upon what appears to them to be the truth and their 
verdicts are present (in books and tapes)….So, the one who makes these claims 
should come to us with one verdict that has an intentional mistake due to coercion” 
(al-Hussayn 2004:42). These statements made by Aboo Hamza may induce rebellion, 
Here Abo  Hamza seems ignorant of many of the religious principle  pertaining to 
takfeer which is refl cted in his verdicts and judgments. First, he made the general 
akfeer of the m jor sch lars of Saudi Arabia, but the criterion he uses remains a 
mystery as it does not conform to the orthodox creed. Second, he alleges they are
enile, and ignorant of principles f monotheism. I  appears Aboo Hamza has n t 
read many of the texts of t ose he criticizes as they are known for their knowledge 
and propagation of Isl amic monotheism in their books, ta s, and lectures.187
                                                 
 Shubahaat -Kashf alSharh ‘Uthaymeen 2005), and  -(al Usool -atha alSharh ThalaSee books like  187
(al-Fawzaan 2001). 
  
companions. Imaam Ahmad said, “The foundation of the Sunna according to us is 
adhering to what the companions of the Messenger-may Allah bestow peace and 
blessings upon him-were upon” (Saalim 2006:10). The accusations made by Aboo 
Hamza are extremely serious and an outright attack upon the scholars, their character, 
knowledge and conduct. It becomes evident from this research that Aboo Hamza 
contradicts the methodology of the orthodox creed and prefers to concentrate his 
criticisms against the Muslim leadership and scholars, similar to the Khawaarij who 
kept silent regarding the disbelievers instead attacking the believers (‘Awaajee 
2002:481). 
 
3.3.8 ‘Abd Allah al-Faisal 
 
 Aboo 
Hamza goes as far as declaring them to be wicked sinners and this is a direct slander 
according to the orthodox creed and claims made without evidence are not accepted in 
Islaam as Allah says, “Produce your proof if you are truthful” (Qur’aan 1996:2:111). 
Ultimately, it seems the main reason Aboo Hamza makes takfeer of the major 
scholars is that they do not encourage jihaad against the leaders. Instead they look at 
the conditions and scholarly precepts that are part of the religion. This is in 
accordance with the orthodox creed which is built upon the understanding of the 
     After discussing Aboo Hamza it only seems appropriate to analyze one of the 
most articulate and fervent leaders in the United Kingdom of the Takfeeree movement 
‘Abd Allah al-Faisal. He is most known amongst English speaking youth for his fiery 
sermons and his unrestrained misuse of the principles of takfeer. Al-Faisal is so 
extreme in his verdicts and abuse of the principles of takfeer that Aboo Hamza has 
written a refutation of him, and Aboo Qataada warned him to be cautious in his 
application of Takfeeree principles.188
     Al-Faisal’s call to Islaam is centered on two primary principles and they are 
takfeer and jihaad. Al-Faisal is associated with urging the youth to involve 
themselves with the political affairs of Muslim rulers, and making takfeer of them 
and those who support them. Al-Faisal also devotes many of his lectures to speaking 
against sectarianism
  
 
3.3.8.1 His Call to Islaam 
 
189
                                                 
al 1999).sFai-(al  Are the Salafis Muslim or Not?Refer to the video entitled  188 
al 2006d).sFai-(alCancers of the Ummah Refer to the audio cassette  189 
  
blatantly and with malice. This was taken to mean anyone who refused to declare a 
kaafir who they thought was a kaafir is a kaafir” (al-Misree 2005c:2). This is a 
common mistake that the Takfeerees make as they do not establish the proof upon 
individuals or groups whom they declare to be disbelievers and they make hasty 
judgments of takfeer for major sins (al-Rahaylee 2006:209). Additionally, takfeer of 
an individual or group that is not mentioned by the Qur’aan or Sunna, or the 
consensus of the scholars is a matter of legal opinion (ijtihaad) meaning there will be 
differences of opinion based upon each individuals understanding of the texts while 
making a verdict. So, if another qualified scholar disagrees with that verdict of 
takfeer, he cannot be accused of being an apostate as the judgment was not upon 
someone whose disbelief is indisputable. For example, Bin Baaz and al-Waadi’ee 
made takfeer of Saddaam Hussayn; however that does not mean that those scholars 
who disagree with their verdict become disbelievers for not holding the same 
opinion. In contrast, if a Muslim denies that a Jew, Christian, or a pagan is a 
disbeliever, then he would in turn become a disbeliever as there is clear evidence 
from the Qur’aan, the Sunna, and Muslim consensus. Allah says, “Verily, those who 
disbelieve from amongst the people of the book and the polytheist are in the hell-fire 
abiding forever” (Qur’aan 1996:98:6).       
 
     The second principle that forms al-Faisal’s call is his concept of jihaad. Al-Faisal 
calls to fight against the leaders and those who support them such as the religious 
scholars. These principles are part of the core belief of the Khawaarij and the 
Takfeeree groups that embrace their creed (al-Jazaa'iree 2005:60-62).  
 
3.3.8.2 His Concept of Takfeer 
  and declaring religious verdicts against many Islaamic groups 
accusing them of being apostates. Oddly enough, Aboo Hamza refutes one of al-
Faisal’s main principles, and criticizes those who attempt to misuse a statement made 
by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab which states, “Anyone who does not declare 
the disbelief of the Mushrikun (pagans), or he doubts their kufr, or the truth of their 
thinking, is a kaafir” (cited in al-Misree 2005c:2). Aboo Hamza’s criticism both 
applies to al-Faisal and himself when he stated, “These people abused this rule 
     A main characteristic of the Khawaarij and the Takfeeree sects is that they make 
hasty judgments of takfeer upon their opponents with disregard for the principles of 
takfeer (al-Suhaymee 205:94). Al-Faisal tends to issue hasty religious verdicts against 
the Muslim leaders and regimes. On an audio cassette entitled Exposing the 
Hypocrites (al- Faisal 2006a), al-Faisal, similar to Aboo Hamza, accused the regime 
of Saudi Arabia of apostasy and hypocrisy for their imprisonment of some scholars 
who were known to incite the youth to rebel against the rulers through their books and 
speeches. Al-Faisal said, “So these great scholars we are not able to benefit from their 
  
knowledge anymore because of the Kaafirs (non-Muslims), and the hypocrites, and 
the tyrants, which have seized power and dominated the lives of the believers” (al-
Faisal 2006a). Here al-Faisal made reference to the Saudi government accusing them 
of  being apostates from the religion in part due to their imprisonment of scholars like 
Salman ‘Awdah, Safar Hawaalee, and ‘Aieed al-Qarnee, who were warned by the 
major scholars to abandon their overly political stance which, according to Salafee 
scholars, emanated from thinkers like Sayyid Qutb.190
     Many Muslims accuse al-Faisal of being severe in his accusations of takfeer and 
hypocrisy and some of his statements appear to support this premise. He stated on one 
 Also implicit in al-Faisal’s 
statement is the charge of hypocrisy against the major scholars for their alleged role in 
authorizing their imprisonment. ‘Awdah, Hawaalee and al-Qarnee were imprisoned 
after several warnings to cease their activism, the premise being that it would preserve 
Muslim unity and protect the Islaamic state from rebellion (al-Jazaa'iree 2005:52).  
 
     Al-Faisal uses every opportunity during his lectures to criticize and make takfeer 
of the leaders. On one of his audio cassettes, after discussing the imprisonment of a 
group of scholars who opposed the government, he commented, “but leaders who 
throw the scholars in prison and kill other scholars, like Hosni Mubarak, and King 
Fraud (Fahad), and Qaddafi, you don’t hold them by the hand (to advise). You show 
them your Kalashnikov! This is supposed to be your stance towards them” (al-Faisal 
2006c). In contrast, the Salafee creed exhorts patience with the mistakes and 
corruption that might occur from the ruler, but al-Faisal calls for their violent 
overthrow. Imaam Ahmad said “Patience upon what we are upon is better than trials” 
(cited in Saalim 2006:265). The orthodox position regarding the oppressive leader and 
the trials he may bring is to be patient and attempt to advise the leader, due to the 
possibility that rebellion may cause chaos and bloodshed.   
  
                                                 
190 Bin ‘Uthaymeen was asked about the differences between Salmaan and Safar’s call and that of the 
orthodox creed and he replied, “There is a difference in creed because it is from the foundation of Ahl 
al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a that we do not make takfeer of someone for their sins” (al-Jazaa'iree 2005:52). 
According to the claims of Bin Baaz and Bin ‘Uthaymeen, the individuals mentioned tend to differ 
with classical interpretations of jihaad and strayed from established orthodox principles regarding 
takfeer. This illustrates that scholars change their position with regards to important issues and can fall 
into error sometimes to the extent of innovation (al-Barbahaaree 1997:68). Wiktorowicz refers to 
scholars like Salmaan and Safar as politicos saying, “The politicos argued that they have a better 
understanding of contemporary issues and are therefore better situated to apply the Salafi creed to the 
modern context. They generally stop short of declaring revolution, unlike the jihadis, but are highly 
critical of incumbent regimes” (Wiktorowicz 2005:221).    
  
of his audio cassettes that, “I wouldn’t be surprised if eight in every ten Muslims 
today are hypocrites” (al-Faisal 2006a). Similar to some of his Takfeeree predecessors, 
al-Faisal is prone to issuing judgments of hypocrisy against most of the Muslim 
nation instead of acknowledging that Muslims have many sins, but also possess good 
as a community as well. The problem with such statements is that they are so general 
they indict the whole Muslim community as Sayyid Qutb did when he said, “These 
societies that claim that they are Muslim all enter into the pre-Islaamic category” (al-
Madkhalee 2006:13).   These types of statements lead many ignorant people to make 
judgments and verdicts against other Muslims like the Khawaarij (al-Shahrastaanee 
1984:115). For example, al-Faisal is often referred to by his followers as Shaikh 
Faisal and when he makes a general judgment, his followers begin to accuse and look 
for fault in other Muslims until they begin to make takfeer of them. This type of 
behavior the researcher has personally witnessed on numerous occasions due to 
statements and verdicts issued by students of both Aboo Hamza and al-Faisal.191
     Al-Faisal has issued many verdicts and statements of takfeer and accusations of 
hypocrisy against his opponents which illustrates his ignorance of the principles of 
takfeer. He stated in one of his audio cassettes, “There is no difference between the 
hypocrites and the people of desires. They are all hypocrites!” (al-Faisal 2006a). 
Evidence suggests that this statement is flawed and potentially dangerous because if 
one is accused of being a hypocrite, it is like saying that he is an apostate, and 
innovation has different levels: some actions or sayings that expel one outside the fold 
of Islaam and others do not. For example, the heresy of the one who says the Qur’aan 
is created is disbelief, however the one who makes it a point to fast everyday has 
innovated, but still remains in the religion (al-Rahaylee 2002/1:104). So, al-Faisal 
actually introduces a new principle into the religion when he declares all innovators as 
hypocrites, and this claim has no textual evidence to support it or precedence from 
classical scholars except the Khawaarij (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:115). It appears that 
according to his own criterion he himself would become suspect to hypocrisy. Al-
Faisal’s circular reasoning is potentially very dangerous as it may lead to verdicts 
which are not sharee’a based and encourage violence. In another example, al-Faisal 
    
 
                                                 
 191 Refer to the case of James Ujaama a Seattle area resident accused of allegedly supporting al-Qaeda, 
and he was a known student of Aboo Hamza and al-Faisal (Mcgain 2004:1). This researcher has 
personally discussed with Ujaama on numerous occasions the orthodox position regarding takfeer and 
jihaad.  
  
on one of his cassettes explained that if a hypocrite migrates to a non-Muslim country 
to take residence “then it is incumbent upon Muslims to send an assassin to kill him, 
so you have to terrorize them wherever they are. Even if they are in the Buckingham 
Palace” (al-Faisal 2006a). This exhortation to violence has no basis in the sharee’a: to 
determine and judge someone of being a hypocrite. This is a matter for the Islaamic 
judge, and to assassinate someone who lives in a non-Muslim land only causes a 
greater harm for the Muslims residing in that land and it sets a dangerous precedence 
of possible arbitrary killing. Therefore, the punishment for hypocrites or extreme 
heretics “…will be based on the legal opinion of the ruler or judges from the Muslim 
leaders, and those who occupy that position, this principle has been established by the 
scholars” (al-Rahaylee 2001/2:626). Therefore, al-Faisal’s call for assassination, and 
his abuse of the principles of takfeer have no basis in the principles and rulings of 
Islaamic law, in fact his principles seem incoherent. To illustrate, on one of his audio 
cassettes he said that “for Israel to be in the middle of the Muslim world and you have 
Muslim countries around it, and Israel is surviving it means that the countries around 
it are Kaafirs (disbelievers)” (al-Faisal 2006d). This shows that his principles of 
takfeer are inconsistent as he claims that the countries surrounding Israel are no 
longer Muslim lands because they have not taken over Israel. He disregards the fact 
that they may not be capable of fighting Israel, or have a treaty with it, which are both 
permissible options in Islaam.192
                                                 
192  “For fundamentalists there can be no treaty relationships---peace can only occur when the entire 
world has submitted to Islam” (Delong-Bas 2004:243). Refer to chapter one the section on Daar al-
Harb also chapter three Sayyid Qutb and Daar al-Harb.  
  
Islaamic sharee’a to varying degrees which is evidenced through their laws and social 
codes (Chene and Jennett 2007:2). The second aspect of his claim is equally 
erroneous and would require some sort of evidence (statements or overt actions) from 
the leaders of those various countries to substantiate his claim. In addition, the 
principles of takfeer warrant that the claimant looks at each society and leader 
individually before establishing the judgment regarding them.
 Al-Sa’dee said, “There is no obligation without 
ability and no prohibition due to necessity” (al-Jaaberee 2006:42). This is a well 
established principle of jurisprudence, so for example, in the absence of the ability to 
perform jihaad then it ceases to be an obligation upon those in the society or 
neighboring Islaamic states. Consequently, al-Faisal’s pronouncement of takfeer 
cannot be substantiated by any Islaamic criterion. Even if the surrounding countries 
had the capability to fight Israel and its occupation of Palestinian lands, but refused to 
do so, would not render them unbelievers. In one of his other audio lectures al-Faisal 
alleged that the reason the governments are disbelievers is because “they don’t have 
any sharee’a in their countries and they hate the sharee’a” (al-Faisal 2006d). A claim 
such as that must be proven by clear evidence. It is evident that although the countries 
of the Middle East have their shortcomings most countries retain aspects of the 
193
     Al-Faisal’s zeal for making takfeer and his misunderstanding of its application has 
led him to belittle the companions of the Prophet. Al-Faisal gives the topic of takfeer 
the utmost importance, and in one of his audio lectures he emphasized various reasons 
for making takfeer. Then he gave an example of how not making takfeer can be 
harmful to the Muslim community and he illustrated this point with an example from 
the Prophet’s companions. Al-Faisal said, “…and as I said on many occasions ‘Umar 
(the second caliph) was killed by a fire worshipper because they (the companions) did 
not apply the rules of takfeer on him” (al-Faisal 2006c). The implication of such a 
statement is that the companions were negligent in making takfeer and acknowledging 
its principles, although they are regarded as the best of the Muslim community 
according to the orthodox creed. Ibn Mas’ood a companion said, “Whoever seeks 
solace, then find consolation in the companions of Muhammad…For verily, they 
possessed the most pious hearts of the Umma, and t ey were the most profound in 
knowledge” (al-Haayee 2005:12). Ibn Ta meeya said, “The companions poss ssed 
understan ing of th Qur’aan that is ab ent from ost of ose who came later; n 
addition, t ey possessed detailed knowled e of the Sunna and the affa rs of the 
Prophet, which most of the later g nerations did not possess” (cited in al-Haay e 
2005:52). Thi  illustrates how the predecessors acknowledg d that the companions 
were the most knowledgeable of the Umma (which challenges l-Faisal’s accusation 
against them). The Prophet said, “Do not abuse my companions. By the one whose 
hand my life is in, if one of you wer  to sp nd an amount of gold qual to mount 
Uhud in ch r ty. He will never attain the reward one of them gets for giving a 
mudd,
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193 See the section on takfeer and its rulings in chapter two.   
 194 A dry measurement equivalent to a half bushel.  
  
companions were inept or inattentive to the details of takfeer reflects a 
misunderstanding of an important foundation of the religion and the orthodox creed. 
This deprecation of the companions, although it may seem like a light criticism, draws 
parallels with the Khawaarij’s disparagement of the companions; only they made 
takfeer and fought them in their extremism.   
 
 or even half a mudd spent by one of them” (al-Nawawee 1997/15:306). This 
shows the esteem of the Prophet’s companions and the prohibition of criticizing them, 
and it highlights the mistake inherent in al-Faisal’s statement. To imply that the 
    Hasty verdicts of takfeer contradict the orthodox understanding of Islaam and lead 
to extremism, and calls for extremist action (al-Suhaymee 2004:79). Al-Faisal appears 
to use religious texts to draw unwarranted conclusions which contradict the orthodox 
creed and show a propensity for violent extremism. In an audio cassette, al-Faisal 
claimed, “A major hypocrite is a person who denies what is known of Islaam by 
necessity. So based upon that definition every member of the Saudi Salafees 195
Al-Faisal’s declaration of takfeer upon the Salafees has far reaching implications such 
as the nullification of the various rights afforded to them as Muslims. On another 
cassette al-Faisal said, “The greatest enemies of Islaam are the Muslims 
themselves…because most of them have apostated so they don’t want Islaam” (al-
Faisal 2006e). Al-Faisal’s outlook appears very negative regarding the Muslims and 
their state of affairs and this tends to be a motivating factor for all the Takfeerees: 
desperate situations bring about extreme reactions. Al-Faisal declared, “In Muslim 
countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan where they are one hundred percent Muslim, 
why is there no sharee’a?! Because they are the enemies of Islaam themselves!” (al-
 is a 
major hypocrite because they deny tawheed al-hakameeya” (al-Faisal 2006a). Here 
al-Faisal gives the impression that he is making the total takfeer of a particular group 
because they do not emphasize, nor categorize this aspect of Allah’s rulership in the 
same way his sect does. Furthermore, this statement exemplifies Sayyid Qutb’s 
methodology  
 
          …of not holding people accountable except if they differ regarding al- 
          hakameeya and his interpretation of ‘there is no God worthy of worship except  
          Allah’ centers upon nothing except al-hakameeya, authority, and lordship,  
          voiding ‘there is no God except Allah’ of its essential meaning that all the  
          books and messengers came with (al-Madkhalee 2006:18).  
 
                                                 
195  This is a term coined by al-Faisal and his contemporaries to refer to those Muslims who ascribe 
themselves to Salafeeya and do not criticize the ruling Saudi regime. Al-Faisal uses this term in a 
derogatory way against those he believes to be their beneficiaries. 
  
Faisal 2006e). Al-Faisal tends to use very strong language and make dismal 
conclusions about Muslims which leads him to make verdicts of takfeer. 196
     Al-Faisal appears to establish new criteria for takfeer, and those who disagree with 
his opinions and creed are the target of his enmity and considered by him to be 
apostates and this absoluteness is similar to the extremism exhibited by the Khawaarij 
(al-Shahrastaanee 1984:115). In an audio lecture he said, “The Talibaan is rejected by 
the hypocrites” (al-Faisal 2006a). According to al-Faisal acceptance of the Talibaan is 
part of the criterion for a sound Muslim creed and to reject them is hypocrisy. There 
are three problems with this claim. Firstly, there is no basis Islaamically for this 
statement: no proof that allegiance to the Talibaan is linked to faith and some authors 
allege that the Talibaan “adhered to the narrow Deobandi
 
 
197 Salafism they had been 
taught in their medressas in Pakistan and Afghanistan” (Burke 2004:121). Secondly, 
this statement contradicts the principle of loving and hating for Allah’s sake.198 On 
several occasions al-Faisal has attempted to make the case that the Salafees do not 
practice this principle, when in fact this statement illustrates his disregard for the very 
principle he fervently espouses. Al-Faisal aligns himself and expresses love for the 
Talibaan because they establish sharee’a laws, but at the same time accuses all other 
Islaamic states of being heretical. 199
                                                 
196  Al-Faisal on the same audio tape declared, “We are about to expose a disease, a fatal disease, this 
disease is worse than cancer, worse than aids, worse than any disease you can think of and 
unfortunately ninety five percent  of the Muslims are suffering from this disease… irjaa’a (liberalism)” 
(al-Faisal 2006e). 
197 The Deobandi are an Islaamic sect which has some of its core beliefs rooted in mysticism and 
highly literal interpretation of doctrine. Deobandi‘s are generally known to follow the jurisprudence of 
Imaam Aboo Haneefa (Taalib al-Rahmaan 1998:26). According to Allen, Deobandis “propagate the 
strict pro-tawhid, pro-ulema, anti-innovation, anti-polytheist, fundamentalist revivalism first initiated in 
Syria by Ibn Taymiyyah, in Arabia by Al-Wahhab, and in India by Shah Waliullah” (Allen 2006:262).  
Here Allen highlights some of the similarities between those various revivalist movements; however 
tawheed as espoused by Deobandi scholars differs with the concepts espoused by Ibn Taymeeya and 
Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaab and the details of the Deobandi sect is beyond the scope of this research. 
198 The principle of loving and hating for Allah’s sake states that Muslims love all the things ordered by 
Allah and the Prophet Muhammad and hate all things they forbade. 
199 The Talibaan  can best be described as a movement comprised primarily of adherents to the 
Deobandi sect who have conservative Islaamic values, Peter Marsden claims, “Mawdoodee’s ultra-
conservative view on the seclusion of women provided ideological justification for the position taken 
by the Taliban” (2002:82-83). The Talibaan cannot be classified as a sect with a uniform creed. 
  
be recognized by the United Nations a kufr organization” (Burke 2004:184).
 Thirdly, the Talibaan are guilty of some of the 
very same ‘crimes’ that al-Faisal and many Takfeerees claim are apostasy. For 
example, the Talibaan and Bin Laaden were both criticized and even considered as 
apostates by some of the more extreme Takfeeree groups “…because they wanted to 
200 So, 
the neo-Takfeerees have many internal contradictions in their creed which does not 
seem apparent amongst the original Khawaarij.201
    Al-Faisal’s extremist conclusions appear to be the result of his lack of knowledge 
and misunderstanding of the religious texts and principles. The very traits that al-
Faisal accuses his enemies of he often exhibits due to his own extremism. Al-Faisal, 
in one of his audio lectures, was discussing how the Jews killed their Prophets and the 
Muslims kill their scholars and concluded by saying, “do you agree with me that we 
are no better than the Jews?” (al-Faisal 2006b). According to the orthodox creed a 
statement like this could amount to disbelief as he did not clarify his meaning when 
he declared that Muslims are equal to non-Muslims. This statement demonstrates his 
rashness when making verdicts and conclusions. He went on to say, “The Jews used 
to kill the prophets because they brought the truth and today the Muslims kill the 
scholars who are the inheritors of the prophets, so there is no difference between us
and the J ws” (al-Faisal 2006b). These re broad indictments of hypocrisy as he 
compar d the Muslim nation to disb liev s. Al-Faisal d scribed the reasons for
Mu lim humiliation and then conclud d by cond mning the Muslim nation at which
point he proceeded to say, “This is why we are cursed just like them! This is why we 
can’t do nothing! This is why our third holy mosque is in their hands and we can’t do 
absolutely nothing about it” (al-Faisal 2006b). Al-Faisal suggests dismal conclusions 
for the Muslim nation and is eager to accuse the leaders and contemporary scholars 
for failing to offer viable solutions. On another audio cassette, al-Faisal said about 
those who disagree with him, “so the Salafees because they are the Yahood (Jews) of 
 Finally, al-Faisal appears to 
contradict the very principles he defends by declaring all those who do not accept the 
Talibaan movement to be hypocrites. This position demonstrates his eagerness to 
apply judgments when he is not considered a scholar of Islaam or an authority to be 
consulted concerning the orthodox creed. 
 
                                                 
200 To resolve this criticism Bin Laaden appealed to Aboo Qataada to arbitrate and he decided in favor 
of Bin Laaden and the Talibaan, and he concluded his lengthy verdict by saying, “…not just anyone 
can make such a decision. Only Islamic scholars” (cited in Burke 2004:184). Here Aboo Qataada was 
referring to making takfeer and that the one who makes such verdicts should be a scholar.   
201 The original Khawaarij were known for their truthfulness and “made takfeer for lying, and now 
(Takfeerees) consider themselves religious by using deception” (al-Rahaylee 2006b). Here al-Rahaylee 
explains how the Takfeeree groups conceal their creed as a religious principle to achieve their ‘jihaad’ 
and this potentially poses a greater danger than the original sect as was witnessed in the assassination 
of Sadaat. Refer to section on ‘Abd al-Salaam Faraj.   
  
the Umma, they have all the qualities that the Jews have” (al-Faisal 2006d). Here, he 
compares the Salafees to the Jews and claims that they possess the same qualities 
which implies that they are no longer Muslim, but instead hypocrites outside the fold 
of the Islaamic religion. This edict echoes the verdicts of takfeer the early Khawaarij 
made regarding their foes (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:115). 
 
     Al-Faisal’s general statements often give credence to accusations against him as a 
major Takfeeree ideologue. For example, in one of his cassettes, al-Faisal decried that 
the hypocrites hate the truth, and then he berated many of the contemporary scholars 
and preachers, accusing them of hiding the truth. He said:     
           
          It is the same way the hypocrites in our midst today slander us, Ahl al-Sunna  
          wa al-Jamaa’a, when you open your mouth and preach militant tawheed,  
          radical tawheed, authentic tawheed. Topics like al-Walaa wa al-Baraa loving  
          and hating for Allah, tawheed al-hakameeya, and jihaad. (All of these)  
          radical topics they slander you and call you a deviant, but don’t think they hate  
          you. It’s not you the deviants hate. They hate Qur’aan and Sunna (al-Faisal  
          2006b).  
 
Al-Faisal’s accusations and conclusions seem harsh and they lead to takfeer of his 
opponents. Al-Faisal makes most of his claims in response to allegations made against 
him. He also appears to radicalize Islaam into a militant religion which calls for 
armed struggle as the only viable means to its establishment and existence. This is a 
common claim of many secularists and the Western media against Islaam, which will 
be discussed in chapter four. Another problem with al-Faisal’s statement is that he 
emphasizes the principle of Allah’s rulership (al-hakameeya) to such an extent that he 
regards it as the only authentic category of monotheism, which implies the other 
aspects of lordship, his oneness in worship, and divine names and attributes are less 
authentic, or in fact unimportant. 202 However, such a statement shows the political 
agenda and aspirations of the Takfeeree ideologues and groups who tend to radicalize 
Islaam in conjunction with their revolutionary paradigm, by calling for jihaad against 
the leaders.203
                                                 
as a part of Allah’s Lordship not as a separate  kameeyaah-alMany contemporary scholars regard  202 
is  eedhtawscholars  alafeeS(monotheism). According to many contemporary  eedhtawy of categor
classified into three categories: lordship, worship, and divine names and attributes. 
203  Al-Faisal does not seem to come with any new ideas regarding jihaadist principles, but rather his 
concept of a global jihaad beginning with the leaders actually has roots in Qutb’s theories and the 
Jihaadee principles espoused by Faraj. Gerges claims, “Faraj’s call to jihad against the near enemy 
  
3.3.8.3 His Jihaad   
 
     Like many of his predecessors, al-Faisal believes that jihaad should begin with the  
rulers of Islaamic countries in order to restore the sharee’a, however, at the same time 
it seems that he holds jihaad as the ultimate goal. With regards to jihaadist theory, al-
Faisal departs from the more classical interpretation which posited jihaad as both 
defensive and offensive which should be conducted alongside the Muslim leader. Al-
Faisal believes that removing the Muslim leader whom he deems an apostate is the 
starting point of a more global struggle that is a duty both of the individual and group. 
Such a stance is similar to theories of Qutb and Faraj. Regarding Faraj’s theory 
Gerges states: 
 
          The importance of Faraj’s operational dictum does not lie in defining jihad as  
          an individual and permanent obligation and refuting the classical view  
          regarding the collective and defensive nature of jihad. Qutb and others had  
          already made that argument very eloquently and powerfully. Rather, Faraj  
          posited a new paradigm, assigning a much higher priority to jihad against the  
          near enemy than against the far enemy (Gerges 2005:10). 
 
   
Most of what al-Faisal, and in fact most of the contemporary thinkers discussed in this 
research share in common is the perception that jihaad is a permanent institution that 
should be waged against whomever they consider as an illegitimate Muslim ruler. Al-
Faisal, like Faraj and many of his successors, appears to raise the status of jihaad to a 
level that was unparalleled amongst classical scholars. Whereas, al-Faisal considers 
jihaad a permanent obligation on the entire Muslim community, the four major Sunni 
schools of thought hold jihaad to be an obligation upon every individual under certain 
specific circumstances.204
       Al-Faisal claimed that Islaam spread by the sword, and that the Muslim 
community today should leave off calling to Islaam and fight jihaad to spread the 
religion. Al-Faisal uses as proof for his claim that the Prophet called to monotheism 
for thirteen years and only a couple of hundred people had embraced Islaam, but after 
  
 
                                                                                                                                            
resonated with most jihadis and informed their rhetoric and action throughout the 1980s and 1990s. For 
a lack of a better term, these jihadis…believed that seizing power at home by armed struggle was the 
swiftest and most effective way to Islamicize state and society” (Gerges 2005:11).  
204  The Hanafee, Maalikee, Shaafi’ee and Hanbalee scholars agree that jihaad is an obligation on all 
individuals if the Muslim leader calls for it, or if a Muslim is on the battlefield when two armies 
confront each other, or if invaders intrude upon a Muslim country it becomes an obligation on those in 
that vicinity to defend that land (al-Muneef 2005:66-70).    
  
the conquest of Makka two thousand had embraced Islaam. However, al-Faisal 
appears to be ignoring most of Islaamic history and the fact that:  
 
          The largest Muslim country in the world today is Indonesia, having over 200  
          million citizens, never saw a Muslim soldier. Islaam spread there and in  
          Malaysia and Philippines by trade. That was also the case of Islaam’s spread in  
          West African countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Chad and Niger. Also,  
          Islaam is the fastest growing religion in America today with anywhere between  
          300 and 500 converts daily. This is taking place without any soldiers or even  
          missionaries (Philips 2006b:1). 
 
     The call for jihaad in order to replace the call to Islaam is not in accordance with 
the orthodox creed and it resembles the Jihaadee call to revolution. Islaam recognizes 
that at times jihaad is an obligation and in this case it would supersede calling to 
Islaam. However, regarding leaving off the duty to call to Islaam all together al-
Waadi’ee said, “We receive respect and love from the Muslims and for the 
propagation of Islaam and the caller. So after all of this we should rest in our houses 
and leave the society?! No by Allah…This is not permissible” (al-Waadi’ee 
2005b/1:70). Al-Waadi’ee’s statement illustrates the importance of inviting to Islaam 
and teaching Muslims and non-Muslims alike about the orthodox creed at all times. 
Al-Faisal and many of the Jihaadee groups propose that jihaad is the means for 
revolution and that this is the true call; however Faraj, the main reviver of Jihaadee 
thought in contemporary times also recognized the importance of Islaamic 
propagation (Faraj 1981:13). On the other hand, al-Waadi’ee explains, “…We do not 
want you to stand and call the people to revolution, and overthrowing (of 
governments). The Muslim youth and the Muslims need someone to clarify for them 
Islaam….so calling to Allah is what repels the people of falsehood” (al-Waadi’ee 
2005b/1:71). This statement indicates that for Salafee scholars Islaamic propagation is 
the primary means for upholding the truth and repelling evil, and that the rectification 
of the Muslim community depends upon it (al-Waadi’ee 2005/1:71). This contradicts 
what al-Faisal and his predecessors allege regarding jihaad.     
 
3.3.8.4 His Belittlement of the Scholars  
  
      Al-Faisal claims that it is hypocritical to make it conditional to have a caliph 
before performing jihaad. He then mentioned the followers of two major Salafee 
scholars of this time Muhammad Amaan al-Jaamee and Rabee’a al-Madkhalee and 
  
falsely attributed this condition to them. This claim is not true as it is known that they 
believe having a leader, not necessarily the caliph, as a condition for offensive jihaad. 
Imaam al-Shawkaanee205 said, “Jihaad is an obligation upon a group of Muslims [as 
long as they fulfill the obligation, there is no sin upon the rest of the Muslims] with 
every pious or wicked leader” (Halaaq 1993:333). This condition for jihaad is 
mentioned throughout the books of jurisprudence: in order to conduct offensive 
jihaad it requires a leader, to sustain order and prevent chaos. 206
     Al-Faisal, like Aboo Hamza, claimed that the scholars made it permissible to take 
non-Muslims as protectors and supporters. The orthodox creed holds that out of 
necessity it is permissible to seek assistance from non-Muslims.
 
 
207
        Al-Faisal tends to mock the verdicts of the contemporary scholars of Saudi 
Arabia, and on one of his audio cassettes he said regarding the scholars who issued 
 While discussing 
the rulings regarding jihaad, al-Shawkaanee said, “They cannot seek help from the 
Mushrikeen (pagans or any religion besides Islaam) except out of necessity and it is 
an obligation upon the soldiers to have obedience to their leader, except if he 
commands disobedience to Allah” (Halaaq 1993:334). This statement of al-
Shawkaanee contains several important points. The first point being that it is 
permissible, out of extreme necessity, to rely upon non-Muslims in jihaad. The 
second point is that leadership is required during jihaad. As a final point, obedience is 
to the ruler in all affairs, including jihaad, except if he commands disobedience to 
Allah.  
 
     In contrast, al-Faisal is extremely critical of the Saudi regime and the Muslim 
leaders in general. He claimed in one of his audio lectures that they took America, the 
greatest enemy of Islaam (in his view), as a supporter to kill Saddaam Hussayn and 
Iraqis and allowed them to occupy the holy lands, which is similar to the Jews who 
took atheists as supporters to kill the prophets (al-Faisal 2006c). This criticism seems 
like an extreme comparison which many of the Takfeeree/Jihaadee groups make 
regarding the Muslim leaders and scholars. 
 
                                                 
205 He was a major orthodox scholar from Sana’a Yemen in the early 18th century.   
206  Even Jihaadees like Faraj acknowledged this point, whereas al-Faisal seems to criticize his 
detractors on this issue which is well documented in the books of jurisprudence (Faraj 1981:20-21). 
207 See the section on Aboo Hamza. 
  
the religious verdict that allowed American soldiers to enter Saudi Arabia that “they 
are all opportunists! When they are passing a fatwa they don’t care if a million 
Muslims will die in the process… that is not their concern. Their concern is that they 
will get a salary and they will be promoted!” (al-Faisal 2006c). Al-Faisal accuses the 
scholars of appeasement and complacency and looking out for their own self interests, 
and it is upon him as the claimant to verify and prove his accusations. In one of his 
audio cassettes he claimed that “the Salafees were set up to destroy the Islaamic 
sharee’a” (al-Faisal 2006d). He offers no justification or evidence for his attack upon 
the Salafees except that in his view they protect and help ‘apostate regimes’ stay in 
power. King ‘Abd al-Azeez, the former king of Saudi Arabia said, “The reality is that 
we as Salafees protect our religion and follow the Book of Allah and the Sunna of his 
Messenger” (cited in Suhaymee 2004:39). Al-Faisal also asserts while criticizing the 
Salafees that “they hate jihaad and the people of jihaad” (al-Faisal 2006d). This 
criticism is both misleading and an attempt to group all the individuals who claim to 
be Salafee into a single category. The adherents to the Salafee creed vary with regards 
to their levels of knowledge, and the general adherents are not like the scholars who 
are less prone to mistakes in creed and major issues such as jihaad and takfeer. It is 
vital when discussing the creed and methodology of any given sect to analyze their 
scholars’ creed and the sources they derive their verdicts from before making a 
judgment upon them. In an audio interview, Shaikh Sa’eed al-‘Amr was asked by this 
researcher about the claims of al-Faisal against the Salafees pertaining to jihaad. His 
response was that the knowledgeable Salafees are the most adherent to the orthodox 
creed and methodology and are more aware of the rulings and legislation pertaining to 
jihaad: they know when it is legislated, and when its conditions are not met (al-‘Amr 
2006). To make the claim that a Muslim hates jihaad, as al-Faisal did, means that he 
is either a hypocrite or an apostate from the religion or completely ignorant as he 
hates something prescribed by Islaam.  
 
     Many of the allegations made by al-Faisal, against the scholars and many of the 
contemporary propagators of Islaam in the West, illustrate another striking difference 
from the orthodox creed, which is a trait of the deviant sects (‘Aseeree 2007:134).208
                                                 
amza‘s position regarding scholars.  HSee the section on Aboo  208 
 
Al-Faisal claimed in an audio cassette, “Whenever Salafees write books about 
  
tawheed they skip tawheed al-hakameeya, because they don’t want to offend their 
kaafir pay masters, so they love money more than Allah. They love their salaries more 
than Allah. They prefer to offend Allah [rather] than their kaafir pay masters that they 
sign on with” (al-Faisal 2006b). This statement is equivalent to making takfeer as he 
claimed the Salafees have committed a type of polytheism and hypocrisy. In another 
audio he claimed they despise jihaad and possess cowardice, because their scholars 
refute many of the Jihaadee groups.209 Al-Faisal concluded, “This is clear evidence 
that the Salafees are like the army of Musaylama 210
     Al-Faisal devoted a significant portion of his lectures to exposing what he referred 
to as ‘wicked scholars’ and their treachery upon the Muslim community. 
 and they are outside the fold of 
Islaam. Salafees are Kaafirs i.e.… a Salafee who knows the leader to be a Kaafir, and 
in spite of him knowing the leader to be a Kaafir, he cements the throne of the 
apostate leader” (al-Faisal 2006d). Al-Faisal appears to be consumed by the creed of 
takfeer to such an extent that he haphazardly pronounces takfeer and issues verdicts 
based upon his perception of what people intend in their hearts.  
 
211
                                                 
209 This term refers to those whose main call is to jihaad and differs with the classical view regarding 
its principles and status in the religion. This should not be confused with those who legitimately fight 
jihaad according to the Qur’aan and the Sunna. In contemporary times in places like Chechnya, 
Afghanistan, Indonesia and Bosnia, orthodox scholars have issued support for defensive jihaad and 
those Mujahideen (fighters in Allah’s cause) who fight according to the correct creed and methodology.    
210 Musaylama was an apostate from the religion who claimed Prophethood after the death of the 
Prophet Muhammad.  
211 Wicked scholars are those scholars who hide the truth and are deviant in their understanding of 
Islaam. However, al-Faisal uses the term to denote those who disagree with his paradigm. 
  
(al-Shahrastaanee 1984:111). In al-Faisal’s case, he creates an atmosphere of distrust 
between the youth and the scholars when they are the most knowledgeable of the 
Umma in this time. For example, Allah mentions, “…and the Angels and those who 
possess knowledge (also bear witness that none has the right to be worshipped except 
Allah)” (Qur’aan 1996/3:18). Many classical scholars like Ibn Katheer, and Ibn al-
Qayyim explain that this verse shows the position, esteem and benefit of the scholars 
over the rest of creation. Allah also mentions in another verse that those who fear him 
the most amongst his servants are the scholars because they truly know him, and how 
to worship him properly, and this evokes suspicion about al-Faisal’s claims against 
the scholars.
 However, 
after careful scrutiny of his charges and statements it appears they are generally 
unfounded claims. Al-Faisal’s allegations are similar to the claims the Khawaarij 
made against ‘Alee, the fourth caliph, when they accused him of making false 
judgments and this was because of their limited understanding (al-Shahrastaanee 
1984:115). Al-Faisal said in an audio tape that “the wicked scholars spy for their evil 
pay masters. They spy on the Umma, so they write a report on a monthly basis to the 
organization that pays them, the country that pays them, whether it is Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, wherever the money is coming from” (al-Faisal 2006c). Al-Faisal’s 
assertions exhibit paranoia and his accusations of treachery are similar to how the 
Khawaarij charged ‘Alee with apostasy for using men to arbitrate his dispute with 
Mu’aawiya. In the case of ‘Alee it was apparent that he was more knowledgeable than 
the Khawaarij and had the support of the most noble of the Muslims: the companions 
212
The ‘bonafide’ scholars according to al-Faisal are those who call to overthrow the 
government and who are imprisoned. For many Takfeerees imprisonment is the main 
sign of a scholar’s authenticity. This is not the orthodox view, although many scholars 
of the past have been punished for standing up for the truth in creed.
  Further, al-Faisal’s audio tapes are filled with mythical scenarios in 
which the leaders and scholars contrive to deceive the Muslim community. He said:    
 
          So they claim that we have enough money to cover up Islaam, that  
          revolutionary religion Islaam. We can put a stop to it. We will put all the  
          bonafide scholars behind bars, in prison, all the upright scholars in prison. And  
          all the scholars outside of prison will tow the line. So they have to preach what  
          we want them to preach…then we will command our scholars to write books  
          and give the watered down version of al-Islaam (al-Faisal 2006c). 
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212 Allah says, “It is only those who have knowledge among His slaves that fear Allah” (1996/35:28). 
213 Imaam Shaafi’ee, Imaam Ahmad, Ibn Taymeeya are just a few examples amongst many scholars 
who were persecuted for upholding the orthodox creed (‘Abd al-Kareem 2001:32). 
  
they considered one’s piety, truthfulness, wisdom and knowledge as standards to 
measure one’s authenticity (al-Lawayhiq 2002:19-24). Wiktorowicz maintains that: 
 
          The jihadi critique is thus based on judgments about the purists’ inability or  
          unwillingness to reveal the truth about context to the people. In jihadi reasoning,  
          if purists were willing or able to come forward and explain the truth about the  
          regime, everyone would recognize that certain oppositional actions become  
          operative, according to shared Salafi precepts. The critique is not about belief; it  
          is about unwillingness of the purists to put this belief into practice by  
          addressing the injustices of the regime and its American (and Zionist) masters  
          (Wiktorowicz 2005:227-228). 
 
3.3.9 Usaama Bin Laaden and al-Qaeda 
 
     In modern times no individual evokes more fear and controversy than the alleged 
mastermind of the September Eleventh attacks on the World Trade Center, Usaama 
Bin Laaden. He is both revered and despised throughout the world by both Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike, and he is considered to be one of the most notorious 
figureheads of the Takfeeree/Jihaadee groups in contemporary times. The movement 
most closely associated with Bin Laaden is known as al-Qaeda, a loose web of groups 
and individuals linked together by common ideologies but yet they operate as separate 
cells and all have a propensity for violence. Burke offers insight into the movement 
when he said, “Bin Laden and al-Qaeda are the radical, extremist fringe of the broad 
movement that is modern Islamic militancy. Their grievances are political but 
articulated in religious terms and with reference to a religious worldview” (Burke 
2004:xxv).  
 
3.3.9.1 Creed and Ideology 
      
 However, the 
classical scholars were not people who called for revolutions and coups against the 
leaders, but instead they defended the orthodox creed and this is how they differ with 
those revolutionary minded Takfeerees of today. Al-Faisal claimed in the same audio 
tape that the so-called wicked scholars have a hidden agenda by defending the 
Muslim state, and this criticism is similar to what Bin Laaden claims, which will be 
discussed in the next section. Al-Faisal said, “So wicked scholars are tranquilizers and 
they lull you back to sleep and then they commit a thousand and one excuses for their 
kaafir pay masters” (al-Faisal 2006c). To al-Faisal and the Takfeeree groups, a 
scholar’s legitimacy can only be attained if he is a recipient of brutality, or 
imprisonment, because it shows that he opposes the government and their policies. 
This is not the criterion set by the orthodox scholars of the past, or present, but instead 
     Analyzing the ideology of such a massive network of organizations is a huge and 
complicated task, so for the purpose of this research the analysis will cover only Bin 
Laaden and the general creed of the al-Qaeda organization as articulated through its 
declarations, documents, and treatises. Aboo Muhammad al-Maqdasee, a Jordanian 
religious cleric is one of the key thinkers amongst Jihaadees, and Takfeerees, and his 
speeches and treatises are often cited by Jihaadees around the world including al-
Qaeda. “Within the Jihadis’ core constituency, the most influential living thinkers are 
al-Maqdasi in Jordan, Abu Basir al-Tartusi and Abu Qatada in England, ‘Abd al-
Qadar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz in Egypt, and several Saudi clerics” (McCants, Brachman, and 
  
Felter 2006:6). Al-Maqdasee’s writings symbolize much of the core creed of al-Qaeda, 
and both Bin Laaden and Zarqaawee are thought to be his longtime associates 
(Brisard 2005:37). Al-Maqdasee writes extensively about tawheed, takfeer, and jihaad, 
and like Mawdoodee and Qutb he emphasizes al-hakameeya and the struggle to 
eliminate what he deems as disbelieving leadership. He states, “We believe it is 
obligatory to rebel against the Imams of Kufr from the disbelieving rulers that are 
placed over the necks of the Muslims. We believe that they have apostated from the 
Din due to their replacement of the Shariah and legislation with Allah, and seeking 
judgment from… and allying with the enemies of Allah and harboring enmity towards 
His Din and His allies” (al-Maqdasee 2003:27).214
     Although al-Qaeda and Bin Laaden differ tremendously from classical scholars 
and contemporary Salafees regarding their methodology, evidence suggests their 
 This statement illustrates the core 
belief of al-Qaeda: the apostate regimes are dismantling the sharee’a and allying 
themselves with non-Muslims against Islaam. Al-Maqdasee goes on to say about the 
leaders: 
  
          And we believe that fighting them is foremost rather than fighting other than   
          them, because the Kufr of apostasy is more severe than original Kufr according  
          to consensus. Also, because preserving the capitol and wealth is given  
          precedence over profit and because defensive Jihad is given precedence over  
          offensive Jihad, because beginning with Jihad against those who are closer to us  
          from the Kuffar is foremost rather than waging Jihad against those who are  
          farther away (al-Maqdasee 2003:27).   
 
This is essentially the argument of many of the contemporary Jihaadees and 
organizations like al-Qaeda: they argue that jihaad should begin with the enemy 
closest to them (i.e. the leaders); however it appears they have misconstrued this, like 
the Khawaarij, to mean those leaders who oppose their ideology (al-Asha’ree 
1999/1:170). When they begin their so-called jihaad it is almost always at the expense 
of Muslims’ lives and property. “Jihadis contend that the violence they do to their 
own people, governments, and resources are 1) necessary, 2) religiously sanctioned, 
and 3) really the fault of the West, Israel, and apostate regimes” (McCants, Brachman, 
and Felter 2006:6).  
 
                                                 
214 This quote was taken from the English translation of al-Maqdasee’s writing which accounts for the 
difference in spellings and transliteration system used. 
  
general goals of a broader Islaamic state and aspirations to liberate the Muslim lands 
are matters of concern to the greater Muslim community (Esposito 2002:158). Bin 
Laaden states, “It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam had suffered 
from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist/Crusaders 
alliance and their collaborators; to the extent that the Muslims’ blood became cheap 
and their wealth became as loot in the hands of the enemies” (Bin Laaden 1996b).215
     Al-Qaeda lists among the characteristics one must posses in order to be a member 
of their group, sacrifice and obedience, and “the member has to be willing to do the 
work and undergo martyrdom for the purpose of achieving the goal and establishing 
the religion of Majestic Allah on earth” (al-Qaeda 2005:16). This type of sacrifice and 
dedication is important to maintain loyalty to the leadership and ideology. However, 
this group’s ideology is extremely dangerous and the Prophet warned about 
sectarianism and following methodologies other than his Sunna and that of the four 
righteous caliphs.
 
The propensity for violence and extremism distinguishes Bin Laaden and al-Qaeda 
from the Salafee creed and their methodology has more in common with that of the 
Khawaarij. Al-Waadi’ee stated about him, “We distanced ourselves from him and his 
actions a long time ago. And the reality is that the Muslims in the Western countries 
are witnessing pressure upon them because of the activities of those who proceeded 
him like Ikhwaan al-Mufliseen (the bankrupt brotherhood) or other than them, may 
Allah help us” (cited in al-Suhaymee 2005b:207). So, many contemporary scholars 
like al-Waadi’ee consider Bin Laaden a “trial and tribulation upon the Muslim 
community, and his actions to be evil” (cited in Suhaymee 2005b:207). “Jihadis lose 
credibility among mainstream Muslims when they attack women, children, and the 
elderly; damage the sources of a nation’s wealth (such as tourism and oil); kill other 
Muslims; and declare other Muslims apostates” (McCants, Brachman, and Felter 
2006:6).  
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 215 There are various different spellings for Bin Laaden. The researcher has maintained the various 
spellings in accordance with the sources cited. However, this research maintains the spelling of the 
transliteration scheme.   
in chapter two.216 Refer back to the section on the orthodox creed 
  
resembles that of many of the modern cults, Islaamic sects, and groups and this differs 
radically from the Salafee position which states that the pledge of allegiance is given 
to the Muslim ruler; either the caliph or ruler of a country (al-Suhaymee 2005:126).  
 
3.3.9.2 The Bai’a 
 
     This issue of the oath of allegiance (bai’a) is one of great controversy in 
contemporary times as many Islaamic groups advocate this pledge to their leaders, so 
it becomes necessary to look into the classical position regarding this issue. The bai’a 
is a type of agreement or pledge of “goodness between the people and the caliph, or 
imaam, or the prince, or ruler” (Qurayshee 1992:492). The bai’a is of seven types as 
mentioned in the books of jurisprudence, hadeeth, and politics by the scholars in those 
fields. There is the pledge to Islaam, for emigration from the land of disbelief, for 
jihaad, for death, to do the deeds of Islaam, to assist, and the pledge of obedience 
(Qurayshee 1992:492). These various types of bai’a are derived from the religious 
texts by the classical scholars. There are also many conditions and obligations the 
leader who receives the pledge must be able to fulfill. The groups who call for this 
pledge often go astray because they are unable to fulfill these conditions. Imaam 
Maawardee, a scholar from the 11th century, mentioned that some of the most 
important obligations of the leader that receives this pledge are that he can protect the 
foundation of the religion according to the pious predecessors understanding, he can 
provide protection, security, and justice. Also, he is able to implement the sharee’a 
punishments, and he must be able to carry out jihaad when its conditions are met. 
These are some of the conditions for the bai’a (Qurayshee 1992:492).  
 
 What is worth noting is that al-Qaeda asks for complete 
obedience from their members but they nullify the obedience to the Muslim leaders as 
they consider them apostates. Obedience is “expressed by how the member obeys the 
orders given to him” (al-Qaeda 2005:16). These secret oaths given to group leaders 
     Al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Jamaa’a al-Takfeer wa al-Hijra all 
implement the bai’a without effectively fulfilling its conditions. Jamaa’a al-Takfeer 
wa al-Hijra claim, “The bai’a and the group are necessary conditions of faith and it is 
a requirement of Islaam to give allegiance to the imaam or leader of a group” 
(Qurayshee 1992:489). Many of the groups that call for bai’a cannot protect their 
communities, nor do they possess authority to call for legitimate jihaad, and they are 
unable to implement the sharee’a law, or provide safety for their group members. 
Therefore, they have no legitimate right to call for bai’a as the conditions of 
leadership are not in place. Al-Hilaalee mentions that the Muslim Brotherhood and 
  
groups like al-Qaeda stipulate in their pledge of allegiance jihaad according to their 
methodology, and obedience to the group leader. Then he goes on to state “the 
conditions mentioned in this bai’a are not given to anyone except the overall ruler of 
the believers and the leader of their group” (al-Hilaalee 2004:216). In support of this 
he referenced the hadeeth of ‘Ubaadah Bin Saamit who said, “We gave the oath of 
allegiance to the Messenger of Allah to hear and obey, in that which we like and 
dislike, and in times of difficulty and ease” (al-Nawawee 1997/12:432). So, the 
Salafee view is that this oath of allegiance is to the general leader of the Muslims not 
to individual groups like al-Qaeda which fragment the main body of Muslims due to 
their blind obedience to their leadership, exclusionary practices, and general misuse of 
the bai’a to wage what they consider to be jihaad (al-Suhaymee 2005:126).  
 
3.3.9.3 Jihaad and Terrorism 
 
     For Bin Laaden and many of his predecessors jihaad has two primary objectives: 
to overthrow ‘apostate regimes’ and to terrorize non-Muslims who oppose them and 
their objectives. Bin Laaden seems to hold nothing sacred when waging his so-called 
jihaad. Many of the operations authorized by him took place on Muslim soil, and 
irrespective of the position of the Muslim authority: whether they have a peace treaty 
or not with non-Muslim states (‘Aseeree 2007:162). Bin Laaden praised “…the strain 
which has eventuated in the relationship between America and the countries of the 
region in the footsteps of the jihad missions against the Americans in Riyadh and as a 
result of the fear of these regimes that their own lands might witness similar jihad 
missions” (Bin Laaden 1996:1). Jihaad to Bin Laaden is a political weapon to be used 
to influence policy of the Muslim regime and this description of jihaad is not 
substantiated by religious texts or the methodology of the classical scholars. Esposito 
observes: 
Today the term jihad has become comprehensive; resistance and liberation 
struggles and militant jihads, holy and unholy wars, are all declared to be 
jihads. Jihad is waged at home not only against unjust rulers in the Muslim 
world but also against a broad spectrum of civilians…. Terrorist such as bin 
Laden and others go beyond classical Islam’s criterion for a just jihad and 
recognize no limits but their own; employing any weapons or means 
(2002:157). 
 
 Ibn Taymeeya concludes, that one must “consider the view of sound scholars of the 
religion in the affairs of jihaad. They are those who have experience in worldly affairs, 
  
unlike those people who are overtaken by worldly matters and only know the 
superficial matters of the religion. So do not take their opinions or the opinions of the 
scholars who have no worldly experience” (cited in al-Badr 2005:24).   
  
     It seems that the solution to Muslim grievances according to Bin Laaden is jihaad 
against the rulers particularly the destabilization of Saudi Arabia. Bin Laaden 
expresses great concern for the sanctity of the holy lands and Muslim blood and honor; 
however he is quick to advocate violence against Muslims, their properties, and the 
agreements they have with non-Muslims which are binding according to Islaamic law 
(al-Ahmadee 2004/1:156). He said, “Today our brothers and sons, the sons of the two 
holy places, have started their jihad in the cause of Allah, to expel the occupying 
enemy out of the country of the two holy places. And there is no doubt that you would 
like to carry out this mission too, in order to re-establish the greatness of this Ummah 
and to liberate its occupied sanctuaries” (Bin Laaden 1996b:1). It seems that Bin 
Laaden’s view of jihaad is what is commonly considered terrorism and sabotage. 
Many of his operations take place on Muslim soil: rebelling against the leader, and 
violating the government’s treaty obligations and these actions are reminiscent of the 
Khawaarij (al-Asha’aree 1999/1:169-170). Shaikh Naasir Bin Hamad said about these 
operations that “the devastation to life is shocking. Incredibly shocking! I saw the 
mosque that was destroyed in Ramadan and I saw the Sudanese guard, the father of 
five children, and I saw all of the Egyptian and Jordanian families. Likewise this is 
wickedness on the earth and has nothing to do with jihaad” (al-Mawjaan 2004:216). 
Shaikh Naaser had previously supported these operations until he witnessed the 
devastation and the loss of Muslim life from the so-called jihaad missions of al-Qaeda. 
Still Bin Laaden’s call to jihaad is mistaken from another point of view and that is 
because “righteousness and stability are both desired everywhere. Especially in the 
Arab peninsula which in reality is the Islaamic peninsula…and it is not permissible to 
spread wickedness anywhere on the earth and especially in this peninsula which is the 
stronghold of Islaam” (al-‘Abbaad 2005:15). However, Bin Laaden was persistent in 
calling to his so-called jihaad. He said:  
          
          When we compared this to your killing of hundreds of thousands of Muslims  
          and occupying their sanctuaries, it is now clear that those who claim that the  
          blood of the American soldiers should be protected are merely repeating what is  
          imposed on them by the regime; fearing aggression and (their own) interest in   
  
          saving themselves. It is now a duty on every tribe in the Arab Peninsula to fight  
          jihad in the cause of Allah and to cleanse the land from those occupiers (Bin  
          Laaden 1996b:2).  
 
In his efforts to undermine the Saudi regime, Bin Laaden claimed jihaad was an 
obligatory duty against Saudi Arabia because of the presence of American troops and 
what he considered as rampant corruption by the Saudi royal family. Saudi Arabia, an 
established Islaamic state with a Muslim ruler should not be fought against as jihaad 
is waged against hypocrites and non-Muslims according to sharee’a principles (al-
Muneef 2005:31-35). Bin Laaden’s declaration of jihaad seems problematic: he is 
calling to fight in the holy lands against Muslims. Al-Albaanee commented after the 
Afghani jihaad saying, “There is no jihaad in the Muslim world at all. There is 
fighting in many lands; but as for jihaad, it is under the flag of Islaam and it is based 
upon the Islaamic rulings, and among these rulings is that the soldier does not act of 
his own accord, but instead according to his commander’s orders” (cited in Jabeer 
1995:79).  Here al-Albaanee explained that jihaad is not legitimate if it does not meet 
the conditions and criterion for jihaad. Al-Albaanee made his statement in the period 
after the Afghan jihaad and he was describing the resistance in places like Palestine 
where many different movements fight and compete for an Arab state, or a nationalist 
identity, instead of Islaam. The above statement also illustrates the importance of 
leadership during jihaad and that fighting is a collective duty. Bin Laaden assumes 
both the position of a scholar and leader by decreeing jihaad as a duty which he has 
no legitimacy to do. Al-Fawzaan said, “The scholars make pronouncements of 
jihaad…because they know its rulings, its conditions, and its importance. So the 
ignorant one does not declare jihaad, and if he goes for jihaad without its criterion 
being met, then that is proof that he does not possess correct knowledge of  jihaad” 
(al-Hussayn 2005:80).    
 
     Al-Qaeda make takfeer of all the present day leaders and advocate removing them 
through violence with complete disregard for the implications of their judgments and 
the sharee’a rulings, and this is what they consider jihaad. According to an al-Qaeda 
spokesmen, “It is the same unbelief that drove Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, Gadhafi, Hafez 
Assad, Saleh, Fahed-Allah's curse be upon the non-believing leaders-and all the 
apostate Arab rulers to torture, kill, imprison, and torment Moslems” (al-Qaeda 
2005:9). Takfeerees believe that the above leaders are apostates and it is incumbent 
  
upon Muslims to resist and remove them from authority. This judgment disregards the 
established principles of takfeer and undermines the authority of the Islaamic state.217 
Bin ‘Uthaymeen said, “There are some people that do not deter (evil) except through 
violence. However, violence that does not serve a purpose and only serves to make 
the situation worse is not permissible” (Saleem 2004:102). It seems that groups like 
al-Qaeda have no real long term goal for establishing Islaam or the sharee’a after 
removing the leaders and what separates them from many of their predecessors is the 
particularly violent nature of their organization. Moreover, their documents and 
statements tend to show they have a rather shortsighted vision based upon violence 
and terror with disregard for Muslim society, sanctity and property, which are all 
protected by the sharee’a. 218
By framing the expulsion of American troops as a religious duty, this allowed for Bin 
Laaden and al-Qaeda to gain new recruits for their global jihaad by establishing 
themselves as the sole defender of the faith. Bin Laaden and al-Qaeda emphasized the 
expulsion of American troops from the Arabian Peninsula to such an extent that they 
contradict other well established religious principles. For example, the zeal they have 
regarding this issue supersedes their obedience to the Muslim authority which 
authorized the stationing of American troops. Bin Laaden’s objection and violent 
reaction incites rebellion against the Muslim leader, a trait all the Khawaarij sects 
   
    
     Bin Laaden responded to the claims of terrorism made against him by describing 
jihaad against America and the Muslim leaders as a religious obligation. According to       
Bin Laaden this religious duty entails terrorizing them and fighting them by any 
means. Bin Laaden said: 
 
          … we were accused of funding terrorism, and being members of an  
          international terrorist organization. Their aims in making these allegations were  
          to place psychological pressure on the Mujahideen and their supporters so they  
          would forsake the obligation of jihad and the resistance of oppression [due to]  
          American and Israeli occupation of Islamic sacred lands. However, our  
          gratitude to Allah, their campaign was not successful, as terrorizing the  
          American occupiers is a religious and logical obligation (Bin Laaden 1996:2).   
 
                                                 
217 Refer to the section on rebelling against the leaders. 
218  Gerges points out that since the 1990s the Jihaadees have redefined their enemies and have 
emphasized more operations against non-Muslim targets like the United States and Britain (Gerges 
2005:14).  
  
possess (al-Asha’ree 1999/1:169-170). In addition, Bin Laaden made takfeer of the 
rulers due to his misunderstanding of the Prophetic tradition which calls for the 
expulsion of Jews and Christians from the Arab Peninsula. This was a general 
command from the Prophet and he himself allowed Jews to stay and work in the Arab 
Peninsula, which continued after his death. From this example some scholars deduce 
that it is permissible for Muslims to seek support from non-Muslims during war out of 
necessity. Therefore, “it is permissible for them to enter the Arab Peninsula with the 
authorization of the imaam if there is benefit”219 (‘Ubaykaan 2004:6). However, Bin 
Laaden staunchly objects to allowing American troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia 
and insisted upon their removal by any means: rebellion, and terrorist attacks. Bin 
Laaden stated, “Clearly, after belief (imaan) there is no more important duty than 
pushing the American enemy out of the holy land” (Bin Laaden 1996b:2). This is in 
contrast to the claims of Salafee scholars who maintain that purification of one’s 
belief and seeking knowledge are amongst the primary concerns of today.220
       Bin Laaden seems to use religious texts to support his vision of global jihaad, 
takfeer, and terrorism. Misconstruing the religious texts and statements of the scholars 
is characteristic of the Khawaarij specifically and the deviant sects in general.
 
 
221
                                                 
219 This principle has been discussed in the preceding subchapter. 
220 Al-Waadi’ee mentions sincerity to Allah, patience and God consciousness, mercifulness between 
Muslims, and education and purification of the soul, and seeking knowledge from the major scholars 
(2002:16). 
221 Refer back to the Khawaarij creed in chapter one and the subsection on Mawdoodee in chapter three. 
 Bin 
Laaden used a verdict issued by Ibn Taymeeya to justify his expulsion of American 
troops by any means. Ibn Taymeeya said, “To fight in defense of religion and belief is 
a collective duty; there is no other duty after belief than fighting the enemy who is 
corrupting life itself and the religion. There is no precondition for this duty and the 
enemy should be fought with one’s abilities” (cited in Bin Laaden 1996b:2). Firstly, 
Bin Laaden misuses this quote of Ibn Taymeeya as it refers to the obligatory jihaad 
which becomes incumbent upon those who have been invaded in accordance with 
their ability to resist their enemy. Therefore, if they do not possess the power to resist, 
then they are not held accountable, nor should they resist, as it may result in a greater 
harm and oppression of the Muslims. Secondly, the American troops were not 
invaders; instead, they were given permission by the Muslim authority to help defend 
them against what they perceived to be a greater harm: Saddaam Hussayn and the 
  
Iraqi forces. Thirdly, Bin Laaden’s application of this quote to justify his resistance to 
the Muslim authority and their American counterparts violates an important principle 
of jurisprudence: “The obligations are interrelated to the ability to perform them. 
Therefore, there is no obligation upon a person if he is unable to perform what is 
required of him, and something is not prohibited when there is a necessity for it” (al-
Sa’dee 2005:93). So, even if the American troops had invaded Saudi Arabia, the duty 
to resist is only contingent upon the ability of those who are occupied to resist. Al-
Hussayn explains that if “the Muslims have the capability to fight against non-
Muslims, and they possess the strength and ability to fight, then they must fight. So if 
they do not possess the capability or the strength to fight, then they are not responsible 
for jihaad” (al-Hussayn 2005:78). A characteristic inherent to the Jihaadee groups is 
that they possess a zeal for confrontation and ignore the conditions for jihaad. Even 
the “Prophet and his companions were in Makka before immigration, and jihaad was 
not legislated for them because they were unable to fight” (al-Hussayn 2005:78). This 
is proof that ability is a condition for jihaad and that the solution to all conflicts and 
oppression is not through violent confrontation. However, the rulers gave consent to 
American troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia, and they should be obeyed in their 
decision.222
     Al-Qaeda believes in violent confrontation with its foes and this strategy is a major 
part of its campaign to overthrow existing Muslim regimes and terrorize their allies. 
Bin Laaden stated, “Terrorizing you, while you are carrying arms on our land, is a 
legitimate and morally demanded duty. It is a legitimate right well known to all 
humans and other creatures. Your example and our example is like a snake which 
entered into a house of a man and got killed by him” (Bin Laaden 1996b:1). Bin 
Laaden likened his campaign of terror and rebellion against the Muslim authority to 
  Finally, due to a lack of understanding of the religious texts, and 
disregard for the verdicts of most of the contemporary scholars, Bin Laaden and al-
Qaeda have assumed religious authority and called for the nullification of the oath of 
allegiance to the present rulers. These grave mistakes are inherent in the Khawaarij 
creed and are a primary cause for the extremist beliefs espoused by Bin Laaden 
(‘Aseeree 2007:134).  
 
                                                 
222 This is essentially the argument of those Salafee scholars who agreed with that position: if the leader 
deemed that there was benefit in the stationing of American troops on Saudi soil and this decision did 
not contradict the foundation of the religion (as there was a precedent from classical jurists regarding 
using non-Muslims out of necessity) then it is permissible however controversial it may seem.   
  
that of a legitimate resistance campaign when in fact it is un-Islaamic to resist the 
Muslim authority unless the leader has apostated and the conditions for rebellion are 
met.223
    A favorite tactic of many of the Jihaadee groups is suicide bombings. Majority of 
the contemporary Sunni scholars hold that Islaam does not condone suicide bombings 
as the Takfeerees advocate. “Suicide missions are completely impermissible. It is 
possible that the bomber will reside permanently in the hell-fire for his action” (cited 
in Jabeer 1995:79). This was a statement from al-Albaanee, which illustrates the 
position most of the Salafee scholars of this time hold. However, some Salafee 
scholars say it is permissible with the condition that the bomber “inflicts the 
maximum loss of life upon the enemy lines and he knows who he kills. This is a 
legitimate act of jihaad and the man killed (while committing that act) is a martyr 
God willing” (cited in Jabeer 1995:83). The above statement was the opinion of ‘Abd 
Allah Bin Muhammad Bin Hameed another Salafee scholar, however the correct 
opinion lies with the strongest evidence from the Qur’aan and Sunna. Allah states, 
“And do not kill yourselves (nor kill one another). Surely, Allah is most merciful to 
you. And whoever, commits that through aggression and injustice, we shall cast him 
into the fire, and that is easy for Allah” (Qur’aan 1996:4:30). Here there is a strong 
admonishment from Allah about killing oneself and many of the scholars use this as a 
proof of the impermissibility of suicide missions. The Prophet also warned against 
suicide saying, “Whoever commits suicide with a piece of iron, will be punished with 
that same piece of iron in the hell-fire.” He also said in another narration in al-
Bukhaaree that “A man was inflicted with wounds and he committed suicide, and so 
Allah said: My slave has caused death on himself hurriedly, so I forbid paradise for 
him” (al-Bukhaaree 1970:4/95). There are many narrations that prohibit killing 
oneself in Islaam and the term suicide bombing from its very connotation implies 
killing oneself even if the aim was to inflict maximum loss of life upon the enemy.
  
 
224
                                                 
223 See section on orthodox creed and rebelling against the leader. 
224  Many Takfeerees use the term “martyrdom operations” instead of suicide missions, probably in 
order to make the term more palatable and remove the stigma associated with the term suicide, and to 
emphasize that the purpose is to inflict maximum damage to their opponents not suicide. 
  
bombings actually cause a greater harm than benefit as they incite public opinion 
against the cause of the bombers when innocent lives are taken. In addition, these 
actions cannot be equated with the battles of the companions who were determined to 
fight to death and were martyred as they did not kill themselves with their own hands 
unlike the suicide operations often employed today.  
 
     It seems according to textual evidence and the general consensus of Salafee 
scholars that it is impermissible to perform suicide operations in which a person is the 
cause of killing himself even if he targets his enemies. This position is radically 
different from the Jihaadee position which holds it to be a preferred act of aggression 
and resistance as will be explored in the section about Aboo Mus’ab Zarqaawee and 
those fighting in Iraq.    
 
     The al-Qaeda manual states a list of ideological aspects of the organization and the 
means for achieving its objective by using a campaign of terror, assassination and 
kidnapping. Its number one objective seems to be: 
 
          …the overthrow of the godless regimes and their replacement with an Islamic  
          regime. Other missions consist of the following: gathering information about  
          the enemy, the land, the installations, and the neighbors. Kidnapping enemy  
          personnel, documents, secrets, and arms. Assassinating enemy personnel as  
          well as foreign tourists. Freeing the brothers who are captured by the enemy.  
          Spreading rumors and writing statements that instigate people against the  
          enemy. Blasting and destroying the places of amusement, immorality, and sin;  
          not a vital target. Blasting and destroying the embassies and attacking vital  
          economic centers. Blasting and destroying bridges leading into and out of the  
          cities (al-Qaeda 2005:13). 
 
 
Bin ‘Uthaymeen stated, “Killing oneself has no benefit for Islaam because if the 
bomber kills ten including himself, or even one to two hundred of the enemy, it does 
not benefit Islaam” (cited in Jabeer 1995:83). Bin ‘Uthaymeen believed that suicide 
Al-Qaeda appears to have resorted to a policy of achieving its objective by any means 
at its disposal, particularly violence and extremism. It purports that the reasoning 
behind establishing a military wing is the "removal of those personalities that block 
the call's path” (al-Qaeda 2005:13). This strategy of destroying those who oppose 
them in methodology or creed is extremely similar to that of the Khawaarij who 
declared their opponents to be apostates and fought them (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:115). 
However, it appears that the modern day groups like al-Qaeda are much more extreme 
  
and sophisticated225
                                                 
225  Gerges mentions how Bin Laaden was both charismatic and effective at recruiting members to his 
organization, also al-Qaeda was highly mobile and sophisticated in carrying out operations (Gerges 
2005:178).  
  
is by raising the issue with the Muslim authority and if they refuse to prohibit these 
practices then they become sinful, not disbelievers. Bin Baaz said, “It is not 
permissible to kill the non-Muslim resident or emigrant who entered the country 
seeking security and refuge. Nor kill the sinner or violate them, instead refer their case 
to the Islaamic court and whatever the judge decides is sufficient” (Saleem 2004:110). 
Therefore, stopping sinful actions through violence can create a greater harm upon the 
society, according to Bin Baaz, and Allah says, “fear Allah as much as you 
can”(Qur’aan 1996:65:16). So, if repelling an evil act will cause a greater harm then it 
should not be stopped physically but rather it should be spoken out against or hated in 
accordance with one’s ability to prohibit the sinful act. This concept of prohibiting a 
sinful act in accordance with one’s ability to change the evil differs with the Takfeeree 
methodology as they see removing sins or achieving their objectives primarily 
through violent means (‘Awaajee 2002:438).   
 
 and ey rely upon un-Islaamic means to dispose of their en mies 
and implemen  their will. Their campaign of terror violates Islaamic law and codes in 
numerous of ways. Firstly, the targeting of f eign tourists is clea ly a violation of 
Islaamic law as they are under the protect o  of the Muslim authority and have their 
permis ion to reside in the country, and to violate the r rights is disobedience to the 
Muslim ruler. Bin Baaz said, “It is not perm ssible to kill or be a gressive towards 
t urists or workers, because they are protected [by the sh ree’a]. T ey entered in 
protected st tus, so it is not permissible to harm them…As for an individual person 
t en it is not for them to kill them or beat them r harm them instead they should raise 
the issue with e leader” (cited in Ibn Saalim 2005: 363). Non-Muslims w o reside in 
a M slim country have rights and protected status from the Muslim au ority. Al-
Qaeda and those who follow their methodology make it permissible to kill and 
e rorize those protected under Islaamic law when the Prophet clearly stated, 
“Whoever kills someone who is protected [under the Muslim authority] will never 
smell the fragrance of paradise” (al-Bukhaaree 1970/4:256). These Takfeeree groups 
accuse their opponents of not ruling by Allah’s law when in fact it appears they are 
the most obvious violators of the sharee’a. Secondly, al-Qaeda targets sinful places 
like discos and bars, and they consider this enjoining good and forbidding evil. 
However, they violate the conditions that were established in chapter two regarding 
enjoining good and forbidding evil and one of the most important aspects is not 
causing a greater harm by removing something harmful. Many innocent people are 
killed when bombing such establishments, and it causes instability in the Muslim state 
and rebellion against the authority. Also, these actions foster chaos and lawlessness 
and the usurping of the legitimate authority by taking the law into their own hands. A 
prime example is the Bali bombing in 2002 of an Indonesian night club which killed 
two hundred and two people; Western tourists and locals (Burke 2004:265). This 
bombing although motivated by the determination to “rid the adulterous practices of 
the white people” only caused greater animosity towards Islaam and was an 
illegitimate act of violence showing blatant disregard for the Muslim authority (Burke 
2004:164). Adultery and the activities condoned in those nightclubs are strictly 
prohibited in Islaam. However, the proper means for addressing these sinful practices 
     Bin Laaden’s grievances are many, and he presents a strong indictment against 
United States foreign policy. His response to accusations of terror made against him is 
that the United States is “accusing others with their own affliction in order to fool the 
masses. The evidence overwhelmingly shows America and Israel killing the weaker 
men, women, and children in the Muslim world, and elsewhere” (Bin Laaden 1996:2). 
Then Bin Laaden mentioned the massacres in Lebanon by Israeli troops, the six 
hundred thousand Iraqi children who have perished because of economic sanctions 
imposed by America and the United Nations and “their withholding of arms from the 
Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina leaving them prey to the Christian Serbians who 
massacred and raped in a manner not seen in contemporary history. Not to forget the 
dropping of the H bombs on cities with their entire populations of children, elderly, 
and women, on purpose, and in a premeditated manner…” (Bin Laaden 1996:3). Bin 
Laaden appears to be very politically astute and observant of history in his claims 
against the United States in an attempt to justify his terror. Although George Bush and 
Tony Blair both claim that Bin Laaden is attacking freedom and democracy, Bin 
Laaden’s statements and actions show otherwise. Bin Laaden retorted with stinging 
criticism when he said, “…America continues to claim that it is upholding the banner 
of freedom and humanity, whilst these deeds which they did, you would find that the 
most ravenous of animals would not descend to” (Bin Laaden 1996:4). For Bin 
  
Laaden the spilling of Muslim blood necessitates retaliation by any means and he 
holds a long list of grievances against the West and its allies. AbuKhalil states: 
          
          Many abhor the indiscriminate violence of al-Qaeda, but fiercely oppose U.S.  
          actions and policies of the region. And this Manichean vision is increasingly  
          pitting the U.S. government against the Muslim and Arab world, despite the   
          assertion by Bush and other American officials that its war is not against the  
          Islamic faith. Yet what Americans must understand is that all rhetorical devices  
          of the administration evaporate in the face of civilian Muslims killed by U.S.  
          bombs… (Abukhalil 2002:84). 
 
Bin Laaden states, “Their blood was spilled in Palestine and Iraq. The horrifying 
pictures of the massacre of Qana, in Lebanon, are still fresh in our memory. 
Massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, Philippines, Fatani, Ogaden, 
Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya and Bosnia … massacres that send shivers through the 
body and shake the conscience” (Bin Laaden 1996b:2). These speeches underline Bin 
Laaden’s call for violent action which he sees as the only solution to the current 
tribulations that the Muslims are undergoing today. 
 
3.3.9.4 His Takfeer  
 
      Like Aboo Qataada, and al-Maqdasee, al-Qaeda seem to hold making takfeer an 
important pillar of faith. Al-Maqdasee’s argument can be summarized as follows: 
           
          what is the benefit of deeming people who submit to tyrants to be disbelievers?  
          The author answers: it is not up to us to determine the benefit of it; we must do  
          it because we are commanded to do it. In order to dissociate from disbelievers;  
          we must be able to identify them. We cannot prefer national and social unity  
          over the greater unity that is true monotheism. Differentiating between  
          believing and disbelieving people is the way to protect true monotheism  
          (McCants, Brachman, and Felter 2006a:190).  
 
For al-Qaeda and Bin Laaden it is a religious duty to scrutinize the leaders and those 
who work closely with them in order to determine their Islaamic legitimacy, and they 
view this as a means of protecting true tawheed. Bin Laaden and al-Qaeda accuse the 
king of Saudi Arabia of being an apostate, so one of the suicide bombers who attacked 
the military installation in Khobar Saudi Arabia said, as narrated by Bin Laaden, “My 
death is victory. I did not betray that king, he did betray our Qiblah. And he permitted 
in the holy country the filthiest sort of humans. I have made an oath to Allah, the 
Great, to fight whoever rejected the faith” (Bin Laaden 1996b). In the view of al-
  
Qaeda, the king has apostated thus nullifying his legitimacy to rule. It only follows 
that this leaves a void in leadership and responsibility for the affairs of the Muslims, 
and warrants executing those affairs by any means. This is blatant Takfeeree thinking 
and they fail to provide sufficient evidence against the accused by declaring disbelief 
for actions which do not warrant takfeer. In contrast, Imaam al-Aajooree 226 said, “It 
is not permissible for whoever possesses a Khawaarij world view to rebel against a 
righteous imaam or oppressive one, gathering his followers, raising their weapons and 
making it lawful to kill Muslims” (1999/1:345).  Bin Laaden, al-Qaeda and the other 
Takfeeree groups seem to have no inhibitions about making takfeer and spilling the 
blood of Muslims. Their ideology seems to restrict their logic which is expressed in 
absolutist terms. Al-Maqdasee maintains that “to claim to believe in God while 
embracing tyrants is hypocrisy and an aspect of disbelief. The hukkam (Arab rulers) 
believe in the tyrants and their profane laws (namely the UN), so they are hypocrites 
and have a share in disbelief. Moreover, they themselves are tyrants who are 
‘worshipped’ by their followers” (McCants, Brachman, and Felter 2006a:189). It is 
this uncompromising stance which allows for Takfeerees, like Bin Laaden, to make 
takfeer of all of those who assist or obey the government that they deem to be apostate, 
which in their minds legitimizes the violence they call for in Muslim societies. 
Another important point is that al-Maqdasee makes takfeer of the Saudi regime for its 
participation in the UN when the Talibaan themselves, whom al-Qaeda once heralded 
as the model Islaamic system, were once seeking recognition from that very same 
organization, and this is why some elements in the Takfeeree movement accused the 
Talibaan of illegitimacy (Burke 2004:184). 227
                                                 
 226 He was a classical scholar who died 940 A.D. 
227 Admittedly, al-Maqdasee in his writings does not appear to be as sporadic in his call to jihaad and 
takfeer. He acknowledges the conditions for takfeer and distances himself from some of the violence 
and carelessness of some of the other thinkers mentioned in this research (al-Maqdasee 2003:23-25). 
He like Aboo Qataada and ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmaan, has a background in Islaamic training and tends to 
be more knowledgeable and cautious than those who do not have a scholarly background. It seems 
“…there has been a shift in intellectual influence from laymen in Egypt (like Sayyid Qutb) to formally 
trained clerics from Palestine (often living in Jordan)  and Saudi Arabia. While it is unclear if this 
correlates with new developments in Jihadi theory, it certainly indicates a trend toward shoring up that 
theory with religious credentials” (McCants, Brachman, and Felter 2006:6).   
  
their followers is not a matter of access to the truth, but rather a matter of 
preoccupation with worldly existence and neglect of vigilance in defense of truth” 
(McCants, Brachman, and Felter 2006a:190).  
 
 A common trait of the Khawaarij and 
contemporary groups is that they fragment and make takfeer of one another. Also, Bin 
Laaden and many of the contemporary thinkers discussed in this research, do not see 
the leaders as pardonable for their mistakes and actions of disbelief they may have 
fallen into. Essentially al-Maqdasee asserts that “the ‘ignorance’ of the tyrants and 
     Bin Laaden issued decrees of takfeer and considered those who hold a creed 
similar to his to be the only legitimate leaders who can assume the affairs of the 
Muslims. Bin Laaden praised the leadership of the Talibaan by declaring, “You all 
know that Allah predestined for this nation during this time the group that established 
the Islaamic state that practices Allah’s law, and raises the flag of monotheism. It is 
the Islaamic federation of Afghanistan under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad 
‘Umar-may Allah protect him” (Majmoo’ 2006:44). To Bin Laaden the Talibaan was 
the only valid Islaamic state and he even went as far as claiming they were the bearers 
of Islaamic monotheism. Al-Ramadaanee criticized Bin Laaden’s claims by saying if 
he had been a logical person with a firm understanding of monotheism he would have 
spent his wealth upon educating the Talibaan (Majmoo’ 2006:46). Unfortunately Bin 
Laaden appears to have spent his wealth mainly on weaponry and fighting instead of 
propagation, and development of the infrastructure of Afghanistan. In another 
statement Bin Laaden called for all the Muslims to give the oath of allegiance to 
Mullah ‘Umar because he believed that Mullah ‘Umar and the Talibaan were the only 
legitimate Islaamic authority (Majmoo’ 2006:44). The issue of bai’a or the oath of 
allegiance is a complex one and al-Waadi’ee says it is to the leader of the Muslims, or 
the Muslim leader of a country and it should not be given to “the groups which divide 
the Muslims, break up their unity, and weaken their strength. Such a situ tion equires 
speaking out a ainst them because there is no oath of llegiance to such a group” 
(cited in al-Atharee 2005:75). Allah says  the Qur’aan “Verily those w o give 
bai’ah to you they are giving ba ’ah (pledge) to Allah” (1996:48:10). Al-Waadi’ee 
explains that this pledge was to th  Prophet. The Prophet said in a narra ion 
transmitted by Muslim that “whoever dies without the bai’a has died the death of the 
days of ignorance” (al-Nawawee 1997/12:442). Al-Waadi’ee elucidates that this is 
evidence that the bai’a is to be given to the Muslim leader from the Qurayshee tribe 
or the leader who assumes the caliph and can protect the sanctity of Muslims. So, it is 
considered an innovation by Salafee scholars to give the oath of allegiance to a group 
or sect, as it causes the Muslim community to split. This is clearly the case with al-
Qaeda and other groups who use the secret pledge of allegiance which causes 
  
sectarianism, and they terrorize and make takfeer of most of those who oppose them 
(al-Mawjaan 2004:86).        
 
      Bin Laaden made the total takfeer like Sayyid Qutb did of all the Muslim regimes, 
which is a common theme amongst the Takfeerees and Jihaadees. In the words of Bin 
Laaden, “Afghanistan is the only Islaamic state. Pakistan follows the English common 
law and I do not consider Saudi Arabia an Islaamic state” (Majmoo’ 2006:44). Bin 
Laaden considered the government of the Talibaan as the only authentic Islaamic state, 
which is similar to the assertion al-Faisal made when he declared all of those who do 
not support the Talibaan to be hypocrites (al-Faisal 2006a).  
 
3.3.9.5 Bin Laaden on Contemporary Regimes 
       
     Bin Laaden and al-Qaeda seem to have immense enmity towards the existing 
Muslim regimes like the early Khawaarij (al-Suhaymee 2004:79). “The confrontation 
we are calling for with the apostate regimes does not know Socratic debates, Platonic 
ideals, nor Aristotelian diplomacy, but it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of 
assassination, bombing and destruction, and the diplomacy of the canon and the 
machine gun” (al-Qaeda 20005:4). Bin Baaz mentioned that these groups believe in 
“killing the people and attacking without justification from the sharee’a. These people 
are terrorists, they are wicked, and they violate security and spread wickedness 
throughout society” (cited in Suhaymee 2004:19). Al-Qaeda’s call to violence is in 
violation of the sharee’a principles and many of their attacks are on Muslim soil and 
directed against Muslims. From May 14, 2004 until December 6, of the same year 
there were at least 14 terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia ranging from bombings to 
shootouts, assassinations, and beheadings, all attributed to al-Qaeda (al-Harbee 
2005:1). The Prophet clearly stated that Muslims’ blood, wealth, and honor are sacred 
and in a hadeeth tradition he said, “Abusing a Muslim is an act of disobedience and 
killing him is disbelief” (al-Nawawee 1997/2:242). The actions of al-Qaeda are 
considered heretical and extremely sinful according to the Qur’aan and Sunna and 
therefore cannot be attributed to Islaam whatsoever. Al-Qaeda claims, “After the fall 
of our orthodox caliphates on March 3, 1924 and after expelling the colonialists, our 
Islamic nation was afflicted with apostate rulers who took over in the Moslem nation. 
These rulers turned out to be more infidel and criminal than the colonialists 
  
themselves” (2005:8). Al-Qaeda’s theory for rectifying the current crisis in leadership 
is similar to Faraj’s who said: 
 
The main foundation of colonialism that exists in Muslim countries is these 
leaders, so beginning by dismantling colonialism would be ineffective, 
unbeneficial and a waste of time. Therefore, it is upon us to settle our affairs 
Islaamically by establishing the divine law first in our countries: making 
Allah’s word superior and no doubt jihaad is required to remove these 
apostate leaders and replace them with a total Islaamic system and this is 
where liberation begins (Faraj 1981:116).  
                      
     Bin Laaden accused the Muslim governments of apostasy as is common with all 
the Takfeeree groups and ideologues that preceded him and follow his methodology. 
In his critique of the Saudi regime he said, “The regime does not cease to cry in the 
open over the matters affecting the Muslims without making any serious effort to 
serve the interests of the Muslim community apart from small efforts in order to 
confuse people and throw some dust into their eyes” (Bin Laaden 1996:2). To Bin 
Laaden the Saudi regime is an apostate regime that uses deception to influence and 
swindle the Muslim masses. Like Aboo Hamza, Bin Laaden makes takfeer for what 
he perceives as ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the Saudi regime and these are not 
among the conditions that render a ruler to be an unbeliever. On the contrary, Saudi 
Arabia is known for its Islaamic philanthropy and “state financed international 
Islamic organizations to promote its Wahhabi-based, pan-Islamic vision and 
ideology…. financing the building of mosques, schools, libraries, hospitals, and 
clinics. It trained and supported imams for mosques, distributed tens of millions of 
Saudi-approved translations of the Quran and religious literature” (Esposito 
2002:107). Bin Laaden disregarded the service Saudi Arabia has put forth in Islaamic 
causes instead he viewed their accomplishments as a facade to cover up their disbelief 
and excesses.228
                                                 
 228 The researcher is not claiming that Saudi Arabia is free from sin or that there are no shortcomings 
in rulership. However, whatever faults, or oppression that may take place does not warrant takfeer of 
the leaders as the Takfeerees' allege. 
  
they appear to be the most compliant with Islaamic law in contemporary times (Chene 
and Jennett 2007:2). 
   
 Bin Laaden compiled a huge list of grievances against the Saudi 
regime citing corruption, scandal and misuse of public funds and oppression. Then he 
made the case that they are disbelievers “ignoring the divine shari’ah law; depriving 
people of their legitimate rights; allowing the Americans to occupy the land of the two 
holy places; imprisonment, unjustly of the sincere scholars” (Bin Laaden 1996b:3). 
Many of the Takfeerees target the Saudi regime although, according to many sources, 
        Bin Laaden blames the rulers for all the ills that have befallen the Muslim 
community similar to Mawdoodee.229
     Bin Laaden uses terror as a means of protesting against the Saudi regime and he 
praised the effects of the bombings in the capital city of Riyadh by saying, “There 
were two important consequences of the two explosions in Riyadh…. most important 
amongst these is the awareness of the people about the significance of the American 
occupation of the country of the two sacred mosques, and that the original decrees of 
the regime are a reflection of the wishes of the American occupiers” (2005:1). Bin 
Laaden’s use of violence t ds to resemble that of many of the Chr stian groups that 
use sabotage and terror to achieve their objectives rather than the rthodox creed 
which encourages ob dience to the ruler even if he is oppressive.
 “The regime is fully responsible for what has 
been incurred by the country and the nation; however, the occupying American 
enemy is the principle and the main cause of the situation. Therefore, efforts should 
be concentrated on destroying, fighting, and killing the enemy until, by the grace of 
Allah, it is completely defeated” (Bin Laaden 1996b:2). Bin Laaden made takfeer of 
the rulers of Saudi Arabia because he felt “the regime betrayed the Ummah and joined 
the kufaar, assisting and helping them against the Muslims” (Bin Laaden 1996b:2). 
The issue of occupation is one of the motivating factors for Bin Laaden’s rebellion 
against the leadership and terrorist activity. Bin Laaden defended his struggle as a 
legitimate one of resistance and he attacked the leaders when he said, “The coward is 
the one who lets you walk on his land, carrying arms freely, and provides you with 
peace and security” (Bin Laaden 1996b:3). However, Islaam does not always call for 
confrontation and the Muslim leader is the one who decides if there is benefit in 
having a treaty or not (al-Nawawee 2002:1800). 
 
230
                                                 
229 Refer to the section on Mawdoodee and leadership.  
230 See the rhetoric of Reverend Michael Bray the abortion clinic bomber, and Timothy McVeigh the 
Oklahoma city bomber (Juergensmeyer 2003:20-35). It is important to note that just as some Muslims 
attempt to justify their terror in the name of Islaam you find an equal amount of Christian, Jews, Sikhs 
and Hindus who justify acts of terror, slavery and murder in the name of their religion.  
  
     Bin Laaden is more politically astute than most of his predecessors. He laid out his 
program for the reformation of the leadership in Saudi Arabia when he said, “There 
are several choices for the regime, one of these is reconciliation with all the different 
sections of the public, by releasing the scholars, and offering essential changes, the 
most important of these is to bring back Islamic law, and to practice real Shura 
(consultative government)” (Bin Laaden 1996:3). Bin Laaden, like Aboo Qataada, 
seems to have a more flexible stance with the Muslim government of Saudi Arabia 
compared to the other ideologues discussed in this research as they seem to advocate 
the potential for reform and return to what they consider Islaamic rule, however they 
both declare the regime to be apostate.
  
 
231 Bin Laaden appears to have more concern 
for Arab and Muslim public opinion so as not to alienate those who may sympathize 
with his cause. Unlike many of the Takfeerees mentioned in this research, he still 
seems to offer a political alternative to violence: if the regimes conform to his 
demands.232
     The establishment and reform of Muslim governments according to the claims of 
al-Qaeda can only be achieved through violence and killing which reflects their lack 
of insight and Islaamic knowledge. “Islaamic governments never have and never will 
be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are 
established as they always have been, by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue 
and teeth” (al-Qaeda 2005:4). This statement is incorrect as it does not account for the 
first Islaamic state of Madina that the Prophet established after migrating from Makka 
and it was not established through fighting. Bin Baaz stated about those who claim 
that Islaam was spread by violence that “this saying in general is false. For Islaam was 
spread by calling to Allah the Almighty and Glorified and was strengthened with the 
sword” (2003/18:418).  It was previously mentioned that Islaam spread to many 
regions of the world through trade not fighting.
  
 
233
     As a justification for its terrorist acts al-Qaeda claims that it operates under the 
auspices of the sharee’a. “These young men realized that an Islamic government 
 
 
                                                 
Aboo Qataada.231 Return to the section on 
232  Burke asserts that “Little of bin Laden’s thought is original, most of his ideas can be found repeated 
in thousands of similar ‘Salafi’ tracts distributed over the last decade. His lack of a clear political 
programme is a feature of most modern Islamic extremist ideology too” (Burke 2004:164). 
 233 Refer back to the section on ‘Abd Allah al-Faisal. 
  
would never be established except by the bomb and rifle. Islam does not coincide or 
make a truce with unbelief, but rather confronts it” (al-Qaeda 2005:9). Bin Baaz best 
articulated the position held by the Salafee scholars when he said, “The treaty made 
with the enemy is permissible infinitely and indefinitely if the ruler sees benefit in that. 
The (proof) is the saying of Allah, the Glorified, ‘But if they incline to peace, you also 
incline to it, and put your trust in Allah the All-Hearer, the All-Knower’ because the 
Prophet practiced all of these treaties” (Bin Baaz 2003/18:439). The Jihaadee groups 
strongly reject peace treaties with their enemies especially non-Muslims. However, 
their inflexibility serves only to distance them from the orthodox creed and 
permissible actions that Allah legislated and his Prophet practiced. Therefore, the 
claim that al-Qaeda adheres to the sharee’a is deceptive: they attempt to legitimize 
their acts of violence in the name of the sharee’a and Islaam, when in reality they 
contradict many of its principles.234
     Bin Laaden and al-Qaeda view the scholars that differ with their world view as 
mere puppets used to protect the interests of the various Arab regimes. Bin Laaden 
describes a three tier societal structure which comprises of the security apparatus to 
spy on the general population and protect the leaders from harm. The second sector is 
the media which is used “to beautify the persons of the leaders, drowse the 
community, and fulfill the plans of the enemies…” (Bin Laaden 1996:3). The third 
component “…takes priority with the leaders in the Arab world, and is used to take 
the people astray, and open the door wide for the security factions to fulfill their 
aforementioned objectives. This is the organization of the scholars of the authorities, 
as the role of this organization is the most dangerous of roles in the entirety of the 
Arabic countries” (Bin Laaden 1996:3). Bin Laaden’s view of the scholars vastly 
contrasts with the Salafee position towards the scholars. Allah says, “It is only those 
who posses knowledge, who fear Allah amongst his slaves” (Qur’aan 1996:35:28). 
This is an incredibly important verse which shows how Allah regards the scholars as 
they are the most obedient to his commands and most deserving of his mercy and 
 
 
3.3.9.6 His Criticism of Contemporary Scholars 
      
                                                 
234 “They call their actions jihaad in order to make them acceptable to common people; however they 
are Takfeeree, and even the Khawaarij called their warfare waged against the companions' jihaad. 
Likewise it is not correct to call this thought Salafee, because it differs with the methodology of the 
Salaf in creed and method, rather it is deception to mix the truth with falsehood and to deceive those 
who are ignorant” (al-Suhaymee 2005:204). 
  
favor after the prophets. Allah’s statement forms the foundation of the orthodox creed 
and therefore Bin Laaden and those who insult the scholars have misunderstood an 
important aspect of the Islaamic creed. Imaam Ibn al-Qayyim said, “Surely if the one 
who is firmly grounded in knowledge comes across doubtful matters, even if they 
were as many as the waves of the sea, they would not remove his certainty. Nor would 
they make him doubtful.… Instead if they come to him, he refutes the doubts leaving 
them shackled and defeated with knowledge as his guardian and soldier” (cited in al-
Lawayhiq 2002:25). This illustrates the importance of acquiring knowledge in Islaam 
and that the orthodox scholars firmly adhere to Islaamic principles. However, Bin 
Laaden claimed those scholars who are known for their knowledge and service to 
Islaam are mere puppets of the Arab regimes and his analysis is not supported by 
evidence. Ibn Taymeeya said about those scholars who are known for their 
“truthfulness in general and are praised by the majority of the people in the Muslim 
community, that they are the leaders of guidance, the lights in the darkness” (Ibn 
Taymeeya 1989/11:43).235
Bin Laaden insulted the scholars describing them as beneath their immediate 
predecessors in knowledge and esteem. He also said, “During the preceding two 
decades, the regime enlarged the role of Bin Baz [former grand Muftee] because of 
what it knows of his weakness and flexibility and the ease of influencing him with the 
various means which the interior ministry practices through providing him with false 
 It seems dubious that Bin Laaden who claims to adhere to 
the orthodox creed could attack the scholars in such a way as to invalidate an 
important aspect of creed. Bin Laaden in a way similar to Aboo Qataada, Aboo 
Hamza, and al-Faisal; accuses many of the contemporary scholars of Saudi Arabia of 
concealing the truth by saying: 
           
          At the same time that some of the leaders are engaging in the major kufr, which    
          takes them out of the fold of Islam in broad daylight and in front of all the    
          people, you will find a fatwa from their religious organization. In particular, the  
          role of the religious organization in the country of the two sacred mosques is of  
          the most ominous of roles, this is overlooking whether it fulfilled this role  
          intentionally or unintentionally, the harm which eventuated from their efforts is   
          no different from the role of the most ardent enemies of the nation (Bin Laaden  
          1996:3).  
 
                                                 
 235 This quote was introduced to show that classical scholars emphasized the importance of scholarship 
and that in general those scholars Bin Laaden criticizes have contributed a vast amount of literature 
dedicated to the revival of the classical Islaamic creed. 
  
information” (Bin Laaden 1996:4). Firstly, it seems from this statement that Bin 
Laaden places himself in the position to pass judgments upon the scholars. Imaam 
Maalik said, “It is not permissible for a man who sees himself to be from a group of 
people (scholars) until he asks those who are more knowledgeable than him” (cited in 
al-Lawayhiq 2002:27). This statement refutes the position of Bin Laaden who issues 
verdicts when he does not possess scholarly credentials. Secondly, it is worth noting 
that Bin Laaden’s criticism differs from the blatant accusations of takfeer issued by 
ideologues like al-Faisal and Aboo Hamza, which seems to show that they differ in 
their levels of deviance from the orthodox creed. Bin Laaden accuses Bin Baaz of 
being decrepit and unable to discern truth from falsehood when he states: 
 
          After this the government began to strike with the cane of Bin Baz, every  
          corrective program which the honest scholars put forward. Furthermore, it  
          extracted a fatwa to hand over Palestine to the Jews, and before this, to permit  
          entry in to the country of the two sacred mosques to the modern day crusaders  
          under the rule of necessity, then it relied on a letter from him to the minister for  
          internal affairs and placed the honest scholars in jail (Bin Laaden 1996:3). 
  
This statement appears to be an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the major 
scholars in a way similar to how the original Khawaarij began to sow discord 
amongst the army of ‘Alee the second caliph until a group amongst them eventually 
made takfeer of him and fought against him, as illustrated in chapter one. Furthermore, 
the ‘honest’ scholars Bin Laaden referred to were the same ones who were accused of 
inciting the youth of Saudi Arabia to speak out and change the leadership. Scholars 
like Salmaan al-‘Awdah and Safar al-Hawaalee who were known for making general 
statements of takfeer against Muslim governments and espouse Qutbism. Shaikh 
Saalih al-Fawzaan was asked about some general statements Salmaan al-‘Awdah 
made regarding the absence of the Muslim nation and replied by stating, “This saying 
'the Muslim nation is absent' entails the takfeer of all the Muslim nations, since it 
implies that there is no Islaamic state, and this is in opposition to the statement of the 
Messenger, ‘There will never cease to be a victorious group from my nation holding 
fast to the truth’” (al-'Adnaanee 2004:146). Most of the Takfeeree/Jihaadee groups 
tend to quote from the same scholars and ideologues that hold their position and creed, 
and it follows that they oppose many of the contemporary scholars who affirm the 
principles established by the companions and Taabi’een, especially regarding jihaad 
and takfeer (al-Suhaymee 2005b:79).  
  
3.3.10 Aboo Mus’ab al-Zarqaawee   
 
     Bin Laaden’s counterpart who has gained notoriety for his resistance in Iraq is 
none other than Aboo Mus’ab al-Zarqaawee. Zarqaawee like many other 
Takfeeree/Jihaadee ideologues was radicalized after fighting in the Afghani Jihaad. 
In Afghanistan he came into contact with ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzam, Bin Laaden, and Aboo 
Muhammad al-Maqdasee another extremist Takfeeree currently in prison in Jordan. 
Zarqaawee was recently killed in Iraq; however his ideals and support for his 
movement continue to thrive in Iraq and throughout the world.  
      
      Zarqaawee had a long history of terrorist activities and exhibited a zeal for jihaad 
and was incarcerated for his activities. Brisard mentions, “His jihad could wait no 
longer; the fanatic Islamist was impatient to make up for the time lost in Jordanian 
prisons. He made more and more contacts, renewing his ties with his former friends 
from the time of the mujahidin” (2005:61). Zarqaawee benefited from a general 
amnesty from King ‘Abd Allah of Jordan which was insisted upon by the Jordanian 
faction of the Muslim Brotherhood and this allowed for many radical ideologues to be 
freed, which the Jordanian intelligence services would later regret (Brisard 2005:57). 
Zarqaawee began to establish himself amongst the Takfeeree/Jihaadee circles and by 
2000 “… Zarqawi had proved himself an important part of al-Qaeda apparatus in 
Afghanistan, and in 2001 he took the oath of allegiance to Bin Laden” (Brisard 
2005:67). Zarqaawee later became independent from al-Qaeda and Bin Laaden and 
began to build his terrorist infrastructure in preparation for the invasion of Iraq. One 
of his lieutenants, Azmi al-Jayusi, who was captured in Jordan, would later confess 
“At heart I started training for Abu Musab. The training included handling high-level 
explosives and learning about poisons. I then took the oath of allegiance to Abu 
Musab Al-Zarqawi and agreed to work for him without questions” (Brisard 2005:77). 
 
3.3.10.1 His Creed 
 
     Al-Zarqaawee was clouded in controversy; however he was not new to the 
Takfeeree/Jihaadee methodology and as previously mentioned he had a history of 
jihaadist activities. The three primary components of Zarqaawee’s creed relevant to 
this research are his ideals regarding jihaad, takfeer, and leadership. 
  
    Orthodox scholars hold refuting religious innovation and mistakes in creed as 
imperative in preserving the religion and protecting the general Muslims from the 
harms of religious innovation as discussed in the beginning of chapter three. 
Therefore, groups like al-Qaeda and Jihaadees like Zarqaawee should be analyzed 
and their mistakes refuted as they are a huge trial and test upon the Muslim nation and 
according to Ibn Taymeeya “they present a greater harm than the disbelievers” (Ibn 
Taymeeya 1989b/5:247). This statement is referring to the evil from within the 
Muslim community, particularly that of the Khawaarij, as they deceive the Muslims 
from within their ranks. However, the fact that they are Muslims means in the 
hereafter they are better off than disbelievers, who according to orthodox scholars, 
abide in the hell-fire eternally. In this regard Allah says, “Verily, those who disbelieve 
from amongst the people of the scripture and polytheists will abide in the fire of hell. 
They are the worst of creatures” (Qur’aan 1996:98:6). Therefore, although innovation 
in worship, and the Khawaarij creed in particular, are sinful according to the orthodox 
creed it is possible to repent and have redemption unlike those who perish while 
disbelieving. The implication is that it is dangerous to hold unorthodox beliefs in 
Islaam and it is a duty to warn against those who hold deviant creeds, and this is a 
type of jihaad. Imaam Ahmad said, “According to us the foundation of the Sunna is 
adhering to what the companions of the Prophet adhered to and leaving innovation. 
Every innovation is misguidance, therefore, avoid arguing about religion and sitting 
with innovators” (al-Muhammadee 2005:6-7).    
 
3.3.10.2 Zarqaawee on Jihaad  
 
     Jihaad to Zarqaawee was the primary means to achieve and return the lost prestige 
of the Muslim community; however as we will see jihaad to Zarqaawee differed from 
that of the orthodox creed. Ibn Taymeeya said regarding the preparation for jihaad 
“then the strength of the religion is with the Book of guidance (Qur’aan) and using the 
sword for assistance” (Ibn Taymeeya 1989/28:234). This statement shows the 
importance of establishing the religion by correcting the creed wherein the sword is 
secondary for strengthening that foundation. Another benefit of this statement is that 
it illustrates that jihaad is not the end result; instead it is a means for assisting Allah’s 
religion if it is performed in accordance with its correct conditions. Allah says, “And 
verily it is a right upon us to help the believers” (Qur’aan 1996:30:47). It can be 
  
inferred that, according to the orthodox belief, Allah’s assistance and victory comes 
through obedience to him and following the Sunna of the Prophet, not through terror, 
ignorance of religious principles and heretical methodologies. The Prophet said, as 
collected by Imaam Ahmad, that “The mujaahid is the one who struggles within 
himself to be obedient to Allah. And the immigrant is the one who flees from what 
Allah has prohibited” (Ibn Hanbal 1996/3:21). Ibn al-Qayyim commented on this 
hadeeth as follows: “Jihaad against oneself comes before jihaad against the external 
enemy and it is its foundation. Whoever does not fight his desires to do what he was 
commanded to do and leave what he was prohibited from for Allah’s sake will never 
accomplish jihaad against his external enemies” (cited in al-Jazaa'iree 2004:56). 
These statements give insight into the classical view regarding jihaad, and it is a 
refutation of the position of Zarqaawee who seemed to emphasize that jihaad of the 
sword comes before correcting one’s creed. Zarqaawee’s jihaad seemed to be based 
upon brutality and this appears similar to the allegations many made against the 
Talibaan’s rule of Afghanistan. Some allege the Talibaan were unable to establish 
themselves amongst the Afghani population and for this reason during the American 
bombing campaign many of their Afghani counterparts fled to the opposing side 
(Hammidov 2004:40-46).236 The fall of the Talibaan draws a parallel to Zarqaawee’s 
campaign in Iraq, which does not appear to have the support of the Iraqi masses 
(Burke 2004:270-271). Brisard claims that Afghanistan and Iraq are both important 
campaigns to Jihaadee groups. “In the former, Bin Laden got himself accepted on the 
basis of his strategic intelligence; in the latter, Zarqawi predominates mainly by force. 
Bin Laden worked out the pragmatic position; Zarqawi advocates chaos as a form of 
political pressure. Bin Laden thinks of himself as bringing people together; Zarqawi is 
exclusionary” (2005:1). Zarqaawee’s terror and wanton violence appeared to have 
alienated him from the Iraqi populace which is not in accordance with Islaamic jihaad 
espoused by classical scholars nor is it a strategy likely to bring about a sustained 
campaign to attain its objectives.237
                                                 
 236 Islaam emphasizes leniency and wisdom especially in application of the sharee’a. Evidence 
alibaan were excessive in their attempts to implement sharee’a especially in regards Tsuggests that the 
to the ban on women’s education and the creation of a climate of fear in Afghanistan from their 
policies (Marsden 2002:94-98).    
237  Burke asserts that Zarqaawee’s targeting of the U.N., several foreign embassies, and the Red Cross 
is much different than typical al-Qaeda strategy and the tactics of Bin Laaden, who is more concerned 
about Muslim public opinion, whereas Zarqaawee is more alienating as illustrated in his attacks against 
Iraqi Shee’a (Burke 2004:271).  
  
     For Zarqaawee and indeed most Muslims, the invasion by the U.S. of Iraq was an 
unjustifiable act of aggression. This is extremely important to understand as it offers 
insight into Zarqaawee’s motivation to fight and terrorize the coalition forces, the new 
Iraqi government, and those perceived as cooperating with them. Zarqaawee stated: 
 
          America came to change the nation's principles, twist its words, and change its  
          curricula. It came to do away with the fountains of goodness that are bursting in  
          the conscience of the Islamic nation and block the way to a new awakening and  
          true return to Islam. America came to spread obscenity and vice and establish  
          its decadence and ribald culture in the name of freedom and democracy. It  
          hopes to remold the region and change its political, religious, and cultural map  
          according to its personal interests (Zarqaawee 2005a:2).  
 
  
Zarqaawee envisioned the invasion as a part of a larger quest for empire and influence 
in the area as well as a type of cultural imperialism to destroy Islaamic values and 
statehood.238
To many Muslims the situation in Iraq is unacceptable and the statement issued by the 
above mentioned Saudi clerics illustrates the tensions many Muslims face: paradox of 
supporting the U.S. “War on Terror”, highly perceived as a war against Islaam, and 
 This is a common perception in the greater Muslim world which seems 
to leave many Muslims ambivalent about the proper reaction to U.S. aggression, 
Zarqaawee, and those who resist American occupation. Zarqaawee framed the war in 
Iraq in religious terms and with concepts that resonate throughout the Muslim world. 
 
          In November 5, 2004, on the eve of the U.S. siege on the Iraqi city of Falluja,  
          26 Saudi clerics, including both al-Awdah and al-Hawali, signed an ‘open letter  
          to the Iraqi people’ that called for Iraqis to join in a defensive jihad against the  
          U.S. military occupation. The fatwa has received considerable attention,  
          although little analysis, let alone consideration of its significance in the Saudi  
          domestic political arena. The fatwa made the case for violence against U.S.  
          forces in Iraq, noting that ‘jihad against the occupation was mandatory for those  
          who were able.’ For those unable to participate themselves, the statement did  
          forbid ‘harming any member of the resistance,’ which the clerics did not bother  
          to define, as well as forbidding ‘any Muslim from providing support or  
          assistance to military operations on behalf of the occupying soldiers.’ The fatwa  
          has widely been interpreted as an endorsement of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and  
          his operations in Iraq (Jones 2005:5). 
 
                                                 
238 Former US Ambassador Madeliene Albright was asked if the deaths of half a million Iraqi children 
were a price worth paying for economic sanctions against Iraq under Saddaam Hussayn and replied, 
“We think the price is worth it…” (Pilger 2003:48). In general, Muslim public opinion views US policy 
throughout the Muslim world as callous, demoralizing, and intrusive, and this plays into the hands of 
extremists like Zarqaawee (Lewis 2003:165).  
 
  
the wanton acts of violence attributed to Zarqaawee and groups that espouse his 
vision of global jihaad.239
     Zarqaawee called the Muslim nation to rally behind his jihaad, but he was not an 
authority to call for jihaad, and his zeal was not sufficient to justify his actions in Iraq. 
Zarqaawee stated, “God be praised, we are invading them, as they are invading us, 
attacking them as they are attacking us, and inflicting losses on them as they are 
 This statement also shows the internal tensions many 
Muslims societies like Saudi Arabia face as the regime must balance between two 
opposing forces which threaten their legitimacy: allying itself with Western interests 
or the interests of their Muslim constituencies, and by choosing the former their 
legitimacy to rule, and in fact, their Islaamic authenticity is open to challenge. 
      
    Zarqaawee claimed that “Iraq in the Talmudic prophesies, which the neo-
conservative rulers in Washington and London uphold, is the land of evil, whore city, 
and first enemy of the Israelites. The prophesies call for killing Iraqis, raping their 
women, smashing the heads of their children, and pouring death on their heads, as 
they have actually done” (Zarqaawee 2005a:2). This actually seemed to be a plea to 
the Muslim masses to come to defend the land of Iraq from oppression and tyranny 
and this gave him legitimacy amongst Jihaadee circles. Zarqaawee’s struggle was 
perceived by some moderates as legitimate due to the inadequate case the U.S. made 
for invading Iraq. Mamdani concludes about the U.S. motivations for invading Iraq 
after discussing the staged rescue of Jessica Lynch, an army Private, that:  
         
          her rescue is as much of a lie as the two major reasons given for launching the  
          war on Iraq: Saddaam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or the  
          links between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda. The very notion of ‘weapons of  
          mass destruction’ was invented as a scare to go alongside the notion of an ‘evil’   
          regime whose arsenal must evoke deep fear (2005:198). 
  
It has become accepted amongst many that there is no concrete evidence to support 
the invasion of Iraq and that sufficient evidence never really existed. This gives 
additional fuel to Zarqaawee’s accusations and the perception amongst some that he 
was a resistance fighter, now martyr, rather than an extreme terrorist.  
 
                                                 
239 Other non-Saudi clerics, like Yusuf al-Qardawi, also find the U.S. invasion of Iraq unacceptable 
and view it as open aggression and thus legitimate jihaad. Al-Qardawi believes that jihaad against 
aggressive non-Muslim states takes precedence in contemporary times and that freeing Muslim lands  
is a duty upon all Muslims (al-Qardawi 2000:1/297-298).     
 
  
inflicting losses on us. Yet, we are not the same. Our dead go to paradise and theirs go 
to hell” (Zarqaawee 2005a:3). Zarqaawee urged the Muslim nation to fight without 
the scholarly credentials to do so or the backing of a legitimate Muslim authority. 
Regardless of this Zarqaawee declared: 
         
         They are aware that if the Islamic giant wakes up it will not be satisfied with  
          less than the gates of Rome, Washington, Paris, and London. They tried  
          before to hide the truth of the battle and to distort the image of the pure jihad  
          flag. They deluded the world into believing that it is the remnants of the defunct  
          regime and the elements of the infidel Ba'th that are waging the resistance  
          operations so that the nation would not back the battle and hail the epic  
          (Zarqaawee 2005a:3). 
 
For Zarqaawee, Iraq was a starting point for his global jihaad, and he aspired to 
export his concepts to much of the Western world. Bin ‘Uthaymeen was asked about 
those who advocate this vision of global jihaad and he replied: 
 
          This saying is foolishness: that it is obligatory upon us to fight America,  
          France, Britain, and Russia. How can we fight refusing the wisdom of Allah the  
          Almighty and rejecting his sharee’a? However, it is obligatory upon us that  
          we do what Allah the Almighty has commanded us to do ‘And prepare for  
          them as much as you are able from strength’…And the most important strength  
          we can prepare is faith and God consciousness (al-Reis 2003:25).    
 
The principles regarding jihaad as espoused by Bin ‘Uthaymeen are to prepare 
oneself through worship and building faith and the fruit of that strength is God 
consciousness: fearing his punishment and hoping for his mercy. Second, it is 
preparation physically and militarily. This statement illustrates a radically different 
approach to Zarqaawee’s, who saw strength and the ability to influence through 
violence as the most effective means of accomplishing his goals. 
     Zarqaawee believed that the struggle in Iraq constituted pure jihaad but no major 
contemporary scholars240
                                                 
240 Some scholars like Yusuf al-Qardawi, the Muftee of Qatar, support suicide bombings and consider 
Iraq a legitimate jihaad. However, al-Qardawi is known as one of the head scholars of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and is accused by many Salafee scholars of straying from the orthodox creed, 
methodology, and jurisprudence. “Qardawi opposes the Qur’aan and the Sunna and the understanding 
of the companions in many of his sayings and actions” (al-‘Adenee 2004:226). What is significant here 
is the process of reconstructing Iraq and how to regain stability for a country fragmented on the brink 
of civil war. The invasion of Iraq, in general was not supported by Muslims, and in accordance with the 
evidence presented in this research, and empirical evidence Saddaam Hussayn and his regime were a 
greater source of stability for Iraq than the occupation by America and coalition forces and the 
consequences of removing Saddaam Hussayn, no matter how contested his legitimacy was, has proven 
to be disastrous for the Iraqi people (Pilger 2003:49-53).     
 supported him in his endeavors or decreed his actions as 
  
legitimate. Jihaad must be in accordance with the Prophet’s Sunna and for the sake of 
uplifting Allah’s word. This according to orthodox scholars is achieved through 
knowledge of the conditions of jihaad. Al-Badr states that “…worship is not correct 
unless it is with knowledge and understanding of the religion. With regard to this, 
‘Umar Bin ‘Abd al-‘Azeez, a Taabi'ee, said: Whoever, worships Allah without 
knowledge then he has spoiled more than he has rectified” (al-Badr 2005: 23). Al-
 Madinain  who teaches in the Prophet’s Mosque scholar, adeethhbaad a major bA‘
Saudi Arabia, declared that the situation in Iraq is chaotic and not reflective of 
Islaamic jihaad. He stated, “What is the result of that chaos (invasion of Iraq and 
Afghanistan) and fighting between the people of those two regions?! No doubt that 
the removal of the Ba’thist Party in Iraq is a great blessing for the people of Iraq, 
however, the siege that continues is a great catastrophe” (al-‘Abbaad 2005:52). It is 
common for the Jihaadee groups to consult with those scholars who hold their world 
view and methodology. Al-Maqdasee, who Zarqaawee often sought religious verdicts 
from, articulates the belief of many contemporary Jihaadees when he states: 
 
          And if standing up to them [apostate rulers] and hastening to replace them is not  
          obligatory except upon the one who is capable, then the condition for it being  
          an obligation is not a condition for its permissibility. Hence, it is permissible for 
           a person to fight them even if by himself and even if he is certain of martyrdom  
          and not gaining victory. Jihad is an act of worship and an obligation that is  
          legislated until the Day of Judgment. Nothing invalidates it. It is permissible to  
          perform it any time such as charity when compared to Zakah (al-Maqdasee  
          2003:27). 
 
It seems odd that someone with the background that al-Maqdasee has would make a 
statement which appears to void important principles of jihaad. Al-Maqdasee 
considers jihaad as both a goal and a means to achieve a political end. In addition, his 
vision of jihaad does not include an analysis of the benefit or harm that may result  
from fighting which must be taken into consideration as it is an established principle 
from the sharee’a as was previously mentioned (al-Sidlaan 1999:528).241
                                                 
241  Al-Sidlaan mentions several examples regarding this principle with the specific case of jihaad. One 
of the examples was the treaty of Hudaibiya where the Prophet saw benefit in giving up the right to 
make the lesser pilgrimage and returning any Muslims that escaped from the polytheists, which seemed 
to compromise the situation of the Muslims considerably in favor of avoiding bloodshed in Makka and 
the harm it would have caused to the Muslims living amongst the pagans (al-Sidlaan 1999:528-529). 
  
some of the Khawaarij sects (‘Awaajee 2002:448). Al-Waadi’ee states, “We possess 
the book of Allah, and Sunna of the Prophet of Allah…We do not need innovation 
which Allah has not authorized from any one, rather innovation is considered more 
harmful than sinfulness” (al-Waadi’ee 2004: 66). The implication is that the religion 
is perfect and complete and unorthodoxy challenges these premises, so it is imperative 
to adhere to the orthodox creed and refer to the major scholars in order to prevent 
chaos and misguidance. In addition, the major scholars possess the knowledge and 
wisdom on how to deal with difficult situations and great tribulations such as the war 
in Iraq and other major world events, and this is essentially the Salafee argument. 
Regrettably, Zarqaawee referred only to those who agree with his actions and creed 
which contradicts the Prophet’s statement when he said, “I fear the most for my 
nation the hypocrite who possesses the knowledgeable tongue” (cited in al-Waadi’ee 
2004:42). This is not to say Zarqaawee was a hypocrite nor those he referred to for 
religious verdicts, but rather this is an indictment against them as they seemed to 
possess eloquent speech inciting to violence without the proper understanding of the 
religion. 
 
 Al-
Maqdasee’s statement shows his departure from Salafee scholars as he deems jihaad 
as a perennial institution permissible for even a single person to engage in similar to 
     Zarqaawee urged the Muslims to spend and support those fighting in Iraq under the 
banner of jihaad when in fact his call resembled a call to more chaos and anarchy. 
Allah says, “Surely, Satan is an enemy to you, so treat him as an enemy. He only 
invites you to his group (hizb) that the may become the dwellers of the blazing fire” 
(Qur’aan 1996:35:6). Al-‘Abbaad mentions about the above verse that “Satan entered 
upon all the people of innovation and desires by the means of doubtful matters which 
he made seem beautiful to them. Then they continue to practice innovation thinking 
they are on the truth when in fact they are on falsehood” (al-‘Abbaad 2005:6). This 
description appears to fit Zarqaawee as he called the whole Islaamic nation to fight 
under his banner of jihaad without legitimacy or support from major scholars or 
adhering to the principles espoused by classical scholars. Zarqaawee said, “Nation of 
Isl m, come to he rescue of t e jihad in Iraq before th  infidel majority b sieges the 
mujahidi . Or by God, who holds my soul, if the torch of jihad is extinguished, if the 
breath of jihad weakens, and if the pockets of jihad in Iraq are closed, the Islamic 
nation will not rise until God wills it to rise" (Zarqaawee 2005a:4). Zarqaawee’s call 
to chaos was not in accordance with any principles of jihaad, but instead an 
exhortation to increased harm upon the Iraqi populace. Allah says, “Do not spread 
  
wickedness throughout the earth after its rectification” (Qur’aan 1996:7:56). It is in 
accordance with the Khawaarij creed to spread chaos and instability in the attempt to 
remove the leaders, or under the guise of commanding the good and forbidding the 
evil (‘Awaajee 2002:437). Al-‘Abbaad states, “In reality, to cause the spread of 
wickedness throughout the earth while at the same time calling for rectification is a 
characteristic of the hypocrites” (al-‘Abbaad 2005:15).     
 
     Terror was the preferred weapon of Zarqaawee and the actions he endorsed were 
used to incite sectarian violence in Iraq in order to destabilize the new Iraqi regime. 
Zarqaawee’s war on the Shee’a must be scrutinized carefully to deduce the Salafee 
position regarding his declarations and actions. Firstly, he built his case against the 
by summing up their general creed, he said: adRaafi 
  
          O nation of Islam, you must know that the Shiite creed and Islam only meet as  
          Jews and Christians meet under the name of the people of the book. The Shiites  
          have distorted the Koran, insulted the prophet's companions, stabbed the  
          mothers of the faithful, repudiated the people of Islam and spilled their blood,  
          committed great sins and engaged in all kinds of superstitions, falsehoods, and  
          myths (Zarqaawee 2005a:4). 
  
 ;not considered Muslim issect  adRaafiAccording to the orthodox creed the       
however the rules of takfeer apply to them as individuals before one can accuse an 
individual from amongst them to be non-Muslim, this is due in part because they 
consider themselves Muslims and associate themselves with Islaam and amongst them 
are some who may be ignorant of the orthodox creed (Ibn Taymeeya 1989b/1:68). 242
                                                 
242 Refer to the section on the conditions of takfeer in chapter two. 
 
Zarqaawee in his self-declared war against the Shee’a made it lawful to kill anyone 
amongst them and bomb their places of worship: mosques and places of pilgrimage. 
Muslims  Sunnigain support from  and adaafiRcase against the  hisn order to build I
Zarqaawee claimed: 
 
          Ari'el Sharon says in his memoirs: We spoke a great deal about the relations  
          with the other communities, especially the Shia and Druze. I personally asked  
          Israelis to strengthen ties with these two minority communities. I even  
          suggested giving them some of the weapons that Israel acquired as a token to  
          the Shiites, who also suffered from serious problems with the PLO (cited in  
          Zarqaawee 2005a:5).  
 
  
This quote Zarqaawee attributed to Ariel Sharon the prime minister of Israel is 
as they have a long history of  adRaafisufficient to strengthen his case against the 
treachery, fighting against and assisting the enemies of Sunni Islaam. Ibn Taymeeya 
the that  adRaafito that of the  Khawaarijy of the unorthodoxsaid while comparing the 
Khawaarij’s “…innovation was not from atheism and apostasy, but instead from 
 ,adRaafi). As for the Qur’aanmisguidance and ignorance of the meaning of the book (
then the foundation of their innovation is from apostasy, disbelief, and lying 
intentionally” (Ibn Taymeeya 1989b/1:68). So, the politics of Ariel Sharon and the 
declared -’s selfZarqaaweeboth give credence to  adRaafihistory and creed of the 
jihaad. Although he has no backing of the scholars or Muslim rulers, he can attract 
 hostile towardsare seen as  adRaafirecruits for his campaign as both Sharon and the 
Muslims. Furthermore, he said: 
          
          Still, let the world know that we were not the first to start the fighting. They are  
          the ones who killed the mujahidin, assassinated the refugees, and the eyes and  
          ears of the Americans. Many mujahidin were killed by treacherous bullets that  
          came from behind their backs at the hands of these people. They also stormed  
          mosques and turned them into dens for paganism and infidelity. They raped  
          women and violated sanctities and are now killing and liquidating Sunni  
          preachers, ulema, and men of learning (Zarqaawee 2005a:5). 
 
Zarqaawee continued to build a strong case against the Shee’a and appears to be 
successful in inciting sectarian rivalries. However, Zarqaawee was neither a scholar 
nor a leader representative of the Muslim community. Therefore, he had no legitimacy 
for his terror campaign under the guise of jihaad. Even, “Bin Laden and those closely 
associated with him have always shunned attacks on co-religionists, even issuing 
apologies for Muslim collateral damage on several occasions in 2003…” (Burke 
2004:271).243
     Zarqaawee’s history is rife with plots to terrorize those who oppose his views and 
particularly the Muslim governments and those he felt are collaborators and enemies 
of Islaam. Zarqaawee had planned several attacks against Israel and was also indicted 
 ussaynHin the Millennium plot to blow up the Radisson Hotel in Jordan and the King 
Bridge which connects Jordan and Israel. “From now on Zarqawi would represent a 
 
 
                                                 
243  It seems dubious that on one hand Bin Laaden incites attacks against Saudi Arabia and other 
Muslim targets, and on the other hand, he seems to hold Raafida, traditional rivalries to Sunni Islaam, 
as sacred co-religionists.  
  
serious threat, as became evident in several attacks and attempted attacks organized in 
the Middle East between 1999 and 2004” (Brisard 2005:81). These terrorist actions 
and attempted plots show the animosity and the commonality that Zarqaawee has with 
the original Khawaarij who “rebelled against the Muslims and their leaders and made 
it permissible to kill Muslims” (al-Aajooree 1999: 1/336). Zarqaawee and his group 
to substantiate their terror  Qur’aanthe verses of the  dusemis Jihaad-eed wa alhTaw
and exhortation to violence, which also resembles the methodology of the original 
Khawaarij who were “a people who misinterpreted the Qur’aan according to their 
desires weakening the Muslims, and Allah the Almighty warned against them, as well 
as the Prophet, also we were warned against them by the rightly guided caliphs and 
the companions” (al-Aajooree 1999: 1/325). There are two important points that need 
to be highlighted in this statement which described the Khawaarij over 1100 years 
ago. Firstly, the original Khawaarij misused the Qur’aan to sow rebellion and discord 
amongst the Muslims much in the same way Zarqaawee and the Takfeerees 
misrepresent the Qur’aan and Islaam. Brisard offers a stinging criticism of 
Zarqaawee’s persona and motivations for terror when he states: 
 
          When it comes to violence, Zarqawi brings terrorism back to its original    
           meaning: terror. Always one war behind, he never succeeded in his   
           undertaking until he found in the Iraqi conflict an outlet for his frustrations and  
           complexes and a way to undo his failures. Draped in his personal religious  
           convictions, he has declared war against the world and everyone in it 
           (Brisard 2005: preface).  
 
Secondly, the above statement illustrates the importance of warning against the 
Khawaarij and groups that hold common ideals, and this is the position of orthodox 
scholars both classic and contemporary (al-Suhaymee 2005:9-17). 
 
     Zarqaawee used assassination and beheadings as a means to strike terror into his 
adversaries. Zarqaawee said before beheading Nicholas Berg the American private 
contractor working in Iraq, “You will see the way your warrior brothers hang the head 
of this infidel from one of the bridges in Baghdad, so that no one will forget the way 
we treat infidels. May he bear witness to the honor of the Muslims” (Brisard 2005: 
131). For Zarqaawee honor and prestige will come to the Muslim nation by killing 
and sacrificing those perceived to hamper the progress of the Muslims. Brisard states,  
  
“Zarqawi is not a great strategist. His prominence is due to his brute force against the 
American ‘invader’. His coalition has no actual coherence other than its savagery, nor 
does it have a political point of view” (Brisard 2005: 133). Brisard’s criticism offers 
insight into Zarqaawee’s prominence, however he has shown his military astuteness, 
and until recently, his ability to elude capture, and that he did possess political goals:  
destabilization of the new Iraqi regime, expulsion of the coalition forces, and 
incitement of the Muslim world into a greater conflict with the Western world and its 
allies.  
 
     Zarqaawee’s group staged numerous ambushes upon Iraqi police and military 
recruits and justified these actions by claiming they are collaborators with the 
American infidels. Zarqaawee stated, “If John Abizaid escaped our swords this time, 
we will be lying in wait for him, for Bremer, for their generals and soldiers, and their 
collaborators” (Zarqaawee 2005a:3). Here he refers to those who work for the newly 
established Iraqi government, support them, or even recognize them as illustrated with 
the numerous killings and beheadings of civilian contractors. In October 2004, fifty 
five Iraqi recruits were slaughtered and “Zarqawi took credit for the action the very 
next day, stating that his group had killed ‘corrupt men’ and had managed to ‘steal 
two vehicles and the salaries the soldiers had just received from their masters’” 
(Brisard 2005:138). Zarqaawee and Tawheed wa al-Jihaad made no distinction when 
terrorizing and killing their foes whether they were Muslim or not, and this was the 
main tactic of his self-declared jihaad. It is important to keep in mind that none of the 
Salafee scholars have declared Zarqaawee’s military operations a legitimate jihaad 
and like the original Khawaarij they have no support from those who adhere to the 
orthodox creed and methodology (‘Awaajee 2002:46). Al-‘Abbaad states about those 
Muslim youth who create chaos and terror in the name of jihaad, “If only those youth 
would struggle against their desires in obedience to Allah to leave their mistakes and 
sins, and not harm the Muslims with their tongues and hands, and make the people 
feel safe in their wealth and persons. Instead they follow their group leaders and 
distance themselves from the scholars” (al-‘Abbaad 2005:46). Zarqaawee’s terror 
campaign resulted in chaos and regime destabilization, whereas the goals of jihaad 
according to scholars like Ibn Taymeeya is “that the word of Allah reign supreme and 
that the religion is solely for Allah. So its purpose is to establish the religion of 
  
Allah…” (cited in al-Badr 2005:18). On the contrary, Zarqaawee boasted of his 
military achievements as primarily the result of suicide bombings by saying: 
 
          God honored us and so we harvested their heads and torn up their bodies in  
          many places: The United Nations in Baghdad; the coalition forces in Karbala;  
          the Italians in Al-Nasiriyah; the US forces on Al-Khalidiyah Bridge; the US  
          intelligence in Al-Shahin Hotel and the Republican Palace in Baghdad; the CIA  
          in Al-Rashid Hotel; and the Polish forces in Al-Hillah (Zarqaawee 2005a:3).  
 
Suicide bombing as already mentioned is not permissible and according to al-
Albaanee is “something we know from the Japanese and others, when a man would 
plunge his airplane into an American warship and blow up himself with his plane” (al-
Haarithee 2003:76). This is not in accordance with the Islaamic creed instead it is a 
form of suicide and it resembles the way of the non-Muslims instead of the Prophet 
Muhammad and his companions. Al-Jaaberee explained that these bombings in 
general are a type of suicide, and furthermore what takes place between the 
Palestinians and Israelis is only harmful to the Muslims as they are the recipients of 
Israeli wrath after such bombings. Then he said, “Those ignorant ones never establish 
a firm criterion to judge by, nor improve their politics and learn the correct jihaad by 
returning to the scholars” (al-Haarithee 2003:82). It seems that Salafee scholars 
expound upon the importance of leadership and returning to the opinion of the major 
scholars when looking at complex issues like jihaad because it is considered a form of 
worship in Islaam, and it has conditions as all acts of worship do.   
 
     Zarqaawee used terror as a political tool to expel the coalition forces from Iraq and 
for him the end justified the means.244
                                                 
244  Brisard states, “Zarqawi has tried several times in his writings and speeches to justify his barbaric 
acts, in particular after some religious Iraqis distanced themselves from his group or condemned him 
outright. He holds that these vile murders are justified by the Koran and that the people he kills are 
spies" (Brisard 2005:144). 
  
hand attacked innocent people to achieve his aims. “Zarqawi knows he will win this 
war primarily by mobilizing public opinion in the West against the occupation. Thus 
civilians have become the organization’s main targets” (Brisard 2005:138). To kill 
civilians and particularly women, children, and priests is strictly forbidden in Islaam. 
In a narration collected in Muslim, ‘Abd Allah Bin ‘Umar a companion of the Prophet 
narrated, “A woman was killed in one of the raids, so the Messenger of Allah forbade 
killing women and children” (al-Nawawee 1997/12:275). 
      
     Brutality and wanton violence are common tactics used by Zarqaawee against his 
enemies and so-called collaborators. In one such incident an Egyptian hostage had his 
tongue cut out for allegations of supplying American soldiers with prostitutes, and 
publicly displaying animosity towards Zarqaawee’s resistance. “He then stuffed the 
Egyptian’s mouth with cotton and read a statement in the form of a judicial 
sentence.… He was then beheaded” (Brisard 2005:140). Zarqaawee meted out 
punishment swiftly against those who violated his sense of justice, and this resembles 
the Khawaarij methodology: how they dealt with those who did not hold their world 
view and concept of justice (al-‘Aqal 1998:111). Evidence suggests that the main 
difference between Zarqaawee’s tactics and that of the Khawaarij is that Zarqaawee 
was considerably more brutal and commonly targeted civilians.  
 
     Zarqaawee and his group are selective in their kidnapping and executions, mainly 
targeting Westerners and their ‘collaborators’ (Brisard 2005:142).This shows that 
do have political motives which  Jihaad-eed wa alhTaw-aland his group  Zarqaawee
disprove the claims of those who say they are simply terrorists randomly killing to 
instill fear and chaos. Brisard states, “His macabre scenarios make an impression 
because of the barbarity they display and the terror they inspire. This is just what 
Zarqawi is counting on” (Brisard 2005:143). Zarqaawee was indeed effective at 
terrorizing his opponents and the evidence shows that he had a political agenda: to 
export his vision of a greater global jihaad and destabilize his enemies; however if he 
had achieved his aims it is difficult to determine what type of system he might have 
advocated if any. 
      
 However, Islaam plays a part in every aspect of 
life and the purpose of actions is to come closer to Allah, therefore it is not 
permissible, nor acceptable to Allah to use any means to worship him except that 
which was acceptable to the Prophet. The Prophet said, “Whoever seeks other than 
my way, then he is not from me” (‘Aasim 1998:48). Then it can be deduced that when 
the purpose of jihaad is to raise the word of Allah, defend and spread the religion of 
Islaam, then this is an act of worship. Therefore, terror even if it brings satisfactory 
results will not be considered worship or acceptable in Islaam. Zarqaawee on the other 
     Zarqaawee had a tendency to violate established Islaamic principles by 
misinterpreting verses of the Qur’aan to support his view in contradiction of other 
  
verses and the understanding of the pious predecessors. Zarqaawee appeared to 
misinterpret the verse of the Qur’aan in which Allah states, “And those who, when an 
oppressive wrong is done to them, take revenge. The recompense for an evil is an evil 
like thereof; but whoever forgives and makes reconciliation, his reward is with Allah. 
Verily, He likes not the oppressors” (Qur’aan 1996:42:40). Zarqaawee deduced from 
that verse that “God permits us to do the same thing to (the infidels) in return, with the 
same means they employ. If they kill our women, we will kill their women” (cited in 
Brisard 2005:144). Firstly, according to the orthodox creed there is no contradiction in 
religious texts and it is not permissible to reinterpret the meaning to suit one’s desires. 
Secondly, the verse was specific in meaning and there is evidence which prohibits 
killing the women and children and imitating the way of the enemy. Thirdly, the end 
of the verse urges forgiveness and illustrates that Allah dislikes those who transgress 
the religious boundaries. The religious boundaries were clearly demarcated by the 
Prophet, and it is very evident that he prohibited retaliation through wanton violence. 
For example, after the battle of Uhud seventy of his companions were slain and some 
were mutilated and the Prophet did not return the act of barbarity (al-Nawawee 
1997/12:358). Imaam Shawkaanee stated, “It is not permissible to kill women, 
children, and the old, except out of necessity. Nor is it permissible to torture 
(mutilation) or burn by fire” (Haalaq 1993:336). Therefore, Zarqaawee appears to 
have misunderstood the text and his application of the aforementioned verse was not 
in accordance with the understanding of the Prophet, his companions, nor classical 
scholars. 
 
3.3.10.3 Zarqaawee’s Criticism of the Scholars 
 
     A common link which binds the creed of the Takfeeree groups is their position 
regarding the Salafee scholars and Zarqaawee was no exception. Zarqaawee was 
critical of the scholars for not supporting him in his military campaign which he 
strove to give legitimacy under the guise of jihaad. Zarqaawee stated: 
  
          Unfortunately, all this is taking place while the Sunnis are asleep due to lies  
          told by their so-called wise men and ulema that drugged the nation and let it  
          down. They were the bridge, which the enemies crossed to kill the nation.  
          Whenever the nation wanted to wake up and avenge for the humiliation of its  
          religion and honor, they told it: Stay asleep and don't wake up. Do you want it  
          to be a sectarian war? (Zarqaawee 2005a:5).   
  
 
Zarqaawee envisioned that the Sunni Muslim community would benefit from a 
sectarian war in Iraq. It seems Zarqaawee and his predecessors believed that chaos 
and bloodshed is the price for victory: by creating a sectarian war it would draw more 
Sunni Islaamic support into the conflict with the possibility of a greater Sunni 
coalition. However, his vision is not shared by contemporary scholars nor does he 
offer an example from the classical scholars in which Islaam benefited from chaos. 
Due to his harshness with the scholars and distance from them it seems he went 
further astray from the orthodox position regarding jihaad and the rectification of the 
Muslim nation. A common criticism expressed by many Takfeerees is that many 
contemporary scholars are ignorant of current affairs and cannot offer viable solutions 
to contemporary problems. 
 
          Frustrated by the purist scholars’ insistence on remaining outside of politics,  
          some of the politicos coined a number of colorful pejoratives to deride the  
          purist focus on rituals, including the “scholars of trivialities,” “the scholars of  
          menstruation” (referring to purist fatwas about the permissibility of sexual  
          relations during menstruation), and the “scholars of toilet manners.” Abd al- 
          Rahman Abd al-Khaliq, the leader of the Turath movement in Kuwait, was  
          particularly vocal in this regard. He derided the senior purist scholars as  
          “mummified,” “a collection of blind men who have given themselves the roles  
          of leading the ummah in giving verdicts,"  and “those who live in the Middle  
          Ages” (Wiktorowicz 2005:224). 245
Takfeerees often voice these types of criticisms against contemporary scholars whom 
they disagree with which is a trait inherent to the creed of the original Khawaarij and 
Zarqaawee is no exception. Zarqaawee said, “Where are the Islamic ulema? Why 
have you deviated from the right path, stopped leading the marchers, surrendered to 
vain desires, and kept sitting complacently on the ground?" (Zarqaawee 2005a). He 
claimed the scholars are overwhelmed with complacency when in fact it appears they 
are the most concerned with Muslim issues and most knowledgeable of the religion 
(al-Lawayhiq 2002:119). It is wise to know when and how to conduct the affairs of 
the Muslims and when jihaad and other acts of worship are legislated. At times there 
is wisdom in concessions, or patience during adversity, and a clear example of this 
was the treaty of Hudaibiya where the Prophet made concessions to the pagans of 
Makka and was not allowed to stay in Makka. The Prophet could have resisted but 
  
 
                                                 
 245 This highlights the differences in approach and in fact rift between those politically active scholars 
and the Salafees who tend to shun political activism. 
  
instead out of his wisdom made the concessions knowing that victory was sure to 
come (al-Nawawee 1997:12/348). This is indisputable evidence that rectification of 
the issues confronting the Muslim community does not always come through fighting, 
and that at times it is wise to be patient. 
 
     The actions and statements of Zarqaawee seems to suggest that he possessed a lack 
of patience, and his willingness to pursue violent means to achieve his goals shows he 
was disposed to place himself in the position of the scholars. The companions and the 
early scholars considered making religious verdicts a very serious matter, and were 
, a Laila Abeein B maanhRa-‘Abd alfearful of the consequences of such verdicts. 
Taabi’ee, said, “I met one hundred and twenty of the Ansaar246
                                                 
246 They were the companions who resided in Madina and gave refuge to the emigrants.   
  
          hands and our swords, and soon, God willing (Zarqaawee 2005a:5). 
 
 from the companions 
of the Messenger of Allah, and one of them would ask about an issue, then one would 
refer to another and another to another, until the question returned to the first one” 
(cited in al-Yoobee 2005:14). This account shows the hesitancy and fearfulness of the 
companions of assuming responsibility for a mistake in a religious verdict. They 
considered it a trust and something they would be held accountable for in front of 
Allah. This is in great contrast to the Takfeeree ideologues that seem to never cease in 
expressing hasty opinions and issue verdicts of takfeer and jihaad. Ibn Mas’ood 
another companion of the Prophet said, “Whoever issues a verdict for everything the 
people ask about is crazy” (cited in al-Yoobee 2005:14).  
 
3.3.10.4 Takfeer of the Rulers 
      
     Patience and wisdom were not characteristics that are associated with the 
Khawaarij methodology, and Zarqaawee exhibited a zeal for takfeer and fighting, 
rather than the knowledge and wisdom necessary to wage authentic jihaad. 
Zarqaawee issued death threats and made takfeer of the Muslim leaders especially 
those in the Arab world. Zarqaawee said addressing the Arab leaders: 
   
          As for you, O Arab rulers, you have accepted to be shoes for the supporters of   
          falsehood and a base in the background from which planes of killing and  
          destruction take off. You are still bases of supplies, logistics, and equipment.  
          We tell you: Saddaam has gone, unsung and unlamented. He was a tyrant and  
          the enemy of God and of the Messenger. He has gone at the hands of his US  
          masters. You will go too. However, we pray to God that you will go by our    
Zarqaawee was highly critical of the Arab governments for their assistance in 
attacking Iraq; however these issues are extremely sensitive and complex and do not 
warrant simple analysis. Zarqaawee’s criticism was based upon stinging rhetoric and 
claims which account for his general takfeer of all the Arab leaders. Even if 
Zarqaawee were correct in his analysis that the leaders had fallen into an act of 
disbelief he disregards the possibility they might be excused by those things which 
’s pronouncement of Zarqaawee 2006: 116). ayleehRa-(al takfeermaking  prohibit
takfeer upon the leaders was unsubstantiated and “takfeer is not pronounced upon a 
 2006: 116). ayleehRa-im” (alspecific individual until the proof is established upon h
So it can be deduced that “the general takfeer is really a description of a saying, or 
action, or creed that is kufr (disbelief), or a description of a sect which is well-known 
2006:253). From  ayleehRa-” (alliefof disbe one of the characteristicspossessing for 
this statement it can be construed that Zarqaawee’s takfeer of the leaders was without 
merit, as the Arab or Muslim leaders are not known as a specific group which holds a 
particular set of beliefs that warrants their takfeer. Even if for the sake of argument 
they all performed an act of disbelief that was clear, open, and agreed upon, the proof 
would still have to be presented to each individual leader before making takfeer of 
and the  Qur’aanfrom the  ggestEvidence seems to susaid, “ ayleehRa-Al 247246F.him
Sunna regarding this issue that Allah the Almighty does not punish anyone from his 
creation for his actions of disbelief or sins that he meets Allah with, until the proof 
has been established upon him that he is deserving of punishment” (2006:253). 
Finally, Zarqaawee’s over simplistic world view seemed reminiscent of the paradigm 
of the early Khawaarij. However, his inclination towards violence, and the misuse of 
the principles of takfeer made him an even greater threat than the original Khawaarij.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
       In summary, this chapter looked at the many historical and political factors which 
contribute to he rise in modern extremist ‘Islaamic’ thought.  However, the main 
characteristics inherent in most of the extremist groups and ideologues can be traced 
                                                 
 247 Unless the act of disbelief or saying is well known in the religion to be an act of disbelief; however 
the conditions of takfeer must be in place before declaring someone an apostate. 
  
to the creed of the early Khawaarij sect. Nevertheless, there are some significant 
differences that can be observed between the Khawaarij and neo-Takfeerees. Neo-
e more violent and reactionary as tend to b istsbtQu-, especially the postsTakfeeree
they developed many of their ideas as a reaction to colonialism.248
                                                 
248 Delong-Bas observes, “In the case of the modernists, the environment was complicated by the 
presence of the Western colonial powers, which had seized control over Muslim lands. The modernist 
call to revival and renewal of faith was thus as much of a response to colonialism as it was an 
observation of the indigenous condition” (Delong-Bas 2004:238). 
  
          vary in Islaam and the adulterer, thief, one who misleads others, the  
          alcoholic, and murderer would all receive equal punishment (al-Mawjaan  
          2004:58). 
 
The Takfeeree methodology can be summed up in the following points: 
     1) They make takfeer for major sins. 
     2) They make takfeer of those who differ with them especially religious scholars. 
whole societies to be apostate. afa declareUstUMu and btQuome of them like S3)       
     4) They declare all contemporary leaders to be apostates.  
     5) They view other Muslims with suspicion especially those outside of their group. 
     6) Another trend observed in this section was that latter thinkers tend to be more    
         prone to violence especially Bin Laaden 248F249 and Zarqaawee (‘Aseeree 2007:134). 
     7) They offer no real political solution or articulate a clear vision or program as   
     a final result of their jihaad (Burke 2004:164). 
     8) Esposito observes: 
  
           They reject Islamic regulations regarding the goals and means of a valid jihad  
           (that violence must be proportional and that only the necessary amount of force  
           should be used to repel the enemy), that innocent civilians should not be  
           targeted, and that jihad must be declared by the ruler or head of state. Today,  
           individuals and groups, religious and lay, seize the right to declare and  
           legitimate unholy wars in the name of Islam (Esposito 2002:157).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
249 Bin Laaden stated, “Those youths will not ask you (William Perry former U.S defense secretary). 
They will tell you, singing, there is nothing between us that needs to be explained, there is only killing 
and neck-smiting” (Bin Laaden 1996b:2). Bin Laaden and many of the Takfeerees analyzed in this 
research tend to see violence as the main means for political change whether by suicide bombings or 
attacks on civilian soil. He said, “Your problem will be how to convince your troops to fight, while our 
problem will be how to restrain our youth to wait for their turn in fighting and operations” (Bin Laaden 
1996b:3).  
 
  
Chapter Four 
Contemporary Misconceptions about Islaam and Terrorism 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 In general, it seems 
the neo-Takfeerees view rebellion and jihaad as a political necessity and religious 
obligation in order to restore the sharee’a in the case of its dismemberment, and 
implement it in the case of its absence. This helps to explain the dual front of 
contemporary Jihaadees: they advocate removal of regimes they perceive as apostate 
and equally they wish to terrorize aggressive non-Muslim states (Delong-Bas 
2004:265). Also, throughout this chapter the harm associated with rebellion against 
the Muslim leader was reiterated with some of the biggest reasons being the loss of 
life, security, and property, and general instability it causes in society (al-Mawjaan 
2004:130).   
      
     In this chapter various ideologues and groups were compared and analyzed with 
some of the major characteristics of the Khawaarij, and it seems that they differ with 
regards to their commonality to the original sect. While some like Mawdoodee 
emphasized rebellion against corrupt leadership, he does not possess the same 
on the other hand, declared the leaders of his time to  btQuper se.  btQuextremism as 
be not only illegitimate, but apostates. Takfeer of the leadership seems to be a 
consistent trend in subsequent ideologues and movements, with thinkers like ‘Umar 
regarding  btQuand  Mawdoodeesomewhere between ting , fitmaanhRa-Abd al‘
takfeer, but he is a major advocate of jihaadist theory. However, “whoever holds 
Khawaarij-like beliefs is classified as Khawaarij and the one who does an action or 
exhibits a characteristic similar to them is associated with them by that action or 
characteristic and should be observed [to determine similarity in creed]” (al-Mawjaan 
2004:135). All of the ideologues in this chapter show similar characteristics and tend 
to make takfeer for major sins like the original Khawaarij; however if sin  
 
          nullified faith completely and the sinner became a disbeliever then sin and  
          apostasy would be considered the same thing, the sinner would be labeled an  
          apostate, and his punishment would be equal. Therefore, penalties would not  
     This chapter will discuss the perception of the secularist critics of Islaam, whose 
ideas of reform, according to contemporary Salafee scholars, seem to contain some of 
the same extremist elements as those of the neo-Khawaarij, and appear to have been a 
aylee hRa-(al movements radicalcontemporary many of rise  the in factormajor 
2003:60-61). In addition, some of the contemporary misconceptions about Islaam and 
its link to terrorism as perpetuated by Western media and policy think tanks will be 
presented and refuted. Finally, this chapter ends with a discussion of the role of 
United States foreign policy in contributing to the growth of terrorist organizations 
like al-Qaeda.250
     Islaam and its sanctity have long been under attack and scrutiny in the Western 
world. Throughout history the Islaamic sense of morality has been accused of being 
backward, and Islaamic values are considered as stifling democratic ideas. These 
accusations against the religion … “date back to the early days of Islam. Aggressions 
from the other side of the divide, however, could be traced back to Medieval and 
Renaissance Europe” (Marrouki 2006:4). The more recent cartoon caricatures of the 
media organizations Western ammad illustrate the great pains that some hProphet Mu
take to violate religious sanctity citing the freedom of expression. Another 
contemporary example of Western denigration of Islaamic symbols is that of Salman 
a contemporary critic of Western  ,. Marrouki
 
 
  4.2 Secularism  
 
The Satanic Verses
                                                 
250  Still, others like Gerges assert that it is not foreign policy or stereo typing by the media that 
accounts for the rise in extremism but rather the authoritarianism of Arab regimes. “The birth and 
evolution, or rather mutation, of the jihadist movement …  stem largely from a deep structural, 
developmental crisis facing the Arab world, in both socioeconomic and institutional terms; it is a crisis 
of governance and political economy, not of culture or foreign policy” (Gerges 2005:272). Gerges’ 
analysis is valuable and offers additional insight into the complexity of trying to pinpoint the exact 
causes for the rise of the neo-Takfeeree/Jihaadee movements. However, as this research posits there 
are a number of factors that contribute to the problem and probably the single most important cause for 
the rise of these movements is that they possess ideological roots similar to the original Khawaarij.     
  
distorted image of Islam and Islamic history, assorted with degrading 
misrepresentations, disgusting images which disgrace the Prophet’s memory, defame 
the sacred text, and dishonour the Prophet and his wives. It equally questions the 
integrity of the Qur’an” (Marrouki 2006:10). Rushdie’s critique of Islaam is precisely 
what many contemporary scholars consider to be a part of the modern secularist 
onslaught used to portray Islaam and its core values as backward and barbarous.
Rushdie the author of 
literature, offers his analysis of the text by stating, “The Satanic Verses offers a 
251
                                                 
251 Marrouki says, “For some media and political circles in the West, Islam and Muslims represent a 
threat to Western values as if freedom, justice, peace and human rights were the apanage, or customary 
prerequisite of the West” (2006:32). 
  
Islaam is based upon the Qur’aan and Sunna; this foundation forms the creed, 
 aylee, many detractorshRa-According to al methodology, and practice of the religion.
of Islaam are familiar with its principles and believe that through reforming some 
practices and understanding of the divine text they can essentially destroy the every 
 Salafee Both 2003:14). ayleehRa-of Islaam and its institutions (al spractice yda
scholars and neo-Takfeerees are equally skeptical of secularism: the reforms the 
secularists advocate lead to disbelief as many of the proponents of that ideology bear 
witness to.
  
 
          It is because of such distortions of the faith by secularists 
          in the Islamic world that the fundamentalists are opposed  
          to secularism; they are prepared to compromise with  
          colonialism but not with secularism. According to the  
          fundamentalists a truly Islamic state is the antithesis of a  
          secular state. They believe that a secular state is a by  
          product of Christian ‘heresy’ and Hindu ‘hypocrisy’ they  
          argue that secularism whatever its form, is basically  
          materialistic and a negation of spirituality (Zakaria  
          1989:11).   
 
     Secularists, like Rushdie, believe Islaam must liberalize itself and accommodate 
Western concepts of morality to free itself from the bonds of tradition. Rushdie was 
amongst a list of writers and political activists who used the recent violence that 
ammad as an opportunity to hresulted from the cartoon portrayals of the Prophet Mu
highlight their “need to fight for secular values and freedom” (BBC 2006:1). These 
activists who issued this statement constitute a list of secularists, primarily those who 
came from Muslim families, and some who have openly renounced Islaam and whose 
political agenda of ‘reform’ is considered by many contemporary scholars as one of 
the most evil and heretical onslaughts against Islaam. 
 
          For Islamists who fight it, secularism has never really guaranteed rights or new  
         liberties-partly, of course, because its arrival coincided with the triumph of  
          Western armies, but more importantly because…it has best served to guarantee 
          the rights of the foreigners who imported it, or of non-Muslim minorities,  
          Christians and Jews, whose support helped the foreigners to establish their     
          domination. The Trojan horse of secularism is seen, above all, as the most    
          pernicious of the West’s ideological weapons, which, at the peak of the colonial 
          adventure, gave legality and respectability to the business of eradicating the  
          normative Muslim system (Burgat 2003:44).   
 
252
Tampering with fundamental Isla mic prin iples is seen as subverting Islaamic 
law: by making prohibited practices lawful, and scrutinizing established norms and 
principles of he Qu ’aan and Sunna, which is an act of disbelief according to the 
consensus of Muslim scholars (al-Nawawee 2002:1727). Rushdie said “Traditional 
Islam is a broad church that certainly includes millions of tolerant, civilized men and 
women, but also encompasses many whose views on women’s rights are antediluvian, 
who think of homosexuality as ungodly, who have little time for real freedom of 
expression…” (Rushdie 2006:1). Rushdie’s statement has several important points 
that need to be highlighted. First, he begins by praising those who he considers 
‘tolerant’ as ‘civilized’ which seems to be a narrow criterion for one to be considered 
civilized: reform minded, open to heresy, and willingness to challenge the religious 
texts and creed in order to distance themselves from tradition. Second, he implies that 
Islaamic tradition, culture, and values are inherently backward, which illustrates his 
blatant hostility towards Islaamic values. Third, homosexuality is considered evil 
according to the Islaamic faith and is a punishable offence. There are clear 
undisputable texts and evidences to support this claim. Allah mentioned, “And 
remember Lot when he said to his people: Do you commit the worst sin such as none 
preceding you has committed in creation? Verily, you practice your lusts on men 
instead of women. Nay, but you are a people transgressing beyond bounds” 
(Qur’aan1996:7:80-81). The Prophet said, “Whoever finds those who d  the a tions 
of the people of Lot, then execute the one who does it and the one who participates in 
it” (al-Dhahabee 1988:55). The people of Lot practiced homosexuality and sodomy, 
and to attempt to refute that this is a prohibited act in Islaam is like attempting to 
refute the Qur’aan and Sunna, and consensus of Muslim scholars. Fourth, freedom of 
  
                                                 
252 Refer to chapter three the section on secularism. 
  
expression to Rushdie seems to imply the right to attack, transgress, and redefine 
religious traditions. Finally, some scholars allege that Rushdie and those who incline 
towards secularism actually want to redefine the very essence of Islaam which means 
“to submit to Allah’s oneness, and adhering to Him in strict obedience and distancing 
oneself from polytheism and polytheists” (al-‘Uthaymeen 2005:68). Islaam is by its 
very nature based upon submission to the will of Allah, not man, or man’s desires and 
whims. The aforementioned claims made by Rushdie appear to be an attempt at 
redefining Islaam and could be perceived as an attempt to undermine Allah’s 
sovereignty in rulership.253
Reformist values are often seen as a type of extremism to Salafee scholars and 
extremists alike, as freedom of expression and democratic values do not take 
precedence over religious orthodoxy and tradition (Lewis 2003: 104-105). Rushdie’s 
reforms seem more like an imposition upon Islaam rather than suggestion for reform, 
and he challenges all the sacredly held tenets of Islaam, he says, “The insistence 
within Islam that the Koranic text is the infallible, uncreated word of God renders 
analytical scholarly discourse all but impossible. Why would God be influenced by 
the socioeconomics of 7th-century Arabia, after all? Why would the Messenger’s 
personal circumstances have anything to do with the Message?" (Rushdie 2006:3). 
His whole discourse is based upon challenging core tenets of the Islaamic creed and 
faith, and in fact questioning the Qur’aan itself, and there is no doubt in accordance 
with the evidence presented in this research that Salman Rushdie has a plethora of 
statements that call into question his Islaamic legitimacy. Primarily, this is due to his 
putting his analysis and logic before the religious texts in order to reinvent Islaam to 
 Rushdie’s assertion of his opinions under the guise of 
freedom of expression have no basis in Islaam and constitute a deviation greater than 
that of the Khawaarij as he advocates disbelief by his reforms. Rushdie’s critique 
appears extreme, according to contemporary scholars, and may lead one to believe he 
is attacking the very creed and values of the Islaamic faith. Rushdie claims: 
 
          What is needed is a move beyond tradition-nothing less than a reform  
          movement to bring the core concepts of Islam into the modern age, a Muslim  
          reformation to combat not only the jihadi ideologues but also the dusty stifling  
          seminaries of the traditionalists, throwing open the windows of the closed   
          communities to let in much needed fresh air ( Rushdie 2006:3).  
 
                                                 
253 One of the most telling reasons secularist thought is opposed by Takfeerees is because its base 
premise is to separate religious life from the state and subvert divine law to human law, and this is 
essentially the argument of all the ideologues surveyed in this study. 
  
suit his whims which is a premise of the heretics (al-Barbahaaree 1997:66-67). “These 
questions are meant to challenge any given knowledge, especially that which is 
divinely revealed, and deride it by giving it the title ‘dogma’, thereby paving the way 
for them (secularist, philosophers) to wholly rely on the human intellect…" (Sani 
2006:2). This practice is common to all the deviated sects, especially the Khawaarij, 
as was mentioned in the section of Qur’aanic misinterpretation. However, the 
difference between the Khawaarij and secularists like Rushdie, is the Khawaarij use 
the verses to fit their paradigm, whereas secularist tend to devalue the texts and 
reinterpret them altogether retaining only that which suits their notion.254 Rushdie 
states, “If the Koran were seen as a historical document, then it would be legitimate to 
reinterpret it to suit the new conditions of successive new ages. Laws made in the 7th 
century could finally give way to the needs of the 21st. The Islamic Reformation has 
to begin here, with an acceptance that all ideas, even sacred ones, must adapt to 
altered realities” (Rushdie 2006:3). It appears that secularists like Rushdie want to 
redefine and reinterpret Muslim identity and religious faith in order to conform to the 
present times, until nothing remains of Islaamic values and creed except its name.255
     Many Takfeeree groups have actually developed as a response to secular 
extremism and this highlights the pragmatic problems of secularism.
 
Even the Khawaarij were less harmful to the Islaamic religion and possessed a greater 
respect for Islaamic traditions than secularists like Salman Rushdie. 
 
256
                                                 
254 “The secularists try to interpret the Qur’anic texts and hadith liberally but fundamentalists oppose 
this on the ground that it amounts to bidat or innovation, which is as bad as heresy. Nevertheless, both 
swear by Islam” (Zakaria 1989:7). 
255  Even Takfeerees like al-Faisal realize the inherent dangers posed by secularist thought and are 
extremely critical of the secularist movement as it calls for the dismantling of Islaamic institutions and 
poses ideas that are contrary to traditional thought and interpretation of the texts (al-Faisal 2006e). 
Zakaria observes, “The secularists (who are also variously called liberals, reformists, or modernists), 
claim to be as faithful to the spirit of Islam as the fundamentalists, but want to bring about reforms to 
make religion more materialistic and worldly” (Zakaria 1989:8). 
256 See chapter three of the present study, the section on secularism. 
  
religious totalitarianism and for the promotion of freedom, equal opportunity and 
secular values for all” (BBC 2006:2). Their claim is based upon the tenet that 
Muslims have the right to choose secularism and choose to do as they please without 
the constraints of culture and tradition. This statement is perceived as a declaration of 
In addition, . aylee 2003:14)hRa-(al by orthodox Muslims war against Islaamic values
the extremists are equally opposed to secularism and the secularist state. These trends 
have given rise to the extremist ideologues due to the fact that “in Islam, according to 
the fundamentalists, there is no place for such a state. Many Muslims consider 
secularism ‘a sub-facet of specifically Christian heresy’ or an aid to the establishment 
of a godless society, with its emphasis on materialism” (Zakaria 1989:18). Secularism 
as an ideology is alien to Islaam as the religion’s foundation is built upon the concept 
that Allah is the law giver and the state is administered as such. All of the extremist 
ideologues discussed in chapter three either developed in part as a reaction to 
secularism or as a result of their perception of the Muslim state and leadership’s move 
toward secularism away from divine law.     
 
     Nevertheless, according to Salafee scholars, secularist ideals and the Takfeeree 
paradigm both share in common a form of extremism when interpreting Islaam.  For 
ts of was questioned about the tene maanhRa-n court ‘Umar ‘Abdul alexample, i
jihaad  in his trial by the attorney general, who commented that “Jihad is not killing. 
This is not Islam’s teaching. Jihad is a spiritual fight against evil, poverty, sickness 
and sin. Killing is only from the devil” (cited in Gabriel 2002:160). This highlights 
the misunderstanding of the principles of jihaad by those oriented towards a secularist 
interpretation of the tenets of jihaad. However, ‘Umar rebutted in his mordant yet 
clever style, when he said, “Are there verses of the Quran that I don’t know about that 
say jihad is a spiritual fight against evil, poverty, sickness and sin? Perhaps there is 
new revelation from Allah that our attorney general received recently and the rest of 
the Muslims do not yet know about” (cited in Gabriel 2002:160). ‘Umar’s concept of 
jihaad has been expounded upon in chapter three. This quote demonstrates the clash 
inherent between the two ideologies: secularism and fanaticism, and although both 
ideologies are contrary to one another, they both constitute a form of radical departure 
from the orthodox methodology and understanding of Islaam (Lewis 2003:106).   
        
 
  
4.3 Misconceptions of Islaamic Jihaad 
 
     Jihaad as was previously mentioned throughout this research is a subject of great 
contention for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. There are many who misunderstand 
the purpose and meaning of jihaad in Islaam as was made clear in the previous 
chapter. I will define my discussion to the views expounded by Mark Gabriel who 
epitomizes all the misconceptions about jihaad. Gabriel defines jihaad to mean 
“…that Muslims must fight the enemy of Allah until the enemy dies or the Muslims 
die” (Gabriel 2002:28).256F257 According to Ibn Taymeeya the general definition of jihaad 
is “striving to attain faith and good deeds that Allah loves and defending against the 
disbelief, wickedness and sin that Allah hates” (al-Badr 2005:5). 257F258 This is a general 
definition according to Ibn Taymeeya’s view of the sharee’a which it seems Gabriel 
somehow misunderstood in his studies before becoming a professor in Islaamic 
history. Gabriel says, “I was teaching what they taught me, but inside I was confused 
about the truth of Islam” (Gabriel 2002:2). It seems implausible that Gabriel would 
have become clearer about jihaad and Islaam after converting to Christianity and 
leaving the quest for knowledge of the religion, especially considering he was 
confused as a mosque preacher and professor. Another misconception held by those 
who are misinformed about the Islaamic religion is that “…dying in jihad is the only 
way a Muslim can be assured of entering paradise at all” (Gabriel 2002:29). This is 
another fallacious claim regarding Islaam and there are literally dozens of proofs that 
openly dispute his claim. For the purpose of being succinct, the researcher will 
mention only a few. Allah says, “By the time. Verily, mankind is in a loss. Except 
those who believe, and do righteous deeds, and call to the truth and call to patience” 
(Qur’aan 1996/103:3). Allah also said, “Verily, those who believe and do righteous 
deeds, they are the best of creatures. Their reward with their lord is Eden, paradise 
underneath which rivers flow” (Qur’aan 1996/98:8). Allah also mentions that “Those 
who are faithfully true to their trusts and to their covenants; and those who strictly 
guard their prayers, these are indeed the inheritors. Those who inherit paradise 
(Firdaus) shall dwell therein forever” (Qur’aan 1996/18:11). On one occasion, the 
                                                 
257 Mark A. Gabriel was a former professor of Islaamic history from al-Azhar University who 
converted to Christianity and wrote a ‘refutation against Islaam’ declaring it to be essentially from its 
roots a terrorist religion. The researcher of this study finds Gabriel a somewhat dubious character as he 
is a PH.D holder and the work at hand is full of glaring errors regarding Islaam, and very speculative, 
lacking in academic merit.    
258 For the conditions and levels of jihaad refer back to the sections on Bin Laaden and Zarqaawee. 
  
Prophet was asked by a nomad if he embraced Islaam and performed only the five 
pillars, and nothing more, would he be successful. The Prophet answered, “If what he 
said is true he will enter paradise” (al-Bukhaaree 1970/1:38). In all of the above 
examples, there were no references to jihaad being the reason to enter paradise or 
even a condition for it: although it is considered one of the best deeds in Islaam, it is 
not a prerequisite for paradise as Gabriel claims.    
 
 The 
secularists and their concept of reform challenges the sanctity of Islaam and opens the 
gateway for extremists as the secularists are seen as assaulting the principles of the 
writers secularist statement issued by a group of  a. In 003:14)aylee 2hRa-(al religion
and activists they declared that “After having overcome Fascism, Nazism, and 
Stalinism, the world now faces a new global threat: Islamism” (BBC 2006:2). The 
authors go on to assert that “We writers, journalists, intellectuals, call for resistance to 
     On another occasion Gabriel alleges, “The focus of jihad is to overcome people 
who do not accept Islam” (Gabriel 2002:33). However, Allah says, “There is no 
compulsion in religion” (Qur’aan 1996/2:256). According to Ibn Katheer, a 14th 
century scholar,259 this verse refers to the fact that “You should not force anyone to 
enter in the religion of Islaam, for verily it is clear and manifest, its evidences and 
proofs unmistakable, and it does not need to force anyone into entering it” (Ibn 
Katheer 1997/1:299).260 Gabriel goes on to state, “Jihad is carried out in order to 
achieve the ultimate goal of Islam-to establish Islamic authority over the whole 
world” (Gabriel 2002:37). Comments like this are to be expected from someone who 
is not familiar with the religion as Allah clearly states the purpose of life when he 
said, “I have not created men and jinn except for the purpose of worshipping me” 
 adeethhor  ,verseThis researcher has not come across a single ). 51:56/1996 Qur’aan(
narration, or statement from one of the companions that substantiates Gabriel’s claim 
that Muslims are commanded to focus their attention on rulership, or that the goal of 
jihaad  revolution.261
     Pr bab y one of the greatest misconc ptions and doubtful practices people attribute 
 deethaha  According tois the killing of women and children. jihaadto Islaam c 
narrat on, the Pr phet was sked about “whet er i  was per issible to attack 
polytheist warrior  at nigh with the p obability of exposing their women and children
to danger. The Prophet replied, ‘they are from them (polytheist parents)’” (al-
Bukhaaree 1970/4:159). The explanation of this narration given by Gabriel is “in 
    
 
                                                 
259 His explanation of the Qur’aan is considered one of the most authentic and widely used by orthodox 
scholars.  
260 Islaam allows for truces between Muslim and non-Muslim forces and does not call for forced 
conversion. “According to shari’a, tolerance of religions based on previous divine revelations was not a 
merit but a duty” (Lewis 2004:95). 
261  These are the exact claims that Mawdoodee and Qutb made and it appears Gabriel refers to their 
thought instead of the actual religious texts and orthodox creed. Refer to section on Mawdoodee. 
  
other words if the parents were infidels, then it was permissible to kill their children. 
Because the Prophet of Islam believed this, this is what Osama bin Laden and Al-
Qaeda believe about killing women and children” (Gabriel 2002:105). The mistake of 
this reasoning and attributing wanton killing to the Prophet is the result of shoddy 
scholarship or it would appear Gabriel has an agenda and is willing to deceive his 
readers to fulfill his aims. Firstly, he misquotes the narration and this is the reason it 
was introduced for a second time during this study. Secondly, inherent in the text is 
the context in which the Prophet was asked: attacking an enemy at night with the 
probability of killing women and children. This illustrates the fact that Islaam 
safeguards the lives of non-combatants. However, if due to circumstances fighting 
occurs at night and non-combatants are unintentionally killed then this is considered 
unavoidable. Thirdly, in this narration as well as on many other occasions “Allah’s 
Messenger disapproved the killing of women and children” (al-Bukhaaree 
1970/4:160). In a situation where women and children are killed unintentionally 
during legitimate jihaad the fighters are not held accountable, and there is 
overwhelming evidence, and consensus, that proves the impermissibility of killing 
women and children as long as they are not fighters (al-Faasee 2003:1018-1020).  
 
     Gabriel not only attributes extremism and violence to the Jihaadees, but he claims 
that unjustifiable violence is inherent to the Islaamic faith, however the evidence 
suggests otherwise, and in fact many major world religions have been distorted by 
adherents to their teachings (Juergensmeyer 2003:4). For example, to many in the 
West, Christianity symbolizes a faith that encourages brotherly love and peacefulness 
with exhortations to turn the other cheek in response to oppression and 
aggressiveness. What is interesting though is that many of the proponents of this 
vision of Christianity hold that Islaam is a violent religion calling for the killing of 
infidels. Gabriel coined the phrase ‘Christianized Islaam’ meaning the concept that 
Islaam is being presented to people as being ‘Christian like’ in its adherence to 
peaceful values. Gabriel says, “I could continue to embrace the ‘Christianized’ Islam-
the Islam of peace, love, forgiveness and compassion, the Islam tailor made to fit 
Egyptian government, politics and culture-thereby keeping my job and status” 
(Gabriel 2002:3). It seems odd that he would make such a statement considering the 
history of the crusades and the church: the moral justification for enslavement of 
  
Africans,261 F262 the colonialism of non-Christian peoples during the 18th century,262F263 and 
the Catholic Church’s role in the genocide of the Jews by Nazi Germany. The above 
examples illustrate how sometimes a religious minority can distort the teachings and 
principles of religion.    
 
4.4 The Concept of the Right to Rebel 
 
     Another commonly held misconception that many Muslims have is that they 
possess the right to overthrow corrupt leadership. Although many who propose this 
view are not considered Takfeeree, they share this tenet of the Khawaarij creed and 
perhaps this is a result of the revolutionary movements and traditions established 
during the 18th century until the present. Zakaria defends the ‘right to rebel’ and he 
attempts to refute the orthodox position by saying, “Of course, there are many hadith 
to the contrary, but since the Murji’ites were principally concerned with upholding the 
temporal power of the Umayyads against attacks by the orthodox and puritans they 
concocted several hadith to buttress their arguments” (Zacharia 1988:22). Sadly, it 
seems to be an unfortunate trend amongst some Muslim intellectuals to override 
research and findings of traditional Islaamic scholarship to expand theories and 
ideologies that, while sounding scholarly, are merely reworded renditions of 
contentious philosophic theories garbed in an Islaamic mantle. Zakaria has several 
claims that are contrary to the position of the majority of classical scholars and there 
is plethora of evidence supporting the orthodox position. Still others argue that 
irrespective of this principle there is growing discontent among many Muslims with 
their leaders.  
 
          For growing numbers, the issue is not religion or nationality, not this or that    
          frontier or territory, but freedom- the right to live their own lives, in a free and  
          open society under a representative and responsible government. For them the  
          prime enemy is not the outsider, be he defined as foreigner, as infidel, or  
          imperialist, but their own rulers, regimes that sustain themselves by tyranny at  
          home and terrorism abroad and have failed by every measure of governmental  
          achievement except survival (Lewis 2003:165).  
  
                                                 
262 The import of African slaves to the Americas was justified by the church “because ‘the law of 
nations for Christian powers’ sanctioned such status for ‘prisoners in war with heathen and infidel 
nations’” (Frederickson 1981:76). 
263 In the case of the African continent it was opened up in what Stanely Livingstone coined the “3c’s: 
Commerce, Christianity, and Civilization, a triple alliance of Mammon, God and social progress” 
(Parkenham 1991: xxii).  
  
Sa’id Hawwa, a Syrian leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, best articulates the 
growing discontent of those who assert their ‘right to rebel’, when he says: 
 
          Many an ignoramus Shaikh considers opposition to any political regime a sin  
          smacking of Kharijite heresy. One realizes how boorish are such ulama when  
          one considers that if they are right, then Abraham and Moses have sinned in  
          resisting Nimrod and Pharaoh….Any revolt against an illegitimate ruler is  
          justified. Isn’t it then right to combat a ruler who does not apply the laws set in  
          the Koran? Isn’t it forbidden to flee, even when outnumbered, when the fight is  
          one between infidelity and the true faith? Doesn’t Allah help those who help  
          themselves? (cited in Sivan 1985:105). 
 
This illustrates how many of the groups distort the meaning of the Qur’aan to support 
their creed, instead of deriving their beliefs from the texts and understanding of the 
companions. Here Hawwa likens Abraham and Moses to rebels, corroborating with 
as if they were sent with the purpose of overthrowing tyranny instead  ;’s claimsbtQu
of calling to the worship of Allah alone. Allah says, “And verily, we have sent among 
every nation a messenger (proclaiming): Worship Allah and avoid all false deities” 
(Qur’aan 1996:16:36). The statement of Hawwa gives an indication of how wide 
also  who Qardawi, -In contrast, al .ist ideas have becomebtQuspread and influential 
has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and supports the use of suicide bombings as a 
means of resistance to occupation, believes that Muslim leadership should not be 
fought against which conforms to the opinion held by majority of Salafee scholars 
both classic and contemporary (al-Qardawi 2000:1/297-300).263F264 
 
4.5 Terrorism: its Types and Motivations 
      
     Terrorism as defined by orthodox scholars has already been discussed in this 
research and it has been proven that it is a tactic of many of the Takfeeree/Jihaadee 
ideologues, and groups like al-Qaeda (Burke 2004:291-292). However, it is necessary 
to attempt to redefine the meaning of terrorism in a broader context when discussing 
its motivations. 
 
                                                 
264 Qardawi states,"I consider this type of martyrdom operation as an indication of the justice of Allah 
Almighty. Allah is just. Through His infinite wisdom He has given the weak what the strong do not 
possess and that is the ability to turn their bodies into bombs like the Palestinians do" (BBC 2004:2). 
When asked about Iraq he replied, "If the Iraqis can confront the enemy, there is no need for these acts 
of martyrdom. If they don't have the means, acts of martyrdom are allowed. I didn't say that the Iraqis 
cannot, it depends on their need" (BBC 2004:2).  
  
     Defining terrorism is a task in and of itself as there are various definitions and it 
has changed to mean something different over time. Initially, terrorism as a term, in 
the context of Western civilization, was derived from the terror campaign of the 
government during the French Revolution. Originally, terrorism was used to describe 
state persecution of its citizens instead of what is now commonly accepted as 
terrorism. Hoffman states: 
          Terrorism, in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term, is  
          fundamentally and inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the  
          pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve  
          political change. Terrorism is thus violence-or equally important, the threat of  
          violence-used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim  
          (1998:14).  
 
This definition encompasses both the actions and statements of the neo-Khawaarij 
groups who possess both goals of secular political revolution infused with Islaamic 
principles and concepts of jihaad. However, it is necessary to show that there are 
different categories of terrorism, and that this extremism is not exclusive to groups 
that associate with Islaam. For the purpose of this research we will narrow our focus 
of terrorism to two types: state sponsored and religious.265
As is witnessed by the above statement, the United States which considers itself the 
defender of freedom and the main advocate of the ‘war on terror’ has been implicated 
on many occasions for its role in sponsoring and supporting terrorists and terrorist 
 
 
     Many states have at some time in their history been sponsors of terrorism. What 
most commonly comes to mind is the United State’s accusations against Syria, Sudan, 
North Korea, Iran and Iraq. Juergensmeyer states: 
  
          It is true that some terrorist acts are committed by public officials invoking a  
          sort of “state terrorism” in order to subjugate the populace. The pogroms of   
          Stalin, the government-supported death squads in El Salvador, the genocidal  
          killings of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and  
          Kosovo, and government spurred violence of the Hutus and Tutsis in Central  
          Africa all come to mind. The United States has rightfully been accused of  
          terrorism in the atrocities committed during the Vietnam War, and there is some  
          basis for considering the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as  
          terrorist acts (2003:5). 
 
                                                 
265 These two categories of terrorism may be somewhat misleading as they can, and indeed often do 
overlap. For example, a state could terrorize through religious prosecutions similar to the inquisition or 
Saddaam Hussayn’s massacre and oppression of the Shee’a.  
  
activities. “The sad fact is that the emergence of the United States as the world’s only 
superpower has gone hand and hand with its demand to be exempt from any 
international rule of law” (Mamdani 2005:208). The purpose of highlighting this fact 
is that it offers insight into the political motivations of terrorism and shows that states 
and groups both operate in support of their political, religious aims and those who use 
terror choose to achieve their goals by violence or the threat of violence. The 
perception of who is a terrorist is equally important and each state or group has its 
own definition. For example, if one asks Usaama bin Laaden or Zarqaawee who a 
terrorist is, they would most definitely list the United States as the most extreme 
sponsor of terrorist activity, which in the eyes of some, would not be an unfounded 
claim considering the actions taken against Iraq since 1991, and more recently 
Afghanistan, with threats against Syria, North Korea and Iran. On the other hand, 
some claim that the United States “is a government ‘of the people, by the people and 
for the people,’ which makes it a heathen government in Muslim thinking because 
Allah is to be the head of all government” (Gabriel 2002:178). This claim of Gabriel’s 
is not entirely true as he uses this argument to support his claim that all Muslims hate 
America and the Takfeeree groups want to destroy it because of its love for freedom 
and democracy. However, his conclusion is problematic, as the evidence suggests that 
those groups target America more for its claim to those principles, and their 
perception of America’s double standards: unilateral pressure to democratize the 
world according to its own concept of democracy, and history of both human and civil 
rights abuses. 266
         As was mentioned in chapter three, the groups and ideologues mentioned in this 
research possess common traits of takfeer and are inclined toward violent means to 
achieve their aims. Obviously, these Takfeeree movements are religious in nature and 
advocate revolution and terror in the name of Islaam. However, it is important to 
highlight that the changing perception of who constitutes a terrorist, by state entities 
   
 
                                                 
266 America’s foreign policy and its impact on radicalizing particular Muslim groups was mentioned 
throughout chapter three. However, its domestic record of oppression, tyranny, and terror is equally 
appalling when analyzing the genocide, and displacement of the Native American peoples and the 
genocide, enslavement, and disenfranchisement of African Americans.  Malcolm X, an African 
American Muslim, summed up the hypocrisy inherent in the American political system when he said, 
“There is no system more corrupt than a system that represents itself as the example of freedom, the 
example of democracy, and can go all over the earth telling other people how to straighten out their 
house, when you have citizens of this country who have to use bullets if they want to cast a ballot” 
(1966:50).   
  
like the United States, is what is portrayed throughout the media influencing public 
opinion. This accounts for one of the reasons Islaam is portrayed as a terrorist 
religion. For example, “In 1980 the U.S State Department roster of international 
terrorist groups listed scarcely a single religious organization. Almost twenty years 
later, at the end of the twentieth century, over half were religious” (Juergensmeyer 
2003: 6). Islaamic groups were among the many groups that were considered religious 
terrorists. Juergensmeyer says, “They were Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist. If one 
added to this list other violent religious groups around the world, including the many 
Christian militia and other paramilitary organizations found domestically in the 
United States, the number of religious terrorist groups would be considerable” 
(Juergensmeyer 2003:6). Some of the reasons the US now includes more religious 
groups and more specifically Islaamic ones is probably a reflection of changing US 
interests in the Middle East and a shift in policy after the fall of the Soviet Union with 
Islaamic 'fundamentalism' being the new target internationally and domestically. This 
helps to account for the negative portrayal of Islaam by the media and policy 
advocates in the US.  
 
     Terrorism and wanton acts of violence contradict basic Islaamic principles and 
many contemporary Islaamic scholars from an array of different perspectives agree 
upon this. When commenting on the World Trade Center attacks al-Qardawi said: 
 
           Our hearts bleed for the attacks that has targeted the World Trade Center, as  
           well as other institutions in the United States despite our strong oppositions to  
           the American biased policy towards Israel on military, political and economic  
           fronts. Islam, the religion of tolerance, holds the human soul in high esteem,  
           and considers the attack  against innocent human beings a grave sin (cited in  
           Kurzman 2008:3). 
 
Tahirul Qadari, head of the Awami Tehrik Party, Pakistan said regarding terrorist 
attacks, "Bombing embassies or destroying non-military installations like the World 
Trade Center is no jihad. …Those who launched the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks not only 
killed thousands of innocent people in the United States but also put the lives of 
Muslims across the world at risk (cited in Kurzman 2008:3). Bernard Haykel,  
assistant professor of Islamic Law at New York University, although not an Islaamic 
scholar, offered a more academic criticism of Bin Laaden and his justification for 
violence under the rubric of Jihaad when he said: 
  
          Individuals and organizations cannot declare a jihad, only states can; 2) One  
          cannot kill innocent women and children when conducting a jihad; 3) One  
          cannot kill Muslims in a jihad; 4) One cannot fight a jihad against a country in  
          which Muslim can freely practice their religion and proselytize Islam; 5)  
          Prominent Muslim jurists around the world have condemned these attacks and  
          their condemnation forms a juristic consensus (ijma') against Bin Laden's  
          actions (This consensus renders his actions un-Islamic); 6) The welfare and  
          interest of the Muslim community (maslaha) is being harmed by Bin Laden's  
          actions and this equally makes them un-Islamic (cited in Kurzman 2008:16-17). 
      
Nuh Ha Mim Keller states, "Muslims have nothing to be ashamed of, and nothing to 
hide, and should simply tell people what their scholars and religious leaders have 
always said: first, that the Wahhabi sect has nothing to do with orthodox Islam, for its 
lack of tolerance is a perversion of traditional values; and second, that killing civilians 
is wrong and immoral" (cited in Kurzman 2008:7). 266F267 It appears to be a fairly strong 
consensus amongst Muslims, with the exception of those who hold Khawaarij like 
beliefs, that terrorism and unjustifiable violence contradict basic Islaamic values and 
principles and should be denounced.    
 
4.6 The Media and the Image of Islaam 
 
     Many groups, including terrorists, use the media as a means to make their demands 
and generate sympathy for their cause. As was mentioned in chapter three, both Bin 
Laaden and Zarqaawee use the media very effectively to gain support for their cause, 
although the latter is less effective and seems to alienate many of his potential 
constituency through wanton violence. “Despite the many differences, however, all 
terrorist groups have one trait in common: none commits actions randomly or 
senselessly. Each wants maximum publicity to be generated by its actions and, 
moreover, aims at intimidation and subjection to attain its objectives” (Hoffman 
1998:131). Publicity is crucial to communicate their message, therefore “the modern 
news media, as the principal conduit of information about such actions, thus play a 
vital part in the terrorist’s calculus. Indeed without the media’s coverage the actions 
impact is arguably wasted, remaining narrowly confined to the immediate victim(s) of 
the attack rather than reaching the wider ‘target audience’” (Hoffman 1998:132). 
                                                 
267 Keller's statement also points to the controversy around the concept of "orthodoxy" in Islaam and 
the difficulty with which some Muslims face in determining who is a legitimate scholar representative 
of the correct creed. During the course of this research some of those concepts have been explored by 
literature. adeethhanalyzing classical texts to provide definitions consistent with  
  
Everything from the fierce battles fought in Falluja, Iraq, to the killing of Shee’a by 
Zarqaawee and his alliance of Jihaadee groups has been broadcast over the internet 
and radio in order to encourage other Jihaadees to participate in the struggle as well 
as defy the United States and its allies.  
 
          On July 28, 2004, a radio message broadcast by Tawhid wal Jihad was  
          attributed to Al-Shami. Pushing the strategy of chaos advocated by Zarqawi to  
          its limit, he declared that ‘if infidels take Muslims as protectors, and these  
          Muslims refuse to fight, it is permitted to kill these Muslims.’ Thus he attacks  
          the Shiites, ‘who have made an alliance with the infidels’ (Brisard 2005:135).  
   
     The media is a very effective tool for generating sympathy and achieving political 
aims. For example, Bin Laaden used the news media on several occasions to rally 
support for his cause and make clear his stance towards US intervention in Iraq and 
the causes and justification for the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center. 
He said: 
 
          This means the oppressing and embargoing to death of millions as Bush Sr did   
         in Iraq which is the greatest mass slaughter of children that mankind has ever  
          known, and it means throwing millions of pounds of bombs and explosives at  
          millions of children, also in Iraq, as Bush Jr did, in order to remove an old agent  
          and replace him with a new puppet to assist in the pilfering of Iraq’s oil and        
         other outrages. So with these images and their like as background, the events of  
          September 11th came as a reply to those great wrongs, should a man be blamed   
          for defending his sanctuary? Is defending oneself and punishing the aggressor  
          in kind, objectionable terrorism? If it is such then it is unavoidable for us. This   
         is the message I sought to communicate to you in word and deed, repeatedly,  
          before September 11th. And you can read this if you wish in my interview with   
          Scott in Time Magazine in 1996, or with Peter Arnett on CNN in 1997, or my    
          meeting with John Weiner in 1998 (2005:2). 
 
     Media coverage has a profound impact upon terrorists’ decisions, and some 
suggest it may even contribute to the cause of these actions or make some targets 
more attractive than others. Hoffman cites one of the “…reasons why terrorists find 
American targets so attractive, a salient consideration has always been the 
unparalleled opportunities for publicity and exposure that terrorists the world over 
know they will get from the extensive US news media” (Hoffman 1998:137). This 
manipulation of the news media can best be summed up by the statement of terrorist 
analyst J. Bower Bell when he said, “Don’t shoot, Abdul! We’re not on prime time!" 
(cited in Hoffman 1998:142). This quote displays the dubious relationship between 
  
media sensationalism and terrorist activity, and it also gives insight into the media’s 
portrayal of Islaam as somehow responsible for all catastrophes around the world.  
 
     Islaam, as perceived by the Western media-and indeed world media-is inherently 
terrorist or prone to violence. Edward Said articulates this Islaamaphobia quite 
eloquently when he says, “Indeed, Islam’s roles in hijackings and terrorism, 
descriptions of the way in which overtly Muslim countries like Iran threaten ‘us’ and 
our way of life, and speculations about the latest conspiracy to blow up buildings, 
sabotage commercial airliners, and poison water supplies seem to play increasingly on 
Western consciousness” (Said 1997:xi). These images of violence and extremist 
activities shape the way much of the world sees Islaam, and this is in part a result of 
the media’s negative portrayal of Islaam. Said says, “Yet there is a consensus on 
‘Islam’ as a kind of scapegoat for everything we do not happen to like about the 
world’s new political, social, and economic patterns” (Said 1997:iv). However, this is 
not to say that there has not been incitement of terrorist activities by Jihaadees as was 
mentioned in chapter three, but it is imperative to distinguish between Islaam and the 
actions of those who adhere to the Khawaarij methodology, and it is incorrect to 
associate Islaam as the cause for the world’s calumnies. In addition, it is equally 
erroneous to associate the actions of a few to the Islaamic faith or Muslims as a 
whole. “Of course no one has equated the Jonestown massacre or the destructive 
horror of the Oklahoma bombing or the devastation of Indochina with Christianity, or 
with Western or American culture at large; that sort of equation has been reserved for 
‘Islam’” (Said 1997:9).     
  
     An outgrowth of Islaam’s association with terrorism has produced “a corps of 
‘experts’ on the Islamic world (which) has grown to prominence, and during a crisis 
they are brought out to pontificate on formulaic ideas about Islam on news programs 
or talk shows” (Said 1997:xi). This shadow cabinet of Islaamic ‘experts’ consists of 
orientalists, Middle Eastern policy professionals, and ill-informed reporters who often 
have little or no knowledge of orthodox Islaam, but yet they are the ones who are 
brought in to articulate Islaam to the Western world. Said cites “well-known and 
mainstream journalism such as The New Republic and The Atlantic, the former owned 
by Martin Peretz, the latter by Morton Zuckerman, both of them great supporters of 
Israel, and therefore biased against Islam” (Said 1997:xxii). There are mountains of 
  
evidence to suggest that much of the media bias in coverage and the negative 
stereotyping of Islaam is in part the result of those who are influenced by their support 
for the state of Israel, or Jewish lobbyists who hold a strong position in American 
politics as will be discussed in the next section. Said mentions that none surpasses 
Peretz’s expressions of “… racial hatred and contempt against a given culture and 
people as he has about Islam and the Arabs. Part of his venom is certainly derived 
from his relentless drive to defend Israel at all costs…and his columns of 
unadulterated, irrational, and vulgar defamation are truly unsurpassed anywhere” 
(Said 1997:xxii). An example that illustrates Peretz’s open prejudices and biases in 
coverage is that  
 
          Peretz first justifies Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s brazen  
          politics of force, then adds that, after all, Israel has to deal with Arab countries  
          in which there is no ‘cultural disposition for scientific and industrial takeoff.   
          Alas, these are societies which cannot make a brick let alone a microchip.’  
          Peretz pursues this idea (which of course resembles his views about African-  
          Americans, that they are historically doomed to inferiority) (Said 1997:xxiv). 
 
 ,agazineMNew Yorker a writer of many articles on the Middle east for the  ,Viorst 
said that Islaam “…succeeded where Christianity failed in shackling man’s power of 
reasoning….Arabs have often noted an intrinsic disposition to conservatism, if not to 
fatalism, within their culture. They are uncomfortable with intellectual challenge” 
(Said 1997:xxv). These are the types of statements the so-called experts on Islaam 
make in order to prove their theories of Western superiority and Islaamic degradation. 
If these are some of the spokesmen who defend Islaam and portray it to the Western 
public, then there is no wonder there is such resentment and open hostility from many 
towards Islaam and Muslims. Said says:  
 
          What matters to ‘experts’ like Miller, Huntington, Martin Kramer, Daniel Pipes,  
          and Barry Rubin, plus a whole battery of Israeli academics, is to make sure that  
          the ‘threat’ is kept before our eyes, the better to excoriate Islam for its terror,  
          despotism, and violence, while assuring themselves profitable consultancies,  
            frequent television appearances, and book contracts (Said 1997:xxxiv). 
 
Evidence suggests that the media is shaped by journalists and commentators who are 
openly hostile to Islaam in part, “because most American commentators are pro-
Israel” (Mearshiemer and Walt 2006:20).  
 
  
     Many of those who are considered experts in representing Islaam have a tendency 
for incompetent journalism. Judith Miller, a journalist who has covered the Middle 
East and authored several books about Islaam and the Middle East, makes many 
glaring errors in reporting and research. For example, when writing about the Prophet 
ammad, “she does not quote one Muslim source on Mohammed and relies hMu
completely on the dyspeptic debunkings of Western Orientalists; just imagine a book 
published in Europe or the United States on Jesus or Moses that makes no use of a 
single Judaic or Christian authority” (Said 1997:xxxviii).  
 
     When portraying Islaam in the media, there is often blatantly biased reporting to 
depict Muslims as perpetrators of terrorist actions. Often language is carefully 
selected to represent Muslims in all situations as terrorists. In Qana, South Lebanon, 
Israel bombed a United Nations post, which was a civilian shelter, killing over a 
hundred people despite being warned by the UN that it contained civilians and they 
were told to stop the bombing but continued. These actions puzzled some from the 
media as they “‘could not understand why Israel would deliberately hit civilians,’ a 
view which … reflects the general United States media view that whereas Muslim 
terrorists are fully capable of acts of deliberate violence against innocents, Israel, 
which is like us, is not” (Said 1997:xlvi). The current crisis in Lebanon also illustrates 
how Israel in its campaign to destroy Hezbollah has blatant disregard for civilian 
casualties and infrastructure. Unfortunately, most Western media organizations offer 
only light criticism over the plight of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples.  
 
4.7 US Policy and its Effect on Muslims 
 
     One-sided reporting of Islaam and its portrayal as a terrorist religion has important 
policy implications, although it seems difficult to determine whether the media or 
policy or a combination of both, are responsible. For example, the U.S. policy towards 
Israel at the expense of its neighbors has profound effects upon public opinion, and 
the media fosters negative publicity towards Islaam and helps to justify those policies. 
“Thus Israel has appeared as a bastion of Western civilization hewn (with much 
approbation and self-congratulation) out of the Islamic wilderness. Secondly, Israel’s 
security in American eyes has become conveniently interchangeable with fending off 
Islam…” (Said 1997:43). The other implication of biased policy in favor of Israel, and 
  
the demonizing of Islaam, is that it strengthens groups like al-Qaeda. Both Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike feel marginalized by such policies and begin to empathize 
with groups like al-Qaeda even if they disagree with their tactics. “Most recently, the 
Bush Administration’s attempt to transform the region into a community of 
democracies has helped produce a resilient insurgency in Iraq, a sharp rise in world 
oil prices, and terrorist bombings in Madrid, London, and Amman” (Mearshiemer and 
Walt 2006:1). The cause for much of the bias in “…U.S. policy in the region is due 
almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially to the activities of the ‘Israeli 
Lobby’” (Mearshiemer and Walt 2006:1).  
 
     The Israeli Lobby in the U.S. is a powerful one which helps to dictate Middle East 
policy and influence public opinion. “In addition to influencing government policy 
directly, the Lobby strives to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle 
East. It does not want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open 
debate might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently 
provide” (Mearshiemer and Walt 2006:20). This absence of debate seems 
contradictory in a nation which claims to hold democracy so dear that it believes in 
enforcing its policies of pro-democratization upon other nations. This demonstrates 
the overall power such lobbies hold in American politics. “Accordingly, pro-Israel 
organizations work hard to influence the media, think tanks, and academia, because 
these institutions are critical in shaping popular opinion” (Mearshiemer and Walt 
2006:20). The influence of the Israeli lobby has an enormous impact upon relations 
between the United States and Muslim states. Moreover, the general perception of 
Muslims world wide is that the United States is biased and anti-Muslim in its policies.    
In addition, both Israel and the U.S. claim common allies and foes, and this alliance is 
often perceived as a threat against Islaam and Muslims.  
 
          Beginning in the 1990’s, and especially after 9/11, U.S. support for Israel has  
          been justified by the claim that both states are threatened by terrorist groups  
          originating in the Arab or Islamic world….This rationale implies that  
          Washington should give Israel a free hand in dealing with the Palestinians and  
          not press Israel to make concessions until all Palestinians terrorists are  
          imprisoned or dead (Mearshiemer and Walt 2006:4).  
 
This close relationship between Israel and the United States actually fosters terrorism. 
Muslim opinion overwhelmingly views United States policy and interests as unified 
  
with that of Israel. This serves to bolster support for those voices in the Muslim 
community that call for a violent solution to the ills of the Muslim community, such 
as Zarqaawee and Bin Laaden.  
 
          There is no question, for example, that many al Qaeda leaders, including bin  
          Laden, are motivated by Israel’s presence in Jerusalem and the plight of the  
          Palestinians. According to the U.S 9/11 Commission, bin Laden explicitly  
          sought to punish the United States for its policies in the Middle East, including  
          its support for Israel, and he even tried to time the attacks to highlight this  
          issue (Mearshiemer and Walt 2006:5).  
 
The policies of the United States are reflective of the make up of the administration of 
“fervently pro-Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. 
Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser. As we 
shall see, these officials consistently pushed for policies favored by Israel and backed 
by organizations in the Lobby” (Mearshiemer and Walt 2006:20). Even the war on 
Iraq seems in part as a response to Israeli pressure upon the U.S. from its domestic 
lobby. “Pressure from Israel and the Lobby was not the only factor behind the U.S. 
decision to attack Iraq in March 2003, but it was a critical element” (Mearshiemer and 
Walt 2006:30). United States policy and its close relations with Israel serve to alienate 
Muslims in general and strengthen and legitimize the cause of the Jihaadee groups. 
Furthermore, in the case of the invasion of Iraq, it has become a common perception 
that oil and neo-colonialism were both contributing factors for the invasion. Mamdani 
suggests, “The United States seeks to replace defiant regimes and intimidate others, 
imposing a new regional order by creating pro-American regimes, first in Iraq, and 
then in an apartheid-style Bantustan like state of Palestine, presenting regime change 
as a strategy for ‘democratization’” (Mamdani 2005:202). 
     
     The justifications for U.S. policy toward Israel are many, but the one excuse for 
this relationship that has proven facetious is the moral argument. This only serves to 
further enrage the Muslim masses and justify the arguments of ideologues like Bin 
Laaden. The U.S  
 
          portrays Israel as a country that has sought peace at every turn and     
          showed restraint even when provoked. The Arabs, by contrast, are said to have   
         acted with great wickedness. This narrative-which is endlessly repeated by  
          Israeli leaders and American apologists such as Alan Dershowitz-is yet another  
         myth. In terms of actual behaviors, Israel’s conduct is not morally 
  
          distinguishable from the actions of its opponents (Mearshiemer and Walt  
          2006:11). 268
      U.S. policy is not just considered favorable towards Israel, but it also appears to 
defy any aspirations of Muslim statehood. The most recent example of U.S. policy 
bias is the current conflict taking place in Somalia. There is a growing perception 
amongst Muslims worldwide that Somalia which has been engaged in civil war and 
lawlessness since 1991 was beginning to show signs of stability until recent 
intervention by Ethiopia with tacit U.S. support. The U.S and Ethiopia seem equally 
opposed to Muslim statehood in the region and the rise of the Islaamic Courts in 
Somalia appears to threaten their interests. The U.S claims that the Islaamic Courts 
are led by al-Qaeda members which under the auspices of the ‘War on Terrorism’ 
legitimize Ethiopia’s intervention into Somalia. John Prendergast, a former U.S. state 
department official, claims that “tacit U.S. support for Ethiopia’s incursion was 
‘incalculably strengthened’ by the Courts’ appeal to Somali nationalism…” (Deyoung 
2006:2). This is yet another blow to U.S. Muslim relations and further tarnishes the 
image of America. The result of such policies appears to legitimize the Islaamic 
Courts and their cause and further marginalize moderate Muslim voices in the greater 
Muslim community, thus reinforcing the ranks of extremists.
 
 
In addition, the founding of the state of Israel was at the expense of the Palestinians 
and was based upon a policy of terror; and for the U.S. to deny this and continue its 
policies which discriminate against Muslim states only further serves terrorists’ 
agendas and aspirations. “Finally, we should not forget that the Zionists used 
terrorism when they were in a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their own 
state. Between 1944 and 1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist bombings 
to drive the British from Palestine, and took the lives of many innocent civilians along 
the way” (Mearshiemer and Walt 2006:13). The argument that Israel is a pacifist state 
seeking to defend itself falls apart when analyzing Israeli conduct towards its 
adversaries in Palestine and Lebanon.  
      
269
 
     
 
                                                 
268 “This same study also reveals that the creation of Israel in 1947-48 involved explicit acts of ethnic 
cleansing, including executions, massacres, and rapes by Jews” (Mearshiemer and Walt 2006:12). 
 269 The Islaamic Courts in Somalia are an outgrowth of Jamaa’a al-Itihaad al-Islaamee and other 
groups and Ethiopia and the U.S. both label them as a terrorist organization.  
  
4.8 Misconceptions about Suicide Bombings  
      
     As was previously mentioned, extremists sometimes use suicide bombings as a 
political weapon and often these tactics are associated with Islaam and Muslims. 
However, it is important to clear up the myths associated with Islaam with factual 
evidence. Although groups like al-Qaeda are increasingly using suicide bombings as a 
tactic, Robert Pape, a professor from the University of Chicago, suggests it is a false 
presumption to associate Islaam with these activities, and this has also been made 
clear in the section on Islaam’s position regarding suicide bombings. “After studying 
315 suicide attacks from 1981-2004, the University of Chicago political science 
professor concludes that suicide bombers' actions stem from logical military 
strategies, not their religion -- and especially not Islam” (Schuster 2005:4). 
Unfortunately, due to media bias Islaam is often characterized as being responsible 
for these acts of violence and terror. “While American news-watchers may hear more 
about Israel and Iraq, Pape calls the Tamil Tigers the leading purveyors of suicide 
attacks over the last two decades -- until now. An adamantly secular group with 
Hindu roots, the Tamil Tigers are engaged in a struggle for independence and power 
with the Sri Lankan government” (Schuster 2005:4). There is very little evidence to 
suggest that Islaam is responsible for terrorist actions, just as Christianity, Hinduism 
and Judaism are not responsible directly for the actions of their adherents. In general, 
suicide bombers prefer this tactic because it instills fear in their opponents, the attacks 
are extremely effective in inflicting casualties at a relatively low cost, and it offers 
media exposure to their cause. Evidence suggests that "What nearly all suicide 
terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel 
modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists 
consider to be their homeland" (Schuster 2005:4). In the case of Bin Laaden that 
means expelling the U.S. from Saudi Arabia, and for Zarqaawee it means driving 
them out of Iraq. Karzai suggests: 
           
          The greatest impact of Al-Qaeda has been to inspire other groups to adopt their  
          modus operandi. Besides the massive proliferation of the global Jihadi ideology  
          to groups with otherwise local grievances, Al-Qaeda's tactical influence has  
          also manifested itself in the global escalation in suicide bombings; in fact out of  
          more than 700 suicide bombings carried out in history, over 70 percent have  
          taken place since 9/11 (Karzai 2007:36). 
 
  
In addition to exporting their ideology, al-Qaeda also helps to proliferate a tactic 
already known to many fringe groups, both religious and secular, which seems more 
preferred for its effectiveness than for its religious legitimacy. This further serves to 
bolster juergensmeyer's theory that religious violence and movements are particular to 
each moment in history and current socio-political events, although the perpetrators of 
violence usually claim a precedent for their actions in the past (Juergensmeyer 
2003:6).  However, as this research shows the neo-Takfeerees share some of the traits 
and creed of the original Khawaarij with an even greater propensity for violence than 
the original sect. The above research offers insight into the causes of terror, its 
motivations, and the misconception that is commonly held by the Western media, 
policy makers, and public: Islaam is responsible for terrorism.270
                                                 
270 Although many of the extremist ideologues surveyed in this research portray Islaam as a violent 
faith and highly political, this is not unique to Islaamic sectarianism as Hoffman states, “All terrorists, 
however, have one trait in common: they live in the future, live for that distant … point in time when 
they will assuredly triumph over their enemies and attain the ultimate realization of their political 
destiny” (Hoffman 1998:169). 
  
It seems they were correct in their assumption that the term Jihaadee is controversial 
and somewhat value laden. Contemporary Salafees take exception to that word and 
disassociate themselves from it in the strongest terms. It was previously mentioned in 
this study that the term Jihaadee refers to those Muslims that hold jihaad to be the 
highest priority with disregard for its principles and conditions, and this is according 
to contemporary Salafee literature.
 
   
4.9 Western Think Tanks and Jihaadees 
 
     Another entity which seems to taint the image of Islaam is the role of Western 
based think tanks in defining the discourse around Islaamic extremism. Many think 
tanks and western analysts, although providing useful information, tend to give 
inaccurate classifications and definitions, from an outsider's perspective, which 
further serves to distort the image of Islaam. Terms like Jihaadees, Salafees and 
Wahhaabees can be particularly problematic when defining and making 
classifications. McCants, Brachman, and Felter state: 
 
          We recognize that the use of “Jihadi” to designate Salafis of a militant stripe is  
          controversial. Some analysts feel that it cedes too much to militant Salafis to  
          ratify their use of the term-they call their movement al-haraka al-jihadiyyah  
          (“the Jihadi Movement”)-since Jihad has positive connotations in Islam. First, it  
          has wide currency in the Western counterterrorism community. Second, the  
          proposed alternatives are either too imprecise or polemically charged to be  
          analytically useful. Third, “Jihadism” indicates the centrality of religious  
          warfare in the militant Salafi worldview. Fourth, using the label makes Jihadis  
          accountable for giving the term a bad name and for not living up to the high  
          standard of conduct associated with jihad. Finally, the term is used in Arab  
          media and was coined by a devout Saudi Muslim who is hostile to the ideology,  
          so it is not a Western neologism (McCants, Brachman, and Felter 2006:5).  
271
This analysis is not consistent with the evidences presented in this research. One of 
the main premises of this dissertation is that the Khawaarij sect and contemporary 
groups differ in important aspects of creed when compared to the orthodox scholars. 
Throughout this research contemporary Salafee sources were used to highlight those 
inherent differences between Takfeeree/Jihaadee groups, classical scholars and 
 Jihaad of the Takfeeree Jihaadee groups is seen 
as illegitimate by contemporary Salafee scholars. Al-Suhaymee states, “If they were 
really on the correct Salafee methodology then they would not exhibit malice towards 
those who disagree with their creed in their books like what has been cited….And 
how many claim to be so-called Salafee Jihaadee movements and in reality they are 
not Salafee or even Jihaadee, but rather Takfeeree, Khaarajee,  Tadmeerees (killers)” 
(al-Suhaymee 2004:132). This quote displays the contempt contemporary Salafees 
have for Jihaadees and the negative connotation it has as a term. Therefore, as this 
research asserts it does not appear to be accurate to associate Jihaadees with Salafees 
as they differ in important aspects of their creed. This illustrates the importance of 
correct classification in Islaam as many sects that differed slightly in aspects of creed 
were considered heretical by classical orthodox scholars (al-Shahrastaanee 1984:5-8). 
Still other analysts classify the contemporary jihaadee groups as offshoots of the 
Salafee movement. Wicktorowicz claims: 
 
          The Salafi movement (often referred to as the Wahhabis) includes such diverse      
          figures as Osama bin Laden and the Muftee of Saudi Arabia and reflects a      
          broad array of positions regarding issues related to politics and violence. This     
          article explains the sources of unity that connect violent extremists with  
          nonviolent puritans. Although Salafis share a common religious creed, they  
          differ over their assessment of contemporary problems and thus how this creed  
          should be applied. Differences over contextual interpretation have produced  
          three major Salafi factions: purists, politicos, and jihadis (Wiktorowicz  
          2005:207). 
 
                                                 
271 Al-Fawzaan states, “Unfortunately in our times there is a lot of controversy around this major issue. 
People who have no understanding or knowledge speak about jihaad and they tend to be either fervent 
extremists or weak and excessively liberal” (al-Fawzaan 2005:79). 
  
contemporary Salafee scholars, with the latter seeming to hold a similar creed and 
methodology to the classicists. In contrast, Wiktorowicz believes: 
 
          The different contextual readings have produced three major factions in the  
          community: the purists, the politicos, and the jihadis. The purists emphasize a  
          focus on nonviolent methods of propagation, purification, and education. They  
          view politics as a diversion that encourages deviancy. Politicos, in contrast,  
          emphasize application of the Salafi creed to the political arena, which they  
          view as particularly important because it dramatically impacts social justice and  
          the right of God alone to legislate. Jihadis take a more militant position and  
          argue that the current context calls for violence and revolution. All three    
          factions share a common creed but offer different explanations of the  
          contemporary world and its concomitant problems and thus propose different  
          solutions. The splits are about contextual analysis, not belief (Wiktorowicz  
          2005:208). 
 
Wiktorowicz’s scrutiny of the Salafee movement offers a broad classification that can 
help define the wide-ranging trends in contemporary Islaamic thought; however it is a 
serious flaw to group those contemporary groups under the banner of the Salafee 
creed.272
 In addition, Salafees tend to distance themselves from politics and as this dissertation 
asserts, contemporary political movements tend to have more in common with the 
Khawaarij view regarding leadership, rebellion, and takfeer, especially the post 
Qutbists. All of these differences are not simply variations in approach and 
 For example, Salafees would argue that Jihaadees distort the concept of 
Islaamic jihaad, and even classicists like Ibn Taymeeya described those who deviate 
in their concept of jihaad as sinful and unorthodox which shows that this issue is both 
a matter of jurisprudence and creed. He stated, 
 
          The Qur’aan and the Sunna are filled with the command to fight jihaad and its  
          benefits. However, it is a must to understand the legislated jihaad that Allah  
          and His Messenger commanded from the heretical jihaad that the misguided  
          people fight in obedience to the devil, and they think they are fighting in  
          obedience to al-Rahmaan…like the Khawaarij who fight the people of Islaam  
          (Ibn Taymeeya 1997a:473-474). 
 
                                                 
272 Even Wiktorowicz concedes that the Salafee movement in Saudi Arabia began to fragment with the 
influx of members of the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1970’s bringing with them “a more 
politically oriented agenda and awareness to the predominantly purist Saudi context. They had a long 
history of political engagement and enjoyed a sophisticated understanding of political events, 
international affairs, and the world outside of Saudi Arabia” (2005:222). It is these very trends that 
helped to produce a radicalization of the Salafee movement and a departure from a once coherent creed 
and methodology, thus producing thinkers and groups that no longer could consider themselves Salafee 
as their ideas and concepts began to coincide more with the Qutbist methodology (al-Suhaymee 
2004:210). 
  
methodology, but a divergence in belief. This seems to be the most accurate 
assessment of these classifications as the books of jurisprudence and creed are both 
filled with the issues of jihaad, recognizing the leadership, and takfeer.273
 Delong-Bas makes a similar analysis when she states, “Bin Laden’s vision of global 
jihad is rooted in the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, and 
Sayyid Qutb” (2004:273). She also claims that contemporary extremists gained their 
concept of takfeer, al-hakameeya, and jihaad as a revolutionary struggle from Ibn 
Taymeeya along with Qutb (Delong-Bas 2004:242-243). Both Salafees and Jihaadee/ 
Takfeeree groups use classical sources to justify their approach in understanding 
Islaam, however interpretation is radically different in key issues of creed. “The most 
important points they differ over are who has the right to call for jihad, who can 
excommunicate Muslims, and whether violent revolt against a Muslim ruler is 
legitimate. Jihadi ideologues are most threatened by prominent Wahhabi scholars 
since they both draw their legitimacy from the same tradition and have the same core 
religious constituency” (McCants, Brachman, and Felter 2006:8). This is a fairly 
accurate assessment; however Jihaadee groups often disregard important religious 
 
  
     Some define Salafees as, “Sunni Muslims who want to establish and govern 
Islamic states based solely on the Qur’an and the example of the Prophet as 
understood by the first generations of Muslims close to Muhammad” (McCants, 
Brachman, and Felter 2006:6). This is an accurate description as the evidence 
suggests they share a common creed with orthodox classical scholars and cite them as 
their main sources for understanding Islaam; however Jihaadees and Takfeerees also 
cite the same sources. 
 
          Not surprisingly, the most influential medieval Muslim authors are largely  
          scholars known for their conservative and uncompromising interpretations of  
          Islamic law and theology. Most of these scholars are also highly influential  
          among mainstream Salafis, which reinforces the notion that the Jihadi  
          Movement is a violent subset of the broader Salafi Movement (largely  
          indistinguishable today from Wahhabism) (McCants, Brachman, and Felter  
          2006:7).   
 
                                                 
273  Some of the classical books in creed that detail these issues are (al-Barbaharee 1997), (al-Qaaree 
1997), and among the books of jurisprudence (al-Shaafi’ee 2005), (al-Nawawee 2002). 
  
principles established by classical scholars regarding jihaad or takfeer. 274
1) Jihaadee Takfeerees tend to make takfeer based upon unorthodox criterions 
and principles, for example they accuse all the leaders of apostasy without 
exception, and
 McCants, 
Brachman, and Felter go on to state: 
 
          Finally, are the Jihadis, the holy warriors and today’s most prominent  
          terrorists, whose movement is part of the larger Salafi Movement (but note that   
          most Salafis are not Jihadis). Since Jihadi thinkers draw their legitimacy from  
          the same tradition as Salafis, Salafi scholars-particularly Saudi clerics-are best  
          positioned to discredit the movement amongst other Salafis (McCants,  
          Brachman, and Felter 2006:6).  
 
This statement seems problematic due to its overgeneralization. This research shows 
that although Salafees and Jihaadees tend to refer to classical scholars they are quite 
distinct in essential aspects of creed which can be summarized as follows: 
 
275
2) encourage and perpetuate violence: refer to the case of al-Qaeda, Bin Laaden 
and Zarqaawee,  
 
3) declare jihaad based upon an unorthodox methodology and tend to see it as a 
continuous revolutionary struggle for both the individual and groups, 
4) use the secret bai’a and separate themselves from the general Muslim 
community, while encouraging rebellion against Muslim rulers, 
5) make takfeer and are highly critical of the scholars who do not share their 
world view, 
6) cannot be classified as rebels but rather Takfeeree/Jihaadee as they share 
similarities; the principles, methodology and creed of the Khawaarij, and276
                                                 
274  This researcher asked Saudi cleric Shaikh Sa’eed al-‘Amr what the difference was between 
Salafees and Takfeerees when they both quote the same sources? He replied, “No doubt the heretics, as 
Ibn Taymeeya said, use evidences which in reality are against them, due to their understanding of the 
texts and misusing them as proofs for their arguments when really they refute them. The Khawaarij 
used the Qur’aan and at the same time spilled Muslim blood, so they are not the first to use the Qur’aan 
and Sunna and statements of the Salaf al-Saalih; however they use the evidences outside of their 
context” (al-‘Amr 2007).  
275 The original Khawaarij and the Takfeeree ideologues both are quick in making takfeer and 
judgments upon other Muslims without establishing the proof upon them.  
276  Most of these groups “evolved from Sayyid Qutb, whose creed, methodology and politics 
developed from the Khawaarij, the Raafida, Mu'tazila and Jahmeeya, especially in the issue of takfeer 
based upon ignorance and oppression. Therefore, all societies to him were ignorant guilty of extreme 
apostasy” (al-Madkhalee 2007:104).  
  
7) the end result of their dawa (propagation) usually results in loss of life and 
property of both Muslims and non-Muslims (McCants, Brachman, and Felter 
2006:10). 
 
8) They exhibit extremism in their statements, actions and ideology (refer to 
chapter three post-Mawdoodee thinkers).   
     9) They tend to place a major emphasis on political issues rather than matters  
           central to the religion.277
    Secularists, the Western media, and policy makers all have a role in perpetuating 
negative stereotypes about Islaam and Muslims. The portrayal of Islaam as a terrorist 
religion and United States foreign policy play a huge role in alienating Muslims 
worldwide, creating an environment of mutual distrust and anger, which creates the 
conditions for extremist ideologues to rise.
 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
278
                                                 
277  “Then came the political groups in our time, whose creed and methodology were effected by these 
groups. Therefore nothing became more important to them than politics, and they did not regard 
rectification of the beliefs and knowledge of the community as being important, so they do not think 
about returning the community back to the Qur’aan and Sunna with the understanding of the Salaf in 
every aspect of the religion” (al-Madkhalee 2007:104-105). 
278 Gerges argues that the role of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East must be rethought and reshaped 
to address the needs of those who are marginalized in those societies to further isolate al-Qaeda and 
their ideology. Gerges states, “A strategy of institutional partnership with Muslim civil society requires 
more than redressing foreign policy; there is an urgent need to address socioeconomic grievances and 
respond to the vacuum of legitimate authority in the region” (Gerges 2005:275). Ultimately, Gerges 
concludes that the U.S could better combat extremists by encouraging its Arab allies to power share in 
their countries and encourage a larger middleclass to combat marginalization of huge groups in their 
societies which may be considered a breeding ground for extremism. These changes ultimately must 
come from Arab and Muslim societies themselves; however it is noteworthy that with the impending 
change in US presidency there is a possibility of strengthening US/Muslim relations but this depends 
upon whether US policy will move from intervention to a less aggressive policy particularly with 
regards to Muslim states.     
  
Chapter Five 
Conclusions and Observations 
 
5.1 Conclusions and Observations 
 
     This dissertation shows the relationship between the early Khawaarij sect and 
modern day extremists who attribute their actions with Islaam. The creed of the 
Khawaarij sect has a strong impact on modern day Takfeeree and Jihaadee 
extremists, and the terrorist actions they advocate under the guise of jihaad. The 
actions of many of these groups and ideologues are un-Islaamic by nature, and 
unfortunately are exploited by the media to reinforce the negative image of Islaam. 
However, it is important to consider the motivations for terror and violence as these 
groups do not commit these actions without a purpose or simply due to their 
ideological ties to the Khawaarij; but rather they are often influenced by political 
events and their aspirations to effect change as this dissertation shows. Some of the 
events that contributed to the rise in radicalism in the Muslim world are the fall of the 
Islaamic caliphate, increase in secularist thought as a challenge to traditionalist 
expressions of Islaam, regime repression, and an increasing non-Muslim presence in 
Muslim lands along with U.S. aspirations and intervention in Muslim affairs. 
However, these historical and political factors do not completely account for the 
increase in Muslim extremism.  
 
     In chapter one the original Khawaarij sect was analyzed along with essential 
statements of the classical scholars traditions and  deethaHelements of their creed. 
show that the Khawaarij are an Islaamic sect that exhibits traits of extremism in 
worship and creed. Due to ignorance, blind following their leaders, and 
misinterpretation of Qur’aanic verses the Khawaarij sect deviated from the orthodox 
creed resulting in the ideology of takfeer, rebellion against Muslim rulership, and 
excommunicating themselves from Muslim society. All of the traits analyzed in this 
section show that there is a direct relationship between the original Khawaarij sect 
and the Takfeeree groups scrutinized in chapter three; because both hold similar 
beliefs and exhibit comparable behavior with the potential for violence.   
 
  
     Chapter two introduces and contrasts the concepts and principles of the orthodox 
creed with that of the Khawaarij. Key elements of the orthodox creed are looked at to 
show the inherent contradictions in the Khawaarij methodology and creed. For 
example, the orthodox creed regards the Prophet’s companions with reverence 
whereas the Khawaarij reviled them because they perceived them as having 
shortcomings in understanding the religion. A noteworthy point is that the Khawaarij 
regarded themselves as the standard of proper conduct, while the orthodox scholars 
rely upon the evidence presented in the religious texts in accordance with the 
 , in. Alsoammadhhe Prophet Muof the companions of tunderstanding and practices 
this chapter the principles of takfeer were introduced and explored showing the 
complexity of this important creed. In this section the researcher attempted to contrast 
the Khawaarij perception of takfeer, with that of the classical scholars. The 
Khawaarij believed in making takfeer of their enemies and those who committed 
major sins and they based their judgments on the apparent meanings of selected 
n ammad Ibhof the creed of Mu ic verses. Chapter two ends with a synopsisQur’aan
‘Abd al-Wahhaab, who is considered by some contemporary scholars as a revivalist 
of the religion whose creed and methodology conform to the orthodox one.  
 
     Chapter three discusses the factors that contribute to the rise in extremist thought. 
This chapter shows that ideology alone does not account for the deviance in creed and  
 
          …there remain political injustices that Western governments and pro-Western    
          regimes in Muslim countries could and should have put right. First among those  
          wrongs is the failure to support the creation of a viable state of Palestine. The  
          ill-conceived invasion of Iraq…is another case in point. By allowing such  
          grievances to continue, the West has done Islamist fundamentalism a huge and  
          continuing favour. It has allowed the extremists to turn to the Muslim umma  
          and say, ‘We told you so! Only we can help you. Together we can turn back the  
          secular, Western tide and return to a glorious past’ (Allen 2006:297). 
 
 In the eyes of some Muslims, these 
ideologues and groups such as al-Qaeda gain legitimacy as the only force active in 
articulating their frustrations and fighting perceived tyranny.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Also this chapter analyzes various contemporary ideologues by comparing their creed 
with that of the Salafee one. Although several factors were looked at to determine 
whether the various thinkers were Khawaarij-like, or not, the primary variables were 
their concepts of takfeer, jihaad, and their recognition of Muslim leadership. A 
significant conclusion derived at by analyzing these ideologues was that they differed 
in their levels of extremism and conceptualization of political struggle, but at the same 
  
time they proved to be intricately linked by creed especially in regards to their notions 
of jihaad and takfeer.   
 
     Finally, chapter four gives insight into how Western media, secularists, U.S. 
government and think tanks all play a significant role in creating an image of Islaam 
as a terrorist religion, marginalizing Muslims and fueling extremism. It shows how 
secularist dogma can have a more profound impact on Muslims than the Takfeeree 
ideology. 
  
5.2 Areas for Further Study 
 
     The purpose of this study was to critically analyze, compare and contrast the 
similarities and differences between various contemporary Islaamic thinkers and that 
of the Khawaarij. This dissertation offers the reader a glimpse into why some modern 
day Islaamic movements use terror as a means of political expression. However it 
does not explore the socio-economic background of these individuals who make up 
these movements, which may offer additional insight as to why individuals choose to 
join these groups. Another area of interest that could be investigated is possible policy 
recommendations for Muslim governments to implement in order to curtail Takfeeree 
ideology and what role if any, would be appropriate for non-Muslim governments to 
play.279
                                                 
279 "Emasculation of extremist ideologies requires serious and systematic redress of its root causes---
poverty, injustice, authoritarianism, repression, and despair---on a global level" (Delong-Bas 2004:289). 
McCants, Brachman, and Felter suggest that Western governments can encourage Salafees to renounce 
Jihaadists, as well as propagate the negative stereotypes and harm these groups cause in Muslim 
societies amongst Muslims to discredit these groups. However, a potential problem is that if Salafees 
are seen as cooperating with the West it could be damaging to the movement and give credibility to 
Jihaadist and those suspicious of the movement in the greater Muslim community (McCants,  
Brachman, and Felter 2006:10-11).  
   
  
unites research with social action to address the underlying problems associated with 
extremist thought and terrorism.     
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